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HARMONISM
CONSCIOUS ÉVOLUTION

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HARMONISM

AND

CONSCIOUS EVOLUTION

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STUDIES, ATHENS

Untwisting all the chains that tie
The hidden soul of harmony.

MILTON: *L'Allegro*.

Regnum Optimi.

"Progress must be rationally imaginative;
neither fatalistic nor fantastic."

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

1922.

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TO
F. E. W.

P R E F A C E

It has been my ambition and my hope, in the writing of this book, that it should prove to be intelligible to all those general readers who, without being specialists in philosophy, are interested in the problems of life and thought, and are conversant with our ordinary English language. I have therefore avoided, as far as possible, all technicalities and technical terms. As I have maintained, especially in the Second Part of this book when dealing with Conscious Evolution, I deem it essential to the advance of human knowledge that each period should clearly establish in its own contemporary language, most fully expressive of the mentality of each age, the highest state of knowledge to which it has attained; and that it therefore is essential that such thought be not transferred to, or translated into, the terminology of previous ages possessing their own mentality and differing from that of later ages. I have therefore also avoided putting my own thoughts into the language of earlier or contemporary thinkers, who have viewed the whole problem or parts of it from different points of view, in different facets of the same body of truth.

The main lines of this inquiry were formulated in my mind over forty-six years ago, when, after continuing my academic studies in America, at Heidelberg for three years under Kuno Fischer and Professor Wundt (following the latter to his psycho-physical laboratory at Leipzig in 1876), I, was engaged in writing a dissertation on the relation between Kant and Hume.

After settling in London in the autumn of that year,

while occupied with my dissertation, I was led further afield into an inquiry into the history of Scepticism. It then became clear to me that the only escape from Scepticism lay in the direction of æsthetics and its fundamental principles in life and mind, and I decided to enlarge and deepen my studies on the historical side of æsthetics in the history of Art, more especially Greek Art, which had formed a part of my studies and my examination for the Doctorate at Heidelberg. By a singular coincidence I was invited to give a course of lectures on "The History of Greek Sculpture," by the Greek Department of King's College, London, in the Elgin Room at the British Museum in June 1878, and after further archæological studies in Italy and Greece in that year and the next I was appointed Lecturer and then Reader in Classical Archæology at Cambridge in 1880. From that time onward, Greek Art and Archæology, leading on to the general History and Theory of Art, became the centre of my academic work and duties.

But during all these years, partly in my writings on various subjects, as well as in my lectures in the University and elsewhere, some of the leading ideas of the Philosophy of Harmonism have been touched upon. It was not until 1915, during the Great War, that, in dealing with ethical and political problems in my book *Aristodemocracy*, etc.,¹ I anticipated the publication of some aspects of the main theory. In the Preface of the second American edition of that book² occurs the following passage: "The sketch for the reconstruction of civilised morals here given is only part of a general philosophical system—the ethical and political part—of which again it only forms the prolegomena. The final and complete

¹ *Aristodemocracy—from the Great War back to Moses, Christ, and Plato* (John Murray, 1916-20).

² p. xi.

elaboration of the system, to which I gave the title 'Harmonism,' I have reserved for the closing years of my life. For, though the essential plan of this work was already drawn up and established as early as 1876, the professional conditions of my life since those early days necessarily diverted me from this task."

Realising the same urgency for the early publication of the whole system in its unity and continuity in the immediate present, I gave a course of lectures on "Prolegomena to the Philosophy of Harmonism" in the University of Cambridge during the autumn and winter of 1920-1. A considerable part of the subject was thus given in a different form in those lectures.

But there exists, finally, a still more personal motive for the publication of this book at the present moment, and in its present form. During all these years, while constantly made aware, by many among those with whom I came into intimate contact, that they were struggling under the serious disadvantage of not possessing a complete and convincing theory of life and mind which could ultimately direct them in thought and action; and give to them the inestimable blessing of peace of mind and freedom from distressing doubt, on the other hand I found in myself that this philosophy of Harmonism freed me from such disconcerting and depressing doubt, and enabled me to think and act with peace and directness, and with the underlying confidence of complete reconciliation and harmony between the immediate and ultimate aims of life and thought. The Real and the Ideal; the Practical and the Theoretical, the Useful and the Good, Truth and Beauty, self-interests and the claims of others, our actual life and the life of religious aspiration, were not severed in irreconcilable conflict, but were harmonised into peaceful unity, full of vitality and hope. Moreover, as the

conviction which moved me at the beginning of the war to anticipate the publication of a special portion of the system, so urgently required during that tragic period, was the need of a reconstitution of ethics and religion, the inadequacy and insincerity of which in those days and for many years before were ultimately accountable for the advent of the great world-catastrophe; so now I feel convinced that the same need for a reconstruction of our fundamental views of life and mind is similarly, and even more urgently, pressing with regard to every aspect of individual and collective life. This applies not only to our ethical and religious outlook, but to the problem of reconciling Capital and Labour, the modification of democracy, if it is to survive, of the State and international relationships, and many other problems of modern life and thought.

What is needed is a new and convincing outlook upon the whole of modern life and thought, and a reform of our ethics, leading to the reform of religion. We must bring before the eyes of modern man the true, clear, and adequate ideal of the perfect man and the perfect life dependent upon our best thought and our most complete realisation of what is best in the actual life and in the actual mind of man, as it has been evolved through ages, and out of the full realisation of which we can look forward to the future and fashion it in harmony with our conception of the Best.

The first, or general, part of the book deals with the origin and dominance of the æsthetic, or harmonistic, instinct and principle in the ordinary life of man, and traces its origin back to the earliest organic life in the animal and even in the plant world. The second or special part applies Harmonism to the higher systematic knowledge of man in the various departments of Science, Art, Pragmatics, Ethics,

Politics, and Religion, and develops the principle of Conscious Evolution in the life of reasoning beings, individual and collective.

I have added in an appendix a reprint of a lecture on "The Future of the League of Nations," given at the University of Cambridge in August 1920, and an article on "America and the League of Nations" from the *Fortnightly Review* of March 1921, as well as two French articles, the one on "Respublica Litterarum," in *Les Lettres* of April 1920, the other on "La Société des Nations contre l'Anarchie Nationale et Internationale," with a short introduction by the late M. Émile Routroux, in *La Renaissance Politique*, April 24, 1920, because, having published my previous writings on that subject from 1899 onwards in a recent book on *The English-speaking Brotherhood and the League of Nations*,¹ I desire to supplement what I have there said by these recent contributions to that all-important subject.

I must again—as on several previous occasions—express my sincere thanks to my friend and colleague, Prof. J. B. Bury, for revising the manuscript and making numerous important corrections and valuable suggestions. As a leading historian, thinker, and scholar, as well as a sympathetic friend of long standing, I have attached the greatest weight to his opinion. My wife has again rendered me valuable help, and again my friend Sir George Leveson Gower has revised the proofs and has offered pertinent criticism. Finally, I must thank Mr. Harold B. Hart and Miss Elsie Day for much clerical assistance, under the exceptionally difficult conditions of the writing and printing of this book.

THE AUTHOR.

NEWTON HALL,
NEWTON, CAMBRIDGE.

• April 1922.

¹ Cambridge University Press, 1919.

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PART I
GENERAL

CHAPTER I

THE ÆSTHETIC INSTINCT AND FACULTY

THE aim of all works of art is to respond to the æsthetic instinct of man and to produce æsthetic pleasure. In so far æsthetics is clearly distinguishable from logic, epistemology, or systematised knowledge in science, ethics, pragmatics, and religion. I may say here that, as we proceed (above all in Part II) we shall establish more clearly the correlation of these departments of human knowledge to one another, and more especially their relation to æsthetics. In giving this summary definition of art I have not defined either the term æsthetics itself or the term instinct, and still less the term pleasure. I may also warn the reader that, at the present stage of our inquiry, we are not concerned when we use the common and complex term "pleasure" with qualifying our conception of æsthetics under the general heading of a hedonistic theory of life and thought or anything of the kind. As regards the term æsthetics, in contradistinction to the other departments of thought, its distinguishing feature is that in all objects with which it is concerned the form is essential to the matter. In this, by the way, we have been anticipated by Aristotle. In every work of art or in every æsthetic attitude of mind towards the objects perceived or reflected upon, the form in which the subject-matter of perception or

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feeling or thought presents itself is essentially and indissolubly bound up with the matter ; while in all other departments of mental processes the subject-matter is essential, and we can always conceive it as capable of being apprehended in some different form as a vehicle of perception, feeling, or reflection. In æsthetic perception, feeling, or reflection, though the form may not be 'the exclusive element of stimulation in all processes, it always remains the essential and central factor in the determination of these perceptions, as well as feelings and reflections.

Moreover, this faculty of the human mind, of the human senses—in fact, of the whole human organism—is *primary* (not secondary) and elemental, in every respect equivalent to the other faculties which underlie perception of outer objects and produce knowledge, thought, truth, and science ; or which contribute to self-preservation in providing for the physical interests of life, to what we call utility or, in social and political life, concerns the desirable relation of man to 'his fellow-men—what is good for him as well as for human society—in ethics ; or even, finally, in his relation to the supernatural powers and to his strivings to satisfy his religious instincts and aspirations. We may even find as we proceed that (to use the terminology of Kant as he applies it to Practical Reason) there is a *Primacy* inherent in the æsthetic instinct which may ultimately lead or refer the satisfaction and development of all these other instincts and aims back to the æsthetic instinct as the primary element out of which the others are evolved.

I am fully aware that this main thesis of the Philosophy of Harmonism may, in this unqualified statement, appear to many readers in the light of a paradox. • *De gustibus non est disputandum* is uni-

versally accepted as so unquestionably true, that it is admitted as one of the current commonplaces, if not truisms. It is commonly believed that all æsthetic perceptions and preferences—all that is related to art and taste—are essentially subjective and personal, compared with those *perceptions* and thoughts based upon truth and capable of logical or scientific proof, or with those judgments concerning utility or the ethically good which are all supposed to be objective and impersonal in character. But I hope to show that æsthetic perceptions, emotions, and principles are objective in character, and that they are so primary and so elemental in the evolution and the activity of the human mind that, ultimately, Truth, Utility, and Goodness must be referred back to them.

Now, the harmonious state of sentience and intellect which the satisfaction of the æsthetic instinct produces in man is pleasurable, not only in so far as the satisfaction of any instinct or craving is pleasurable, but because the emotion resulting from form is determined purely by the perceptive emotional or reflective activity itself, and is not determined or absorbed by any further aim inherent in the object perceived. For this reason the objects of æsthetics have been called "contemplative" (*anschauend*), "theoretic," "disinterested," corresponding to the attitude of play, and not of work or effort.

The work of art, therefore, has as its originaive aim the production of æsthetic pleasure. Its object is not to establish or promote truth or utility, or goodness, or holiness. We find ourselves thus on the verge of the endless discussion concerning the relation of æsthetics to ethics, and science and religion, on which so much has been written, but which it would be confusing, as well as premature, to enter upon in

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any detail at the present stage of our inquiry. For these relationships, both as regards similarities and differences, will become abundantly clear as we proceed.

The mistake generally made in such discussions arises out of an unduly narrow conception of æsthetics as dealing exclusively, or at least primarily, with "Works of Art"; though it cannot, and need not, be denied that a work of art, being the direct and, more or less, conscious attempt on the part of man to satisfy his æsthetic instinct and craving, is the purest and in some aspects the most illuminating vehicle for the study of æsthetics. But the questions at once arise, what this æsthetic faculty really is, what is its origin, and what is its position in the development of the individual human mind and in that of the whole human species? When we endeavour to answer these questions we soon perceive that by the premature intrusion of art we have focussed the aim of our inquiry far too narrowly to lead to full and thorough apprehension of the truth. As a matter of fact, this fatal mistake has been made, and is being made, by many theorists and writers on æsthetics, and is constantly biasing their sound perception of facts, their judgment and generalisations.

Æsthetics does not deal exclusively, or even primarily, with man's "works of art," however important this province of the study may in its due position and proportion become, and however illuminating it may always be for us to deal with definite objects which are designedly and directly meant to respond to that instinct and faculty of man. Nor is it even wise to dwell too much at an early stage of inquiry upon the differentia between æsthetics, science, pragmatics, ethics, and religion. The safer method, and the most likely to lead to true results,

will be to observe and to analyse with concentrated accuracy the æsthetic instincts and faculties in themselves, and to trace their origin down to their earliest beginnings and elements in human, and even in animal, life and throughout nature.

I may here anticipate, and enter into, a more specialised department of the general subject, namely, the historical aspect of the study of æsthetics, more especially the evidence bearing upon the subject as derived from archæology, anthropology, ethnography, and, still more specially, from excavations and the materials presented by them. In my own excavations, as also in those of many of my colleagues and of the numerous anthropological and local excavators of prehistoric sites, it has been the practice (excusable in itself, because so natural) to show the greatest eagerness to find, and the care of preserving and of tabulating with full precision the more highly decorated objects (which approach the claim of being "works of art"). The excavator is thus led to pass over or to discard a large number—generally by far the larger number—of undecorated objects in which a symmetrical form or a higher decoration is not manifest, or in which such decoration is of a most rudimentary and tentative character. The result would be that the whole proportion, in the first place, of the finds and, consequently, in the second place, of the summary picture of the actual life which they illustrate and the creative and artistic activities of the primitive peoples, would be distorted and give no true presentment of that life and no justification for many of the generalisations based upon the data. I am convinced that this is especially the case as regards the earliest prehistoric discoveries of primitive man.

To arrive at a true understanding of æsthetics we must go much deeper down and further afield, and must not limit ourselves to works of art, but must

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consider those works of nature which man *selects*—though he has not created them—because they respond to his æsthetic instinct. Among these will be found, not only in the primitive and subsequent periods of civilised man's history, but in the savage life of people still extant, as well as in the objects preferably chosen by children, a large number of articles found in nature and adapted to use, not only because they serve a need but because they give delight by their form or colour, to the touch, to the eye, or even to the lower senses. Let me merely suggest the important part which shells have universally played in the life of the most primitive and of later peoples, from the simple bowl-like shape and symmetry of form of the Echinus (the body of the Doric capital is called Echinus!) to variegated and beautiful shells with intricate and harmonious variety of patterns.

When we are thus led from the creation of the work of art proper to the *selection* of æsthetic objects, we have advanced a step towards the understanding of the æsthetic instinct. But from this active selection we naturally proceed to inquire into the principles inherent in the objects of nature which produce and guide such a selection with its implied preference, and we thus are face to face with the complicated problem of the æsthetic principle in nature—as yet only the perceptive side of that principle which leads man to prefer and to select, and not yet the objective elements of form to be discovered in nature itself irrespective of man.

But do not assume that I am now about to jump to a more complex and later department of our study in which the highly trained and cultured man, with fully developed æsthetic faculties, contemplates what is called the “ beauties of nature ” such as have been so eloquently described by many writers, among

whom I might single out Ruskin.¹ This question belongs to a far later phase of our inquiry.² What the previous remarks on the elementary and primitive "selection" of works of nature by the men of the Stone Age and contemporary savages are meant to impress is that the problem of æsthetics will not reveal itself to us if we only deal with the "work of art," or even with the selection of natural objects according to æsthetic principles, but that this selection and preference itself depends upon an attitude of mind, a psychological condition in which man perceives, contemplates, and reacts upon nature.

We are thus forced to take a much wider purview of the problem before us when we realise that we do not merely wish to develop a Theory of Art and a Theory of Beauty which æsthetically correspond to a fundamental attitude of the mind; but that this æsthetic principle and instinct really is a *view-point* of nature, life, and the works, actions, and thoughts of man, a fundamental response to an instinct, as well as to all perception, cognition, imagination, reasoning, and action. We shall find that this view-point, this principle of sentience and consciousness, is *fundamental*. I shall even endeavour to show, as I said before, that it underlies all other principles of Epistemology, Pragmatics, Ethics, Politics, and Religion. I must also repeat again that this æsthetic view-point is that in which the form is, if not the whole object, at least essential to the thing perceived, the object which stimulates the senses, is felt or is reflected upon. The narrow denotation of the term "art" in the English language, moreover, which always implies a predominance of painting and sculpture, is most

¹ See *The Work of John Ruskin*, by the present writer (Harper & Bros., 1893), especially cap. ii, "Ruskin as the Founder of Phænomenology of Nature," p. 65 seq.

² See Chap. II, Pt. II.

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misleading in directing the mind of the inquirer towards a theory of æsthetics. For such inquiry music and the decorative arts are safer guides, if we wish to penetrate to the foundations of the æsthetic principle, to its earliest origin and its most developed manifestations. It is even often confusing and misleading to make too free use of the term "Beauty." We must seek the principle still further down in the foundations of the human mind, and perhaps of nature as well, and resort to the principles of proportion and of Harmony. I therefore generally substitute the term Harmony for that of Beauty. We thus find ourselves ultimately approaching the suggestive metaphysical principles that have only come down to us in a few fragmentary sentences of the ancient philosopher Pythagoras, such as "number is the essence of all things," and the phrase "the music of the spheres."

Above all, it is our duty to inquire into the origin and the development of the æsthetic faculty in man : (1) in full-grown normal man, and in the constitution of his higher senses ; and we must trace this back in the fundamental constitution of the mind, the physiology and psychology of the human being, and in the evolution of the lower animals, until we find that these æsthetic principles are impressed upon man through life in every phase of his sentience and consciousness ; and (2) as they are impressed upon him by nature itself and the æsthetic principles which man can there discover in the objects of nature, including also the contemplation of the human form as such an object ; and (3) in human life, including ethics, pragmatics, sociology, and politics ; and (4) in the higher intellectual life of man, in science and philosophy, and theology, and in the search for the principle of the universe, including the life of man.

A further principle of scientific subdivision of our

own immediate subject, as well as of all scientific and philosophical inquiry in other spheres of thought, is that between' (a) the theoretical, or passive, or receptive, and (b) the practical, or active, or creative, aspect of æsthetics.

As for the term "beauty" we have substituted the terms "harmony," "symmetry," and "proportion," so we must further reduce harmony, as far as possible, to first principles, in order that æsthetics as a science should be of undeniable and universal validity, not a matter of individual and subjective opinion—the distinction which the ancient Greeks drew between *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα*. It will then also establish the relation between generalised and lasting types, not individual and ephemeral objects, just as in the exact and natural sciences the aim is to recognise and to establish the "laws" of nature and of thought and the formulæ which clearly embody them—most clearly established in logic and mathematics and laboriously and conscientiously aimed at in the natural and experimental sciences, which latter approach the more closely to their ultimate aim the more they approach to the definiteness, exactness, and finality of the more deductive sciences—logic and mathematics.

Part I of this book, the more general aspect of the inquiry, will thus deal with the origin of the harmonistic and æsthetic instinct in the nervous system and in the developed human senses, as well as its dominance in the fully developed human mind. Part II, the special aspect of our inquiry, will establish the fundamental effectiveness of the Harmonistic Principle and of Conscious Evolution in Epistemology, Æsthetics, Pragmatics, Ethics, Politics, and Religion.

CHAPTER II

SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY—THE PRINCIPLE OF HARMONY

BEAUTIFULLY-SHAPED objects which we can touch and see, and beautiful sounds which we can hear, are pleasant. Æsthetic pleasure in normal man with normally developed senses is, in the first instance, produced by the perception of symmetry—harmonious proportion of coexistence in space, harmonious and rhythmical succession in time. We need not hesitate to lay this down as an absolute "law" when studying the perceptive faculties of man after the embryonic or earliest infantile stages in all times, and in all conditions of his individual and social development, as this thesis is always illustrated in the most primitive prehistoric conditions of man's work in what might be called primitive art. We shall presently go deeper down into the origin of this pleasure in the earlier morphological and physiological stages of human life, animal, and perhaps even vegetable life, as we shall also in the opposite direction pursue this principle to its higher and most complex developments in the artistic, intellectual, and moral life of man. Remember, in taking our stand on this, more or less, central platform of our scientific journey downward, as well as upward, we are assuming the fully developed functioning of man's perceptive senses, especially of what we might call his "higher" senses—sight, hearing, and touch. The following simple drawings will make my meaning clear :—





FIG. 1.

We have here before us simple regular or symmetrical forms, such as a straight line, a square, a triangle, a curve, a wavy line, a circle, and a simple trefoil. Opposed to these regular lines we have an example of irregular lines joined into a most irregular body. Now, there can be no doubt that these regular or symmetrical forms are easily perceived and produce pleasure to the senses of sight or touch in their natural functioning, whereas this is emphatically not the case with regard to the irregular body.

This truth can be readily proved by experiment. A rough and ready experiment, in the case in which a child or an infant cannot express in words the sensation which it feels, is furnished by the expression of its face, manifesting ease and pleasure in perceiving a symmetrical form; as, *per contra*, by contracting its brow into a frown, it will show its difficulty in perceiving the irregular or asymmetrical body. More accurately and objectively the measurements of time which it takes for the apprehension of the one and of the other will clearly demonstrate the greater rapidity and facility, and hence pleasure, in the perception of symmetrical over asymmetrical bodies. Still more "objective" experiments can be made by the help of instruments indicating the curves in a chart; and, finally, by the still more subtle measurement of blood-pressure.

The same applies to the sense of hearing; and the following figures show by means of dots, lines, and curves representing long and short sounds and their intervals, regularity and symmetry, as distinct



from irregular asymmetrical succession, while waves and parallel waves indicate the graphic charts of tones and harmony of tones, in contradistinction to the irregular and intersecting lines and curves of confused sounds, which we call noises. Here again experiments readily demonstrate that tones and harmonies are more easily perceived and are more pleasurable to the ear than confused sounds or noises.

An important result, corresponding in the senses to this æsthetic quality of harmonious coexistence and succession, is no doubt due to the fact that the higher organs of sensation—the eyes, the ears, and the hands—are dualistic, that they are in pairs. They are or ought normally to be symmetrical themselves. Complete and individual perception depends upon the co-ordinate working of the two organs together—what, with regard to the eye, is called “accommodation.”¹

Numerous experiments can be made, and have been made, to demonstrate this normal functioning of the higher senses. But the fact that such complete “accommodation” is required for the full sense-perception is amply proved with regard to the eye by the effect which the pathological condition called “astigmatism” has upon vision, and the resultant discomfort, ultimately leading to a disturbance of the whole organism, to pain, and even disease.

With regard to the sense of hearing, it can equally be demonstrated that causes which disturb the harmonious centralised functioning and accommoda-

¹ Of course, outer objects or stimuli may in their relation exclusively or more strongly affect one of the two organs (one eye, one ear, or one organ of touch); but, as has been demonstrated (especially by Loeb, in dealing with heliotropism) the result of unilateral stimuli produces a definite movement which corresponds to a regular mathematical or symmetrical formula. The normal tendency in the human being, however, is as far as possible, to rectify and complete all perception of dualistic senses by centralised perception, in which both organs act equally and harmoniously.

tion of the two ears interferes with complete perception, its facility and pleasurableness.¹

In the further processes of mental activity arising out of simple perception, it is important for our purpose to know the bearing of symmetry, contrasted with asymmetry, upon the memory,² for it will readily be seen that the symmetrical body or stimulus can be easily retained and on future occasions recognised by its identity or similarity with the first impression, whereas this is not the case with a highly individual irregular or asymmetrical body. And we shall see at a later stage of our inquiry that the irregular and essentially individual stimulus or body will be recalled or described by its deviation from the symmetrical or "typical" body most clearly related to it.

We shall also find that all apprehension of individual things and beings as such, what gives them their "individuality" or "originality," is received and imparted by fixing or emphasising the deviation from the regular, symmetrical, or typical forms to which they belong, as in the simplest geometrical or arithmetical formulæ we should describe a singular body or relationship by its deviation from the most typical form or relation. So, for instance, we should describe an irregular line or curve, or body, by its deviation from the straight line or circular curve, or triangle, square, or any other regular known shape; and, in dividing seventeen, the schoolboy would naturally recall that it is three times five plus two, or three times six minus one.

One fact stands out clearly, namely, that in our

¹ I know of the case of a highly trained lover of music who, late in life, was forced to give up hearing all concerted music, from which he had formerly derived much pleasure, because a disturbance in one of his ears led to the perception of accord as discord.

² This question will be more specially considered in Part II, in dealing with that harmonistic principle in its relation to human knowledge or epistemology.

simple sense-perception regularity, symmetry, and harmony are most readily perceived and produce æsthetic pleasure.





We have hitherto only dealt with what we have called, in an inaccurate phrase, the "higher senses," and have noted that these are dualistic in the organs of perception. But it may fairly be questioned whether the "lower" senses (smell and taste) are not also provided with dualistic organs. We must remember that we have two nostrils; that the tongue has two sides; and that taste depends upon the co-ordination and co-operation of the palate, lips, and the other sensitive mucous membranes of the mouth, as well as their co-operation with the olfactory organs and nerves. It is also of great importance at this early stage to remember that the whole of the human body is symmetrical in its division into two halves, and that the outer direction of stimuli on the right and left, front and back, up and down, are all based upon geometrical and symmetrical principles.

But a very wide field of further inquiry is open to the experimental physiologist and psychologist in determining whether our sensations of smell and touch, though differing in degree, are not in kind of the same æsthetic nature as those of our "higher" senses. Experiments can even now clearly show the different reactions in the sense of smell to the perfume of a rose or the stench of a putrifying body, as well as the sweet taste of one article of food, or the acid or bitter taste of another. It may be possible to produce charts reflecting to the eye symmetry in the one case and asymmetry in the other. Finally, I would suggest that the normal physiological functions of the body in the circulation of the blood and in digestion, etc., are rhythmical, periodic, and symmetrical, and that any interruption or disturbance of normality and health produces pain, whereas

symmetry indicates the normal state and, when perceived, produces pleasure. In any case, the fact remains that symmetry underlies æsthetic pleasure.

But, without wishing to confuse the reader at this elementary stage of our inquiry by anticipating complexities, the solution of which belongs to a much later, if not the last, stage of our researches (metaphysics and religion), I must (if only as a warning against extreme, and hasty generalisation) show that what is clearly asymmetrical or discordant from one point of view may, from a later or higher point of view of relativity, become symmetrical and harmonious. To put this question—or rather problem—into an epigrammatic form: When we proceed to the infinitely great or to the infinitely small, what was asymmetrical and discordant may become symmetrical and harmonious; and I cannot refrain from adding to this, as a mere suggestion for thoughtful reflexion, the fact that in the whole of human life and thought this result provides a hopeful element in the outlook upon life in its relation to the universe, and forms the basis for optimism and hope instead of pessimism and despair. To illustrate this by Fig. 1 here, in which, in the first instance, the symmetrical form stands in direct contrast to the asymmetrical form, we shall find that, if we approach the infinitely small by taking even a comparatively large subdivision of this symbol of asymmetry, and still more when we apply the microscope, each section presents in itself a completeness of symmetry. It is instructive to note that the most repulsive pathological specimens under the microscope—the stronger the power the more so—assume often the most artistic decorative and pleasing forms, whereas the greater the distance from which we see the figure irregularities recede. The same applies to elements of sound and succession. If, on the other

hand, we take this complex tangle of lines as a unit and reduce it to the smallest dimensions in which it becomes but a round spot, it will correspond to other spots and will form a unit for further symmetrical combinations. Contemplate the picture of a starry night, and remember what the form of a planet may be when seen in proximity.

Thus, if we take our specimen of an asymmetrical body (Fig. 1) we find that as we enlarge it, until finally we examine its portions under a microscope, each portion or segment of this asymmetrical figure becomes symmetrical or regular. Those which are parts of a straight line running in any haphazard direction or intersecting one another become, when thus reduced in dimensions, straight lines and show definite regular angles (— — — ) in their change of direction. Those which are curved running in a haphazard direction become definite and harmonious segments of a circle or an arc ( ,  , ).

Each section thus presents complete symmetry and harmony.

On the other hand, if, keeping the asymmetrical figure in sight, you recede backwards at varying distances, you will again find that the asymmetry and irregularity diminish as you recede. If a number of photographs are taken, you will note how, with the increase in regularity and symmetry of the figure as a whole, portions of the detail in line drop out, while others are relatively accentuated until you reduce the complex body to comparative simplicity. The interior too changes its colour, gradually turning from lighter grey to a darker shade, until, finally, at the furthest distance, the body is reduced to a simple dot or circle which, as a regular unit, might form any part of a complex symmetrical series.

PLATE I




FIG. 3. EXPERIMENTS IN CONVERSION OF ASYMMETRY INTO SYMMETRY BY DISTANCE.
The lower series gives the changed appearance at 9, 18, 36 and 72 feet.

I have made numerous experiments to verify the continuous predominance of symmetry as an asymmetrical body is viewed at gradually increasing distances. It is a noteworthy fact that with "abnormal"—especially "astigmatic"—vision some individual lines asserted undue prominence and direction. But with normal vision the growth of symmetry was undoubted and manifest. The series of figures (Plate I, Fig. 3) were produced photographically at the laboratory of the Cambridge & Paul Scientific Instrument Company, and show the changes in the appearance of the asymmetrical body at the distances of 9, 18, 36, and 72 feet.

Though this aspect of the problem concerns a later stage of our inquiry, we may anticipate the suggestion that we have here before us, in broad outline, the chief elements of the mental process, from a simplest perception, through all forms of conception and generalisation, to ratiocination. In any case, the microscopic process corresponds to the analytic faculty of mind, as the megascopic corresponds to the synthetic faculty. It is, however, important to remember that even the analytic process is not purely passive, negative, and dissolvent, but calls into play some positive or imaginative activity, and that both are determined by the harmonistic principle in the perception of regularity and symmetry.

Now, to leave this parenthetical episode on asymmetry and to search for the reason for this result of æsthetic pleasure upon human perception arising out of symmetry, we find, in the first instance (*a*), that this pleasure, especially as regards our higher senses, is caused by the need of such symmetry owing to the dualism of these higher senses, in that we have two eyes, two ears, and two arms and legs. Without venturing deeply into the problems of physiological optics, or the physiology of the ear, what is called accommoda-

tion of the eyes in ocular perception is an essential factor in that perception, the importance of which becomes especially manifest when there is a pathological inefficiency in the act of accommodation. Thus, to say the least, a symmetrical form is more easily perceived than an asymmetrical one ; the latter may become relatively painful as regards the perceptive effort, while the former will only become relatively pleasurable. It takes the infant some time to accommodate its perceptive functions in space and time to the realities of outer life, and to acquire the power of localising outer objects and their relation to itself and its needs by means of the proper functioning of both its eyes, both its ears, and both its hands.¹ If we rise from these simpler elements of sense-perception to the higher forms of conscious perception, to the forming of concepts, the rudimentary but clear and complete sense-perception through the accommodation of the dualistic organs of sense leads further to a clearer and higher phase of apprehension and cognition which gradually, and even at an early stage, confirms and makes conscious *objective* perception and the establishment of consciousness in some form or other, fixing the relation which the outer object bears to self in the satisfaction of wants and desires or in the satisfaction arising out of successful activity or functioning of the organs themselves. At all events, the easier and more complete this form of sense activity and sense-perception is, the more does it avoid pain and positively lead to satisfaction and pleasure, conditioned by what may be called the harmony of the outer object perceived. (b) But a second and more advanced condition arises out of this objective harmony, namely, in the fact that the

¹ We shall have occasion as we proceed to consider the question of the symmetry of other organs and of the human body in relation to the organic and inorganic world.

symmetrical or harmonious presents the senses with a generalised or typical form, while the asymmetrical and discordant remain individual. The result is that, with repetition and repercussion, the harmonious or generalised forms become still more easy and pleasant of apprehension, while the others do not. Still further (c), it thus forms the groundwork for memory and association which, as is universally admitted, form the basis for the whole development of the human intellect. I also need not insist upon the fact that this symmetrical form, so easily and fully apprehended, and establishing a general type in itself, in contradistinction to the distinctly individual nature of the asymmetrical body, can, and as a matter of fact will, and must, as regards its harmonious nature be repeated in experience and can be readily remembered and recognised with regard to its identity or similarity—which is not the case with asymmetrical bodies. The same, of course, applies the nearer we approach towards the work of art in which a definite tune or shape can be remembered and accurately reproduced; whereas the same cannot apply to an accidental tangle of form or noise.

I must here point to a very significant and important fact, namely, that what we thus call the "higher" senses (I maintain because of this primarily *æsthetic* quality of theirs) have evolved generalised attributes fixed by human language, while the "lower" and purely elementary or procreative senses and instincts have not. This of itself leads us to all forms of spiritual generalisation, even to the highest abstractions of the human mind. Thus all the elements of Euclidian geometry, appealing to eyesight as well as touch, in their simplest sensual form are established by means of general terms, which can be applied to an infinite number of individual objects. The same applies to colours growing in variety and

nomenclature, as man progresses in civilisation and productiveness, including the minutest shadings of definite colours. The same also applies to musical rhythms, to the variety of notes, harmonies, notation of *tempi*, and of the other highly differentiated and exact notations of music: whereas, when we come to the sensation of taste, with the exception of sweet, sour, and bitter (and we cannot include hot and cold, or hard and soft, as these are probably borrowed from the sense of touch), and to smell (in which "sweet" is probably only borrowed from the palate), the attributes are not generalised, but can only be conveyed by the distinct taste or smell of the individual object.

Whether the "higher" and "lower" depend upon the difference between the dualistic senses (eyes, ears, arms, etc.), in contradistinction to the single organs of perception, I will not endeavour to determine now. But, leaving these dualistic senses, we must turn to these single organs of perception—in which again the æsthetic principle of pleasure in the business of perception constitutes an elementary principle. But I must at once point out that the dual nature bearing so immediately upon touch,¹ in the arms and hands, is not always necessary to our perception of touch by other means; for we may—and, as a matter of fact, do—often perceive with one hand only (though this again is made up of five fingers).

Now, with regard to the problem immediately before us, it is most important for us to realise that the single organs of sense are inseparably attached to the human body (as well, of course, as the dual organs). They are thus, as I venture to call them,

¹ In this connection I must also remind the reader that touch applies to the whole peripheral surface of the human body or skin and also to what might be called the muscular sense, especially as regards the perception of hot and cold, hard and soft, front and back, right and left, etc.

somatocentric, or, as the mathematicians would call it, *centrobaric*. This in simple language means that they are attached to the human body as a whole, and lose their nature as organs of sense when severed from the body. Their activity as organs of nerve activity is thus determined by the fact that they are tied down to their central position, and must radiate their activity from that centre. I must here at once anticipate and suggest the importance of this fact in the creation of the consciousness of the *ego*, or of self-consciousness, in the evolution of the human mind. Every sensory act received or conveyed by these *somatocentric* organs is therefore determined by this central bodily point, whether it be centrifugal or centripetal. It is thus a form of motion. But, in so far as it becomes perceptive and responsive, the ease or facility, the economy of effort, and (if we may call it so) the perfection of the motion, determines its pleasurable or its painfulness—which, again, follows the law of least resistance. Now, this ease or economy of effort, or even of force, in such a *somatocentric* motion, is to be found in two broad subdivisions: the one the straight and continuous line; the other the curve and circle, which will naturally, from the centre outward and back to the fixed starting-point, take an elliptical form. These again fall under the same heading of symmetry and harmony as being the most highly generalised form applicable to all objects facilitating apprehension and producing memory and association, to which I have just referred above, as a result of the activity of the dualistic organs of sense. The straight line and its combinations in all geometric forms is the easiest and most economical form of motion. Whether this continuous straight line is made up of innumerable interrupted dots and spots or not does not affect our argument and its conclusion, because the same

principle in respect of time will apply to arithmetical regularity and proportion, and again brings us face to face with the epigrammatic principle of Pythagoras, that "number is the essence of all things." I may here also throw out the metaphysical suggestion, which as early as 1878 ¹ I ventured to make, that pure realism or pure idealism—that is monism—can only be established when space is converted into time, or time into space. Besides the straight line, with its continuation and combination into angles, triangles, squares, etc., there is the curve which is the necessary consequence of any motion emanating from a fixed centre and especially the natural motion of the hand with the arm fixed to the shoulder of the human body. Therefore, as all *somatocentric* motion and function is summarised under these two main divisions of the straight line and the curve, while conforming, if not producing, the consciousness of the *ego* of the human embryo or the infant, these geometric forms, which in common parlance we should call regular or symmetrical, being the most economical form of effort, the easiest, and therefore the most pleasurable, also produce the æsthetic principle which we have hitherto found always interwoven with the acts of sense-perception.

¹ *The Balance of Emotion and Intellect*, p. 40 seq. (Kegan, Paul & Co., 1878).

CHAPTER III

CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

HERE we must pause for one moment and consider more closely the concept Consciousness in connection with the influence of the somatocentric and centrobatic movements and functions. Biologists, as well as psycho-physicists, cannot be too frequently reminded of the fact that Consciousness implies a complexity presenting an infinite number of gradations. These range from the simplest form of reflex actions to the highest form of self-consciousness and abstract and generalised reasoning. As far as our present knowledge goes, the simplest and earliest manifestation of reflex action is connected with galvanic stimulation in which the very slightest degree of sentience can be assumed or no sentience at all. We shall deal with these earlier phases when we are considering the evolution of the nervous system and of sentience in the simplest organisms and phases of animal life. For the present we must confine ourselves to the human being from birth upwards. Here, too, there are a large number of phases through which sentience passes until it reaches consciousness, and all the philosophic systems which begin with self-consciousness are, in the light of modern research, greatly at fault. For we must note that self-consciousness—the consciousness of the *ego*—marks a comparatively very late stage. But even the scientific modern physiologist or psychologist must take great care to keep clearly separate in his mind

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the several distinguishable phases, or his conclusions are apt to be confused and faulty. The somatocentric and centrobaric functions which point to somatotropic quality of the nervous system in man go far to make clear to us some elements and phases in the mental evolution which leads finally to developed self-consciousness. This "tropism" manifests itself in the earliest phases, and, to take a rough and ready instance, in the very first and significant moment in the birth of the infant—namely, in the first sound or cry emitted by the normal infant leading to normal respiration. This sound or cry, even though it be stimulated by outer chemical elements, is a spontaneous activity of the vocal chords. From this moment numerous somatocentric activities proceed which—*unconsciously to the infant or organism itself*—establish its relationship to its own functioning body and to the outer world. But with the growth of sentience and nervous activity all the physiological activities of the child are *somatocentric* and manifest geometrical or rhythmical regularity, establishing the harmoniotropic tendency and principle of activity. It takes a considerable time and numerous evolutionary phases have to be undergone before the child adapts itself to the outer world, and more or less realises the existence of things without. But it is all-important to remember that these things without are exclusively related to the bodily centre itself, and are not distinguishable in the consciousness of the child—if we may use the term consciousness at all—from that centre. For a long time subject and object are mixed up together, and while the outer objects are all limited in their subjective existence to the relation to the child's own body, with growing "unconscious" perception, its own body is not yet distinguished from the outer objects. Thus for a long time the child will speak of itself—namely, its

bodily existence as baby, or something on a par with the outer objects which have come within its range of perception. Then gradually the range of outer objects becomes more extended in space and enlarged in number. But even then all these perceptions are *egocentric* and their existence is limited by the relationship to self. The further differentiation of the outer world takes place in that things without are, through memory and association, "integrated" on the grounds of symmetry or likeness, and then the more remote, or newer, or more unlike, objects are classified with the nearer, more familiar, and more identical objects of its past perceptions. Thus every man and woman is at first classed as *dadda* or *ma'mma*, until they are at last endowed with independent individuality of their own. It is at a comparatively late stage that the consciousness of self, as distinguished from the outer world, is developed and established, and that the whole world of relationships in perception, feeling, and thought unites to make up the mental individuality and the higher faculties of feeling and reason by means of the function of memory and association with which we shall deal in the Second Part.

It is, of course, at a still later stage that the moral and social relationships of self to human beings, to society and to the whole universe are developed in man.

In conclusion we must note that it is quite conceivable that, through the process of integration, repetition, and association of stimuli, the unity of the body may become a recognised centre, and that the several organs are attached to, and form part of, that body and lead to consciousness. The step to *self-consciousness* is more difficult to account for and marks a comparatively late stage in the evolution of the human mind. But, no doubt, from the recognition of the parts and organs of his own body, the

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human being proceeds to the recognition of similar parts and organs in those habitually about the infant ; this is strengthened when once, through the senses (especially through the eye in reflecting bodies such as water or shining substances acting as mirrors), the infant sees itself. Finally, through the perception and full recognition of its own desires and activities, their satisfaction and their success, or their unfulfilment or failure, coupled with that of the full personality of other human beings, friends and foes, evoking hopeful attraction or fear, love or hate—all similar, if not identical with, its own body and bodily activities—the fuller consciousness of self and *self-consciousness* are developed and completely established ; until language and thought finally lead to the most complete realisation of self and its relation to other individuals and the whole outer and inner world.

What, however, is here of chief importance to our inquiry is the realisation of the fact that, fundamentally and ultimately, the somatocentric and centrobatic movements and functions, with all the resultant influences, are based upon the harmonistic principle.

Now, the principle of symmetry in static bodies and in motion, implying also regularity in time—the principle of harmony—is thus the principle of all sense-perception in its most elementary form, and corresponds, because of this economy in effort and in force, to the rudimentary feeling of ease, and consequently of pleasure, in the function of each sense organ.

It may be said that the principles here insisted upon really come under the heading of utilitarianism, and not of æstheticism. I readily admit that, in these early phases of the working of the human organism and mind, these two divisions of what might be called utility and harmony have not yet

bifurcated as they will do in the later and more advanced stages of human development. Self-preservation implies the concept self, which we have seen is a late development in the history of the organism. At most we might assume consciousness in the functioning organs and in the function itself; but this would be of a harmonistic or æsthetic nature and not simply self-preservation of the individual as such or "utility." I maintain that the concept utility is not simple and elementary, but is complex, and is therefore grossly misleading when applied to these elementary phases of physiology and psychology. For the connotation of utility presupposes a fixed, fully developed, and consciously existing number of units, who either of themselves or by some directing agent without, a *deus ex machina*, immediately minister to the self-preservation and advancement of these several units. It certainly implies a fixed and self-conscious unit. Our principle of harmony, as we have seen, thus leads through the actual working of it on the lines of least resistance and of regularity in the static and the moving nature of its functions, to the gradual production, or at least the confirmation, of such an *ego*, and therefore belongs to an earlier phase. Moreover, the æsthetic response in these rudimentary forms, as applied to the human senses, is immediately and wholly the outcome of this harmonious nature of the function itself, whereas the idea of utility necessarily implies a further object or end beyond the function itself, through which it becomes useful. I shall have occasion to show (when we deal more especially with the works of man relating to art) that objects in nature and those produced by means which are in their entirety destined to be useful, are principally determined in their form by their purely æsthetic quality.

CHAPTER IV

THE HARMONISTIC PRINCIPLE IN EARLIEST FORMS OF ORGANIC AND SENTIENT LIFE

WE shall, in the course of our inquiry, trace still further the development of the æsthetic instinct, and show how it is primary and dominant in the functioning and growth of the mind from birth upwards. But, before we proceed in establishing this dominance in human life we must find, as far as possible, the foundations and the origin of the æsthetic instinct in those elementary forms of life and sentience preceding the complex organisation of the human mind with man's fully developed nervous system.

Of course it is more difficult to ascertain the sense-perception in animals, as they have no direct means of communicating their own perceptions to us as perceptions. It is difficult, if not impossible, for us to discover their feelings or consciousness concerning the nature and quality of their perceptions. We can only ascertain what is immediately painful or pleasant to them by direct stimulation. But there is no doubt, for instance, that gentle and rhythmical stroking is pleasant, whereas violent and spasmodic jerking or patting is not, and that sudden and unwonted experiences startle or frighten, while those familiar do not. It is really in the domain of the simple functioning of their organs—and in these we should have to anticipate the consequent subdivision of our inquiry from the passive or receptive to the active and functioning of the senses—that we can again discover the æsthetic

principle statically symmetrical or rhythmically and symmetrically moving. Thus, in all the functioning of the internal life of animals regularity and periodicity are continuously dominant, while in their outward activities and progression, whether it be walking or running on two, four, or more legs, or even crawling on the ground like a snake, or the flying of birds and the swimming of fishes, we can discover symmetrical and rhythmical action in these organs of progression, or rectilinear or curved and wavy or spiral principles in their movement, whether in the air, on the ground, or in the water. We must trace it in all its phases of animal life and especially in the lowest and simplest organisms in order to establish its objective validity as a fundamental instinct in mind, as well as a force in life; and, finally, in the universe as a whole. We must do this by examining the structure of the sensory organs, their development, as well as their functioning (anatomically, morphologically, and physiologically). We must thus face the problems of the elementary principles of life and sentience in the organic world, in the structure and the development of organisms, as well as in their simplest functioning.

In dealing with this aspect of the question we must, for the time being, shift our point of view from man, with his fully developed nervous system and organs of sense-perception, and even from the more developed animals, and descend to the study of the lower organisms. It will therefore be advisable to substitute for the term "æsthetic" sense and perception, as well as "æsthetic" pleasure, which we have hitherto used, some term conveying the fundamental and purely objective nature of the principle applying to the lower organisms and their life out of which the "higher" has logically and by the actual functioning of these organisms grown. The terms we thus use for the æsthetic principle in its simpler and lower forms are the

harmonistic principle and the *harmoniotropic* tendency or instinct. At a later stage, when full consciousness is established, the *harmoniotropic* instinct and functioning of the human mind is frequently replaced by the form which I call *aristotropism*¹ in mental activity.

Now, we shall find as we proceed that all the higher æsthetic sensations and mental functions in man, all conscious or subconscious impulses, activities, as well as habits and instincts, can ultimately be reduced either to the aristotropic or the harmoniotropic faculties and principles as the simplest ultimate and decisive factors. In the same way we shall find that the harmoniotropic principle constitutes the simplest and ultimate element to which the functions and activities of all organisms, even the lowest, must be reduced as the principles of life and mind beyond which we cannot descend. We may even find, at a more metaphysical later stage of our inquiry, in the Second Part, that in the organic world and the ultimate active principle in the universe is the same harmonistic principle. This principle also prevails, whether we regard all life ontogenetically or phylogenetically (in the development of the living being or of the species), morphologically or physiologically (the form as well as the functions of organs). *A fortiori* will this be the case with living beings, endowed with perception, feelings, intelligence, thoughts—a soul. But in every case it will be possible not only to reduce all higher mental activities of man to this simple elementary principle, but also to understand

¹ Even in dealing with the simplest activities of the lowest organisms, Professor Jennings has introduced the term *optimum*, which by analogy anticipates this complex and highly developed form of intelligent activity in what I call *aristotropism*. (See Jennings, *Behaviour of the Lower Organisms*, p. 295: "Towards or away from the *optimum*. By *optimum* we mean here the conditions most favourable to the life process of the organism in question.")

the development out of the simplest manifestation of the harmoniotropic force and instinct by natural, gradual, and logical growth into all the higher forms of mental faculties and activities. We shall thus find that the harmonistic principle is always present and active in all phases of mental life, and that thus, at least as a hypothesis, it tends to explain the phenomena of life and mind.

From the very outset of my philosophical inquiries more than forty years ago, after a whole new field of inquiry had been opened out to me during my intercourse and studies with the late Professor Wundt at Heidelberg and Leipzig from 1873 to 1876, I felt the need of confirming the more philosophical results by observation and experiment in the new development of psycho-physics, as well as of physiology and biology. It was between the years 1877 and 1882 that I directly turned to my friend the late George Romanes, while I was working on these æsthetic principles as underlying the whole of mental activity, and inquired of him whether there was any evidence furnished by his own researches (which at the time he, as well as Eimer, were so successfully carrying on into the nervous system of medusæ and similar organisms) to warrant my generalisation.. I felt at the time that the real crux in the problem of the evolution of the nervous system was to find an explanation for the step from purely muscular activity to nervous or sensory activity. The problem appeared to me then, as it does now, whether, in the essential nature of excitation and receptivity of outer stimuli a specific principle could be detected in the transition from the muscular tissue into nervous tissue. The hypothesis which was in my mind at the time was that, if, by the specific outer activity of stimuli, as well as the specific quality of muscular tissue and the component cells, it could be assumed that regular channels were

formed in the muscular organism, the regularity, identity, or even similarity of repercussion would establish regularity and periodicity of receptive activity, and might lead to the formation of definite channels or fibres. When once these were developed as the natural structures or organs for receptivity and transmission they could by such continuous concentration and repercussion produce endings to collective stimulation and transfer activities both in an *afferent* receptivity of stimuli as in an *efferent* channel of force or function from the organism itself outwards. Such a hypothesis would to some degree account for the evolution of the nerve fibres and ganglia and finally a central nervous system. My friend Romanes's replies to these questions were most encouraging. But the chief and central point of my inquiry was (ultimately from the æsthetic point of view) that the nature of this biological and morphological process depended in its essence upon the distinctive nature of the outer stimulation and inner receptive agents which was again to be found in the regularity and symmetry, in what I now call the Harmonistic Principle inherent in such force or activity. My direct work and my researches on this problem were interrupted at this stage for many years until—though many confirmatory sidelights have since then accumulated—I have again turned to them, to find that the stupendous advance made in that period in biological, physiological, and psycho-physical inquiry has only confirmed my conviction as to the effective and universal validity of that principle; though at the same time the leading theories as to the origin of life and mind have developed antagonistic principles differing from the system I would adopt, but in reality, I venture to think, strongly confirming it. I must therefore now turn to a brief consideration of the bearings of my harmonistic principle as

ultimately underlying the development of life and mind in the light of the leading theories of the present day with which I am acquainted.

To begin with the anatomical and morphological aspect of the problem : one fact of supreme importance must be admitted, namely, that the cell itself and its evolutionary history, as of all the minutest histological elements, are distinctly symmetrical in their structure and in their growth and multiplication, in their processes of segregation. When we proceed to more developed organisms, we again find fully established throughout this principle of symmetry, and this must be admitted in spite of differences between the parts of the organism in the regular geometrical subdivision of the sides, front and back, upper and lower parts. This regularity of "orientation," though no doubt applying to all objects in the universe in space, has supplied a more definite and fixed centre for regular orientation in those separate units and organisms which have an independent existence of their own in space and, especially in those that live and move and depend for their subsistence upon such orientation and direction in a fixed geometrical and arithmetical relationship, the distinct divisions in space being of essential importance.

We have seen above how the somatocentric and centrobatic activities of organisms have a direct and important bearing on the origin and development of sentience and higher mental functions. In the more complex structures of higher organisms the further we advance the less reason there is to doubt that some of these oriented parts, in which the symmetrical principle on the whole prevails, are not symmetrical. Thus the front and back may differ in line and form as well as the upper and lower portions and, in some cases, the right and left ; and such differences within the prevailing symmetry are perhaps most marked

in the higher organisms, the higher we rise in the scale of organic beings. Thus the different parts of the human body, as we proceed from the head to the feet, and when we contrast the front with the back view, are markedly different and differentiated, as also the several internal organs are not all of them reduplicated and are placed singly on either side of the body. But in the main system of structure symmetry prevails in that there is a regular bisection of the two halves of the body, symmetrically corresponding to one another, as also the main organs of activity and locomotion are those symmetrically dualistic—especially all organs concerned with sentience and consciousness.

If this symmetrical and harmonistic principle prevails in the main outlines of structure, this is still more the case as regards the regularity of functioning in time and the rhythmical principle of movement in the main acts of living, of self-preservation, and of locomotion. It has quite recently been maintained by Professor Kofoed "that the protoplasm of single-celled animals known as Ciliates and Flagellates exhibited definite structural regions to be compared with the muscles and nerves of higher animals, and that the motions of these actively swimming, sensitive drops of protoplasm had brought about changes in structure; a division of the cell into right and left sides which could be traced through the processes of reproduction."

But in dealing with the anatomical and morphological aspect of the question as manifested in the structure of the animal world, the same principle of symmetry has been amply shown to be present and active in the plant world, as also in those interesting transitional forms in which heliotropic activity has been manifest and has been turned to such good purpose in throwing new light upon the region of the

sensory organs, especially by such biologists as Professor Loeb.

Researches on the elementary nervous system have recently been summarised by Professor G. H. Parker.¹ Without considering for the moment the more highly developed nervous system in man and in the higher animals, we find that in the earthworm the neurones, i.e. "the simple cellular elements," are, according to Parker, "arranged upon a comparatively uniform plan." The spiral nerve and spiral chord of such vertebrates show a certain symmetrical arrangement in the disposition of the sensory and motor neurones. When we proceed still further down to the whole group of sea-anemones, jelly-fish, etc., especially the coelenterates, we meet with the receptor-effector system and the proto-neurones, in which the nervous activities are as yet uncentralised and the sensory nerve-net is diffused in its action and near the surface, the tendency being more and more to concentrate these sensory organs away from the surface, from the epithelial region, retreating inwards, and being thus protected and strengthened, so that, in the step from the coelenterates to the earthworm, we come from the diffuse epithelial regions to the central band of tissue. But in all these organisms, as in the sea-anemone, the diffused nervous transmission of the nerve-nets has a tendency to form definite tracts, which mark the beginning of a central nervous system ending in, besides receptor and effector, the adjustor, the central nervous organs in the higher animals. But in all these earlier stages we note the dominance either of polarisation in function or of what is called synapsis, a function in one direction only, which marks a most important step in the evolution of the central nervous system. In any case, however, we

¹ *The Elementary Nervous System* (Lippincott Co., Philadelphia and London, 1919).

can discover the more or less pronounced effectiveness of regular geometrical or symmetrical principles. The same holds good in the still earlier stages and more elementary conditions of animal life in the sponges, where we cannot yet establish neurones or proto-neurones but where what might be called a neuro-muscular mechanism exists. In the canal system of the calcareous sponge the superficial pores receive water from the exterior in definite directions, and by a regular process of muscular contraction and relaxation pass through the canal and are ejected at the osculum at the apex. But it will be admitted that not only in the organic structure of the sponges, but in their rudimentary functioning in receiving and ejecting water—which itself generally is received from without in regular or rhythmical periodicity inherent in waves or currents—the principle of symmetry is predominant.

However, in dealing with the anatomical and morphological aspect of the question as manifested in the structure of these earliest organisms and their several organs, we find that these are directly dependent upon stimulation, function, and various activities in the very development of these several organ-forms. We are thus driven to face the main problems of these biological functions themselves, the physiology of these lower organisms.

It is here that, in recent times, the main problem of the physiology and evolution of the nervous system has been dealt with in two main directions which stand opposed to one another.

These two main fundamental points of view and theories, which thus stand in direct opposition to one another, might best be termed the Mechanistic and the Vitalistic Theories of Life and Mind; the one most definitely represented by Professor Loeb¹

¹ This difference has been put by Professor Loeb in several passages, e.g. *Physiology of the Brain and Comparative Psychology*, p. 10 seq.

and his various writings, the other by Professor Driesch. Professor Loeb maintains that biological science cannot remain content, and has not really solved the chief problems of that science, unless, by means of exact observation, coupled with experiment, it can ultimately reduce all the phenomena of organic life to the mechanistic principle and, ultimately, to the physico-chemical force, and even to the final chemical element out of which the phenomena of life and of psychic activity evolve. The Vitalists, on the other hand, discover, even in the simplest fundamental forms of organic life, the element of "purposefulness," the *entelechy*, which underlies the activity of the simplest organic units and out of which, by natural process, sentience and all psychic activities are in due course evolved. These two *monistic* views stand in direct opposition to one another.

With whatever respect and admiration we must regard the theories and conscientious experiments and investigations of the numerous biologists who belong to either of these opposed schools, the unbiased but critical mind, which must in the last instance weigh the evidence presented by such thorough observation and experiment and has the right to test their validity, cannot remain satisfied with either for the ultimate explanations of these all-important phenomena of biological science. It cannot further the solution of these problems to fall into the very error with which the experimental scientist charges his opponents "by substituting mere words for facts" and classifying all differing views under the depreciatory term of "metaphysics." This charge is itself a flagrant instance of such use of mere words. The final test of all evidence, including that based upon observation and experiment, is unbiased reason; and this can justifiably and profitably be applied by the sympathetic student who carefully follows the

recorded observations and experiments of the biologist.

In spite of the most remarkable and striking evidence adduced by Professor Loeb, I cannot feel that he is successful in explaining fully the fundamental principles of sentience on the grounds of pure mechanism or physico-chemical forces. You might accumulate and strengthen the mechanistic principle to the infinite degree, you will not account for or explain the phenomenon of sentience. On the other hand, the vitalistic theory, with its concept *entelechy* or "purposefulness" inherent in the elementary organs of sentience, connotes to so high a degree the anthropomorphic, human, or personal element, that it cannot satisfy the scientific mind as to the explanation of the essential factor out of which sentience grows. Now I venture to believe that the principle of Harmonism and of harmoniotropic tendency or function inherent in all the simplest elements concerned in psychical, as well as in physiological and physical elements, will supply to mechanistic activity that requisite element which may help us to understand the activity of those mechanistic forces which ultimately lead to sentience. On the other hand, it will dissolve the anthropomorphic and personal element inherent in such concepts as *entelechy* and "purposefulness"; while substituting, in an impersonal and objective form, throughout the whole of nature as well as in man, his mental processes, his designed wills and aims, the harmonistic principle for that more subjective and human factor which these concepts of the vitalist undoubtedly contain, and thus provide an explanation of the origin and development of life and mind.¹

¹ *Entelechy* and "purposefulness" in this sphere of biological inquiry appear to me to have the same defects as those which in other passages (see chapter on Pragmatics) I have ascribed to the concepts Pragmatism and

I even believe that in the remarkable inquiries into the integrative action of the nervous system which have led Professor Sherrington¹ to such important results, the application of the harmoniotropic principle will go far to make these results more effective in explaining the underlying principle of integration and co-ordination of movements in the lowest organisms. The same may even apply to the "taxis" of Professor Jennings,² "concepts" and "tonus" of Professor Uexkuell.³

I maintain that both these antagonistic theories will fail as *monistic* explanations of natural phenomena because they are too doctrinaire and (if I may say so without offence) too "metaphysical." For such a monistic principle we may have to substitute not even a *dualistic* conception, but a *triadic* principle. The harmonistic and harmoniotropic principle of life and mind manifests itself, not only in one form, but in three forms, the union of which is essential to account for all those phenomena on which the several biologists—whether they belong to the mechanistic or the vitalistic camp—base their conclusions. I venture to maintain that there is not a single observation or experiment recorded by biologists explanatory of the phenomena they investigated, and on which their general principle is based, in which three different manifestations of harmonism and harmoniotropism cannot be discerned as effective and even indispensable. The first of these tripartite manifestations of harmonism is inherent in the receptive organ and Utility in relation to Art, Ethics, and Human Life. They are distinctly "opportunistic," and can only apply to definite individual complex conditions, varying with the purpose and aim in each individual case, but do not furnish us with an impersonal "law" or principle unvaryingly active in the same direction.

¹ *The Integrative Action of the Nervous System* (Yale University Press and Oxford University Press, 1906).

² *Behaviour of the Lower Organisms* (Columbia University Press, 1906).

³ *Leitfaden in das Studium der experimentellen Biologie der Wasserthiere* (Wiesbaden, 1905).

its quality—a symmetrical or harmonic quality of the organ, which is stimulated, whether this be in the form of neurones, ganglia, or higher central organs, or merely in the muscular tissue manifesting a special form of “irritability” or “conductibility.” The second aspect of harmonism appertains to the outer stimulus, what might roughly be called the “laws of nature”; even though the stimuli may be reduced to purely physico-chemical activities, such as photochemistry (which Professor Loeb, no doubt with conscious poetic licence, would sometimes call the “will” or the “soul” of the organism affected). The third harmonistic aspect is the harmonistic relation between each instance of stimulation and receptivity. The coincidence of these three harmonisms is essential to anything of the nature of sentience.

The activities of outer nature in every form—even if we reduce it to physico-chemical factors, or even to one physico-chemical element—are active in the universe and are present to, or press upon, the organism continuously. They may affect one organism as they affect the objects of inorganic nature without producing any biological or psychological result. They may even affect certain parts of the organism and not others; and they may even affect the same part at one time and not at another. There are billions—in fact innumerable—stimulations of this kind active; but only just one produces the biological or psychological stimulation which the observer and experimenter notes. It is in the harmony between the outer stimulus and the receptive, as well as *functioning*, organism that a new relation is established which culminates in the biological phenomenon underlying all forms of sentience, even the most elementary. It is this triadic principle which must be substituted for the monistic principle. But the essential factor in these three aspects of the

same principle is, after all, Harmonism. When this triadic harmony is, by habit or instinct, consciously or subconsciously aimed at ; when once sentience is established with success and completion results in the activity of any organism and after the harmoniotropic instinct is effective, sentience and higher mental activities then manifest themselves.¹

In spite of the criticism of the mechanistic theory of life and mind contained or implied in what has just been said above, I gladly admit that Professor Loeb's Mechanistic Theory is the safest method to be applied by the biologist as promising the most positive and scientific results. Above all, it ensures against the obtrusion of the personal equation in the researcher, which can be summarised under the term "idols." Yet I cannot see how the acceptance of the Harmonistic Theory can in any way exert a disturbing influence upon the strict pursuit of observation and experiment on mechanistic lines. On the contrary, the results of his own researches and those of his fellow-workers distinctly tend to confirm the principle of harmonism and of harmoniotropism which reinforced the effectiveness of the various tropisms (heliotropism, geotropism, chemotropism, galvanotropism, etc.). Symmetry or some other form or modification of harmonism prevails in every aspect of such observations and experiments and the results deduced from them.

¹ We shall see in Pt. II, Chap. I, how this same current of harmoniotropic activity, developing into the aristotropic force, manifests itself in the imagination.

² It will be seen in the first chapter of Part II, on Epistemology, that I there maintain that all observational and experimental sciences reach their highest point when results can be verified by experiments and by "synthetic" reproduction of natural bodies, which again implies that they approach the stage in which the elements and data of their scientific generalisation can be represented by mathematical or arithmetical relationships, which when applied to words and not to forms and numbers means pure logic.

1. To begin with the organs themselves, their constitution and their *function*, they all manifest a harmonistic form or tendency. The generality of such organs is dualistic, distributed on either side of the animal, and in their functions they thus tend to act in a regular geometrical line or in rhythmical succession in time. When not dualistic, we shall see that, while no longer following the rectilinear or straight-line system, they function in a spiral or curved line, again manifesting geometrical regularity or harmony. In any case "irritability" and "conductibility," as we shall see, are of those qualities which imply response to regular stimulation in all truly biological functioning or stimulation. The degree of "facility" as regards the reception of stimuli—of "facility" in contradistinction to complete adaptation of definite tracts or organs for the function of receiving stimuli and of regular reaction to them (such as Professor Loeb ascribes to muscular tissue in opposition to those who uphold the necessity of nerve-ganglia to account for "instincts")—merely marks a difference of degree and not of kind in the harmonistic nature of such receptive bodies.

2. When we come to the outer stimulation of those physico-chemical "laws" which are assumed by the mechanistic school to furnish the complete explanation of all biological and psychical phenomena in these lowest organisms, I need not waste much time in insisting upon the fact that these "laws" essentially connote the most complete and, at times, the most complex regularity or relationship in time and space, and ultimately present themselves to us in geometrical or arithmetical formulæ illustrating the purest regularity and harmony. I shall dwell upon this fact in the first chapter of Part II, in relation to Epistemology, the origin and development of "knowledge."

3. But when the mechanist maintains that he can

now, or hopes in the future to, explain fully the phenomena of life and sentience by these physico-chemical factors of the outer world in any individual organism, he overshoots the mark. We cannot for a moment admit, on the ground of the very striking and numerous experiments adduced in support of such a view, that, for instance, the Bunsen-Roscoe photo-chemical law, or even those laws of movement of light on the optic nerve as shown by S. S. Maxwell and C. D. Snyder, can be considered the "will" of the winged aphids or any other organisms—"that in this instance the light is the 'will' of the animal which determined the direction of its movement, just as its gravity in the case of a falling stone or the movement of a plant."¹ Adopting the same poetic licence, I might say that it is neither the light nor the light-receiving organs of the aphid, but the relation between the two, which produces the phenomenon, both being attuned harmonically and, as far as we may even in figurative speech use the term, "will." It is the harmoniotropic force inherent in the aphid, that which necessarily, all-constrainingly, subjects it to the harmonic activity in natural laws, and in its own organisation and functioning power, which is the "will" accountable for the deed or activity. The preliminary activity is on both sides, and the consummation is due to the harmonic principle inherent in both and active in combining them. Thus, again to quote Professor Loeb himself:

"if a positively heliotropic animal is illuminated from one side, a compulsory turning of the head toward the source of light occurs only when the

¹ Loeb, *The Mechanistic Conception of Life*, p. 40 (University of Chicago Press, 1912). See also Loeb, *Physiology of the Brain and Comparative Psychology*, xi, "Relationships between Orientation and Function of certain Elements of the Segmental Ganglia" (Putnam's Sons, New York, and John Murray, 1900).

difference in the rate of certain photo-chemical reactions in the two eyes reaches a certain value."

It will here be seen how the functional activity of the animal is as essential to the phenomenon as is the stimulation without ; and it will be seen how subtly important it is that the relationships between the two should exactly synchronise and harmonise, when the passage quoted proceeds :

" If the intensity of the light is sufficient and the active mass of photo-chemical substance in the animal great enough, it requires only a short time, for instance, the fraction of a second, before the difference in the mass of the reaction products formed on the two sides of the animal reaches the value necessary for the compulsory turning of the head toward the source of light. In this case the animal is a slave of the light ; in other words, it has hardly time to deviate from the direction of the light rays ; for if it turns the head even for the fraction of a second from the direction of the light rays, the difference in the photo-chemical reaction products in the two retinae becomes so great that the head is at once turned back automatically toward the source of light. But if the intensity of the light or the photo-sensitiveness of the animal is lessened the animal may deviate for a longer period from the direction of the light rays."

It will here be seen how delicate and all-important is this harmonic relation between stimulation and receptivity, and how the final effect depends essentially upon the harmonic quality of the receptor, as well as of the stimuli, and, above all, the harmony between the two. Nor can I admit the conclusion of Professor Loeb when he proceeds to say :

" It is therefore not a case of a qualitative, but of a quantitative, difference in the behaviour of heliotropic animals under greater or lesser illumination, and it is therefore erroneous to assert that helio-

tropism determines the movement of animals toward the source of light only under strong illumination, but that under weaker illumination an essentially different condition exists."

It is neither the mere quantity or quality of the light alone, nor of the animal alone, but in the harmonic relationship between the two that the effects are produced. Whatever changes may be experimentally produced in the animal to heighten or diminish its photosensitiveness, the result cannot be ascribed wholly to one or other element, as little as (and here I may indeed lay myself open to the charge of using "rhetoric") we claim to explain the fact that an orator, poet, or musician can or cannot make good speeches, write beautiful verses, or produce good music when he is drunk, by maintaining that it is the alcohol which has or has not produced these manifestations of art. His nerves and brain are certainly under different conditions through alcoholic stimulation; but it still remains through them and through the will of his individual personality that the works of art are produced by him. When it is further maintained¹ that "heliotropic phenomena are determined by the relative rates of chemical reactions occurring simultaneously in symmetrical surface elements of an animal," it is essential to remember that we have already granted the "symmetrical surface elements" as well as the "simultaneous occurrence," which are in their essence manifestations of the harmonistic principle. In fact, the sensitiveness of the animal varies, and Professor Loeb has thus given a definite term to the variations of the sensitive receptors, namely, "differential sensibility" (*Unterschiedsempfindlichkeit*). He rightly reminds us² that "the progress of natural science depends

¹ Op. cit., p. 54.

² Op. cit., p. 59.

upon the discovery of *rationalistic elements or simple natural laws*'' ; but he has also shown that photo-chemical stimulation does not entirely depend for specific reactions on the part of the organism upon the symmetrical surface elements of the animal. Thus, the *Ranatra* and robber-fly, as shown by experiments of Parker, Holmes, Garrey, and others,¹ while following a straight line when possessed of the use of two eyes, will follow definite curved or spiral lines when one eye is blackened. In all these cases, however, the result of the activity follows definite geometrical directions, and the whole process of such accommodation in asymmetrical animals as well shows the dominance of the principle of harmonism.

We are thus inevitably driven to the conclusion that the laws of nature, including the physico-chemical forces, manifest to the highest degree the principle of harmonism, and that in the chemical process what has roughly been termed *Chemical Affinity* is one of the most perfect expressions of the connotation of harmony. But this same affinity and harmony must be extended to the nature of the receptive organ in order that a new affinity or harmony be established which results in the biological and psychical activities.² Not only, whether the receptive substance is hard or soft, warm or cold, a stone or a muscular or nerve tissue, will these forces act differently upon them ; but in every case it depends upon just that harmony of relationship between all the three factors to produce each definite phenomenon. I may also add that, in spite of the general objection which, as stated above, I have to the vitalistic theory as expounded by Professor Driesch, because of the

¹ Loeb, *Forced Movements, Tropisms, and Animal Conduct*, p. 52 seq. (Lippincott Co., Philadelphia and London, 1918).

² It will help the general reader, in the whole course of these arguments to establish the harmonistic principle, to bear in mind the analogy of wireless telegraphy.

anthropomorphic concepts of *entelechy* and "purposefulness," I feel that in some of his ideas and expositions—notably when, for instance, he refers to "harmonious equipotential systems"¹—I find myself in many points in agreement with his conclusions.

We have seen above (see Chaps. II, III) how in the higher organisms, notably in the human being from birth upwards, through the agency of what we called *somatocentric* and *centrobaric* movement, the development of consciousness and, finally, of self-consciousness was distinctly furthered, if not produced. In the case of the lower organisms with which we are here dealing, we can more or less understand how sentience develops into functional activities through the formation of "habit" and "instinct," and how the morphological development, leading to the evolution of the nervous system, is established through the effective intermediary influence of the harmonistic principle. It can hardly be maintained that in the morphological aspect of this question the introduction of the harmonistic principle should not be helpful in every one of the theories of evolution, including not only those based upon biological experiments, but also those which apply the Mendelian principle of observation to selective heredity in time. For, beginning with the receptive muscular tissue of the surface of organisms and rising, through all the stages of the development of nervous tissue, to nerve-centres of the highest order, we can see *how, in the accumulation in time and in space (i.e. of the actual modification of the receptive tissue itself in space and through stimulation in time), the repercussion of stimuli would not be effective in producing the morphological changes which lead to the development of the nervous system, without the harmonistic principle in space and*

¹ *History and Theory of Vitalism*, pp. 208-9 (authorised translation by C. K. Ogden, Macmillan & Co., 1914).

time to act as the "cement" between the individual "building blocks" of the structure. Out of the regular repercussion of currents, forming regular or symmetrical channels, so that not only outer stimulations but also the inner functioning and spontaneous impulse or activity in the organism run in this same direction and produce similar symmetrical activities, there is formed what by analogy we may call "habit," and such "habit" subconsciously produces certain activities or actions even though attention and consciousness be concentrated in other directions. The step from this habitual subconscious or even unconscious activity to the establishment of *instinct* is a natural and logical one, and also (and this we shall further see in the chapter on Epistemology) accounts for the development of memory and association and, through them, of higher mental activities. But in all phases of this gradual evolution it will be found that the harmonistic principle of symmetry, be it through identity and repercussion, affinity, or inherent association, is fundamentally the active principle. We must further note that it is finally in the triadic aspect of this harmony that, when in the mental activities of the highest organisms this triadic harmony is consciously or subconsciously (by habit or instinct) aimed at, the designed or purposed or willed action is completed, and that the harmoniotropic instinct is directly effective.¹ We thus rise from the earliest origins of sentience through reflex action, as well as subconscious or habitual activity, to instinct, and from consciousness to self-consciousness, and, finally, to designed self-assertion and self-repression, to fore- and after-thought, and all highest mental and moral activities.

¹ We shall see in the chapter on Epistemology (Part II) how the function of imagination plays an important part in this process in the human mind.

As we have seen, the symmetrical motion, when not curved, leads us to the straight line, and thus to the line of least resistance and the economy of movement, function, or perception. And it is here that what might thus be called the utilitarian or economic element meets with, and is identified with, the æsthetic principle of proportion and symmetry. Now, biological researches during the last hundred years have gone to show us how in the rudimentary forms of animal life the continuous functioning of any organs, and even of the continuous line of stimulation which precedes and leads over to the development of such an organ, is by the continuity of such a line productive of a regular symmetrical channel.

CHAPTER V

HARMONIOTROPISM IN HUMAN LIFE AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE ÆSTHETIC ATTITUDE OF MIND .

WHEN we leave this elementary phase in which we have recognised the dominance of the principle of proportion and harmony in the constitution of the senses of man in their relation to perception, and assuming the full and conscious development of the sensory organs in man, namely, his perception of nature and its objects, the effect of these æsthetic principles upon the formation, the development, and the *habituation* of the perceptive senses and their functions becomes still more manifest.

In dealing with this aspect of the question we must again take timely warning, while considering the perception of natural objects, that we are not drawn into that complex and misleading department of the theory of art which deals with Art in Nature—or rather, with the highly artistic contemplation of nature by the developed and cultured individuals who have been habitually trained in the contemplation and the appreciation of works of the highest art. It is not in this aspect that I now propose to deal with nature from the point of view of sense-perception, but in a much more rudimentary phase of the whole question. I wish merely to show how, in the contemplation of nature and its objects, the human perceptive senses are constantly, continuously, and forcibly impressed by æsthetic principles of the most valid and generalised form. We must therefore

become thoroughly clear in our mind that, on the whole, when we consider nature and art, the work of nature and the artifact, the products of nature and the products of man—nay, even, as has repeatedly been shown, the actual course of nature and what we call Progress—stand as antitheses rather than as identical or harmonious elements. Stoic philosophy and its tenets are shaken to their very foundations by those writers and critics who have dwelt upon the cruelty, the constant internecine warfare of nature, as also in life the Optimist who believes in the prevalence of justice and the immediate predominance of virtue and merit and continuous progress of humanity, has been severely shaken by the arguments of the Pessimist, who points to the constant predominance of injustice and the defection of virtue and merit in this world of ours, and the retrogressions of human society towards savagery. The constant and resistless flow of nature and life with its change, leading to dissolution and death, and the struggle for existence which is discerned in every department of its progression, are in direct opposition to the harmonious completeness and reposefulness of art-design and fulfilment of effort. The works of man's art and craft thus stand in direct opposition, from this point of view at least, to the objects of nature, so much so that, when man finds complete form and responsiveness to his feelings and needs in these objects of nature, he uses the significant phrase "freak of nature," as he is also pleasantly surprised when a coincidence in the outer world not directed by his own design or will brings, by what he might call accident or "luck," the good fortune which his design would have led him to create.

I have perhaps sufficiently illustrated what I mean to insist upon, as a warning against hasty generalisation with regard to the sensory experiences of man in

his perception of nature and its works as being productive in these senses of the proportion and harmony which constitute the æsthetic principle. But, having thus recalled the difference, if not the opposition, between nature and art, we now turn to those perceptible elements in nature in which, by its constitution, the æsthetic instinct in man and the æsthetic element in his sense-perceptions are, if not exclusively produced, at all events confirmed throughout his life from earliest infancy to the end.

We have already seen how in the lowest organisms—even in sponges—the rhythmical and periodic functioning of the organism confirms the harmonistic principle. So in man the periodic and rhythmical functions (the heart-beat and other periodic bodily activities) subconsciously confirm in him the continuous insistence of symmetrical and harmonious succession.

But in his more complex experiences of outer nature, to begin with the important subdivision of time in his conscious existence, the harmonious rhythmical and numerical subdivision of time in the conscious existence of man is impressed upon him through his perceptive senses from their earliest awakening to the end of his life continuously, and at regular intervals—darkness and light, sunrise and sunset, dawn and evening twilight, the consciousness of the year and its subdivisions with the periodic changes of seasons which, at an early period he may, more or less, clearly and perfectly identify with the sun and moon, and with the constellations in the sky, from the general and harmonious framework of his consciousness in time. Again, he experiences cold and warmth; cloudiness, stillness, and wind-swept turmoil and storms; in racing nebulae changing their shapes at every moment; the world of sound, confused and escaping the grasp of his perceptions

through the very confusion in which no single tone predominates ; and, on the other hand, the familiar rhythmical cadence of sounds in the songs of birds or the bleating of animals, or the calls and chants of his fellow-men—through all this endless complexity and confusion there issues out and impresses his senses with the regularity and symmetry of their form or their relation to one another, or their fixed and recurrent relation to his own existence, the principle of harmony and proportion which through the elusive and disturbing complexities of nature and life brings pleasure to his senses, his emotions and thoughts. And in the movement of his own kind, and of the animal world about him (to which I referred above in relation to the functioning of the progressive organs in the animal world), as well as in the growth of the whole vegetable kingdom about him, the trees and plants in their wholeness and in every part, the structure of the land and of the mineral world and the regularity, symmetry, proportion, and inner harmony of their stratification and structural composition, reflecting the number and regularity of the long ages of gradual growth and organisation (of which geological evolution he may have no ken whatever)—all these impress upon his senses from earliest infancy the dominance of symmetry, of proportion and form.

And when he examines individual objects more closely, he notices—though generally subconsciously—in every tree and shrub the principle of growth in the structure from the trunk to the distribution in varied symmetry of the branches and twigs, and of the leaves upon them ; and in these leaves and buds and flowers, the most marvellously varied though perfectly symmetrical and harmonious configuration of their form. Furthermore, the movement of masses of plants, swayed by the wind, the rippling

of the stream, the rush of waves, and the great surging of the sea—nay, if he but examine a flower or the smallest herb and leaf or snowflake on his hand he would see in it all the variegated forms in which his eye delights, as well as in the innumerable shells which he finds on the seashore—until at last he chooses the most perfectly rounded pebble and the most harmoniously variegated shell, and delights in the touch and the sight of them and even at last turns them, not only to his use, but as ornaments for his own body or for his surroundings. Surely it is enough merely to suggest a few of these items in which the æsthetic principle of harmony, in the process as well as in the products, in the change and movement as well as in the static repose of nature as man learns to see it as a whole and in each of its innumerable parts, is constantly and continuously impressed upon his senses. Now it is these elements which make for ease and repose within the difficulty of apprehension and the restlessness of changes which he cannot control; thus modifying his senses and their inner needs until he indissolubly associates these æsthetic elements with perceptive pleasure.

When we turn from outer nature to man himself as an object of contemplation of form, his appearance, his body and face, we must, above all, remember that among all objects which man observes most frequently and continuously and with greatest interest, human beings are prominent. Moreover, these are impressed upon him from the first awakening of his senses to the end of his life. We can therefore, for instance, understand why the ancients—among them Vitruvius—sought to trace the origin of architectural forms back to human forms in their general proportion, and even with regard to some definite details. Though these analogies were frequently fanciful, it remains eminently true that the general sense of

proportion and feeling for form as applied to all things, if they do not originate in the proportions of the human figure, are greatly influenced by the habitual standards established by this continuous observation. No doubt the proportions in the outwardly visible form of the human figure may ultimately be expressive of the perfect anatomical and physiological adjustment of the organs of the body; but in their specious manifestation the standards of proportion, modified by the general life-standards of the peoples in various localities and periods of history, are fully established in themselves and in relations of proportions which respond to the æsthetic sense of harmony. Not only are there thus established the broad distinctions as regards the body between the cripple on the one hand and the perfectly-shaped man on the other; but a great variety of shadings in the proportions of the body as a whole and in the relationship of the various members of the body to one another and to the whole, are directly fixed in the appreciative sense of the various peoples. So much is this the case that this scale of proportion as applied to all things, animate and inanimate, becomes subconsciously a norm of an appreciation of form. I would, for instance, even maintain that the lines expressed by what æstheticians have long since called the "golden section" (corresponding, roughly speaking, to the ordinary cross) arise out of the fact that, in facing and regarding the human beings whom we meet or with whom we converse, the face and head being the most important part of our observation, the relation of the head to the rest of the body, joined by the neck, has thus established the main subdivision between the upright and the horizontal, not, as might naturally be supposed, by a horizontal line of equal dimensions running through the centre of the perpendicular line, but

the horizontal line from shoulder to shoulder, or extended from hand to hand stretched out horizontally, thus accentuating the chief demarcation between the head, with the neck, and the rest of the body. No doubt the cross, familiarised to all modern peoples as a symbol of Christianity, which served to receive the body with extended arms, has thus further familiarised such a subdivision, unconsciously or subconsciously, with the so-called, "golden section." Further, we must remember that the lines and proportions of the human face and of the body itself, presenting the most perfect harmony, have in their æsthetic appearance had a most important influence on the sexual instinct and sexual selection ; and that thus this, one of the most important elements, emotions, and passions in the life of man (and animals as well), is directly associated with, if not originated and modified by, the æsthetic aspect of form. But we must also realise that, even with primitive man and savages, and especially with civilised man, the nude body is covered from head to foot by different forms of raiment and embellishments, and these again in their outer appearance manifest in the highest degree of complexity all the varieties of line, colour, and form, and of purely æsthetic impressions.

Further, civilised man—and to a lesser, though considerable, degree prehistoric man and the savage—is, above all, a domestic animal. Consider the all-important fact that, though he may spend much of his time in nature in the open air, his real life, and to him the most important part of his life, at least from the point of view of pleasurable impressions, happiness, and all that directly or remotely comes under the category of æsthetic enjoyment, is spent in his house, or in similar structures in town or village. From earliest infancy upwards the form of the dwellings is thus impressed upon his senses and associated with his

very existence on every side. Consider, furthermore, that in its outer appearance, whether artistically ornamented in detail or not, the house manifests in the most impressive form the harmonious proportions of a well-defined unity of structure in the whole and in all its parts and in the relation between the parts and the whole, from foundation to roof. The intersection of doors and windows, with cornices and mouldings, present the most pronounced harmony of lines joined into unity, divided symmetrically—in short, the simplest and most convincing form of all principles of art. From this point of view there is much justification in the claim of the architect that his art is the mother of all arts ; but, without in any way considering it as a work of art, the mere constant repercussion of such a manifestation of absolute symmetry in the house as a unit, in its relation to the other houses and to the street as a whole, and the street with its pavement and middle roadway and symmetrically divided parts and direction, is a most potent vehicle for the transmission of this sense of proportion in every moment of the visual life of civilised man. And when we come to the interior, the planning and arrangement of the rooms and hallways and stairs, with steps and banisters, to the rooms themselves, in which most of the lives of most people are spent from infancy upwards, whether in work, play, or repose, consider the structure of the rooms with the low or high wainscoting, with the doors and their setting, as well as the window frames and the windows, with the cornice leading over to the ceiling, simple or ornate in moulding or decoration, with the position of the fireplace in its relation to doors and windows, until we come to the furniture and its position in the room, and to the articles of furniture themselves, displaying in chairs, couches, tables, in each as a whole and in every part

of their structure, plain or decorated, the most complex and most pronounced symmetry and harmony of proportion ; and when finally we consider that the eye and the sense of touch and the whole perceptive consciousness of every man and woman is thus continuously living within surroundings which, above all, impress in their totality and in their every detail proportion of line, shape, and colour in the most pronounced and continuously impressive form, we must realise that the lives of civilised men and women are set in a world of clearly and convincingly expressed harmony, symmetry, and proportion.

Yet, furthermore, every article of dress and of use, apart from those which are meant by their artistic form directly to satisfy the æsthetic instinct, clearly and wholly show in their structure and the finish of elaboration (as did the stone implements of pre-historic man) the feeling for form, appealing to touch or sight. I have more than once insisted upon the fact that the greater proportion of our industries in crafts and manufacture, in the making of them and in their appeal to the purchaser, are intended to stimulate and to satisfy the feeling for form. Even in the transportation and packing of them, whether in a paper parcel, box, or case, the symmetry of form is the most manifest feature. It is no exaggeration to say that there is hardly a moment that passes in the existence of civilised man in which some of his senses are not impressed by these purely æsthetic stimulations and elements. And it is therefore not to be wondered at that in the phraseology, not only of the cultured and educated classes or individuals, but in that of the simplest people, far removed from what has been called the "Hellenic spirit," and quite unconscious of "art for its own sake" or æsthetics in any form, the terminology used to express

their approval or disapproval of the constant experiences in their daily life as well as of the people and objects about them, and even of their work and occupation, is essentially of an æsthetic nature. With the least cultured people, things and work are either nice or nasty, fine or mean, splendid or poor, beautiful, ugly, or beastly, or they may use still more emphatic adjectives of approval or disapproval borrowed from the outer appearance of things.

If we really dwell upon, and fully appreciate, these simple influences of daily life upon civilised man, we shall realise the dominant part which the æsthetic factor plays in his existence.

CHAPTER VI

THE ACTIVE INFLUENCE OF THE ÆSTHETIC OR HARMONISTIC PRINCIPLE

ALL that has hitherto been said concerning the æsthetic element as dominating the perceptive faculties applies more to the passive and receptive perceptions themselves. We now come to the element of æsthetic satisfaction or pleasure in the active aspect of the organs of sense-perception, namely, in their function as such, in the liberation of their functional energy, as distinguished from their reception of outer stimuli. Here again we must establish two main subdivisions : (1) The delight in the function itself for its own sake purely and simply, whether physical or mental ; (2) the direction or modification of the æsthetic element, by the search for formal harmony, beauty, and even use. In this second division we approach more closely and directly the development of art and the theory of that department of mental activity.

But, before entering upon this inquiry into the active side of our perceptive senses and faculties, we must in a few words consider the sexual instincts ; but only in their bearing upon the harmoniotropic and æsthetic instincts. The supreme importance of the sexual instinct in life, upon which the preservation and continuance of the species depends, can hardly be overestimated. Whether the sexual impulses are based merely upon the normal internal functioning of the physiological elements concerned in the normal

life of all organisms and in man, we need not consider here. That they are most active and powerful must be admitted. But we are concerned with the excitation of these functions through outer and inner stimuli which produce desire, passion, and that emotional state in man termed *love*. Here again arises the question whether the conditions producing this stimulation are due to the racial "affinities" (or harmonies), or affinities among the same species or between definite individuals among these, subconsciously producing "attraction" (as *per contra* antagonisms are similarly produced); or whether they are, in a higher degree of consciousness, awakened and intensified by the perception of quality in individuals which produces what in one simple word we call "admiration." Our subdivision, be it understood, does not exclude the combination and fusion of both these elements, the subconscious and the conscious.

In the first source of stimulation it is evident that in the "affinity" or harmony of the outer object, itself a direct and complete manifestation of the harmonistic principle, and its harmonious response to the mentality as well as to the physical nature of the receptive being (whether plant, animal, or man), the harmonistic and æsthetic element is emphatically dominant. Darwin even, uses the highly complex term "beauty" as being the dominant element in sexual affinity and selection, on which latter the evolution of organisms and man greatly depends.

In the second origin of erotic tendencies, to which the term "love" may more fittingly be applied, sexual affinity and selection are no doubt also active, as they are in the lower organisms. But sexual affinity is turned into "elective affinity." Furthermore, the object which thus incites and develops sexual emotion produces, through the perceiving senses, what again in one simple term we call "admiration." Those

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qualities which produce "admiration" may in man be of a physical or of a mental and spiritual nature. They may be perceived and realised with full consciousness or in various degrees of subconsciousness, and may be the outcome of direct or reminiscent stimulation of those elements which produce the emotion of "admiration." They may be aroused by one single quality or group of qualities or by the personality or object as a whole. Finally, the individual thus affected may, as far as conscious realisation is concerned, be in error in assigning to the one or other quality the cause of his admiration.

Admiration as an emotional state thus responds to qualities and objects not necessary to the physical subsistence of human beings—purely physical—in nature, but may be mental and spiritual; and thus the love or *Eros* of Plato applies to all love of the perfect, the *ideal*, including even the cognitive *Eros* which impels man to the love of Wisdom or Philosophy. It thus produces the mental or spiritual desire and passion which underlie all mental and moral activities.

But what is essential to the meaning of love as the expression of the sexual instinct and passion is that "admiration" is an active emotional state producing desire which impels man to act and to create. It is thus the foundation of all willed activity, all productivity and creativeness in man—it forms the outgoing, "poietic" passion which, beyond mere physical subsistence in the lower organisms, leads man to will and to act, to produce and to create, and thus enters into every activity and every phase of life and mind in the existence of man.

What, however, we are concerned with is that, whether through racial and subconscious "affinity" and sexual selection, or through admiration, the æsthetic instinct and faculty are strengthened in

the mental life of man, and, through them, permeate his every activity.

There is attached to, or implied in, all normal functioning of the human organs an æsthetic element, depending, not only upon the function of individual organs as such, but also upon the harmonious relation of all the several organs of the human body, including those directly concerned in mental activity. This relationship of the part to the whole is directly concerned with normality and health, the basis of all the physiological life of the individual organic being, both from the anatomical and physiological point of view. As the subject of theoretical study this leads us to anatomy and physiology, just as the disturbance of such organic harmony in the living individual being constitutes the study of pathology. But when we regard this group of phenomena, not from the outside as objects of such study, but within the individual reflecting the sensory and emotional states corresponding to the normal and healthy function, approaching from the subconscious to the conscious dwelling upon such complete and harmonious relationship of structure and vitality, we have a direct response in human perception, emotion, and consciousness to the æsthetic principle of harmony. In a general sense the sum of such emotion arising out of the normal and healthy functioning, when sufficiently strong to manifest itself in a general perception, emotion, or in consciousness, leads to a feeling of vigorous vitality, and may be summarised under the French phrase *la joie de vivre*; just as *per contra* a disturbance in the functioning of the human organs and an inharmonious relationship in their organic inter-activity produce disease, discomfort, pain, or at least what neuro-pathologists have called "organ-sensations," in which latter condition the functioning of those single organs—essential to normal self-preservation,

each in complete subordination to the organic unity of functions—becomes obtrusively aggressive and in so far disturbs the mental and emotional equilibrium. On the other hand, not by the involuntary obtrusion of such organ-sensations, but when the designed desire of activity or a completely directed conscious activity of will is centred upon some individual function, the perfect functioning of individual organs or groups of organs, apart from their normal subordination to the central object of physiological self-preservation, may also become directly pleasurable in the conscious or subconscious realisation of the harmony in the functioning of such organs themselves. Thus the complete, accurate or comprehensive perceptive or receptive activities of the eye and the ear and of touch in perceiving form and colour and sound may in themselves as functions, when realised to be working harmoniously and perfectly, be a source of such æsthetic pleasure. The same applies to our muscular activity and the realisation of its stored up energy and vitality, as we see by the delight of the infant in its own vitality in movement and in exercise, by the jumping and dancing of children, their shouting and their singing, and by the pleasure in exercise and sport of adults.

It may not be inadvisable here to cast by anticipation a suggestive glimpse into the later region of fully developed art and the æsthetic principles which underlie and permeate it. Now, it is out of this delight in the spontaneous liberation of vital energy (muscular, organic, and mental) as well as in the spontaneous and perfect functioning of our muscles and organs, that, on the physical side, all that may be summarised under the word play and, on the mental side, all that approaches directly to art, are developed in the human species. The pleasure in what we call exercise pure and simple, walking,

running, jumping, shouting, leads to our organised games, and the whole development of our athletic institutions. On the mental side the same liberation of mental energy leads to art in all its forms. Between the two, where the physical and mental join and intermingle, we come to symmetrical and rhythmical or consciously harmonious movement in dance, or we convert the shouting into singing, and find delight in the regularity of beat or metre, in the dancers, the regular clapping of hands, or striking of the "tom-tom," or in the music and even the verses of the most primitive people, until out of these simple forms of pleasure in harmonious muscular activity and sense-perception, there spring all the creative arts and crafts of time and space in decorative arts, in architecture, sculpture, painting, as well as in music and poetry. I must still further point out and anticipate what belongs to later inquiry, the fact that such æsthetic activity cannot occur when function and exertion are directed to some definite outer production responding to duty or utility, if this outer object absorbs the whole of attention and motive force and leaves no opportunity for pleasure in the function itself. This marks the difference between work and play, as it also does in later stages between the pragmatic or useful, the ethical or good, or the scientific or true, attitude of the mind. Play and art thus do not belong to the activities immediately necessary for physical self-preservation, but constitute what might be called, with some suggestive vagueness of meaning, luxury, in contradistinction to necessity. Though it is therefore only in the more restful moments of recreation or in the comparatively more advanced organisation of social life that such "luxury" of existence becomes a conscious aim of human activity, and then produces "culture," we have not yet found, in even the most primitive phases of existence in

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historic and prehistoric times, any period when such activities did not form a part of the life and were not of paramount importance to primitive human beings. On the other hand, the more highly civilised societies become, the more fully are these elements of existence recognised, organised, and developed. In this respect it is a most suggestive fact in history that the ancient Greeks, to whom civilised man down to the present day owes what is most essential to our civilisation in all departments, were also the first to have developed, on the one side, athletic games as an essential institution of their communal and national society, and on the other art—and, moreover, pure art, that is, art the physical expression of which, e.g. picture, statue, drama, poem, music, etc., served no other purpose than the immediate and complete satisfaction of the æsthetic instinct as such.

For many years I have been engaged in lecturing for the Gilchrist Educational Trust ¹ to the working

¹ The most illustrious as well as most successful lecturers, among many others, were Huxley, Sir Robert Ball, and Dr. Dallinger. In every lecture we addressed hundreds and even thousands of skilled and unskilled labourers in every part of the country, from the North of Scotland to Land's End and from the West of Ireland to the east coast of England. They were chiefly in the industrial centres, but also extended to agricultural and fishing districts. They generally lasted for an hour and a quarter, during which these large and mixed audiences manifested unbroken attention, sustained interest sometimes rising to enthusiasm. The lecture from which a passage is here given began with the statement that, in singling out among qualities which tended to make life efficient and happy, perhaps the most prominent was the sense of proportion. It was this sense which enabled us justly to balance the claims of others and our own, the importance of individual disappointments and sorrows in their relation to our life as a whole, and it even enabled us to be just to ourselves in that we could justly harmonise our duties with our capabilities. The most important aspect of our life in which it produced beneficent peace and contentment was the division and harmony between our life of work and of play. It was with the latter division with which the lecture was chiefly concerned. The second half of the lecture was devoted to Greek Art with illustrations. Absolute evidence was produced that these audiences learnt fully to appreciate, e.g., the beauties of the Parthenon pediments.

population of the United Kingdom, one of which was on "Labour and Art in English Life, illustrated by Greek Art," which I am justified in saying was eminently successful in bringing home to the labouring population the position which art has held, and ought to hold, in the life of a civilised community. It may be useful to quote a passage here illustrative of the preceding contention. Of course, in bringing home to them in some form the distinctive character of artistic perception, one was bound to avoid, as far as possible, abstract generalities, and to employ definite examples. Beginning with the production or the purchase of a walking-stick, or of a pipe, one endeavoured to convince them how potent was the artistic instinct in their choice of such objects, and how this choice illustrated the essential principles of art in proportion and harmony. But, with regard to the artistic element in the functioning of the human organism just referred to, I always found two special examples of convincing effectiveness: the first was a detailed account of the duty of the postman on his daily round; the other was the form and colour of an apple.

"The postman has to go from this place X to that village Y, which is six miles off. Day by day, in rain or sunshine, whether he is tired or fresh, ill or well, he has to trudge his daily round and deliver his letters. Every limb and muscle of his body is subordinated to this supreme task of making his round, and his eyes and his attention must not wander; they must be fixed on the letters which are in his charge, so that he may deliver each one to the house indicated by the address on the envelope. You will all admit that this is work—hard work. Now, you or I, who happen not to be postmen, but are working men, each one of us in our several ways, are cooped up for every day of the working week in our workshop, in the factory or the mill, down in

the pits, or in our shop, in our office, in our study—we are all working men, at least I hope so. Well, let us say we have a holiday, or a half-holiday—a whole holiday would be better—and, being normal, healthy human beings, possessing the two great requisites for happiness and efficiency—a good digestion and a good conscience—we are not satisfied to remain indoors and mope, and we do not wish to work at what is our exclusive occupation during the week ; so our healthy energy drives us out and we take the same walk which the postman took. But, mark the difference ! Every step we take, the act of planting our feet firmly and pushing back our knees vigorously, of contracting and extending our every muscle—these acts are not subordinated to any further duty or task, but the exertion of energy becomes a pleasure in itself. The expansion of our chest as we breathe in the fresh pure air in this beautiful country when you get beyond the town and the smoke of the factories, the very act of breathing, becomes a source of pleasure. We need not trudge on wearily and reluctantly, as the postman does—our very effort is the object and aim of our moving and is in itself a source of delight. And our eyes ! They are not riveted upon the letters and the address of the houses which we may pass ; but we allow them free scope to drink in all the beauty of the country about us. The road itself, winding along like a bright fawn-coloured ribbon, as it ascends the hills and dips into the valleys ; the hedgerows on either side with the lovely mass of plants and shrubs, each smallest particle of which presents a world of beautiful lines and hues and colours against the blue sky ; and, further afield, the gracefully undulating country, rich in its green turf, more beautiful than any velvet carpet that man's hand can weave ; even the colour of the ploughed field, from dark russet and brown, through yellowish buff and mauve, changing with every season and always beautiful to the eye ; and where the dip is down the valley, where the bubbling, babbling stream rushes along between the overhanging trees ; and up again to your beautiful hills

whose green slopes gradually fade away into a misty blue—all this your eyes drink in with a gladness that fills your soul. And, when the sunset comes—such as we had this evening—you see beyond and between each hill the whole sky streaked and flecked with clouds, deep blackish-grey on either side, and between them the setting sun sinks down, a fiery vermilion globe. And, as it gradually disappears between the masses of grey clouds to right and left, the sky between becomes a bright luminous transparent endless sea of molten silver, that gradually grows deeper, turning more to yellow, until it becomes again a fiery mass of molten gold. And from gold it grows ruddy, at first a delicate pink ; then a richer crimson in the centre, and, through the delicate pink, the clouds that are touched by it are embroidered with a luminous golden band between the mass of pink, bright and filled with light ; they fade towards green, to a delicate light sea-green as this whole mass of light and colour sends its last rays, sweeping over the darkening green fields ; and you stand in the midst of all this world of colour and form, drunken with the sight of it, and your heart is filled with the beauty of its harmonious life, until your joy becomes too solemn for expression and fills your whole nature with a glow of responsive gratitude. This walk is the play-side ; the postman's walk was the work-side.

“ Let me give you one more instance :

“ An apple is, to most of us, simply an article of pleasant food and nothing more. Now, remember, only one person can possess that apple and eat it ; and if two people want the same apple—ah, that is the beginning of all envy, hatred, and malice ! And if two nations want the same tract of land, as we have seen but recently in the south-east of Europe, they spring at each other's throats, and the fields flow in blood. But has it ever occurred to you that there is another way of regarding that apple ? When you go home this evening, do me the favour to take an apple, and put it on your hand and look at it. Don't consider it as an article of food, and forget

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the fact that it belongs to you. Only look at its form and colour. Has it ever occurred to you what a beautiful object an apple is? Note the lovely *rondeur* of it, the beautiful roundness. Not the roundness of a circle drawn with a pair of compasses, hard and mechanical in its absolute regularity, but a lovely 'variegated *rondeur* full of movement and life in the flow of lines ; slightly flattened at the top, where it dips down in the little hollow that we did not like as children because we could not eat it ; curves intersecting each other on either side—not one apple is exactly like the other, and each contains a world of beautiful harmonious form. And the colour of it ! On the one side you have a deep cherry red, most intense in the centre of it and gradually shading off more delicately into tender reddish hues that grow more and more pink and then end interfused with a tinge of yellow that leads over into a greenish hue as you come to the other side ; and the green, quite pale, becomes more intense and deeper until it grows into a rich verdant green opposite to the deep crimson red on the other side ; the small roughly rounded object presenting you with a world of colour and gradations of colour in itself, harmonised throughout, and lines and mass and curves and colours uniting into one harmony and beauty of form and, through your eyes, fills your own soul with its own harmony and beauty.

“ Now, mind you—and this is an important point—not only you can thus enjoy it. Every other person who looks at it in the same way and in the same spirit can derive the same refining and elevating pleasure out of it, and its substance is not diminished thereby. It does not become the apple of desire and discord ; it is not consumed by one person only with the enjoyment of the eating of it. The desire to possess it does not produce antagonism between people who crave for it, hatred and malice among them, and greed that fills their soul with wrath. On the contrary, the fact of enjoying it, the fact that there are kindred souls who can be moved by the same ennobling spirit of artistic delight, draws you together.

That is the spirit of art ; it is the golden chain that knits humanity together, instead of severing them ; that purifies and elevates the soul and leads it on to love and fellowship of mankind and of all the works of God. The more people enjoy a work of art, the more does it fulfil its sacred destiny, and the substance of the work itself is not diminished. On the contrary, we may say the vitality of its existence is thereby confirmed and increased. A great drama or a great poem that is not heard by a large number of people who can thrill with the harmony of diction, and can be moved by the scenes and the stirring events and feelings which they convey, is dead and does not exist ; but the more people who are thus moved by such a work, the greater is its artistic life and vitality. A great symphony or oratorio or any work of music that does not cause the heart-strings of the listeners to vibrate in harmony with its own beautiful tones and the rhythmical sequence of its melody and metric harmony is dead ; but the more it thus moves, refines, and elevates the greatest number of people, the more does it live. And so with a statue that presents the most beautiful forms in nature in harmonious masses, with gracious curves which reproduce the great types and ideals which have been evolved by nature in its struggles towards perfection for countless ages ; so also with a great picture that transfers the beautiful forms of nature and the semblance of man and his life on the flat canvas ; and by means of drawing and composition of lines and colours harmonised, and light and shade and perspective, selects from the world without what is most beautiful and gives it back to the eye of man, capable of receiving the noblest gift of beauty which this life can present to us. So with art in all its forms. And all these great works treasured up through past centuries, from every race and from every clime, produced by the great geniuses of the world with the work of their hands and the sweat of their brows—nay, the blood of their hearts—they are all there ready for us. And how many of you enjoy their fruit, and give back to them the very soul

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of their vitality for which they were created and for which they exist for mankind?

“ I am not overstating my case when I say to you that every man and woman of ordinary intelligence, possessed of normal senses (for if they are born colour-blind or note-deaf they cannot appreciate pictures or music), can arrive at the appreciation of the highest works of art—provided you are given the chance and, above all, give yourselves a chance of cultivating and training your faculties. But how often have I heard you say : ‘ These things are not for us ; they are for our betters.’ That is not true. Such servility of mind, unworthy of free men, arises out of mental sloth and intellectual cowardice. The great art treasures in our country belong to the nation—*they belong to you* ; and what good are they to you, what use do you make of them ?

“ If you were told that beneath the soil on which I am now standing there were treasures of precious metals or valuable chemicals, you would think that it was ‘ flying in the face of Providence ’ that such values remained unused, that such huge capital brought no interest. And here, in the great works of art, the most valuable treasure, the noblest spiritual capital of the nation, remains unused, yields no interest as far as you are concerned—in fact, is by your indolence and subserviency deprived of its life, lies dead ! For, as I have said, a work of art which is not perceived is dead, and can only be resuscitated to life by the responsive human soul, by æsthetic appreciativeness.”

Thus art is the final and most direct expression of the active influence of the harmonistic and æsthetic principle dominating the senses and the whole mind of man.

CHAPTER VII

THE DOMINANCE OF THE ÆSTHETIC ATTITUDE OF MIND IN CULTURED LIFE

THE result of our inquiry into the *active* functioning of the human mind, as affected by the æsthetic or harmonistic principle, has shown us how it leads to "play" and, finally, to the production of art. These results will be further investigated from a more special point of view in the chapter on Æsthetics in the Second Part.

But we must now return to consider the influence and dominance of the æsthetic attitude of mind in civilised, and even cultured, life as produced by our mental need for symmetry, proportion, order, law in the highly organised life of what we may call the historical period of human society. In the various aspects of this life we are concerned with the life of reason, of use, and economy, of social and ethical order, of political organisation, and, finally, of religious ideals, as well as with art; and these subdivisions of the main question, as I have already said, will be dealt with specially in the chapters on Epistemology, Æsthetics, Pragmatics, Ethics, Politics, and Religion in the Second Part. At the same time, however, while we are now endeavouring to realise the influence and dominance of the æsthetic and harmonistic attitude of mind within the wholeness of life, we must point to those facts in the actual ordinary life of civilised man which prove this dominant influence in our conscious existence.

In the first instance, it is all-important for us to consider that civilised man—and this is true even of the beginnings of civilisation when 'purely animal instincts and passions predominated over the organised life of the family and of society—undergoes from birth upwards, far into adult life, a process of training or education to prepare and fit him as a member of ordered civilised existence. Now, it is through this training and education in the home and in the school that system, order, law, harmonious relationship of man to man and to the material and moral world in which he lives, are designedly and systematically impressed upon him from infancy upwards, until, habitually and subconsciously, as well as consciously and in willed action, his whole mentality is based upon this summary ideal of social harmony. This applies to his mental faculties, to the direction of his will, to the control of all elements that make up intelligence and to his own individual deportment as an individual. From infancy upwards he is insistently impressed with the general framework of his existence within order and law, in the division of time for his life and his occupation, according to firmly established principles ; in the regulation of time ; in the broad division of occupations between work and play, between duty and recreation ; in the indulgence and realisation of his own needs and desires, as well as of those of others ; in his deportment, habits, and manners in order to contribute to the peaceful and pleasant flow of human intercourse and the avoidance of conflicts and disturbances ; and, finally, in the direct modification of his own personality so that it should be æsthetically attractive and not repulsive—the care and cleanliness of his person beyond mere hygienic needs (though these also are ultimately reducible to harmonistic principles), including to the care and embellishment of his dress. All these factors constantly and continuously

impress upon him the ordered and harmonious life, the foundation of an æsthetic principle of guidance directing the existence of each individual towards a harmonious whole of civilised society. When we come to his direct ethical and intellectual training we again have a completely organised and ordered system harmonious in itself, as well as in the proportion which it bears to the wholeness of civilised life, as developed in the teaching of school and in the home. The life of reason and the life of justice and goodness are thus impressed upon him by the established rules of order and proportion and harmony ; while in the elementary and advanced teaching of this life of reason, thought, and knowledge, as we shall more fully realise as we proceed, he is subconsciously, if not consciously, impressed and habituated by means of the harmonious structure and method of the various departments of knowledge and thought. In these particulars, by systems developed through many ages, in the simplest subjects like language, grammar, and arithmetic, as well as in the higher departments of science, the harmonious structure of reason applied to the world of things, to the material and to the spiritual world, is infused into his whole mentality.

Through education and continuous experience civilised man thus becomes the reasoning being and is thereby distinguished from the brute animal world, and this life of reason becomes a dominant quality in his consciousness, in his normal existence, in contradistinction to the unreasoning, the chaotic, and casual, as well as inharmonious, existence of the haphazard sequence of events, ending in conflict, which would be his condition were it not guided by such established and dominant order. However much and frequently in the experiences of his life he may meet with the power and often the prevalence of unreason, of stupidity, and even of insanity ; how-

ever much he, or those with whom he associates, may prove blind or deaf to the vision and the hearing of truth and reason, the shock, pain, or revulsion which will be thereby caused will only the more confirm the ruling supremacy of reason as the normal condition of his conscious mentality through which he can realise with wonder, pain, or opposition the exceptional obtrusion of unreason—just as before we noticed that in his perception of nature the accidental and inharmonious phenomena only confirm the symmetrical and harmonious laws of form in nature.

The same applies to the conditions of use and economy in life and in the occupations and material aims of man's existence. His own work and that of others is organised so as to fit harmoniously in with the work and the needs of the society in which he lives ; and again, in spite of the failures and imperfections, disharmonies, ineptitudes, and injustices which may divert the successful striving after economic harmony ; and in spite of the continuous changes and conflicts which arise in order to harmonise supply and demand, and the means and ends of material subsistence, it is because this final goal of establishing complete harmony within the discord is the leading factor in our mentality that the disharmonies are felt and that society struggles for final adjustment and harmony.

The same again emphatically applies to man's specifically social life and the codes of laws and morals, including manners, which are developed in each successive period, harmonious in themselves, in order to lead to the final harmony of collective life. If man is differentiated from animal as an intellectual being, he is also eminently so as a moral and social being. From childhood up, a civilised man—even if he develops into a criminal—has impressed upon him the ruling moral standards of the society in which

he lives. Justice and charity are infused into his mentality from his earliest years upwards. All the actions of the human animal before the establishment and recognition of these leading moral laws, and the moral consciousness of the society in which he lives, were casual and unrelated to one another, caused and directed merely by the momentary instinct or impulse, until, through the evolution of consciousness and self-consciousness and the relation to other conscious and active beings like himself, by means of memory and association, his actions are all integrated in his consciousness as emanating from himself—those of the past as well as the present—including even his prospective desires and activities in the future, his intentions, hopes, and aspirations. Out of this confluence and integration of mental activities there grows his *Conscience*, the mental power and constraining force which unites all his past actions and the memory of them into a unit and recognises their living relationship to his own self and to other beings and to the world of things without. Corresponding to this organic and complex relationship, indissolubly bound in the consciousness of man into a unity which constitutes his own moral personality, there arises in him what in one word is called his conscience, which again harmonises with the collective conscience of the community in which he lives. In the light of this ruling spiritual factor of man's actions as seen and felt, he is bound to feel the constraining impulse to harmonise his actions with his conscience. Justice and charity in social life are the expressions of that need for moral harmony towards which, by the very nature of his mentality, he must strive. But here again, as we have seen before, the actual experiences of life will show that these moral laws do not always exercise their unquestioned sway. Wrongdoings, injustices, and

criminalities abound—the Good does not prevail in this life.

We finally come to the second subdivision in this phase of our inquiry, namely, the mere functioning of the organs themselves, to the higher activities as directed and strongly modified by the æsthetic element. But I wish my readers to distinguish here a somewhat difficult and intricate point. Remember that we are still considering the origin and the development of the æsthetic element in the mind, which will enable us later on to realise not only the whole of human activity as directly produced, or affected by the æsthetic instinct as such, but also its continuous and all-pervading effectiveness, if not its dominance, throughout all the phases of life. We are therefore now merely trying to grasp the production of the æsthetic instinct as well as the confirmation and strengthening of that instinct, the view-point and the habit of mind, so that finally we shall be able fully to comprehend to what degree this element becomes a directing part of our whole mentality (more especially through the emotions and the imagination) and of all our activities.

It is from this point of view, and from this point of view only, that I wish you to realise how the whole of our experiences of human life thus impress upon us in their totality, as well as in detail, the æsthetic principle. Here again, as in the recognition of natural laws, in education, and in economics, the experiences which counteract the dominance of moral law and order in life confirm their rule within our consciousness as standards of perfect life—of all life. For, however the constant repercussion of our life-experience may impress upon us the rule of injustice, so that at times we may question

Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,

Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
And by opposing end them ?

For who would bear the whips and scorns of time,
The oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely,
The pangs of despis'd love, the law's delay,
The insolence of office, and the spurns
That patient merit of the unworthy takes,
When he himself might his quietus make
With a bare bodkin ?

whatever irrationalities may thwart the expectancy of, and the desire for, a reasoned succession of events by due cause and effect without the intervention of what we call chance, good fortune, luck ; however inharmonious and discordant from our reason all about us may be,—these experiences only confirm in us the dominant harmony of our spirit, the ever-present longing for justice, for the rational balance of moral cause and effect, for success in our well-directed enterprise, for the admiration of the great and good man, and of pure and noble lives, with the recognition of supreme eminence instead of undeserved failure. We do indeed find the mean and bad man successful and prosperous. Yet all our longings for moral balance, for the victory of moral principles, for the realisation of Poetic Justice, only confirm the passionate and ever-present hope that complete harmony may succeed the discord and cacophony about us ; and this hope or passionate endeavour, this protest or unremitting fight is the mainspring of our conscious existence and of the human will, individual and collective. It matters not that we may relegate perfect harmony to Utopia, or that, realising this imperfect world of ours, we may be fully aware that such harmony is still indefinitely remote. But the standard of the perfect world is the basis of all our values, and harmony of life the guiding principle of our consciousness, from which the disheartening realities are but tortuous deviations and bypaths.

The pessimist is really a disappointed optimist, as the sceptic is the disappointed dogmatist. They profess scepticism or pessimism because the highest standards and ideals dominate their inner life as opposed to outer life and reality. And, after all, perhaps were we to tabulate our experience with statistical accuracy, we should find that the cases in which true merit is unsuccessful and the unworthy wins the day are really exceptional, and that, when our experiences are summed up and balanced the good and best are really the victors.

In organised society, in politics, in the life of communities and States, man is again impressed throughout his life with their orderly and harmonious organisation, in contradistinction to disorganisation, anarchy, and disharmony. It is an old commonplace that "order is the soul of the State." In every State and in every organised community within it, the harmonious relationship of all individuals to their corporate bodies is the recognised guiding principle. However they may differ in form and conception, they all directly tend to further peace, contentment, progress, and the harmonious collective life within their separate organisations ; but, further, the life of these separate bodies, local or federal, must be harmonised with the wider unit, and finally nations and States must ultimately be harmonised (among each other) in their due relationships, confirming justice and peace. In spite of all the changes in political organisation during the ages of historical evolution, in spite of all the differing forms of government, in spite of all discontent, reform, and even revolution, the one fact remains—that the aim and the soul of all government is the realisation of harmony between the citizens of the State and of other States which will confirm freedom, peace, and prosperity by means of law and order. It is here that, from childhood

upwards, all civilised men and women have impressed upon them throughout their lives the dominance of harmony in human existence, even if they be criminals or revolutionists.

Finally, in religion man aspires to the realisation of the perfect life, the supreme harmony between his highest aspirations and conceptions, and the ultimate realisation, in this or in some other life, of these highest ideals. The soul of harmony is here complete. In spite of all imperfections which, in the outer realisation of this ultimate religious harmony, the creeds of man may show in their successive phases, from crass superstitions, magic, fetishism, idol-worship of the most material nature upwards, through the lives of saints and martyrs and the creeds which inspired them, the ultimate aim and soul of all religion is this striving for supreme and final harmony. The impress which the religious life and teaching thus give to the mind is, above all and most directly, the Principle of Harmonism.

It is thus that in the existence of civilised man, and in the whole development of his mentality and his subconscious as well as conscious life, he has constantly impressed upon him, as the basis of all civilised spiritual existence, in which mind dominates over matter, the principle of Harmony manifested in him by the æsthetic attitude of mind.

PART II
SPECIAL

PART II

INTRODUCTION

IN the first part of this book, dealing with the problem of Harmonism from the general point of view, we were concerned in discovering the origin of the æsthetic instinct in life and mind and its dominance in man in the form of Harmoniotropism, leading to Aristotropism, made more effective by the presence and activity of the dualistic senses and the symmetrical division of organic bodies, organs, and senses, and their functions, and in the single (not dualistic) senses by their somatocentric and centrobaric tendencies, which latter in turn facilitate the development of sentience, perception, consciousness, and, finally, self-consciousness. We traced the origin of these principles back through the animal and plant world to the most rudimentary organisms, and finally saw how the life-experience of human beings, possessed of normally developed minds, accounted for the dominating influence of this æsthetic instinct in man underlying all conscious and subconscious activities.

We now turn in the life of the fully developed normal human being to the special or philosophical aspect of the question. We shall here again see how in the mental development of man, as manifested in the several departments constituting his systematic conscious life—in Epistemology, Æsthetics, Pragmatics, Ethics, Politics, and Religion—the æsthetic instinct, operating through the harmoniotropic and aristotropic principles, is ultimately dominant and

constitutes the elementary and final principle of rational existence.

We found that, even with lower organisms, sentience—which by gradual stages leads to consciousness—did not depend upon a purely *monistic* principle, in which either the outer stimulus itself “mechanistically” determined the nature of sentience, nor yet upon the inner disposition of the receptive organ, be it through *entelechy* or through “purposefulness.” It really depends upon the *triadic* harmonistic relationship in the nature of the outer stimuli, in the receptive organs themselves, and between the two, all three relationships establishing the final harmonistic relation. It is again through the harmonistic principle in time and space, by periodic repercussion on the one hand, and by physical and sensory affinity on the other, producing corresponding changes in the receptive organs, that these organs are developed in the line of sentience, and a corresponding state of the organism results from such repercussion of stimuli and sensory states, out of which grow *memory* and *association*. But memory depends upon the most pronounced form of harmonism, namely, identity of successive stimulations, or something closely approximating identity; while association depends upon the harmonious affinity in the outer stimuli (physico-chemical or more complex), as well as upon the inner harmonious affinity of the sensory organs and their activities.

Now, when in the fully developed human being memory and the associative feelings are once established, all conscious impressions from without, all perceptions, are conveyed by means of images.¹ These images, however, always produce what we call

¹ Even in the lower organisms it has been determined that images are thus conveyed, and that, for instance, in fishes images in the form of colour patterns are transmitted through the optic nerve to the surface and are actually reproduced in the scales of fishes.

an *immotion*, a receptive nervous activity corresponding to the stimulation. This immotion, when sentience is complete, produces an *emotion*, a general mental state or condition corresponding to, and harmonising with, the perceptive image. Otherwise the outer stimulus, though striking the peripheral receptor organs, fails to be perceived. An inorganic body, a stone, or even an organic body not possessed of sensory organs attuned to the outer stimulation, fails to feel the stimulation and is not moved by it. Through the more passive state of immotion the step is made to the more active state of emotion. Through memory and association a similar or harmonic emotional state or mood is thus spontaneously evoked and recalled.

No conscious or subconscious stimulation or immotion is purely objective in the developed mentality of man. We might even say that no so-called reflex action (excepting perhaps those depending upon galvanotropism) is purely objective. They are none of them unalloyed as regards the emotional state of the mentally developed organism. The receptor organ or organs are not purely passive recipients of an objective stimulation. An emotive state, based upon memory and association, at once reacts to every stimulation and perception by calling up similar images which in the higher human mind take the form of (literally) Imagination, and which essentially directs the reaction to the outer stimulus or perception of outer objects.

Now, it depends upon the relative clearness of the image thus evoked through the imagination to what degree the emotional and motive activity becomes conscious, designed, and reasoned, or subconscious, vague, and unreasoned. There is thus an infinite gradation from the most mechanical form of reflex action, through all stages of subconsciousness, to

clear purpose, design, will, reasoned volition, and purposeful activity.

Excluding the insane and mentally deficient, as well as all states of hypnosis, and also of those states when we are what we call "blinded" by passion, or are in fits of "absent-mindedness" (when purely by the spontaneous activity of subconscious memory and association our emotional states dominate our consciousness and resultant activity),¹ *every conscious form of activity, controlled and directed by the mind, is determined by the activity of the imagination, dependent upon and directed by the harmoniotropic tendency in its higher conscious form of the aristotropic faculty of the mind. The step from the harmoniotropic to the aristotropic activity of the mind is analogous to, though not identical with, that noted from sexual affinity and selection to elective affinity in sexual life referred to in Part I.*

Every single action, however simple, common, and material, as well as our most complex, exceptional, and spiritual activities, if wholly conscious, are all preceded by an image presented to our inner consciousness. This image directs our activity, our energy, our desire and aim. The clearer the image, the more conscious, the more completely willed, and the more intellectually reasoned does that action become. The vaguer the emotion, the less defined in consequence will be the image, the less clear our purpose and design—our Will—and the more are we guided by subconscious emotional images, blurred

¹ The fundamental thesis of a remarkable book by my brother, the late Dr. Louis Waldstein, is that "in whatever degree or manner these perceptions may have been received, they are registered permanently; they are never absolutely lost." In this book on *The Subconscious Self and its Relation to Education and Health*, published in 1897, but written some years before this, in spite of some marked difference in conclusions and exposition, the author had, if not anticipated, at least come to some of the chief conclusions since made public by Dr. Freud.

and vague in outline and design ; but ever present as imaginative stimuli in action. The clearer our determination; the more active is the aristotropic tendency, even though it arise from a vague and perhaps faulty image. Within the focus of this determined activity there are subconscious resonances and reminiscences of a variety of images out of which the one which attracts and ultimately directs our activity stands forth in sharpest precision, even though it be wrapped in emotional indefiniteness of design.

Take the commonest acts of daily life—the eating of an apple, the shutting of a door, the moving in one direction or another—and all the innumerable acts that we do not perform automatically or in a fit of aberration or absent-mindedness, but as conscious activities. Somewhere in the mind there appears with greater or less distinctness, according to the degree of “ concentration ” of our activity, an image of the perfect accomplishment and achievement of such an act. It is the realisation of the act of eating the apple, with perhaps even the anticipation of the pleasant effects, the perfect consummation of the deed, which presents itself in some form and draws us on to the directly designed action. We see the completeness in the act of closing the door, which presents itself as the aim and stimulus to that simple action of ours. We more or less see ourselves arrived at the point which has determined us to move in a certain direction as the stimulation to our movement. Further than that, our imagination may often evoke at the same time several alternative activities, and our decision then is marked by what we should call our “ preference,” which only means that we choose what at the time we consider the “ best ”—our action is then directly determined by aristotropism.

Every single conscious action is thus preceded by

the evocation in some form and in varying degrees of consciousness, of the most perfect consummation of the act, its completion—what Platò would have called the idea or ideal of the act. We may have "made a mistake" in choosing the one image or ideal in preference to another, and our action may be imperfect, faulty, foolish, or even criminal.¹ But when we consciously chose our aim for a definite activity, it appeared to us the best at the time, and the aristropic force of the human mind was active in producing complete harmony between our individual will and the definite thing or action without or within.

Still more is this the case in the higher activities of an intellectual, moral, and social order. Our preference may be guided by pure selfishness, passion, greed, and all the "affects"; but these still produce a clear and designed image towards which we consciously strive. So also the image which forms our design may have been born out of an accumulated habit, of prejudice, or unreasonable and immoral traditions of a perverted character or *ethos*. Still, it is definitely there as what we consider best. All our actions may be directly tainted by the supreme love of self; not, as some biologists would have us believe, because of any conscious realisation of the "instinct for self-preservation," but because of the emotional states arising out of our character, which has been allowed to become absorbingly "selfish." Still, at the time our "selfish" aims appeared to us to be the best.

Nevertheless, as civilised human beings of a higher order, our conscience can be, and ought to be, directed by the laws of ethics, as our reason is trained by the laws of thought, and our taste is permeated by pure

¹ The question of legal or criminal psychology is very much concerned in thus defining what are "premeditated" actions for which an individual is responsible.

harmony and beauty. Thus the higher standards of preference above the shifting uncertainty and variety of individual interest, passion, and prejudice will permeate our character and lead our emotion, moved by our imagination, to choose what is truly best.

There is then developed the higher reasoning man ; and collectively, in human society, through countless ages of spiritual activity, there have been evolved civilisation and the summary of spiritual laws which have led to science, art, ethics, and religion, and through these to the conception of progress. This progress, this evolution of the collective human mind, is directly and consciously aristotropic ; not fatalistically tied down to mere adaptation to the surroundings—in themselves blind forces—by the “ survival of the fittest ” in the struggle of forces and conditions not directed by a reasoning and moral intelligence ; but consciously aristotropic ; in which in each age the highest results are formulated, grouped, and apprehended by reasoning man. Taking a firm footing on these highest results of Conscious Evolution—willed design—each age directed by the harmoniotropic and aristotropic forces leads upwards in natural, though designed, progression.

In this aspect of the reasoned mental life of man we have been primarily considering the ordinary activities of daily life, in which the object of each activity is clearly guided by reason through the aristotropic imagination. But the end thus “ held in view ” and the attainment of each ultimate object itself are the main incentive to our will, however much it may be guided by reason and by the striving for the Best. In one word : our attitude is eminently, if not wholly, “ *practical*,” and the mental and moral aspect ends with the attainment of the object. But there is another and higher aspect of such reasoned activity in civilised man, individual and collective,

in which the reasoned design and purpose, based upon the various relationships themselves, are the objects of mental activity, and no further individual or practical end. This we call the *theoretic* attitude, in contradistinction to the practical. But here again this willed activity of the mind is the more complete and perfect and the clearer, the more it is the outcome of pure will concentrated upon the mental relationships themselves and not the outcome of habit, instinct, passion, prejudice, or other subconscious impulses. Through the most highly developed functioning of the associative faculties of the mind, mental activity is concentrated upon the relationships, spiritual and material, which present themselves to perception and thought, leading to the final apprehension of the so-called " laws of thought " and the " laws of nature " with which all individual phenomena are to be harmonised. Moreover, this willed activity of the mind may be consciously directed upon various aspects of such relationships. First, the relationships of all mental phenomena to the laws of thought and nature, out of which grow epistemology and systematised knowledge—science. It may be concentrated upon the relationship of form and proportion in things material or spiritual, pure harmony in itself, or beauty, which leads to art. It may further consider the relationship of outer things to the individual use of man, out of which grow pragmatics and the pragmatic attitude of mind. It may further penetrate into and systematise human relationships as such—of man to himself, to his fellow-men, to human society, and to nature—which constitutes ethics. It may establish the special relationship of man to the separate groupings in human society—politics. Finally, it may establish the relationships between the human mind and the highest ideals of life and mind—religion.

As the psychological facts with which we have just been dealing are themselves the outcome of an attempt to establish the true relationships of human thought, reason, will, knowledge, and the truth resulting from the discovery of such true relationships, so we must now turn to that systematised department of the human mind which may best be termed Epistemology, and examine how far this department, of supreme importance to the understanding of life and mind, is affected by, or dependent upon, the principle of Harmonism.

CHAPTER I

EPISTEMOLOGY.

It is from the very outset important for us to realise that, though we have for the time established the difference between the practical and theoretical attitude of mind, and that though we ourselves and civilised human society collectively during many ages of historical evolution have established pure science, all these forms of mental activity in every case present themselves as activities and actions, as outcomes of the human will, though in its highest and most concentrated form. I must insist upon the importance of realising that the highest and most purely theoretical mental activity—pure thought—represents such *activities* and does not represent passive states independent of the will of the mind that thinks them. When we *think* we are performing a willed and designed mental act, in contradistinction to dreaming in “night-dreams” or “day-dreams.” In the latter our will and consciousness are passive, and it is our subconscious self or one group of ideas or feelings which ~~themselves~~ are active without the direct control of our will and the concentration of thought directed to accurate perception, knowledge, and the apprehension of truthful relations. Every act of thinking is preceded and succeeded by an emotional state fully related to, and harmonising with, the thought. It is the failure to realise this fact which accounts for the mistakes so frequently made by those who put theory and practice in irreconcilable opposition to each

other, who turn their backs on theory and insist upon the primary and supreme validity of action as opposed to thought.¹

If we have thus established the fact that all reasoned thought is not merely passive but also active, willed, through the immotions and emotional states, the imagination and aristotropic principle of choice and action, we have also realised that the more they are thus permeated by reason the more are they directly willed and active, until at last we reach the highest stage of ethical or scientific thought. For we thus have presented to us a rising scale of reasoned mental activity long after we have left the early and rudimentary forms pertaining to the undeveloped

¹ I cannot refrain here from drawing attention to one of the most perfect didactic poems in the English or any other language, namely, Mr. Kipling's "If—." Confirming one of the most striking defects of British life and mentality, within all the distinctive qualities and virtues of the British people, Mr. Kipling, in the second stanza of that remarkable poem, carried away in his exaltation of the supreme value of courageous, sane, moral, and efficient life, ignores, and more than ignores—in fact expunges—the fundamental importance of the theoretical striving of man for truth, the moral as well as the practical value of pure thought. This second stanza runs:

If you can dream—and not make dreams your master ;
If you can think—and not make thoughts your aim ;
If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster
And treat those two impostors just the same ;

With all due respect and deference for the great poet, I venture to suggest as a possible emendation for the second line in this stanza:

Can think and act or make pure thought your aim.

For Mr. Kipling himself no doubt realises the supreme value of pure thought and all scientific thought, penetrating as it does the fundamental phases of actual existence as well as the highest regions of spiritual aspirations; but he must also realise that it is one of the greatest and most urgent lessons to be impressed upon the mass of the British people that pure thought and the search after truth in itself are amongst the highest duties of a civilised community. Perhaps I might even add that the change as regards the repetition at the beginning of the line—"If you can," etc.—may relieve a certain insistent monotony caused by such repetition in the relationship between the three first stanzas.

nervous system of lower organisms and higher animals, and have ascended to human beings with fully developed minds. In the human mind we have distinguished as precursors to higher mental activity the states which we have called immotion and emotion and which have directly affected the imagination of man. In what we call immotion the accent is to a great degree placed on the outer stimulus producing a response in the nervous system. Immotion is thus chiefly dependent upon memory, which, as we have seen, arises out of the repetition of identical stimuli or of those having a specific "affinity" (which implies pure objective harmony in these stimuli, so that the same stimulations coalesce or "integrate" and group themselves together. Out of these memory images, based upon the affinity of such harmonic stimulations and experiences, grows the power of "association" which forms the groundwork for all "reasoning." Moreover, these coalesced groups have the natural tendency to predominate in the mind and thus produce feelings and moods—*emotional* states—which dominate consciousness and all mental activity. All heterogeneous stimuli (outside the integrative group and not possessing affinity or harmony with it) are disturbing and are thus "ignored" or discarded. The result of this emotional state in its active, moving force is "concentration" or attention, leading to conscious and willed activity itself, arising out of the emotion and mood corresponding to the summary of such group-stimulation, memories, and associations. In contradistinction to immotion, in emotion, as we have seen, the accent is placed on the inner functioning of the nervous system, the perceptive organs, memory, association, reasoning, will. The co-operation of all these elements together produces a mood of the whole mind, and it is through this mood, as the unit and centre of corresponding

mental and physical activity, that such activity is effective. The guiding principle of harmoniotropism underlying this activity is, through the imagination, converted into aristotropism, and leads to designed and reasoned mental acts.

In these activities, however, the mind is comparatively passive, as it is dominated by the immotional and emotional states pertaining to the mind and consciousness—the mood—as a whole. In the highest scientific apprehension, however, the attention and concentration are more actively freed from general emotional states and are designedly, by a supreme act of will, turned upon pure apprehension and thought—apprehension, moreover, of the relationships in thought, of truth, and of the laws of evidence. These mental relationships themselves are converted into one dominating emotion. The mental activity arising out of this emotion when truthful relationships are completely apprehended, so far from being passive, is the most active feat of the human will. Attention and concentration imply that the mind is fixed upon these definite relationships, and in this act a rigorous selection is made on the principles of harmony, in that all stimuli, apprehensions, and facts which are “irrelevant” to the relationship arresting the attention are discarded; until, by this strictly concentrated act, the mind is at last filled with one supreme emotion corresponding to the pure harmony of such relationships, and what we call “Conviction,” or “Belief,” in the highest form, is produced. The importance of these emotive images in this phase of scientific apprehension and the creation of a corresponding emotion or mood must be manifest. For the clearer the image and the more in harmony with the reality and “truth” of the relationships, the clearer and more “single-minded” (harmonious) becomes the emotion or mood, and therefore the more direct,

vigorous, and complete the act of apprehension. If the image is vague, the emotion or mood is vague and undecided ; if it evokes heterogeneous or discordant associations and thoughts, "negative instances," exceptions, etc., there arise in us doubts, and the less complete is the final conviction corresponding to objective truth. It is upon this selective immotiveness of the human mind, of an essentially æsthetic order, and upon the resultant emotion of conviction (which is also essentially harmonistic or æsthetic in principle) that the highest scientific apprehension is dependent.

In the ideal world and in the ideal phase of science this deductive and selective¹ activity of the mind would supersede the inductive method of apprehension. We shall see how in art the ideal phase would be reached when "composition" would be the absorbing and central activity of the artist, not material and technical activity. In composition the *selection* of elements making for perfect harmony in the work of art would be the essence of artistic creativeness ; and the technique dealing with colour and line, with the writing of words in literature and tones in music, with the building up of architectural structure, etc., would be reduced to a minimum by means of mechanical reproduction. In science the laws of nature—force, movement, and variation in the outer world—would be so thoroughly known, that we could produce them and regard them in the light of established relationships. Physics, chemistry, and biology would be reduced to a "synthetic" phase, not requiring previous analysis of observation ; until, at last, by means of mathematical formulæ,

¹See Chapter on Æsthetics, in which I endeavour to show how the ordinary act of seeing and perception through other senses is not purely passive but is active—moreover, an act of selection partaking of the essential nature of artistic creativeness.

physical, chemical, and even biological forms could be directly reproduced by experiment. Something approaching this stage may conceivably exist on one of the other planets. It certainly is with God and with the purely godlike life.

MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC

The purest form of systematic scientific apprehension is to be found in Mathematics and Logic, which directly represent the laws of thought, the mental relationships applying to all things in life and mind.¹

The full realisation of truth depends upon producing conviction, which is a form of emotion based upon the harmony of relationships; this harmony is most completely embodied in the studies of mathematics and logic. Both these sciences directly and in the purest form embody these relationships without any disturbing admixture of individual facts and forces which appeal to, and stimulate, other senses, interests, and passions which are not immediately concerned with these relationships, and in so far counteract the essential harmony upon which truth and the emotion of conviction depend for their apprehension by the human mind. Therefore, when facts and thoughts and their complicated interrelation are to be apprehended in their relationship, independent of their accidental and purely individual nature and condition, they must be reduced to the laws of mathematics and logic in order to be apprehended scientifically and with lasting validity.

But it is important for us to remember that numbers and other mathematical formulæ; as well

¹ We shall see how in art, the arts of music and of pure ornamentation hold an analogous position compared to the other arts of space and time. The step from the music of Bach to the work of the highest mathematician is, in so far, but a small one.

as logic and grammar,¹ deal only with the counters or symbols of things (abstract as well as concrete)—not with the things themselves—in order that the pure relationship should stand out in unalloyed purity to be apprehended by the mind.

Both mathematics and logic (including grammar) present most wonderful structure, the ordered and beautiful complexity of which is rarely apprehended by the ordinary human being, who has been instructed in these sciences in a mechanical manner from childhood upwards, and, through mechanical habituation, is rarely cognisant of the harmonious complexity of these highest achievements of the human mind, taking them for granted as commonplace facts of ordinary life.²

When a fact or a problem is to be fully apprehended so that evidence and proof produce the final emotion of conviction, the highest stage is reached when such evidence can be brought home in a mathematical or purely logical form. But again I wish emphatically to note that all these relationships which make for truth in its ultimate form—mathematical

¹ It is important for philologists to remember this simple fact, as well as for certain philosophers and psychologists who do not realise that language in itself, as the means of conveying things and thoughts through sound, is not primary and elementary in the world of life and mind, and that thought is far from being identical with words and that word-thinking does not cover the whole of human thought.

² In ordinary teaching the child is hardly ever led to realise the marvel, almost miracle, of the fact that in "sums" an addition, a multiplication, a division, should "come out right," and apply to the relationship of all things in life in unvarying security of this rightness. So also, having associated in its mind the tedium and distastefulness of the dry laws of grammar, it is unable ever to realise the marvel and harmonious complexity of the system of language, like the most beautiful and elaborate Gothic cathedral, in which definite meanings, unerringly communicable to its fellow-men in the exactitude of all the innumerable shadings of meaning, thought, and feeling, should be conveyed by just that one right and harmonious relationship between words, sentences, paragraphs, chapters, and books, or in continuous speech, presented to it first through grammar and then through logic.

as well as formally logical—rest upon the principle of harmony, and that, in order that the mind should not merely be engaged in a play of faculties, a game like solving a puzzle, without any deeper significance to individual and general life and the world as a whole, mathematical and logical principles must be related to and conform to the outer and inner world. They must be realities, and we must find their mathematical or logical harmony reflected in the outer and inner world, i.e. in the “laws of nature” and the “laws of thought.” As we have said before, the highest aim of science will ever be to approach as nearly as possible to the phase in which even, beyond logic, all truths of experimental science can be reduced to ultimate mathematical formulæ. We thus find ourselves face to face with the (unfortunately) fragmentary epigram of Pythagoras that “number is the essence of all things.” The end of science is thus not found in the mechanistic and synthetic reproduction of outer facts of nature and of life by means of experiment, as Professor Loeb and those who think with him would have us believe, but in the reduction of all facts of life and mind to the purest form of harmonistic relationships.

CONVICTION

On the other hand, though the test of truth thus remains with mathematics ¹ and logic, there are other

¹ Even as regards mathematics as a whole there are such individual differences among people. I may perhaps give my own experience which led me, as a boy, to be proficient in Euclid and geometry, while I was emphatically weak when beginning algebra and later forms of arithmetical studies. This was no doubt due to the fact that the sense of vision and touch—perhaps the æsthetic instinct—were most pronounced in my mental development, and that if I could reduce mathematical relationships to a visual form, there was a more immediate and complete appeal to the mental state, leading to conviction, than the less visible and plastic vehicle of relationship in numbers or mere symbols.

forms of expressing the relationships which lead to truth and "conviction," which appeal to us through other senses than the immediate harmoniotropic sense so fully and directly conveyed by mathematics and logic. According to our individual mental constitution conviction comes to us more readily or more forcibly through other senses and conditions. There may be the *demonstratio ad oculos*. In such "demonstration" and in experiment, the sense of the eye, of touch, even of taste and smell, may be vehicles for conveying truthful relation and evoking emotion and conviction. Such experiments and demonstrations may prove through the eye, or through the corresponding sense of touch, the truthful relation of things and facts to one another, and even in the test-tube of the chemist, not only the colour of his solution, but also the smell and the taste may furnish complete evidence producing conviction. We must, however, always remember that in *demonstratio ad oculos*, as well as in "synthetic reproduction by experiment," there are two elements in such a phrase, *demonstratio* and *oculos*. *Demonstratio* must produce a convincing emotion, and the eye must respond harmoniously to produce the emotion or mood. Synthetic is a harmonistic reproduction of identical conditions and phenomena by means of designed experiment.

In every case, again, it depends upon such harmonistic relations which evoke a corresponding emotion.

Whether perceptions and thoughts are innate or acquired, intuitive or experimental, transcendental or empirical ; whether acquired habits and knowledge can be transmitted by heredity or not, the fact remains that truth, truthful perception and apprehension, cannot affect the human mind towards conviction without the corresponding emotion.¹ Reduce

¹ See *The Balance of Emotion and Intellect*, p. 5 seq.

all perceptions and problems to the simplest laws of reason and thought in mathematics and logic, in order to be effective in their appeal to the human mind they must not remain a matter of pure intellect, but must be converted into an emotional state and mood corresponding to conviction. "I see, but am not convinced," "This may be all true, but I do not believe it," show that, though the formal relationships in their undoubted organic sequence and inter-relation may have been apprehended by the senses or the intellect, they have not yet succeeded in producing the emotional state necessary to conviction. This emotion is based upon harmony in the outer world of facts, and the inner world of thought in a direct appeal to what we might call the "sense of truth," filling it full with its correspondence or harmony, without the intrusion of inharmonious elements disturbing and polluting this harmony (such as negative instances, contradictory facts, prejudices, traditions, mental habits, etc.). All is based upon harmony.¹

As I have indicated above, these highest abstract relationships in mathematics and logic must, in order to stimulate the emotions, conform to the realities of outer life. It may thus be maintained that all that we have found in this epistemological inquiry is exclusively, or in too great a degree, dependent upon the merely psychological sphere or point of view. But science has amply shown that, even without the human mind, in what we term the "laws of nature,"

¹ A large field for inquiry and experiment is here opened up to the experimental psychologist and physiologist to find, if possible, whether some outer physical test can be established for this harmony of truthful relationship and conviction. Experiments made by Mr. Richard Kerr and Mrs. Watts Hughes on water-colour films or charts illustrating symmetrical forms as in music, in corresponding harmonious pictures, might perhaps be produced to represent such harmony of relationship establishing truth.

the principles of symmetry and harmony prevail. In the outer manifestations of the law of causality, of all physical and chemical laws, of astronomical observation—besides mathematics and logic, to which they are undoubtedly related—nay, even in biological science, in the realisation of the work of Darwin and Weismann, of Galton, and, recently (in Mendelian research and in Biostatistics as represented by Professor K. Pearson and others),—in all these the dominance of such mathematical and logical harmony and symmetry is manifest as the fundamental and all-pervading principle.

It is thus that in this highest intellectual activity all subjective, all specifically human, desires and prejudices must be cast out of the mind when we face the world in search of pure knowledge. We should strive to attain the attitude of mind, to use the words of Spinoza, "neither to weep nor to laugh, neither to despise nor to admire—but to know" (*neque flere, neque ridere, neque contemnere, neque admirare—sed intelligere*). As we shall see, this attitude of mind differs from the more practical and less theoretical attitude from the essentially human (though spiritual) point of view in art, pragmatics, ethics, politics, and religion. But besides assuming this general attitude we must deliberately and in every case cast out of the mind all "prejudice."

Harmonism in the relation between outer objects (including thoughts), as we have seen, may of itself (through memory and association) produce Immotion, but not Emotion, which corresponds to Conviction, unless its objective harmony so fills consciousness and creates a completely corresponding mood which we call Conviction, because it may be blocked by a thick layer of "prejudice," "convention," or "authority." We may, as it were, be in a state of Suggestion or Auto-suggestion, which interferes with the moral

effectiveness of the objective harmonism seeking its way to consciousness. Consider what occurs when people say : " That may all be demonstrably true ; but I am not convinced ! " , Apart from all-pervading passions, or equally distracting absent-mindedness—in which case the outer harmony does not penetrate or act at all upon consciousness—the subconscious elements, ever present in the human mind, may permeate the mood and dominate the emotions to such a degree as to attenuate, or essentially to modify, if not totally to divert, the direct stimuli coming from such outer harmony consciously received. These subconscious forces, collectively opposing themselves to the complete reception of outer evidence consciously received, form the mass of what we should commonly call " prejudice," and take the form of suggestion, based upon cumulative habit, education, superstition, tradition, fashion, convention, etc. In addition to this source of prejudice a more personal form can be distinguished under the term " Authority " —in which case the Authority takes the form of an active suggestive agent, or a " Suggestor." In any case the path leading to the reception of the pure outer harmony in the relationships of things in nature, as well as in thought, by the conscious thinking mind is blocked by the mass of prejudice.

But what this really shows is that some objective " proof " and evidence, even the mere statement and demonstration of laws of thought in logic and of universal relationships in mathematics and the conformity of the individual fact or problem to these, are not efficient and truly active in the mind, unless they produce the emotion of conviction and, as it were, stimulate and set vibrating the central organ or sense responding to such harmony, and thus producing an æsthetic mood fully attuned to truth, as the immediately æsthetic mood responds to beauty,

another to goodness, and still another to the ideals of religious life. Only when the mind and, through the mind, the whole personality of man, is moved by such an "æsthetic" mood is conviction complete. Conviction thus ultimately depends upon an æsthetic mood.

SCIENCE

Now, out of this concentrated activity of the mind, individually and collectively, through ages—from the elementary prehistoric feeling and thinking of man, half-animal, through all stages of civilisation, ending in the highly cultured life of the historical period, from the East through Greece and Rome, the Italian Renaissance, and the successive periods of modern enlightenment; out of this continuous and inter-relative activity, complex and beautiful, though fused into effective unity, has grown up the huge structure called Science. This *Cosmos* or conscious, systematised knowledge emerging out of the chaos of confused and unrelated sensations, experiences and thoughts, as well as passions, disordered and casual, without correlation, organisation, and unity of design or form, from childhood to maturity in the mental development of the individual and from the infancy of mankind through all ages of the human species, has established the vast and beautiful system of mental life of Reason and of Science. By the supreme and ever-active force of its inner harmony the subject-matter of thought, governed by the divine, formful and beautiful Spirit of Truth, has grouped itself by inner affinities and harmonies, spurred onward and upward by the conscious image of the Best, until there have emerged, not like Athene, sprung fully armed in adult virginal beauty from the head of Zeus, but by long struggle and labour, by continuous

evolution, the fully harmonised departments of human knowledge. It is this inherent and fundamental quality of the human mind, at once harmoniotropic and aristotropic, which has produced this highest consummation of the human spirit.

But it is well for us to remember that in the development of systematised knowledge among the individuals of successive ages direct education has always played its part. Education has been active from the rudimentary forms of teaching by example, by verbal injunction, in the earliest prehistoric ages of man, to our own highly developed systems ; and this important factor in the progress of human life and mind must ever be borne in mind. Even if "acquired" habits and mental achievements are not transmitted by heredity through individuals, and thus evolution and progress through the individual are not manifestly assured, at least collectively, in the tradition which solidifies and continues the effectiveness of all fruits of civilisation in science, art, ethics, and religion, as well as in manners, customs, and modes of living of civilised societies, progress can be guarded and directed and made to last in the continuity of its aristotropic effectiveness.

CONSCIOUS EVOLUTION THROUGH SCIENCE

In order that this progression may move in its natural evolution with the advance of the human mind and of human society, it cannot be left to the blind "struggle of existence," leading in nature to the "survival of the fittest"; it cannot mean fatalistic renunciation to outer force, but, in harmony with the aristotropic mind of man, it must be converted into what we have called Conscious Evolution. Responding to the aristotropic principle, the conditions to secure this must lead us, in the first

instance, to establish in every period the formulation of the highest achievements in each department of science by means of the clearest exposition in the language most representative of the mentality of each period, and not obscured by authoritative standards or dominant modes of expression issuing from the mentality of a previous period, but clearly, and with supremely conscientious honesty in the most precise and most convincing terms of the age itself, and, finally, by the activity of the imagination, saturated with and guided by the spirit of science, to forecast the further tasks, ends, and ideals towards which truth itself and the human spirit are to tend and strive. Humanity has amply learnt in the past how great scientific discoveries—and even hypotheses—may alter the standard and mental focus of each age and establish new methods, new standards of concentration and effort, limitations of scope and admissions of further relativities unknown. Through ancient Greece and Rome to the gates of modern times, when Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton altered and advanced the vision of the whole of civilised human society in its outlook upon nature, down to our immediate times, when even the unthinking masses have, through such discoveries as wireless telegraphy, altered their outlook upon the universe, and in these very days when we have issued from our purely atomistic conception to some more or less perfect realisation of the nature and activity of electrons and protons,¹ and of the problems of Relativity as brought before the world by the theories of Professor Einstein—through all these, and many intermediary phases, the civilised world has completely modified its mental attitude

¹ I would here remind the reader that these elemental units of matter in the world combine to produce all objects in nature according to their relative distribution, and that all individual differences thus depend upon numerical relationships which are the purest expression of the harmonistic principle.

towards nature and ultimately even towards the daily experiences of life. It may be that psychological research, carried forward by those qualified to deal with the problems and mysteries of mind, may still further revolutionise and advance the range of thought and the scope of truth. But it is of supreme importance that, before accepting demonstrations or hypotheses, the results be tested and finally confirmed, until they are rightly admitted to affect the foundations of actual knowledge and to indicate the direction of future efforts and ideals.¹

Not only in the concentrated pursuit of special knowledge in the various departments of science within the *esoteric* body of scientists, but in view of the immediate transformation of the public mind in each period, must the general platform upon which our human intelligence moves be raised and modified from time to time in order adequately to respond to the advance of knowledge itself. This in one word is one of the most important spheres of Education. When, for instance, the theories of Professor Einstein have issued from the critical tests of those qualified to confirm, reject, or modify the highest results of pure science, they ought, through all the machinery of education, to be made to permeate the consciousness of the general public. I must, for instance, confess that I myself—owing chiefly to my preparatory education from youth upwards—find myself unable to grasp the essence of this theory, and the consequences arising out of its applications. I am confidently assured that our children, if properly instructed, will not, or ought not to, find any such difficulty. But to take an ordinary and trite analogy, I believe that most parents will share my own experience, that our children, who are growing up in

¹ See *Truth—An Essay in Moral Reconstruction*, ch. iii and v, p. 38 seq.

the age of the familiar use of motor-cars and of aeroplanes have an incomparably greater faculty of understanding the construction, the working, and use of these modern instruments of transportation than ourselves. Thus, besides all means of publicity, by books, and even by journalistic articles, all solidly established achievements of science and art (not mere ephemeral theories and fashions) must lead to the diffusion and infusion into the public mind of the progress of science.

Still more directly is this the function of our educational institutions, schools, and universities. To enter still more practically into the means of ensuring the progressive evolution of the human mind and human society, I would suggest that one of the chief functions of the heads of all educational institutions should be to ensure the successful establishment of the scientific consciousness of each age. Thus, for instance, the well-qualified head-master of every school ought every year to give one or more lectures to the assembled staff, representing every department of instruction, however remote from pure science, epitomising the results of new discoveries in science and art, not only of mechanical and experimental sciences but also including humanistic studies, history, criticism, philosophy, and the works of art and literature. Thus every master and mistress of a school may be helped to keep pace with the progress of knowledge, and, through their personality, this mental evolution in them would permeate their teaching and create the true intellectual atmosphere of each age for the younger generation as it grows up. In universities similarly there ought to be periodic assemblies of *all* the teachers in every faculty at which those qualified would epitomise the contemporary advances in his or her department of study.

We have until now considered the mind in its

relation to knowledge as it is affected by reasoned evidence in every given instance, and by the summary of known truth in the complete organisation of science in all its departments, and we have seen how this ordered spiritual *Cosmos* or Reason affects both the individual and the collective mind in each period of history with this reasoned orderliness and harmony, in contradistinction to the casual and inharmonious, unreasoning, world of contending individual passions, desires and prejudices. But science in this form depends upon the conscious and concentrated activity of individuals in all ages, who devote their life-activities to the strenuous discovery of truth in every sphere reached by human consciousness. Each one of these seekers after truth (philosophers and men of science) contribute to the organic completeness and harmony of such systematic knowledge in the period in which he lives. It is the active work of scientific research of all designed discovery and invention.

SPECIAL SCIENTIFIC STUDIES

We have before seen how the reasoning mind of ordinary man, not devoted to specialised scientific inquiry, responds to truth, not merely in a passive form, but in acts of clear perception, as well as reflection and ratiocination, and performs an active function in establishing the harmonious relationship between outer truth and the receptive organs of truth, inducing objective harmonious relation by means of selection, concentration of attention, and elimination of whatever is irrelevant or disturbing. Now the mind of the searcher after truth, the philosopher, the observer of nature, the experimenter, discoverer, and inventor of all new facts and relationships is still more active in the functioning of his mental powers by means of selection of relevant facts and in the concentration upon the relationships between pheno-

mena and thoughts. Still less than the ordinary reasonable observer do his observations and his reasoning upon them partake of the nature of a haphazard dip into the lucky-bag of the innumerable facts without and within ; but his observation, concentration and reflection become stringently methodical, and take the form of selection on the one hand and of isolation of phenomena on the other, both based upon, and guided by, the essential affinity and harmony between the phenomena with which he is dealing and the willed avoidance of all phenomena and relationships that are " irrelevant."

CLASSIFICATION OF SCIENCES

At an early stage in the development of science civilised mankind has thus recognised and fixed the different departments of knowledge according to that inner affinity or harmony within the groupings of phenomena and the relationships of thought. This has led to the establishment of the various departments of science. Each of these again have developed their distinctive methods, themselves based upon the affinity and harmony in the distinctive nature of the phenomena with which that department deals. Various systems of grouping the departments of systematised human knowledge can be and have been adopted, as we face the problems of the universe which is thus to be known in the greatest possible fullness and accuracy. Thus we may divide the whole knowable world into (1) the outer world or nature, viewed as far as possible by itself and in itself ; and (2) nature and the universe in their relation to man and to the human reasoning mind. The one might thus be called Natural Science and the other Humanistic Science ; or again, we may face the problems primarily in the conception of the universe

and the relation of this earth to it, in which case we should begin with Astronomy and, related to it, Physics and Chemistry and the mathematical aspects of these sciences. Turning next to this earth we might begin with Geology, Geography (in its various forms), Physics, Chemistry, Biology (subdivided again into Botany and Zoology—which studies have again been subdivided and specialised into varied groupings, especially in modern times); until we come to human life and the human body and its study in the normal state, including Anatomy and Physiology, the latter again being subdivided into Histology and numerous other subdivisions of study, while both again can be, and are, studied specially in their relation to the rest of the organic world and the evolution of one form of life out of the other in Morphology and general Biology. On the other hand, the human body and its life may be studied, not in its normal constitution, but in its abnormal states of Pathology; and out of these several points of view have been developed all the varied departments of medical study. In the wide and all-important study of man and human life we are led to the mind of man, to Psychology in its several aspects, which again opens the doors to Epistemology, which on its side may lead to the study of language and other forms of expression.

But at an early stage the work of man, including all material and spiritual achievements and relationships, forms a vast department of human knowledge, subdivided into definite and highly organised special studies and dealing with man's life and his achievements in all stages of the past, leading on to the present and the future. In wider groupings we have the most general study of so-called Sociology, including Anthropology and Ethnology, and Archaeology. These again naturally lead, with regard to the

recorded achievements of human society and groupings in the past, to the study of History in all its varied departments, including also the special aspect of human relationships—Economics and Politics, Ethics and the study of Religions ; while the achievements of man in art and literature in the past can form special groupings of extensive studies, historical in character and method. Human language, as the most important and direct vehicle of expression of man's reasoned life and thought, and again in all its varied manifestations and inter-relations, be it as a specialised study of Philology or as a study of Literature in all its forms, has been developed in all its ramifications into a completely organised system throughout the world. But, as we shall see, the less theoretical, but more practical aspects of such harmonistic studies have led to the systematic inquiries into human relationships on the ground of moral laws, individual and collective, in Ethics and Politics, as also to the production of literature and art, as the direct expression of the æsthetic instinct and needs of man. And, finally, there remains that department of human knowledge dealing with the broad relationships between all these several departments and with the final summary of harmonious relationships to man and man's spirit in Philosophy and Theology.

RESEARCH, INVENTION AND DISCOVERY OF NEW TRUTHS

Now, the life-work of the men of science and philosophers, who have concentrated their chief energies upon the recognition of truth within the several departments of science and with the definite aim of adding new knowledge to the body of truth already possessed by man, is again not purely passive. Outer truths are not simply received by the

receptive organs as passive agents, as the simplest organisms react upon galvanic stimulation ; but the investigator is supremely and positively active in the search, the hunt, the battle for truth. His selective and concentrated mental activity, the outcome of his cognitive emotion and imagination, spurs and leads him onward in the direction prescribed by the several *methods* established for each department of science in order to discover the several relationships by selection and isolation of the innumerable phenomena about him, in conformity with the harmony subsisting between these phenomena themselves, and to join them together into that unity which corresponds to truth. These *methods* of investigation again are, in their turn, modified according to the special phenomena and their relationships, and his life-work leads him in conscientious concentration and in preserving continuity of effort to harmonise these several relationships. In this hunt after truth, this struggle with the confused data and irrelevancies, and in the final victory over all the opposing forces of confusion and ignorance, as well as over the obtrusion of personal passions and desires, filling the breast of man, and out of harmony with the pure theoretical truth which he purposes to grasp in its harmonious purity, there issues in his mind and soul, through the gates of conviction, the joy of discovery, when truth reveals herself in the sublimated clearness of divine light. His activity is indeed not passive, but eminently active, creative, poetic. The harmonies which enter his soul do not remain *immotive*, but become emotive, and lead him to discovery and invention and the establishment of new relationships before unknown. His activity is distinctly synthetic. Even when his task of observation and thought consists in the analysis of material or spiritual phenomena into their component parts, the mental activity itself is not

purely analytical, but always synthetic, emotive, creative, in establishing new harmonious relationships. His constructive imagination leads him to recognise the single elements out of which the phenomena are composed in their organic and harmonious relationships, and in so far all his work is that of *composition*, essentially of the same nature as that of the creative artist and poet—for his every art and achievement is *poietic*, creative ; and the source and fountain of this supreme spiritual activity is the thirst and passion for Truth, which drives us onwards to grasp and retain its elusive yet beautiful form. The dominant mood which overcomes him while he struggles on or is exultant in victory is that of inspiration and enthusiasm, filled with and moved by the Love of Truth of Plato, the *Amor Dei* of Spinoza. Ask the true scientific investigator in even the most sober, jejune, and apparently dry subject of study, what he feels when he sees, as in a flash (not only by conscious and disciplined elimination of irrelevant and negative instances), the fact and arguments all fusing together organically into a living unit, harmonious in form and substance, as if, almost beyond his will, if not against it,¹ an outer inspiration and enthusiasm were blown into his soul and set his brain moving in harmony with the whole truth which binds the innumerable particles of facts and evidence together. It is the Music of the Spheres vibrating in his soul ; the great god Eros of Hesiod and Plato who rules over the world ; the emanation of the Holy Ghost of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, filling the heart of man with true enthusiasm, so that for the time he becomes *ἐνθεος*, filled with the Spirit of God. The fundamental, the ultimately ruling,

¹ I believe that the *daimon* of Socrates (though his intervention was generally restraining), the spirit which he claimed moved him beyond his own power of will, can best be explained in this sense.

spirit underlying all theoretic activity of the purest and highest philosopher, scholar, inventor, or discoverer of truth is essentially of an æsthetic and harmonistic nature.

i

EXPOSITION OF SCIENTIFIC TRUTH

If thus we have recognised the fundamental dominance of the harmonistic and æsthetic factor in the general systematic recognition of truth, as well as in the creative work of the scientific investigator, the effective dominance of the same mental activity is still more prominent when the man of science turns to the exposition of his discoveries.

This is the final stage in the work of the man of science and philosopher. As the schoolboy who has not mastered his lesson and hides his ignorance or imperfect knowledge under the plea that he "knows, but cannot express it," the greatest discoverer, experimenter, and thinker is not fully possessed of his own discoveries of truth until he can convincingly impart them to others, and previously to himself, in an objective form, adequately conveying the harmonious and truthful relationships which he has endeavoured to establish. But it is here that his activity approaches so nearly to that of the creative artist that the one can hardly be distinguished from the other, and that in their main nature they are fundamentally the same.

Language itself, as we have seen before, presents to us the most harmonious structure. The welding together into living organic unity of separate sounds in words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, chapters and books, presenting one harmonious whole, in which each word is in exactly the right place within the harmonious context, is in the fullest sense the presentation of a work of art, as its primary appeal is to

the æsthetic senses and emotions, ultimately leading to the response of truth in conviction. For the time being the man of science, habituated to the discipline of pure induction, of minute analysis and observation, to the most sober furbishing of passions, feelings and desires, has become a poet moved by the same feelings and forces as the musical composer or the composer of a picture or a statue. In so far he is eminently inspired, the inspiration 'coming from the harmonious relationships in the world without and in the intelligible world of thought within, as opposed to the cacophonous, inharmonious chaos of unrelated facts that have not been united into the organic unity of truth.

As we have seen before and shall note again, music, of all arts, is the one which directly and completely expresses this harmonious relationship in its purity. It is worthy of note that the German poet Schiller in a letter to Goethe writes : " Before I compose, whether in verse or prose, I am overcome by (*überkommt mich*) a musical mood (*Stimmung*)."

The exponent of a great work of science must struggle with the innumerable facts which he wishes to present in their essential interdependent unity to convey the fullest apprehension of truth, in order to place the several elements constituting this unity in their harmonious sequence and inter-relation. He must bear in mind the wholeness of the truth while dealing with every part, he must be guided at every stage by the laws of thought in logic, and he must maintain the due proportion and harmony in significance corresponding to the quantitative and qualitative emphasis which he gives to each part justly subordinated to the final unity of the whole. To call this " rhetoric," with the derogatory implication of the superiority of science over art, the experimenter over the poet, truth over beauty, is unfair, as it fails

to recognise the true nature of science. We shall dwell upon the distinctive and different attitudes of mind in science and art, in Epistemology and Æsthetics, as also upon the difference between these points of view and those of Ethics; but, more especially in the expository work of the 'man of science, in formulating and in making intelligible and convincing the results of his scientific inquiry, the activity is essentially the same as in the other more practical departments of mental activities. Nor, I hope, need this occasion surprise to my readers who have followed our previous results even up to this point of the inquiry, when we realise that ultimately they are all derived from the harmonistic principle underlying the laws of nature and the laws of thought.

But, not only to the production and exposition but to the consequent understanding of great works of science and philosophy, does the dominance of the harmonistic or æsthetic principle apply. To read intelligently and to understand a dialogue of Plato, or a book of Aristotle, the works of Spinoza and of Kant, the *Principia* of Newton, the mature and clear exposition in the writings of Darwin and Huxley—nay, to understand and to appreciate the construction of the Forth Bridge, and the machinery in a motor-car, or an aerial machine-gun, produces the same class of emotion as when we read or see a great drama or a play of Shakespeare, a great poem of Homer or Dante, a comedy of Molière, the masterpieces of Goethe, or what overcame the spectator when standing before the Zeus and Athene of Pheidias, or in the Sistine Chapel of Rome, or before "The Last Supper" of Leonardo, or the great cathedrals of Chartres or Amiens, Durham or Lincoln, or when we are thrilled by the music of Bach and Beethoven, or the music-drama of Wagner. Read the great works of science and philosophy, and if you are able to concentrate

your attention upon them and are sufficiently prepared to understand the facts that are conveyed in logical sequence and in harmonious composition by the master minds, there will pervade your consciousness the same æsthetic feelings which moved you in the reading of Shakespeare or Dante. At times in the reading of these great poets or in the *Faust* of Goethe, or even in one of the sonnets of Shakespeare or Wordsworth or Matthew Arnold, we cannot distinctly discern whether it be the supreme truth conveyed or the beautiful rhythm and harmonious melody of the language which stirs our æsthetic emotions; but in every case, in the work of the philosopher or of the poet, it is through the harmonious composition that truth penetrates our consciousness and fills us with the corresponding emotional mood as the beauty of form and language fill our consciousness with the harmony that is essentially of the same nature as that of truth.¹

Thus in the final exposition of the research of the votary of pure science and philosophy we have a reflection of that larger harmony which we have seen produces the laws of nature and the laws of thought.

We have thus realised that, not only in the systematic apprehension of truth in Science, are we ultimately dependent upon the active emotion responding to the harmoniotropic and aristotropic needs and functions of the mind, but that especially in the discovery of truth, as well as in its exposition, the philosopher and the man of science are ultimately moved by the æsthetic emotion which dominates their imagination and directs their will in creative intellectual activity.

¹ See *Balance of Emotion and Intellect*, p. 11 seq.

CHAPTER II

ÆSTHETICS—ART

INTRODUCTION

I MUST here premise one general remark which applies to this and all other departments of human activity, and must constantly be borne in mind by the reader. Life is one organic whole and can as such never be mechanically subdivided into watertight compartments. This complexity of organic interdependence between the various departments of human activity grows with the advance in civilisation from the simpler primitive conditions to the highest complexities of life and thought in highly cultured communities. Thus the instinct, motives and aims which led men to the earliest expression of the æsthetic order and were markedly, if not exclusively, active in primitive periods, join forces with numerous other motives coming from the other departments of mind in later phases of civilisation. We shall thus find that in every work of art at a comparatively early stage elements and aims which belong to the other departments, such as Epistemology (the true), Pragmatics (the useful), Ethics (the good), Politics (the social), and Religion (the ideal), have intruded and are inseparably mixed. We shall now see this with regard to works of art. But I must remind the reader that, as works primarily and ultimately aiming at Truth in Science and Philosophy directly appeal to our sense of Harmony and Form in

Discovery and Exposition (so that in a written book as well as in an oral exposition, the harmony, adequacy or beauty of form are essential to or absorb the conscious attention of reader and audience to a high degree), so in a work of literary, dramatic, even musical, plastic, and graphic art, Truth and convincing persuasion become an important, at times a dominant, element in the attention, interest, and enjoyment produced by the work of art. In the same way works of art and science, being part of mental life and reflecting upon it, have definite relationships to utility, ethical fitness, social and political peace and progress, and religious ideals and aspirations; while works of use and of morals are penetrated by beauty and truth. Finally social, political and religious principles and ideals must stand the test of criticism and truth, and must appeal to our sense of harmony and beauty in the world and in life.

ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES ¹

We have seen in the later portions of the preceding chapter how, even in Epistemology, the æsthetic imagination, the instinct for harmony, is active in the discovery and exposition of truth, and we have maintained throughout the whole chapter the primary and fundamental activity in the human mind of the harmoniotropic and aristotropic instincts. But the fact remains that the direct aim of all thought, science,

¹ Though I have designedly refrained from quoting the literature on the subjects with which I am dealing here, and have merely confined myself in these prolegomena to a summary account of the philosophy of Harmonism, I think it might be helpful to the reader to give here some indication of the bibliography to æsthetics, a subject not familiar to most readers, especially a fairly complete one, *Bibliography to General Æsthetics*, by Edward Bullough (privately printed for use in lectures, 1909), supplemented by his recent article (*The British Journal of Psychology*, June 1921) on "Recent Work in Experimental Æsthetics."

and philosophy is the recognition and establishment of truth, and not harmony, beauty or artistic effects. In æsthetics and art, on the other hand, harmony, proportion, form and beauty are the *direct* aim and end of man's mental activity and of the production of all works which belong to the category of art. * Æsthetics thus deals with man's direct activity to realise in nature, life and thought, by means of his own work, the satisfaction of the æsthetic instinct, feeling for form, for harmony and beauty.

. We have already amply shown how "form" responds to and satisfies the harmoniotropic instinct in man's senses, even in his own physical nature, in that the due proportion of all the organs of his body and their harmonious functioning in health positively produce the *joie de vivre*, and how, in the outer world of nature and life, it is also impressed upon his senses as a primary need ; and we have finally seen how this expression of the harmoniotropic instinct in form is conducive to perfect and facile perception and understanding as a means, until we now come to regard it as the end in itself, out of which grows his production of art in all its numerous manifestations.

The challenge of so many writers on art, and on the theory of art, to produce a system of criticism or æsthetics which will possess scientific validity and can be reduced to fundamental principles, as firmly founded as are those of any other department of science, can be met and must be met by serious students of æsthetics. These sceptics despair of such attempts, until they restrict themselves to the mere dogmatic selection and establishment of canons of taste and good art, recognised as such by the "best judges." (among whom they themselves are included as foremost, or over which tribunal they themselves presume to preside).

A. FORM—PURE ART

Now it will have to be admitted by all that the senses of men are satisfied, and that pleasure is produced in them, through pure form,¹ or rather through proportion and harmony—not to say beauty—which exists in the most rudimentary phases in nature and in all that stimulates man's senses.

That there is such an elementary basis for æsthetic pleasure arising out of simple form can be shown with regard to the simple activity of man's senses.

To begin with the "lowest" senses :

1. The sense of smell ; it must be admitted by all that a stench is disagreeable, and a perfume is agreeable ;
2. That, as regards the sense of taste, bitter is in itself disagreeable, and sweet is agreeable.²

¹ The use of this word form—in contradistinction to matter or content—may be misleading, as it too directly, if not exclusively, implies space, plastic or graphic, volume, and not time and rhythmical qualities of movement, and even, to a certain degree, chemical qualities. It is associated too exclusively with that which is perceived through touch and through the eye—tactile and fictile values, and even as regards the latter it often emphasises line, light and shade, to the exclusion of colour, so that in the graphic arts form and colour are sometimes contrasted to one another as, by analogy in music, rhythm and time are contrasted to melody. In thus using "form" we distinctly mean form as opposed to matter—that is, proportion and harmony in the relation between things material as well as spiritual.

² It might be maintained that these forms of æsthetic sense-pleasures are not primary, but secondary ; that they are dependent for their pleasurable stimuli upon association with other rudimentary forms of sense-pleasure, or to a still more fundamental, though less conscious, form of association through habit and experience with that which is favourable to the preservation of the body in opposition to what is unfavourable and deleterious. But I see no grounds for denying that certain chemical properties act in a direct way pleasantly or unpleasantly upon the senses. Acid reactions show violent contractions, while more soothing and pleasant chemical combinations give no such signs of reaction and opposition. Moreover, as has already been shown, harmonious tones and their combinations produce symmetrical lines and decorative colour effects. I do not despair of being able to show,

3. With regard to touch, it must be admitted that soft and hard, smooth and rough, curves and jagged lines, straight and crooked, warm and cold, all have their specific æsthetic qualities which are pleasant or unpleasant, and that their pleasant quality depends upon this harmony and proportion which responds to the inherent proportion of the senses themselves.

4. When, finally, we come to the highest senses, with which art is chiefly concerned, the eye and ear, seeing and hearing, we have already noted how, in line and form, the regular proportion, straight line and curve, in contrast to the absence of such proportion and harmony, in symmetry as contrasted with asymmetry, both in form and colour, as well as in tones contrasted with noises, and in harmonies and rhythmical progression contrasted with absolute irregularity, there is a direct response to æsthetic impressions in these higher senses.

5. No doubt, influenced by the evolution of form in nature, certain proportions and rhythmical responses (especially in what has been shown by thorough and ingenious work concerning such forms as the spiral)¹ impinge their pleasant harmony upon

by means of psycho-physical experiments, that the scent of a rose can produce graphic forms that are symmetrical and harmonious, while stench produces asymmetrical and amorphous formulæ. Furthermore, it must be noted when we proceed beyond the simple and elementary stages, in which what is elementarily and fundamentally pleasing no longer produces a corresponding sensation, but negatively, through habituation and tedious repetition, sinks to the commonplace, that positively, through more pleasant associations, in spite of its inherent unpleasantness, asymmetrical or discordant forms may produce the very opposite effect. It is thus that certain discords in music, in the most advanced and highly developed music, occasionally produce pleasure when they are not too frequent or predominant, and that certain irregularities, if not distortions, of pathological and grotesque forms may, when introduced in advanced art, by collocation and association produce the opposite effect to their essentially æsthetic nature.

¹ See Part I, Chap. V, p. 55 seq.

man's senses through his absorption of outer nature, though we have had every reason to realise that they respond to the inherent structure and function of the senses themselves.

Successful attempts¹ have been made to discover

¹ See Part I, Ch. V, p. 55. The most recent and striking treatment of this subject is that by Mr. Jay Hambridge, who has published a periodical (*The Diagonal*, printed by the Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.) developing his theories. He distinguishes between what he calls static and dynamic symmetry, maintaining that the latter is distinctively dominant and characteristic in Greek art, and, by means of what he calls the root 5 rectangle and the rectangle of the "whirling squares," he gives definite mathematical formulæ underlying the proportion in all works of Greek art, and even capable of practical application by artists and decorators in the production of similar works. I am myself incapable of fully understanding or of following these mathematical expositions, though I am prepared to believe that every work of art, however delicate in its varied proportions, as well as every phenomenon of organic life, could in an ideal world be formulated mathematically and in so far reproduced in that ideal world. But, in criticism of some of his generalisations, I am bound to point out that in the various schools and in the various periods of Greek art, Mr. Hambridge's distinction between static and dynamic symmetry forces us to recognise that in some the static, in others the dynamic, predominates. I have myself many years ago ("Pythagoras of Rhegium and the Early Athlete Statues," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1880-1, reprinted in *Essays on the Art of Pheidias*, 1885) pointed to the difference between static and what I called organic symmetry, the one predominating in archaic, the other in the higher periods of sculpture, as the one predominates in the inorganic world, petrography, crystallography, the other in the organic world, especially in animal life. In the Archaic Greek sculpture *symmetry* (static symmetry) predominated in the conventional and stiff statues; while in the periods of complete freedom the flow and movement and variation of life, which the Greeks expressed by the term *rhythm*, were blended with the symmetry and modified it into a new form of organic symmetry or *eurhythmia*. Diogenes Laertius ascribes to the sculptor Pythagoras of Rhegium (who, in the first half of the fifth century B.C., marked the transition from Archaism to full freedom, culminating in the art of Pheidias) this fusion of symmetry (the static element in proportion and harmony) with rhythm (the moving element in life). The real consummation of this great artistic task was reached in Pheidias and his successors during the highest period of Greek art. The whole achievement of Hellenic art in all its forms may, from this point of view, be summarised as the transfusion of the harmonistic principle with the world of nature and of thought; the principle of symmetry and proportion with naturalism; the

and to formulate certain mathematical and physical properties in the proportion, not only of Greek works of decorative art, such as vases, mirrors, etc., but even in the proportion of the human figure in Greek sculpture, which may show a common system and regular formulæ belonging to the whole of that art in contradistinction to that of the art of different, if not opposed, races and periods. There is also considerable literature grouping round one of many striking instances of such pleasing complicated proportions, such as that known as the Golden Section or Cut.¹

establishment of the types of nature in most perfect, most normal, and therefore general, form; the Naturalistic Ideal, the Ideal arising out of, and based upon, the Natural and the Rational. The formulation of the dynamic proportion has moreover been long since admitted with striking success in the widest spheres by the work of Kepler and other astronomers and physicists, and in the organic world by the remarkable researches of Professor A. H. Church (*Phyllotaxis in Relation to Mechanical Law*), to which I must add in recent times the work of Sir Theodore Cook, in his *The Curves of Life*, supplemented by more recent articles in the *Field*.

¹ There has been much ingenious mathematical calculation as to the arithmetical proportion in this golden cut, which might roughly be described as the relation between the perpendicular and the horizontal bars in the ordinary cross. Quite recently (at the Philosophical Congress at Oxford in 1920) I listened to an elaborate attempt to explain the relation between the horizontal bar to the perpendicular one, out of the structural need of the stone or wood, and the security of the transverse portion to account for the ordinary proportions in our crosses, as I have already shown in Part I. It has always appeared to me that this pleasing effect of proportion upon the eye of man is due chiefly to our constant habit of vision and touch throughout the ordinary life of man, so that he naturally demands such proportion in objects and is pleased when he finds them. As we have seen before (Part I, Ch. VI, pp. 57, 58), it is due to the fact that in conversing with our fellow human beings we naturally and continuously look at their face, and in so far visually ascribe the greatest importance to that portion of the human body which is above the shoulder line. This constant habituation prepares the visual sense for that most important subdivision in the human form between the line of the shoulders upward to the neck and head, whether the latter is covered or raised in height, or not, by head-dress. Moreover, in many, if not most, implements the handles of tools and weapons, as with us the walking-stick, have their chief subdivision in a similar proportion, which proportion thus satisfies both our visual and tactile sense.

It must thus be admitted as a fundamental truth that harmony, proportion and symmetry are pleasing to the human senses themselves, and that human beings, as organic and conscious entities, desire and strive for this form of satisfaction and pleasure. Out of this striving, based upon the æsthetic instinct, grows that activity of man which we call Art ; and all those functions and the creation of all those works and the admixture of this æsthetic element into the other works of man, primarily and directly issuing from other needs and desires which constitute the whole of human activity, until it permeates the actual life and the act of living of every human being as a dominant factor in his conscious or subconscious existence.

We must now, however, deal with the arts which are the most direct expression of the harmoniotropic and aristotropic instinct of man.

SELECTIVE ARTS

As has already been stated in the beginning of the General Part of this book, before we come to the creation of the work of art, we are bound to deal with that most important aspect of the æsthetic instinct which leads to the *selection* as distinguished from the actual *creation* of forms which essentially respond to this æsthetic instinct. This selective activity would *a priori* precede, as historically it can be shown to precede, the creation of works of man's hand.

So important is this selective artistic activity that I do not hesitate to formulate what may appear to be a glaring paradox, and to maintain that we can conceive of a most perfect future in this terrestrial world of ours in which the whole function and work of the artist would consist of selection and not of creation—in which "Composition" would entirely

supersede all artistic execution and technique. To take an instance from the graphic arts. We can conceive of a state in which colour photography would reach such perfection that all forms in nature, shapes and colours, with their slightest modifications and textures, as well as all scenes in nature and in life, could be perfectly reproduced in different media, shadings, and qualities ; so that the technique of the draughtsman and painter would be superfluous, and the whole artistic function would consist of, and be concentrated upon, invention and composition, expressive of the highest inner visions and the loftiest and truest artistic imagination of the perfect artist born and bred.¹ The step from conception to realisation would be reduced to a minimum. Let no one say that nothing would remain for the artist to do ; on the contrary, the artist, unhampered by the craftsman, would reach his loftiest flights ; and his ideas, his emotions, his visions, his ideals, would directly and convincingly be imparted to the spectator. The artist would grow in power and in activity, as the craftsman would waste away into inactivity. Such a state of affairs does not exist, has never existed, and, we may add, will never actually exist. Moreover, as things are, many an artist, and of the greatest among them, would remind us how much of the highest artistic and spiritual qualities, and how deeply the significant and impressive artistic ideas and forms, were born in his imagination in the process of arduous technique and struggle and through them. Nevertheless, my paradox rightly illustrates and emphasises the truth, that the purely artistic function is to be found in the most direct and complete satisfaction of the æsthetic instinct.

¹ See *Essays on the Art of Pheidias*, passage on " The Spirit of the Art of Pheidias."

Now, to return to these fundamental principles which underlie all art and which justify our contention that art can thus be reduced to fundamental principles valid for all normal men, as much as the facts of science are based upon admitted fundamental principles.

The earliest artistic function of man is thus selective and not creative. We have already from a wider general point of view, in the First Part, referred to this selective activity to prove the dominance of the æsthetic instinct. We are now dealing with the direct satisfaction of this instinct by means of man's activity and creativeness. It can be proved by the extant remains of primitive life in the earliest periods of man's appearance upon the earth, as well as by the study of savage life and the life of children, that man's first manifestation of such selective activity to satisfy his æsthetic instinct consists in his choosing "regular" and symmetrical objects in nature, in his preference for them, and his preservation and treasuring of them as objects of exceptional value, because they thus respond to and satisfy his longing for form, harmony, and beauty. Like the earliest primitive man, the child will delightedly pick up a perfectly rounded pebble or stone and treasure it, valuing it the higher in the degree in which it manifests this regular harmony or beauty of form. The more varied and complex manifestations of such symmetry, proportion, harmony and beauty will lead it to select shells and other objects of nature in which more elaborate geometrical patterns are combined into the unity of composition which satisfy to a still higher degree its sense of symmetrical and "beautiful" form. In the earliest stages of human existence, delight in flowers and plants manifesting the same qualities leads to similar active selection which by natural stages is then applied to adorn the person. Now, we must

remember that such purely regular forms in nature, such as the rounded pebble or stone, are not the common objects which generally and continuously stimulate the sense of vision and of touch. But we have already seen that the reason for this æsthetic appeal to the senses is to be found in the constitution of the human senses themselves as organs of perception, inducing the further mental activities and, above all, conducing to uniform and harmonious sensations and emotions, ending in "æsthetic" moods. The very rarity of harmonious objects, as we have seen, confirms the need and desire for harmony in life and nature, and harmony, at a later stage of observation and reflection, manifests itself in what we call the Laws of Nature, also in the static symmetry of the inorganic world, and in the dynamic symmetry in movement and growth in the organic world, until, finally, we come to the highest forms of harmony and justice, ever present in the mind and in the longings of social man, which he desires to see realised in human life. The delight of primitive man, of the savage and of the child in finding such regular objects in nature as respond directly to his feeling for harmonious form and to the use of his own life, is due to the fact that he finds the ideal principles of his life, even in its most rudimentary, sensory form, reflected in nature. The "artifact," which is contrasted to the natural object, differs from the latter in that it was made to respond to his needs, and in the most elementary form to the need of his senses for regularity and symmetry. The artifact manifests his deliberate activity in fashioning the object, and he is pleased when nature gratuitously offers him this finished article. So important is this contrast, that the judicious student of nature and of the remains of primitive man is naturally inclined to doubt whether some primitive implements, which

show shapes of tools or weapons—the so-called “eoliths”—were artifacts (works of man) or of nature.¹

If we were to find a stone or pebble as absolutely perfect in its rondure as is a billiard ball, we should have grave doubts whether it could possibly be what, by a very significant term, we should call “a freak of nature.” But we must also remember that in the shapes and forms of flowers, in any snowflake seen under the microscope, and innumerable other objects, the geometrical patterns would be as varied and as perfect as anything the Arab, Persian, and Moorish decorators have designed. However, the more uncommon such perfect symmetrical works are in nature, the more are they valued because of their æsthetic qualities and the more positive grows the act of selection in order to satisfy the æsthetic instinct by means of what thus becomes a work of art, though purely the product of nature. Now, in the earliest stages man will select his dwelling guided to a very important degree by this regularity and symmetry of the structure which he finds to yield him shelter, such as the cave. No doubt, as is maintained by some leading anthropologists and pre-historic archæologists, at a comparatively very early stage he will make the first step to the creative, as opposed to the selective, principle in art in that he will fashion some form of wattle hut for his abode by placing twigs or other material in a regular and symmetrical manner in order to afford shelter. His handiwork will, however, be reduced to a minimum. But even in the cave which he selects, it must be maintained that the impulse which responds to elementary needs below the æsthetic instinct may be of primary importance. We shall again have to treat

¹ See *Eugenics, Civics, and Ethics*, by the Author (Cambridge University Press, 1920, p. 10 seq.).

with these subtle distinctions when we come to consider architecture as an art ; but, as has already been suggested, structure and construction are, in themselves based upon harmony. Use, as distinguished from harmony of form, is itself an expression of harmony in the adaptation of means to ends ; and when the object of use is one that directly affects the senses, such as touch and vision, the sensations of perfect satisfaction must be reduced to the principle of proportion and harmony. The same applies to weapons and tools. Though the object of their selection and the impulse which led to it may primarily have been that of use and of the direct satisfaction of physical needs, the thing itself and its quality as a tool and the measure in which it performs its appropriate function in the feel of the hands using a perfect implement, or to the eyes of a spectator, are valued in the degree in which it thus, through its shape, appeals to the senses and satisfies the desire for perfect form. Even in the most rudimentary and primitive tools of this kind a very dominant attribute is always their harmonious form.

At an early stage also we come to the appreciation of the æsthetic qualities in the human body. These no doubt are to a considerable degree determined by other factors, such as strength and agility, subordinated to or associated with the primary need of self-preservation in work and in the struggle against animal and human enemies, and also determined by the sexual instinct and its selection ; but both these determining factors can be and must be reduced ultimately to the principle of harmony, and more directly they show themselves in lines, curves and volume, and in the composition and proportion of the parts of the body to the whole, as they appeal to the eye and touch and directly to the æsthetic instinct. That this æsthetic quality is dominant is proved by

the fact that whatever other motives may be involved, the adornment with feathers and other objects of nature, as well as the tattooing and other decorations of the body, which mark a further stage than pure selection (and might therefore almost belong to the phase of creative art) show the importance in the various aspects of the appreciation of the human body through purely æsthetic stimulation.

In all these considerations of the selective activity in art we have naturally dealt with the simplest and most primitive forms, so as to apply a strictly scientific method to the exposition of elementary and universally valid principles of æsthetics. But this selective activity, more or less passive and not directly creative, is present in, and never was absent from, the functioning of the mind in every phase of life. In fact, the more complicated such life becomes in the growth of civilisation the more active is such selective æsthetic function in every aspect of existence. The delight in the contemplation of nature, of definite objects of nature, of flowers and plants and animals, of the finest shadings of human form, the features of the face, and the expression of these features in a world of spiritual gradation—all these grow and are ever present with the growth of civilised man as a source of satisfaction and delight ; until we finally come (as we shall do towards the end of this chapter) to the "Art of Living," and the direct and conscious modification of our lives, individual and collective, to respond to the more complex phases of æsthetic and artistic principles. Such advance is necessarily only attained when individuals and communities have passed beyond the primitive and rudimentary stages in which all energies and activities are practically absorbed by the need of struggling with untoward conditions and surroundings for mere self-preservation, and there is no transitional period and energy

left between work and absolute rest. — It presupposes and predemands a surplus of energy and a certain minimum of freedom from work and from interested care in order that "recreation" takes an active form in play, physical and mental,¹ in the physical pleasure of exercises and athletic games, as well as in the spiritual delights of the mind most directly expressed by art. Of all ages of the past it was in the Hellenic world and through the Hellenic world that this development of the common life of civilised man reached its most perfect expression and type, and has, in the deepest sense of the word, ever since become "classical" in the estimation of civilised peoples.

THE WORK OF ART

The step from the selective to the creative phase of art is made by those æsthetic impulses, present in the earliest conditions of primitive and savage life, which can be said to produce activities and which, moreover, are so spontaneous, as expressions of more or less physiological motives, that, though fully and directly expressing æsthetic instincts, they might still be considered to be selective and not consciously creative. Such are the rudimentary forms of the art of dancing (including gymnastics), music and poetry. They are the spontaneous and momentary expressions of æsthetic emotive impulse, and pass away and vanish when the impulse has spent itself. On the other hand, as soon as these impulsive expressions, whether material or moral, in their repetition have been organised into some formal system, and their leading features and essential characteristics have been tabulated in memory, they must definitely be classed as works of art, and, as a matter of fact, they may develop into the purest, as well as the highest, forms

¹ See Part I, pp. 66, seq.

of artistic production. Dancing is thus one of the first, if not the first of arts. In itself it is a pure æsthetic act. It is not the work of the hand, of handicraft, guided by the eye or the ear to fashion forms ; but it is the work of the whole body in which movement is composed and made symmetrical as fully as the work of the decorator traces such forms in various materials. It certainly is one of the earliest arts, as practically all savage people practised it and as all archæological records give evidence of its existence. The hopping and jumping and evolutions of the child (not to mention the gambolling of young animals) is an activity not directed by any purpose of utility or self-preservation, but is merely an expression of the perfect functioning of the organs of the body, and of their normal or harmonious relation to one another. Symmetry and rhythmical regularity at the earliest stages make themselves felt and in themselves lead to satisfaction—pleasure in the performers and admiration on the part of the observers.

At a very early stage dancing is combined with music and poetry—no doubt in their most primitive forms. This is natural, and affords evidence of the inter-relation between the arts of time and the arts of space, the visual, tactile and graphic arts with the arts that are based upon symmetrical movement and rhythmical symmetry, proving the elementary unity of these contrasted forms.

At an early stage, however, it loses its purity in that it absorbs other forms and motives of expression belonging to different and not purely æsthetic needs and impulses—a distinction with which we shall have to deal more fully in our treatment of the creative arts. It then becomes an expression (though an æsthetic, artistic expression) of the other phases of primitive life. Thus sexual life, its needs and impulses, is at an early phase blended with the purely

æsthetic expression of movement in the dance, in that sexual longing and sexual attractiveness are consciously expressed in it. The same can be traced in the movements, if not dances, of animals in the breeding period; and we can even discern, as I have done, the direct influence of such *choroplastic* motives from animal life in the national dances of civilised communities, such as among the mountaineers of the Tyrolese and Bavarian Highlands, in which the movements of certain birds are directly, though not consciously, imitated. The war-dance is common to lost savage tribes, and has thus absorbed a number of other elements and motives to stimulate courage in the dancer and fear in his enemy. Among them elements of actual life can thus be discerned.

The evolution of the dance among the Ancient Greeks is most significant and interesting. At a very early stage it became the most important artistic and decorative factor in all their ceremonies, and was naturally and spontaneously associated also with its congenital counterpart in a vigorous and manly people, namely, gymnastic and athletic games and evolutions. It formed an important part in the funeral rites and ceremonies, and, through these and through the general development of their games and art, in the development of their lyric poetry and their drama. Early Minoan and Mycenæan monuments exhibit its prevalence in festivals and "artistic" entertainments along with the representation of gymnastic feats. The skill of the performers of such feats, though manifesting strength and agility (and thus arousing admiration), is chiefly dependent upon the symmetrical and decorative quality of the resulting movements in these performances, as can be seen in the work of any acrobat of our day.

On the Homeric Shield of Achilles the symmetrical division of the two semi-choruses accentuates the

symmetrical composition of that elaborate work with its numerous scenes, and shows how, in those days certainly, the rules and figures of the dances were established on complicated symmetrical lines. The position of the Chorus was one of predominant importance in the earlier days of Greek drama, and depended upon the old religious ceremonies, especially in the Dionysian festivals, in which dancing no doubt formed originally the most important part. We can follow here its interesting evolution in tragedy and comedy. But undoubtedly it fulfilled many of the functions of the drama in its later history throughout the world, and is, as regards the origin of the drama and its further development in Greece, an artistic element of central importance. In the history of modern nations dancing has also played, and plays, a most important part as a powerful and direct expression of artistic needs; and in dramatic art, through the pantomime and the ballet, absorbing in itself lyrical and dramatic elements and especially music, it has taken, and takes now, a very prominent place in the evolution of the complex and higher life of cultured communities.

The art of music has gone through similar stages of evolution. From the earliest and crudest emission of rhythmical sounds and the satisfaction and delight which primitive man had in this response to the æsthetic elements in his sense-perception, it has advanced to one of the highest and most complex arts, uniting with its own form those of other arts, as it has also been incorporated to strengthen and develop the artistic qualities of the sister arts of poetry and drama. At an early stage, in addition to the human voice, instruments were fashioned to produce rhythmical and melodious harmonies as the direct expression of æsthetic impulse and needs. The tom-tom, which merely renders the rhythmical side of musical

harmony, is an early and universal instrument of the most primitive savages. With the addition of sounds developed more and more methodically by the human voice, aided by the clapping of hands and other instruments, it is at an early stage fused with the dance in this most primitive transitional period from selective to creative art.

The same applies to poetry, in this selective transitional stage. The sounds emitted by the shouting or singing savage or child are soon supplemented by the rhythmical enunciation of words, and can be illustrated by the early sing-song babbling of any child.* It is important to remember, in the light of this inquiry into elementary æsthetic principles, that the enunciation of language is at first only used as a means and not as an end in itself. That is to say, that it is merely applied to convey certain necessary meanings, and that the conscious efforts of the speaker, the conscious and emotive aim which he has in speaking, is merely to convey the meaning or to attain his object, and not to enunciate sounds and words themselves. But when the child, or when primitive man, babbles his "verses," the sound, and moreover the harmonious sound, of the succession of words is the primary and ultimate end of speech. M. Jourdain, who, in Molière's comedy, is astonished to find that he speaks habitually in prose, enunciates an important and fundamental truth in the historical evolution of human language, as an object of art. Moreover, it is as well to remember that when man had reached the phase of writing down his thoughts and feelings, and desired to do more than convey his more material expressions and meanings, he generally, if not always, did so in verse, or in some metrical or æsthetic form. Not only did the earliest Greek philosophers write their philosophy in verse, but, in the religious writings of all earlier peoples of the East

and West, including the Bible, some form of metrical or rhythmical responsions, or even of elaborate versification, is dominant.

CREATIVE ART

Now, leaving the selective phase as well as the transitional steps to the creative sphere of art, we must at first deal with the purest form and expression of art as such, unalloyed with, and undiluted by, elements that belong to other spheres of mental activity. In using this term purest, it is not meant that it is synonymous with the highest development of art to whatever qualitative height in artistic expressiveness some of the arts, notably music, may have attained when remaining strictly within the bounds of their pure æstheticism. The two departments of art which, among all arts and their works, are from their very nature purest in æsthetic expression, are the arts of music and of decoration, though, as we shall see, they may in the earliest, as well as in the latest, periods become associated, or blended with, other departments of art and in so far themselves lose the paramount quality of this æsthetic purity.

MUSIC

In music all means of expression, vocal and instrumental, are applied more or less to produce sounds in tones and their combinations which directly satisfy the sense of form, and not for any other purpose.

The human voice is used to emit sounds in singing which reach far beyond mere interjection, just as it is also used for the formulation of words in ordinary speaking. Calls or shrieks are emitted to express sensations or emotions for the immediate and sole purpose of expressing pleasure or pain, in laughing or weeping, or in calls to attract attention or ask

for help, or utter defiance, etc. In these phases they partake to a considerable degree of the nature of reflex actions, as far as the definite sounds are concerned. But when the emitted sounds or tones become what we must call "lyrical," harmonious, symmetrical, and are emitted because of an æsthetic impulse producing the corresponding form and the delight in it, we attain to what we call the "song." They may be expressions of emotions as well, or rather of definite emotional states or moods not induced as a reflex to one definite sensation or experience and ending with this individual expression. But as definite vocal expressions of joy, sadness, longing, love, courage, and as manifesting these emotions and moods in the singer, they convey to and produce in the hearer the same or similar emotions or moods. We thus have joyful and sad songs, those that express longing and love, anger, courage and warlike passions, grief, and the whole scale of human emotions. But we must again remember that they are not the direct and individual expression of an individual feeling of joy, sadness, or love. The object of such a feeling does not fill the consciousness, and the sounds are not an unconscious means of interjection or exclamation; but the expression itself reproduces the emotion and, by this reproduction, awakens satisfaction or pleasure in the producer and in the hearer.

Thus at an early stage vocal music develops subdivisions of joyful and sad character, definite types of song like the love-song, battle-song, dirge, etc.

So also at a comparatively early stage vocal music is combined and blended with poetry and dancing, and these combinations again lead to further subdivisions in which the song is subordinated to more complicated and wider purposes in early ceremonies and rites, religious and secular—in dirges, at funeral

ceremonies, in songs of battle or victory, and in temple rites and cults and other religious performances, as well as in a variety of civic ceremonies. But in all these cases the lyrical element which directly responds to formal æsthetic harmony is the ruling element and principle. Still, in the degree in which such music is blended with other arts, activities, and purposes, music as such loses the artistic purity of its nature and appeals to other emotions and moods which are not essentially æsthetic. There is no doubt that through this admixture of poetry and language, as well as the combination with other arts, musical expression gains in definiteness and individuality of expression, increases to an almost infinite degree the variety of shadings of emotions, experiences, and even thoughts, which it becomes capable of expressing ; but it is important to bear in mind that in so far, as a work of art, it loses its æsthetic purity. The same applies to instrumental music in which, in early as well as in later stages, musical purity is to a greater degree maintained intact, owing to the fact that the tones are emitted instrumentally and not through the human voice, which has also to perform the ordinary function of speech. Instrumental music is thus not æsthetically weakened by the intrusion of definite and accurate meaning in language which appeals to other faculties. Concerted instrumental or orchestral music has in the course of the last few centuries evolved a number of forms in which the composition as a whole, and each of its parts, present the most varied formal harmony.

The Symphony is, perhaps, the highest type, subdivided into movements which are all correlated to one another. Freedom and variety from this strict classical form are given by the orchestral suite, intermezzi, symphonic poems, etc. In solo-instruments, as well as in duets, trios, quartets, sextets,

etc., the sonata and the classical trio and quartet, in the so-called Chamber Music, follow the form of the symphony ; but here, again, a large variety of forms have been evolved, and respond to all shadings of modern life and feeling.

Church music, which has played so important a part in the development of music, has also established a variety of forms ; but, as is the case with the military marches, dances, etc., its purely musical form is subordinated to or modified by its special purposes, character, and atmosphere, and is bound up with special religious rites and ceremonies.

Though instrumental music, perhaps of all arts, has been most highly developed in modern times, maintaining in concerted instrumental music from the solo to the highest orchestral forms of symphonic compositions the purity of its formal æsthetic principles, it too is often blended with vocal music, and both together with scenic effects and dramatic action ; until there has been evolved the whole world of musical form, which constitutes one of the most considerable artistic departments of modern civilised life, and which as far as complexity is concerned culminates in the Wagnerian music-drama, to which we shall have to refer when dealing with the drama. But even in purely instrumental music, when lyrical or descriptive poetry is not introduced, the development of so-called " programme music " has tended to extend the sphere of musical expression and to fix the definiteness of individual emotions, and even a great variety of experiences and thoughts.

In spite of all this development of musical art, the underlying and dominant fact always remains that music itself and in itself never was, and never is, the vehicle for conveying definite objective perceptions, meanings, and thoughts. Its proper scope is directly to express by the harmony of tones the complete

harmony of form which through these conveys corresponding æsthetic pleasure to the senses and responds to the emotions and moods, which crave for and are satisfied by such harmony. In itself it thus always remains the purest of arts.

THE ART OF ORNAMENTATION OR DECORATION

If we now leave the art conveyed through the organs of hearing and the harmonious succession of impressions in time, and turn to the arts appealing to the sense of sight and touch in space, the purest form of such artistic expression is to be found in what we call ornamentative or decorative art. This arises out of the fundamental principle of symmetry, proportion and harmony of form, which, as we have seen from the beginning of our inquiry into the nature of the human senses, is elementary and fundamental in the human mind. In the creative stage of this ornamentative activity of man, in contradistinction to the merely selective phase, we find that in the earliest activities of primitive man, as well as in savage and infantile life, man endeavours by his handiwork to reproduce those simple symmetrical forms by design in modelling, scratching or incising, drawing or painting, and every other method of fashioning the forms which by their symmetry and regularity appeal to his æsthetic instinct.

In the purely selective stage man was simply moved by the desire for harmonious form in choosing a symmetrical object. But his creative decorative work generally finds its scope on some article of use which was primarily produced for some other purpose in his life, namely, utility, ritual, or other motives. Still, innumerable objects abound in all times in which the activity is in no way related to any further purpose, and in the earliest work of the modeller of clay, the

worker in stone or metal, and the "graphic" artist there is no ulterior purpose than the satisfaction of such design. He merely fashions in these materials objects of decoration because of their regularity, symmetry, and variety of form, and he scratches or incises on any empty spaces, geometrical patterns, simple in their rudeness, or complicated in their elaborateness, to satisfy this craving for form. These decorative activities are in no way intended to possess any further "meaning" to be apprehended by the spectator and for such purpose of apprehension and understanding. My own conclusions on the evidence of early prehistoric finds have been confirmed to me by the best specialist authorities among prehistoric archaeologists and anthropologists (such as Abbé Breuil) that purely geometrical ornament precedes naturalistic ornament in the work of prehistoric man.

This in no way precludes the fact that the Palæolithic incisions and drawings on bone and other materials, reproducing with such astounding skill and truth to nature animals (reindeers, horses, etc.) and other subjects in advanced freedom and naturalism, are succeeded by designs of later periods in which the freedom and naturalism of reproduction are lost, and the process of "conventionalism" more and more tends towards pure geometrical pattern, marking degeneration of art, as it may also mark degeneration in the life and thought and civilisation of the later peoples. I am myself inclined to believe that these remarkable instances of truthful and free naturalism in some Palæolithic periods, which stand out in such astonishing superiority of technical skill over the work of subsequent ages, illustrate a high development in the comparative civilisation of these early prehistoric periods and thus presume a long series of evolutionary periods preceding them, as they may mark the *end* and not the *beginning* of an evolutionary

upward wave. It must also be remembered (as I have already anticipated in the First Part) that the purely decorative designs are not only found anterior to the naturalistic drawings and incisions, but that they are always found accompanying those latter designs, and, moreover, that the natural tendency of the excavator and archæologist is to overlook such simple work, owing to the impressiveness of the less numerous remarkable specimens of advanced art, thus distorting the actual proportion and dominance of the one form over the other.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that purely decorative work is generally applied to articles of use, implements of peace and war, which are fashioned to serve other purposes, not purely artistic, and to satisfy utility and not beauty. But even so, it must never be forgotten, and cannot be repeated too often, that the quality of "utility" itself in any object created by man must ultimately be reduced to what might be called appropriateness, that is, to the principle of harmony, which can be finally tested in an intelligent being like man only by its response to the æsthetic instincts and emotions. Still we are bound to realise that such objects as a whole were definitely meant and created for their utility, and not for an artistic or decorative purpose. But, in contemplating them, their form may be such in their perfect construction and elaboration that through the sensations of eye and touch they please and appeal to the æsthetic sense. We have already noted how, in the manufacture of the most highly developed modern industries in this practical and commercial age, practically all articles of use and mechanism have a large portion of work put into them to assure their perfect design and elaboration and their attractiveness in the eyes of the purchaser. However, apart from the form of such objects of

use, taken as a whole, the spaces and surface of these objects become the neutral field for "decoration"—namely, the groundwork upon which the decorative artist can more fully, and (in the best work) in harmony with the form and purpose of the object as a whole, create those ornamentations which exclusively appeal to the æsthetic sense and satisfy man's artistic, and not his practical or mechanical, desires. These parts and spaces thus become the spheres for pure ornamentation. This applies too, in the first instance, to all objects of ornament for the person of man himself, for his home and surroundings, to all his articles of daily use. The work of the ceramist, the worker in wood and in metal, the weaver of textiles, the armourer, the builder, the milliner, etc., in some cases, as notably in weaving, in basket-making, etc., the actual production of the article, the process itself, predemands a regular and symmetrical manipulation and construction which itself is one of geometrical design; so that the very structure and existence of the body is thus based on regularity of design. The same we shall see applied to all forms of architecture. But in most cases the decorative ornamentation is the direct and conscious aim in the work of the artist who uses the spaces as purely neutral grounds; though, as we shall see, such spaces as a whole and their relation to the surrounding parts of the object decorated may, and ought to have, their influence on the ornament and its composition. Such designs are in the first instance devoid of all meaning, and consist merely of the collocation of forms and lines in harmonious sequence and proportion which please the eye. Straight lines, parallel or regularly intersecting or intertwining circles or curves lead to such familiar forms as the zigzag, the meander pattern, the succession of circles, the parallel wavy lines, spirals, etc. But soon, subconsciously, and not by

deliberate copying (on the contrary, out of the subconscious summary of man's continuous observation), such regular and symmetrical forms in nature, in plants, flowers, and shells, are introduced, until the artist and the spectator are struck by the resemblance to, if not the identity with, the natural forms. In the next stage in the evolution of these generalised forms suggesting nature, but not copied from any individual elaborate instance of the natural form, the suggestion of the natural object, whether shell, plant, or flower, becomes more or less clearly or consciously indicated. There is then evolved the "honeysuckle" and "anthemion" pattern, so prevalent in the art of ancient Greece and throughout all subsequent art in various modifications, and in the decorative forms of Oriental art, since known as Arabesque, all of which, without "meaning" or direct imitation, satisfy man's instinct for harmony and form, though they may suggest various particular forms in the world of nature. These early artist-decorators could rightly, though unconsciously, feel that they must not aim at reproducing accurately, "photographically," the individual plant or flower, but that they must subordinate form entirely to the decorative composition of lines and masses in their inter-relation to the complete satisfaction of the æsthetic, and not of the mimetic or imitative or cognitive or naturalistic interest of man's senses and emotions. In the further development of decorative art, especially in some forms of Oriental art—Persian, Indian, Arab, Hispano - Mauresque, Byzantine—and in some phases of Gothic art, the decorator so far delighted in his dexterity as a draughtsman or as a sculptor that he would reproduce in detail, with most perfect precision, actual and elaborately beautiful forms from the life of plants, flowers, and animals. We need not regret this. But we must

remember that these ornaments were not fashioned to give us information about plant or animal life ; but to please us by the lines and forms ; and, furthermore, that these individual and highly finished reproductions of natural elements formed but a part of the whole scheme of decoration, be it in a capital, or in an elaborate frieze of a harmoniously constructed building, or in the filling of definite spaces with harmonious lines and forms in vases, shields, sword-blades, and other articles of use.

In course of time, even the human figure, singly and in groups, reproducing or suggesting definite incidents and scenes, was also introduced into more elaborate forms of ornamentation. But these again were entirely subordinated to the all-predominating object of harmonious decoration rather than to the delineation and convincing reproduction of the human figure or of incidents and scenes. It is here that the ancient Greeks, more than any other people, developed the decorative principle of art in the plastic or graphic reproduction of scenes. On the other hand, in Oriental and Egyptian art the primary motive and origin of sculptured, drawn, or painted bands with animals and human figures, was rather based on the mimetic and cognitive than on the harmonious and æsthetic interest. They all partake of what again must be termed the *pictographic* or *narrative* character. They were primarily and, above all, meant to convey and to record incidents and scenes, generally in the history of one of the Pharaohs or other monarchs, and the æsthetic and formative aim was subordinated to this principal object. However highly developed in artistic skill they were, as a form of "picture-writing," no doubt raised far beyond the earliest pictographs or hieroglyphic symbols, they were still of the nature of such pictographs. With the early Greek artists a new and most

important principle of art is introduced, and its successive manifestations lead to the highest development of complex decorative art. Even in some forms of Minoan and Mycenæan art, it will be seen how the endless succession of animal and human figures, which is meant to show the succession of events and human actions in time, following one another like a record in speech or writing in Egyptian and Oriental art, is replaced by the central principle of all art which we call "composition." This means nothing more nor less than the application of the laws of formal symmetry and harmony in order to appeal directly and completely to the harmonistic or æsthetic instinct, ending in the highest artistic appreciativeness. The main outline of any given scene does not naturally go on indefinitely impressing succession in time, but is rounded off and completed, in one most important central figure or incident, leading, if not forcing, the eye of the spectator to concentrate within the outlying symmetry and giving organic inter-relation of form to the composition as a whole. This can be fully appreciated by comparing, to take one instance, the wild bull-catching scene on the gold cups from Vaphio with any Egyptian, Assyrian, or other Oriental scenes, of which there are innumerable instances. Whereas the latter give a long succession of figures following one another, without a definite composition in space, the scene on the Vaphio cup, in which the wild bull is caught in a large net, by the device of the marked semicircular line of the net in the centre with the figures on either side symmetrically turned towards the centre, forms a complete decorative and harmonious unit. The Hellenic artist has thus carried the earliest linear geometrical decoration one step further in emphasising this principle of pure decorative art by composing each scene within the limited space of the object of

use, and then in giving harmonious unity to the scene.

The front and back of the body of a vase, its neck, its handles, its foot, all give distinct though different opportunities for decorative artistry and for the application of purely artistic principles; and it is by these principles of "composition," produced by the welding of the two spheres of human activity—that of the artist and that of the craftsman, the potter, metal-worker, joiner, stonemason, and builder—that decorative art, without losing its own artistic principles and æsthetic motives, is carried a considerable step forward in the evolution of its creative powers responding to the growth of varied, complex, and highly advanced life of cultured communities. This influence of the craft of building upon the art of pure decoration, ultimately reaching its culmination, the combination and blending of the two activities in Architecture, cannot be overrated. It is here that Iktinos co-operates with Pheidias, and presents to him, as earlier Greek artists did for earlier Greek sculptors, a new sphere for the sculptor to work in, the sphere of decoration, setting to him most complicated and difficult tasks in the adaptation of decorative composition in pediments, metopes, and friezes to the structural unity of a great building, which not only responded to the definite purpose for which the edifice was erected, but also satisfied æsthetic harmony in its perfect lines and proportion as a whole. It is thus in the blending of the craftsman and builder with the artist that the work of the "decorator" in the full sense of that term is evolved. But let no one conclude from this historical fact that the craftsman and the builder by themselves (merely following the primary impulse to create an object of use) could ever produce a *work of art*; and that the principles of such use by themselves did in the

past, and ought in the present and the future, unaided to produce the principles of pure artistic decoration and to guide and inspire the decorative artist.

Such a view has led to over-generalisations and fallacies emanating from practising artists and craftsmen, as well as from æsthetic critics and theorists in our own days. An attempt is constantly being made to reduce the principles of decoration to the principles of "structure and use"; and it is maintained that the fundamental principle of all decoration is nothing more than right construction. You may raise construction and use to their highest power, but you will never thereby alone produce a work of art. They may appeal to, and strengthen, artistic perceptions, instincts and feelings, but they cannot by themselves fully satisfy the æsthetic instinct. In many cases the mechanical and utilitarian attitude of mind to which they correspond may even be in direct contrast, if not antagonism, to the artistic feelings. On the other hand, the history of this natural exaggeration and over-generalisation does illustrate one essential requisite in perfect decoration. In modern times the theory of æstheticism, craftsmen and architects, which I am combating, arose out of a well-founded reaction against the vulgar degeneration of decorative art not very long ago, when inept and grotesque perversion of ordinary meanings and redundancy of blatant ornamentation (frequently in sham materials) filled all our buildings and our ornamented implements, corresponding to vulgar, blatant, and showy manifestations in other departments of our social life, and promoted by the incursion of manufacture by mass, which is inevitably characterised by mechanical sameness and generally works in tawdry, if not sham, materials, instead of honest, beautiful, sincere and painstaking handiwork inspired by truly artistic principles and aims. The reaction against the tendencies of this period of

decorative work has proved very useful and has, in many cases, counteracted some of the besetting sins of that misguided phase. It has drawn the attention of the public as well as of the artistic world to a most important aspect of the general principle of all art as applied to decoration, namely, harmony between the idea and execution, between the form and material, between the purpose of the work decorated and the decoration itself. It has furnished, and furnishes us now, with the most important negative principle of true decoration, namely, that, to produce the supreme harmony between form and matter, there must be no clash or contradiction between the use of the object decorated, or the material in which the decorative forms are to be worked, and the principles of construction out of which the object to be decorated is produced. In spite of the beauty, for instance, of even certain Gobelins or Aubusson tapestries and textiles, it may be doubtful whether it is right that the seat of a chair, or cover of a footstool, should be decorated with a beautiful woman's face or a delicate flower, upon which we sit or place our feet. Nevertheless, in such cases it may be maintained that, when the compositions on the chair and on the footstool are complete in themselves and please the eye by the harmony of their lines, forms, figures, as well as of colour and tone, nobody is reminded or need be reminded of the use which these objects are to serve, and there is no reason why, when they strike the eye, the æsthetic pleasure they would naturally produce should be compromised by the circumstance that the textiles themselves are used to cover chairs and footstools. Nor are all subjects and forms of decoration appropriate to our ordinary articles of use. The handle of an axe for chopping wood, a frying-pan, a pocket-handkerchief, a lady's parasol, are not suited to subjects and scenes from

life. It is also absurd to use costly material out of place, as it is undoubtedly inept to apply a pattern appropriate for lace or the most delicate metal-work to a common wooden chest, a terra-cotta vase, or the panel of a motor-car. There is no doubt that such radical and gross incongruities and absurdities mar the artistic harmony of any form of decoration, as there can also be no doubt that the decorator's success in the realisation of harmony in the design and subject-matter of the decorative forms and scenes represented and the material in which they are expressed and the use and structure of the objects they are to embellish, must be complete. It is also true that the very term "redundancy," or "over-decoration," implies bad taste, that it counteracts the harmony of the whole.

But it is gross exaggeration to maintain that a decorative form is inseparably wedded to one definite material, and that out of the intrinsic nature of the materials and the technique in handling them all decorative forms are wholly evolved. That is untrue to the facts of history, as it is to æsthetic theory. All the noted Greek forms of decoration, from the zigzag and wave pattern and meander to the most elaborate anthemion and floral patterns of the ancient world, were used indifferently in the best periods, and by the best artists in vases of terra-cotta, of bronze, silver and gold, and of marble; in stone-work, metal-work, and woodwork; in drawing and in painting—irrespective of the nature of the material, or of the technique, or of the purpose of the decorated object. Those patterns were put in the right place and harmonised in line and colour with the objects, and were given the right proportion, so as not to produce a redundant, gaudy appearance in the work as a whole, or too meagrely or thinly to produce a *simplicity out of place*, which, it must

always be remembered, is a form of meanness and vulgarity as marked as is ostentatious splendour. A drawing-room decorated like even the most beautiful cottage kitchen, and a kitchen with precious marbles and gilded ornaments of a ball-room, are as vulgar and as absurd, as insincere and as untrue, as would be the appearance of a cricketer in evening dress with white tie, or a dancer in a ball-room in flannels. The highly ornamented ball-room is a supreme object of beauty and gives the greatest opportunity for the decorator's genuine craft. The object of the decorator will always be to appeal, through the senses, to the artistic emotions of a receptive spectator ; and no amount of use, fitness, appropriateness, constructive efficiency, *by themselves*, without artistic beauty, will produce this æsthetic effect.

We have thus traced the advance of ornamentation as a pure art, appealing to, and satisfying, the æsthetic instinct directly and completely by form, proportion and harmony, to its more complex manifestations in which it is mixed with objects and elements belonging to other departments of human life and human creativeness, until it can no longer be called pure art in the sense in which we are using that term. Still the fact remains, that, with music in the world of sound and ornamentation in space, through the direct activity of the artist who fashions objects to satisfy æsthetic needs, works are created which are a direct expression of pure art.

B. ARCHITECTURE

We must now turn to those numerous and most important forms of creative art which are no longer the pure expression of æsthetic needs and principles, but, through the development and complexity of

civilised life, have become established departments of art-work and are mixed in character.

Architecture, in contradistinction, on the one hand, to building and, on the other hand, to decoration, is the foremost type of such mixed art. In fact, the architect, though historically he may have grown and developed out of the builder, may also have developed out of the ornamenter. He does not belong wholly and only to the one class or the other ; but the distinctive activities and aims of the architect as an artist are to be found in the complete and harmonious blending of the two. The builder, as such, is a pure craftsman, as much as is the stonemason, the joiner or engineer. The works which in the earliest times he produces aim, in the first instance, at utility and not at beauty ; they partake more of the nature of the mechanical than of the artistic, and the whole of his functions belong more directly to the department of pragmatics than of æsthetics. But so soon as the æsthetic instinct and need which supply the motive-power to the activity and creativeness of the ornamenter become active in the builder, they lead to the blending of these two impulses and found a new activity. Thus is produced the complex art of Architecture—neither wholly the work of the builder nor wholly that of the ornamenter. But, as soon as the builder becomes an architect, he becomes an artist ; and, however necessary it may be for him to satisfy the technical and, in great part, mechanical principles of construction in various materials, and as a practical worker to fulfil the definite purpose of use prescribed by the form of building he constructs, his function as an architectural artist must always be to satisfy directly the need for harmony, the æsthetic instinct of man. He must create a thing of beauty. No amount of mechanical ingenuity or knowledge, no regard for the structural

nature and capabilities of the materials with which he deals, no justness and competence in fulfilling the useful purposes of the building he erects, will of themselves make of him the true artist whom we call an architect. These are only the qualifications of a craftsman and an engineer. As an artist, he must compose into perfect harmony and unity of design the several parts of the building, elaborate each portion and member of this constructed unit, so that they fully respond to the æsthetic feeling for form. He must further evolve those elements of ornamentation which belong to the sister graphic or plastic arts and emphasise and intensify his architectural construction, not merely as an object of use, but as a work of art, to satisfy the æsthetic feelings of all who contemplate and use the building. But with the advance of complex civilised life and the innumerable varieties of its needs, individual and collective, and with the increase of the number of materials that are used, the demands upon the ideal architect, on the intellectual, mechanical and even scientific side (in contradistinction to the more imaginative and emotional qualities of the artist), become more exacting and intrusive in his training and in his activities. In modern architecture the necessity of providing for the housing of all classes, with the need of many urgent considerations, and beyond the domestic sphere, in the world of business—from workshop to factory, from the shop to the great department “store”—and in all public buildings, from theatres, cinematograph halls, churches, clubs, working-men’s institutes, and Government buildings—all these practical needs and all the physical means of responding to them become still more confusingly complicated by the use of quite new materials, demanding new forms of construction and treatment—through iron and steel to “reinforced concrete”—

which must be added to all the earlier materials which had evolved their own characteristic treatment and style. All these preliminary, though essential, demands urgently clamouring for due consideration and elaboration, require the modern architect to be not only a builder, but even a mechanical and civil engineer. Nevertheless, in order to be an architect—a full and adequate representative of the noble art—he must possess, as a primary force of his artistic creativeness, that all-pervading sense and love of form in harmony which in more direct and predominating strength drives the musician and the decorator, the sculptor, painter and poet, to produce the works of their respective arts.

It will thus be seen how in the making of the ideal architect a large number of separate qualities must be combined in the personality of the artist. Not only the peculiar technical and artistic qualifications, to which reference has been made, are required, including a thorough scientific education in higher mathematics and physics for the construction of the building as a whole and in all its details (the properties of the materials, stress, strain, etc.); but also complete mastery of draughtsmanship, and, above all, that imaginative visual capacity to see all the forms with which he deals *architecturally*, as the sculptor and the painter spontaneously visualise all forms in their distinctively *sculpturesque* or *picturesque* nature. This does emphatically not only apply to the outer appearance, the elevation of a building; but implies that the internal spaces, with which he has to deal, present a harmonious and fully organised plan—the ground-plan—and that his imagination naturally presents all spaces in this form, which the untrained layman is hardly ever able to do either by natural predisposition or by training.

Beyond these qualifications his faculties and his

work must not be limited to the single building by itself, but in its relation to its surroundings, whether in town or country. This wider harmony between the buildings to one another in civic architecture and to the street or district as a whole—the subordination of the buildings to a wider artistic organisation—is conveyed by the modern term “town-planning.” The nature of this important architectural quality can best be illustrated by the comparative neglect of such principles in the case of New York as an architectural unit compared with Paris. It becomes more and more urgent that civic authorities should, *under competent expert advice*, consider these wider artistic needs.

In the country the architect must also consider the building in relation to its natural rural setting. The artistic organism must here also harmonise with its environment. The ideal architect must therefore also be a competent “landscape gardener.”¹

One fact, however, remains paramount within all the technical requisites of the architect as a builder, namely, that he must be essentially an artist possessing all the natural powers and the training of the artist, especially in the Pure Art of Ornamentation.

C. THE ARTS OF “MEANING”

(SCULPTURE, PAINTING, THE LITERARY AND DRAMATIC ARTS, MUSIC,
THE ART OF LIVING)

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

We have already distinguished “Pure” Art from what might, perhaps, be called “Applied” Art—if we were to take the analogy between Pure and

¹ I recall a striking phrase of my friend, the late Charles Eliot Norton, when visiting him in his picturesque country house at Ashfield, Massachusetts. I had asked him what he was then occupied in doing. “Oh,” he said, “I am landscape-painting with an axe.”

Applied Mathematics, Physics and Science in general. The further development of the art of ornamentation has already shown us how decorative art loses its "purity" as it progresses; and how, in architecture, elements alien to the purely æsthetic aims are introduced and blended in the development of the art of building. Practically all the more advanced arts evolved by civilised man in the course of ages must surrender their purity of æsthetic function with the advance of intelligence and thought, of man's spiritual and mental activities, which dominate all his conscious life. His senses and perceptions, his feelings and thoughts, his imagination, his creativeness in every direction, are modified and guided by his intelligence, in accordance with his aspirations and ideals. It is thus, through the channels of intelligent apprehension, that his further artistic desires and creativeness manifest themselves. To use a simple term, the forms which he puts into the material of artistic creativeness must have a *meaning*; and it is thus through the channels of apprehension and understanding that his æsthetic faculties are stimulated and his desire for the harmony of art satisfied. Clear and accurate meaning must be as near as possible to the thing itself which is to be apprehended. Apprehension or cognition is to be objective and not subjective, independent of all subjective states, receptivities, pleasures, or pains, peace of mind, personal admiration and all other "affects." Things are to be apprehended as they are. This is the supreme domain of human cognition, ending in truth and leading to science.

But, as we have seen, even in the purest science, the discovery and exposition of truth are ultimately based upon the harmonistic principle, and man's work arising out of this is in truth a kind of art itself. We have even seen that the simplest full sense-

perception rests upon the harmonistic principle ; it is never completely and purely objective, but is, from one point of view, a subjective activity of the human mind. For if we consider more searchingly what happens when we use our higher senses in seeing and hearing, we shall be forced to realise that these perceptions never consist of the purely passive stimulation through the outer object perceived, a passive reproduction of the thing itself which stimulates our senses ; but consist in great part of an active, subjective selection, or what we might even venture to call the “ composition ” of stimuli, in which we actively *project* with varying degrees of consciousness (generally purely subconsciously) our memory-images or our associative imagination. In the act of seeing and hearing we only receive a part of the attributes of the outer object perceived, and we “ concentrate ” upon one or more of these innumerable attributes, we select them, we compose them on the lines of “ attention,” and on the principle of harmonistic selection. When we “ see ” a face or a hand, when we hear a longer or shorter sentence, or part of it, or a word, the outer objects which stimulate our perceptive faculties are in each case composed of innumerable attributes. Our sensory organs of sight and sound, by their function, ignore most of these attributes and select those which by attention and the desire of apprehension harmonise into the definite “ meaning.” The ideal perception of an ideal being would reproduce and grasp *all* the infinite attributes in every object perceived. My meaning in this seeming paradox would become clearer if we were to assume that the human eye and the human ear resembled the most complete microscope and megaphone, as well as telescope and telephone, to the *n*th power—to an infinite degree. To leave for the moment more complicated objects, such as a face or

a hand, let us take a small portion of the human skin, which consists of all the innumerable visual attributes which even any magnifying-glass reveals in the pores, small cavities, among other distant and individual features, all of which when we "see" the human skin we either do not see or ignore. The same with any composition of sounds or single sounds and their component parts and intervals, which we do not hear with the "natural" ear unaided by instruments. In the same way the telescope reveals distant stars and planets that the naked eye does not see, and corresponding macrophonic instruments will produce similar results in sound. The same applies to the perception of succession in time or movement. Thus, for instance, the invention of instantaneous photography has revealed to us a more minute subdivision of the innumerable stages in movement than the naked eye habitually perceived. It was a revelation when we were first shown the several component portions of such continuous movement in the "horse in motion." We were thus led to believe that our previous visual picture of a galloping horse as shown in all graphic illustrations in drawing and painting was wrong. The result has even been that in modern graphic representation of such movement a more minute single instant in a gallop or a trot horse is chosen for the typical illustration of the whole movement. This is a mistake. Our natural eye, and the older artists who followed its lead and recorded its impressions, were right. They selected and composed spontaneously and naturally the typical elements that constitute galloping or trotting, and thus truthfully represented the real art of vision, which in itself is one of selection and composition. Our natural vision is not an individual instant of photography, but always partakes of the nature of what we now call a composite photograph.

This will, in the first instance, show that our sense-perceptions never mean complete and accurate transference of the attributes of the object to the subject perceiving. Consider for a moment what happens when you listen to any speech directed to you in command or in conversation. We are addressed by the words, "Please listen to what I am going to say to you." If a phonograph were to record such a quickly spoken phrase it would amount to a jumble of sounds something like this, "plslsntowimgngt-satu"—or even much less in the majority of cases. But even a few of these individual sounds, stimulating the drum of our ear, are elaborated by our organ of hearing into a complete picture-sound by the *projection* on our part, according to definite principles of meaning which we convey to our own consciousness. The same occurs with regard to sight. A mere part or hint of a familiar form is converted by our inner image into the consciousness of complete form. Both in sight and in sound we are constantly "composing" on very imperfect actual suggestions¹ into complete form, or we reduce the great variety of visual and audible objects which strike the eye or ear when we are looking in a room or at outside scenes, or listening to sounds, into some unity by definite concentration and isolation of phenomena, into one well-composed and clear image or impression which we apprehend as such. Every visual "scene" is provided by us with a foreground, middle distance and background; the middle distance being the point of concentration, while the details of foreground and background, as well as the side views, are relatively indistinct and of minor importance to the

¹ It would be well that those dealing with psychical phenomena, such as ghosts and apparitions, should remain strictly conscious of this "projecting" activity of our senses on insufficient actual stimulation from without.

central unity of composition. In seeing and hearing we are selecting and composing *as artists do*, continuously throughout our life, at nearly every moment of our conscious existence.

Thus, as we have already suggested in the previous chapter, science itself is based upon selection, which ultimately follows the principles of harmony. Now, in the "Arts of Meaning," the act of apprehension and cognition—the epistemological activity—is involved, as well as in science; but the difference between science and these arts lies in the position which Form and Harmony hold in both activities. In art they are the end and object; in science they are the means of discovery and exposition. In a work of art just one *form* given to the expression of any meaning in nature and in life and thought is essential to the exposition of the matter or meaning conveyed. No other form can take its place. It is essential to the creation presented; it is the spirit which gives life to the dead and meaningless matter. Rob the sense-impression or feeling of this and the living thing no longer exists. *One* form is not essential to the abstract truth itself conveyed in science; it can be discarded when the truth is apprehended for itself, not tied up with one form. Understanding of truth might be established, confirmed and imparted by other means, by other departments of science. Mathematical truths by means of numbers, or algebraic symbols in geometry or trigonometry; physics and chemistry, biology and geology, logic and philosophy, even history and its various aspects and parts—social, political, economical—may interchangeably establish, prove, or confirm, and in turn impart, one truth; the form in which this truth is conveyed is a mere means to the establishment of the truth itself. Even one and the same work may at times be used and considered as pure art or as pure

science, according to the concentration of attention upon the form side or the meaning side. The facts in a passage of Thucydides, in so far as it aims at recording a battle scene in the spirit of historical science, might be imparted by some other author or conveyed by other departments of historical study—the topography of the site, the archæology of the monuments referring to the battle, the epigraphy of the inscriptions referring to it, etc. But when this passage is considered as a work of literary art, for the style of the author, for his *lexis*, the facts, the matter itself, is literally “inspired” by the spirit of form into a new living organism or creation, and the form becomes the essence—no other mode of expression can replace it. We can never consider the form as a mere means in art and discard it when the meaning has been conveyed; for in the highest degree of purpose and consciousness in such creations the form is the essence.

Now, in the Arts of Meaning unquestionably facts and truths must be conveyed in artistic form, which becomes the chief constituent of the work as a whole. But in the actual history of such artistic work and in the theory and criticism of such artistic creativeness, the crucial point has ever been, and will always be, the relation and proportion between these two elements of form and meaning which are to be organically fused into one. The predominance of the one over the other will thus be characterised by what has been called Realism or Idealism. Realism will, above all, aim at truth, as the corresponding forms of Idealism will aim at form. But such one-sided, exaggerated and pronounced Realism, the highest aim in the production of which is truth, can never produce or attain to the highest art, because the work of art then merely becomes a feeble and shadowy substitute, a makeshift, for reality; and it would

attain its highest perfection when it could deceive the spectator into mistaking such an artifact (for it never is a work of art) for the thing itself—as certain people are delighted when at Mme Tussaud's they find themselves addressing one of the wax figures as a living visitor or attendant and fondly believe that, because they have thus been tricked, the waxwork is the highest realisation of the artist's work. Yet, not only in this vulgar form of wonder, mistaken for artistic admiration, but even with some of the highest representatives of art and æsthetics, can this underlying fallacy be detected.

We have seen before, in dealing with the art of ornamentation, the narrative or "pictographic" stage in which the graphic arts are made subservient to the mere imparting of knowledge, and these arts are reduced to picture-writing, a makeshift for the imparting of information, and not a work of art designed to satisfy the æsthetic instinct and feelings. The same is true of those "arts of meaning" as well in which the facts conveyed ought merely to be means and units to the establishment of a further harmony. In so far as they are only designed to convey accurate information they belong to the domain of science and not of art. It is therefore a complete misunderstanding of the nature of art to maintain that it arises out of the *mimetic instinct*—the reproduction or imitation of outer things, events, or actions. Thus Plato,¹ who in some of his dialogues (notably in the

¹ I must make an exception to my self-imposed rule of not discussing or quoting the various views on the subject I am dealing with or in any way translating the expression of my own convictions into the language of other thinkers, by referring to a very able and suggestive exposition of the Platonic conception of art as well as of that of other philosophers in a book on *The Theory of Beauty*, by Mr. E. F. Carritt, of Oxford. It must be remembered that Plato and Aristotle at times refer to art from the fixed point of view of Ethics, Pædagogics, and Politics, and that in such cases there is a fixed ethical or pædagogical bias in their conception of Æsthetics.

Phædrus) has gone to the very heart of the nature of art, singularly contradicts his definitions and the true principles there laid down when (chiefly in the 10th book of the *Republic* and in the *Philebus*) he ascribes to *Mimesis* the fundamental principle of artistic creativeness, and consequently assigns a comparatively low position to art and to the artist in the world of spiritual achievement.

When Robert Browning, in "The Last Ride Together," deplores the inadequacy of art :

And you, great sculptor—so, you gave
A score of years to Art, her slave,
And that's your Venus, whence we turn
To yonder girl that fords the burn !

he comes dangerously near to ignoring the true essence of art. It is not the æsthetic sense or spirit which leads the man to prefer the village girl who fords the burn to the statue of Venus ; but his sensuality.

A visit to a session of a Criminal or Divorce Court ; a ball at some social gathering ; eavesdropping or keyhole-peeping at a love-scene ; or the verbatim accounts of any scene or incident of life in any newspaper, would all be a more perfect means of apprehending the truth of life than any work of poetry or prose, conveying the spirit and essence of life in all its manifestations in the most harmonious, thrilling and lofty forms of literary art. On the other hand, pure " Idealism," ignoring all the truthful rendering of objects and scenes from nature and life in the desire to convey form in its purest and absolute harmony (unless it is merely an expression of the pure art of " ornamentation," with which we have dealt before), can never succeed in imparting ideas, which in their harmonious forms are designed to stir us to higher æsthetic appreciativeness and emotions. Moreover, in so far as the meanings which are to be

conveyed produce inaccurate or distorted images of facts, objects, incidents and scenes of life, by their very faulty description or drawing, they lead to distorted perceptions which, as such, are inharmonious and counteract, or detract from, the ultimate harmony. Such inaccuracy or untruthfulness produces either disturbing or painful struggle in the act of mere apprehension, or an opposition and protest in the mind of the spectator or audience, because of their untruthfulness. In the reproduction, for instance, of the human being, of landscapes, animals, plants, buildings, by means of the plastic or graphic arts, if these forms are out of drawing or out of perspective, or with false keys of colour, then, *in so far as they strike us as false*, and as this untruthfulness obtrudes itself upon our attention, thus obscuring or weakening any other visual emotion, harmony of form and colour, or general harmonious æsthetic mood, the result is cacophony and not harmony; they can convey no idea or ideal, they only disturb or destroy the artistic expression itself. On the other hand, it must be remembered that, for purposes of impressing their visual form in one distinct æsthetic aspect, details in the object may be ignored as others may be emphasised, if not exaggerated. This really is but a continuance and development of the principle inherent in the act of "seeing" to which I have just referred. For instance, the presentation of a galloping horse in one definite composite moment is not true to the momentary action of the horse itself as perceived. If thus El Greco exaggerates in portraits the dimensions of his figures, emphasises the single features to produce the strongest characterisation, chooses pronounced contrasts of light and shade and colour to give one vivid totality to the whole scene, this unusual and, perhaps, untrue rendering of living forms may all be so thoroughly subordinated to his

own individual pictorial sense and imagination and to the forcible realisation in his work of his own conceptions and moods, that many, if not most, of his pictures are distinctive and high forms of pictorial art. But it is important and essential to remember that it is *in spite of*, and not *because of*, these concessions of ordinary visual truth to a wider aim of formal harmony, that his works are to be appreciated and admired. Such a practice ought, however, never to be put forward as the rule and norm of pictorial art ; and, still less, ought it to form a school, which aims at establishing the normal standards of that art in exaggerated eccentricities of drawing and colour, and without the genius for true artistic harmony possessed by El Greco. The most modern schools of " impressionism " and " futurism " are justified to some degree, as in their protest and reaction against the commonplace and mechanical conceptions of antiquated technique, as well as against the realistic schools which aim at indifferent rendering of truth to life and nature without harmony or form. But they are wrong—unless they convincingly take their stand in the domain of the art of pure " ornamentation "—when they obtrude obvious faults in drawing, in perspective, and in harmonious colour, while basing their impressionistic pictorial harmony of objects in nature, in human and animal figures, trees and plants, rocks and houses which are unrecognisable or " out of drawing," so that the unprejudiced spectator with normal visual senses is at once, and above all, struck by the discrepancy between the pictorial representation of these objects and his own normal visual images of them in life. However much such artists justify their general æsthetic theory of aiming at harmonious forms and colours, they do not succeed in realising these theories in their works, which directly contradict their own theories.

The true aim of the Arts of Meaning must be to fuse into just proportion and harmony these two extremes of Realism and Idealism—a task which the ancient Greeks were the first to achieve for the world, so that the term “ classic ” will ever suggest this right balance in the evolution of art throughout all ages.

To the conveyance of accurate meaning, which thus complicates, obscures and sometimes diverts into inartistic channels the various arts which present definite things, events, experiences of nature and life, we must, in order to create the harmonious whole of a true work of art, add other elements coming from relatively alien sources and aims which still further inhibit, impede, dilute, and complicate the chief aim of the artist to establish Pure Form and harmony in the sphere of æsthetic creativeness. Such complications are due to the fact that the nature of outer objects in the world and in the life from which the artist chooses his subjects alters with the variation of the human mind, the point of vision which man may adopt, as well as the development of society and civilisation. The change of purpose in the things and beings which man perceives, the change of “ Fashion ” which the modification of communal life in successive periods establishes, stand in the way, and embarrass the discovery and the appreciation of the pure form which, on the grounds of normal physical and physiological development, the artist endeavours to establish.

Take, for instance, the human and normal forms with which the graphic and plastic arts are principally concerned. Let us even simplify this complex problem by limiting our scope to the *Homo Europeus*, and not include the other races of man. There can be no doubt that the typical proportions of the human body and of the human face, in their relation

to one another and in the normal anatomical and physiological development of each one of the visible organs of the body and the features of the face, have been evolved and established by what, roughly speaking, we might call classical art. But, however complex and arduous the task has been in the past, and ever remains, of thus responding to our sense of proportion in appreciating a human form on the ground of physiological normality, it was, and is, a comparatively simple task. When, however, to the existing complexities are added the changes in our standard of admiration and appreciation, forcibly, if not necessarily, produced in us by the development of the fullness of our communal social life, the task of the artist in composing into harmony all these standards due to new appreciations of form becomes still more complicated and difficult, though, no doubt, art itself gains in variety and in the living expansion of its domain and activity. When nature is thus not left to its purely physiological activities, but man, with his needs and desires and purposes in the course of social evolution, steps in to modify into different channels the functioning of the human body, the physical types and ideals of man have become essentially modified.

The simpler the conditions of communal life in each period and in each locality, the simpler the establishment of the typical, the more will it approach to the type naturally evolved by the interaction of physiological causes. When the chief and all-absorbing task of man was protection against savage animals and human enemies, the highest type from every point of view, including social and ethical needs, was the strong man, whose physical, and especially muscular, development markedly responded to such needs. So also this bodily strength secured his power of asserting his superiority over the

weaker members of his own community. When, in a further stage, he invents and produces mechanical means of defence and offence—that is, arms—the efficiency of his strength is conditioned by his skill in using those arms ; and further modifications have been constantly recurring in consequence of changes in the character of his weapons throughout his whole historical evolution until—to take a striking instance—we come to the most marked change in the history of highly civilised European peoples when the fully armed, mounted knight of the Middle Ages, and all the social qualities which his superiority implied, was pulled down from his high and dominant position, owing to the invention of gunpowder and all that this implied. In our own times, owing to the various inventions in defensive and offensive arms, we have witnessed, and are witnessing, momentous changes, perhaps as great and significant as resulted from the invention of gunpowder. The consequence thus is, that at an early stage different modifications of the physiological type of the perfect body of man assert themselves and effectively modify the ideals of form. In the first place, skill is added to strength, fleetness and agility to the mere muscular development, and, especially in ancient Greece, through the great festivals with their athletic games, subdivisions of types corresponding to the “ heavy ” and “ light ” games (as in war there was the heavy “ hoplite ” and the more lightly armed warrior), supervene, until at last skill leads over to intelligence, and even the outwardly visible signs of such intelligence become the reason for admiration as regards the physical appearance of man. The more that moral and intellectual qualities become effective means of establishing social dominance, the more do the physical concomitants and outwardly visible attributes of those qualities affect physical appearance and constitute the type

of man most admired—most perfect. When to this strong motive force in developed communal life there is added the powerful factor of sexual selection, there appears a still more complex modification of the simple physiological type. The direct recognition of social superiority itself then becomes a very powerful factor in the modification of the ideal of the human form. The physical qualities which correspond to, and produce, grace and charm, on account of their direct or remote and vague association with intellectual and moral qualities bearing upon social life and adding to the direct sexual attractiveness, become more and more potent and modify the representation of the visible attributes and forms which the artist represents in his harmonious composition. Every step and modification in the evolution of social life itself and of its complex factors, produces a direct modification in the establishment of the perfect physical type and the outer appearance of the ideal man.

The same fact is to be noted in the historical development and modification of the female form in art. The purely physiological type, in the harmonious inter-relation and proportion of all the visible organs, is at a very early stage modified by the powerful obtrusion of the sexual element, in that, after all, the chief and central function of woman is to be the mother of children. It is thus that, from the earliest times, those attributes in the form of woman which suggest her capacity of childbearing and, preceding that function, that of her powers of sexual stimulation and attractiveness, become most powerful elements affecting her presentation of perfect form, the purely physiological and anatomical proportion of bodily forms in perfect harmony.

These factors, for instance, in various phases of historical evolution, directly act upon the widening

and accentuation of the hips, and this widening, when elaborate and complicated dress is introduced, leads to the relative narrowing of the waist and the corresponding exaggeration of the hips, by all kinds of artificial devices, which appear singular and even grotesque to the people who are not under the influence of such an individual fashion. Here again, and perhaps even to a greater degree than in the case of man, immediately "social" attractivenesses and amenities obtrude their modifying influences, until the woman who manifests the attributes of a higher social class, attractions of wealth and refinement, sets the standard of female form and strikes the keynote of physical charm. I have elsewhere¹ indicated in one single instance the paradoxical fitfulness of such influences when enlarging upon the well-known degeneration of Saxon words with the advent of the Norman Conqueror, who claimed the monopoly of social refinement for the words in Norman-French language. Thus the word *buxom* (from the Saxon *beogan*, *bugan*, to bend) originally, no doubt, conveyed the lithe and svelte gracefulness of the female form. But, with the introduction of Norman-French, it was lowered in meaning to the sphere of the healthy and rotund peasant woman when the Norman Conqueror assigned his own terms to the graceful woman of his own class. The word came to convey the very opposite of its original meaning.

These modifications, which reflect the endless variety of historical changes in all the fine shadings of our actual social, as well as economic, life, are directly reflected in art, which takes immediate cognisance of the fullness of life and expresses this in the perfection of harmonious form. We can trace

¹ *Balance of Emotion and Intellect*, Appendix, "Language and the Emotions," pp. 209-10.

this powerfully active process in our own time in every year and almost every day in what might, by a familiar phrase, be called the influence of *fashion*. I have elsewhere¹ dealt with this subject, and have specially emphasised two main currents in the production of fashion in industrial art, as well as in the higher forms of art. These two potent factors are *Habitation* and *the Desire for Novelty*.

These two influences often clash, and in this struggle the one may temporarily dominate over the other. We then have either a conservative and a moderating, or a radical—if not revolutionary—tone and direction of taste. But it must be noted in the whole history of art in all its numerous manifestations that, whatever new varieties are introduced and dominate for the time, the physiological normality and its type, which, as regards the human figure, was practically established by the Hellenic artist in "classic" form, always reasserts itself in the ever-recurring conflict between the Ideal and the Real, the Classical and the Romantic.²

I might enlarge this inquiry by dealing with similar elements of change that affect and modify pure formal harmony in every other aspect of life—which from the plan and nature of this inquiry would lead us too far into the discussion of special æsthetics. But I must just suggest in a few words the similar modification of these laws of form as applied to the establishment of perfect types in the animal world.

¹ *Journal of R.A. of Arts*, March 27, 1914.

² I have, however, endeavoured to show how the successive changes in the character of the various athletic games in the classical world affected the rendering of the human physical type in art. See "The Influence of Athletic Games upon Greek Art," *Proc. Roy. Inst. Gr. Brit.*, 1883 (reprinted in *Essays on the Art of Pheidias*, 1885). The whole history of art in its successive changes shows actions and reactions between the classical and romantic, the chief moving force being *Habitation* and *the Desire for Novelty*.

This is especially the case with regard to domestic animals. I have shown elsewhere¹ the influence of domestication in converting the aim and purpose (*telos*) of the breeder in the cause, the naturally efficient agents of change and evolution which lead to the establishment of such animal types. The perfect type, the ideal form, of all our several domestic animals (horse, dog, cow, etc.) are modified by the aim or purpose (what Aristotle calls *entelechy*) through which man interferes with purely "natural" selection. Thus the horse has changed from the earliest periods of its history to the time when it had to carry a fully armed knight down to the thoroughbred horse of the present day. But in our own day we have developed subdivisions, such as the heavy cart-horse, the hunter, the hackney, the polo-pony, etc., all of which establish their own type or ideal of form. So too the dog has undergone all the modifications from the dachshund at the one end to the greyhound at the other, and, by means of the influence of "fashion," and even economical interests, with every successive dog-show, the perfect type is modified even in the same race and breed. The same thing is clearly illustrated by the development and the type of the cow and bull.

All the Arts of Meaning thus deal with the fullness of life in all its varieties and modifications, adopting and applying objects that possess inherent meaning in order to create a harmonious organic whole, in which the form and matter of expression are inseparably blended, fused into individual life by the creative imagination of the artist, directly appealing through the senses to his fellow-men and reproducing in him the perfect harmony of the work of art, culminating in the æsthetic mood pervading the human mind with its harmony. But the several

¹ *Eugenics, Civics, and Ethics*, p. 7 seq. (Cambridge University Press, 1920).

arts appeal to different senses and use different materials and modes of artistic expression. They can thus be, and have thus been, broadly subdivided into the Plastic Arts or Sculpture, the Pictorial Arts or Painting, the Literary Arts (including Poetry and Prose), among which may also be classified Dramatic Art (though it might be grouped as a class by itself), and, finally, Musical Art, with which in the main we have already dealt.

(a) SCULPTURE ¹

The fictile or plastic arts—Sculpture—excepting in their purely ornamentative stage, have as their subject-matter human and animal life. Though they may present other forms and even introduce these as accessory elements, they are practically limited to the human mind and animal figure and the manifestation of life through them. The vehicle for artistic expression is an inorganic material: clay, wood, stone, metal, bone, ivory, etc., and various modifications or combinations of these. Thus the first and most difficult task of the sculptor is to infuse convincingly the essential characteristics of organic life into inorganic material—to infuse life into a dead substance, by means of the spirit of artistic harmony which provides the living breath of imagination, feeling and thought to the lifeless stuff. The first and central condition for such artistic expression, inherent in the very principle of harmony, is that those manifestations of life should be selected which, so far from being contradictory to the essential nature of the material itself, should harmonise with it; that is, that those aspects of life should be avoided,

¹ *Essays on the Art of Pheidias*, C.U.P., 1885; especially essay entitled "The Spirit of the Art of Pheidias." *Greek Sculpture and Modern Art*, C.U.P., 1914.

which, by their very nature, are opposed to the most manifest qualities of the material in which the forms and meanings are conveyed. But the aim of the sculptor being to convey his æsthetic or harmonious conceptions of life into a lasting form, to, as it were, perpetuate the harmony of life and its complete moments, ultimately to produce what Aristotle has called *αἰσθητὰ αἰδία* (feelings eternalised), he sought for, selected, and used materials which should thus be not only perceptible to the senses but should retain their form unaltered as long as possible. Life and its changes should be "monumentalised," and that means as far as possible "eternalised."

The fact remains that such lasting materials are inorganic. And thus the artist had, from the beginning, to face a problem of contradiction between this nature of the material and of the subject-matter which he desired to infuse into it, which is organic. We thus find that in the history and evolution of this art we can detect as one principal feature the advance of technique in the sculptor's craft. The earlier stages in the development of sculpture manifest themselves chiefly in the sculptor's struggle with the reluctant material and his final victory over it. Moreover, we recognise in the history of sculpture of every period and country, which we can trace from its beginnings upwards, that the earlier works fail in so manipulating the material as to produce the illusion of life. The archaic works are stiff and lifeless. They may be symmetrical and harmonious in outline and in inner composition, and in so far satisfy the principles of ornamentative art; but they fail to produce the lines and forms of life and movement.¹

. ¹ In the history of some arts it may be found that some works of a distinctly earlier period are "freer" and more naturalistic than others which are of a distinctly later date and manifest more of these archaic characteristics. Such is not only the case when we compare some Palæolithic with some Neolithic sculpture, as well as some works of the

They forcibly illustrate the primary impulse to artistic creativeness, which does not arise out of the imitative instinct, but from the purely artistic impulse of harmonious composition. Symmetry dominates over rhythm, lasting proportion over fleeting life.

The predominance of the regular, symmetrical, transference of form to the detriment of the production of the illusion of life is also and in great part due to the technical incompetence of the fictile or plastic artists in early periods. It arises from the difficulty or opposition offered by the inorganic material, as well as from the want of skill in handling the tools to impress the material with the forms the artist endeavours to give them.

In his desire to perpetuate fleeting life the sculptor must thus choose lasting material, and, as he progresses, he finds more and more materials which, infused with the lasting form of "æsthetic" life, are not subject to change and annihilation. From the earliest time, consciously or subconsciously, he wishes, in the words of Horace, *exigere monumentum ære perennius*—to erect a monument more lasting than bronze. Perhaps, among the earliest materials which he thus chooses, when he has risen beyond the "ornamentative" phase to the stage of pure art, to create a statue, however rudimentary in form, is clay. This material, moreover, has the specific inherent advantage of "plasticity," readily receiving

Palæolithic period with those of a later date in that period (a phenomenon with which we have dealt above under "ornamentative" art), but also in the sculpture of Egypt and even of Greece. In the latter we find that some Mycenæan and Minoan works of sculpture are much less archaic, much freer, than subsequent works of the archaic historic Greek period. But (as I maintained in dealing with ornamentative art), these highly naturalistic earlier works marked, not the beginning, but a later period, if not the end, of a wave of social and artistic development. We can always show works antecedent to these remarkable naturalistic specimens which are more primitive and archaic in character.

form (as children making mud-pies have used this material in all ages); and thus the fictile sculptor, the coroplast, is closely related to, if not identical with, the earliest potter. Wood is also one of the earliest materials used, especially in countries with climatic conditions which favour the preservation of that material. But the choice of wood, as perhaps the most prevalent material for the Greek statue, even at so late a period as when athlete-statues were erected in Greece to commemorate victories in the great games (see Pausanias, vi, p. 187), may have been in part due to the fact that the tree-stem and board took the place of symbolic images in the earliest cults, which were connected with tree-worship. In the same way stone—hard and reluctant as it is—and, ultimately, marble, were at a very early period chosen for the sculptor's material, not only because their manipulation was introduced in the earliest building structures, but, as in the case of the tree-stem, the pillar was an early forerunner of the temple statue, as stones and rocks were clearly associated with early cults. In due course metal followed and, by natural association with the forms of ornamentative art, the precious metals and precious stones; until bronze, by its perfect artistic quality for the purposes of monumental sculpture, became more and more predominant.

It will be seen that in these materials there is a natural progression relative to the monumental quality of durability. Moreover, it will also readily be perceived how, for instance, the tree-stem was naturally discarded when its place was taken by stone (especially marble) and bronze for large statues, not only because the raw material of wood was limited in amount and width, so that the sculptor was hampered in presenting laterally extended compositions, but also because projecting portions

of a statue were subject to injury and destruction. But it is important to remember that the term for the temple statue in early times was a "carved image" of wood (*ξύανον*). In the progression of these materials, moreover, it will be found that, with the invention and improvement of tools to work them (thus the invention of the sawing of marble is noted by Greek writers as marking a distinct phase in the development of archaic sculpture), bronze and marble, as well as the combination of gold and ivory, tended to become the leading materials for the higher development of the sculptor's art.

The invention of new tools, as well as the improvement of the older ones, for the working of these several materials greatly increased freedom and naturalism, giving to the statues the illusion of life by means of adequate outline composition in attitudes suggesting or indicating a variety of living variations and more definite characteristic incidents and scenes expressive of the full diversity of life, and also by means of the detail-modelling of the surface of the human figure in all its parts. The gradual advance from archaic stiffness to full and naturalistic presentation of life in successive stages is clearly marked in the systematised classification of the periods of the history of sculpture (especially Greek sculpture), and thus presents to the student a most interesting and instructive sequence. We are able to trace, step by step, how the ancient sculptors overcame the inherent reluctance of the material, from the earliest extant works onwards to the period of perfection and decline; and how, before the period of full freedom, the works exhibit this struggle in the obtrusion of technical incapacity on the part of the sculptor in using his tools for this purpose. We can even detect how the surviving and persisting reminiscences of techniques and styles of earlier ages, fixed by the nature of

earlier materials and less perfect tools, obtrude themselves for a time in the work of artists belonging to later periods who had already selected new materials and were possessed of more perfect tools.

The wealth of monuments which has come down to us from ancient Greece amply proves and illustrates this evolutionary process ; while the extant passages in ancient authors definitely provide new confirmatory evidence with regard to each successive step in this development and progression. I have before noted one illustrative and striking instance relating to the achievement of the sculptor Pythagoras of Rhegion. Innumerable instances of a similar kind are at hand for any student who wishes fully to apprehend this important development in the history of human effort.

Undoubtedly thus in the outline composition and attitudes in all their varieties the advance towards freedom and naturalism was achieved, from the rudest, stiff, and symmetrical archaic statue, to the living figure suggestive of movement and life. So also in the modelling of the surface of the human figure, the contractibility and elasticity of the human skin as it covers different muscles and organs are indicated with naturalness and freedom, and all together suggest an organic being and not a lifeless and mechanical collocation of parts.

I must here give the actual words of an eminent Roman critic, Quintilian, as forcibly rendering, in the contemporary thought and language, the principles of sculpture as illustrated by the works and the artists of his own day.

“ For my part, ‘ This counsel twice, yea thrice, will I repeat ’ (a quotation from Verg. *Æn.* iii. 436), the orator must on every occasion have regard to two things—to the form and to the meaning. It is often necessary to introduce some variation in the estab-

lished and conventional arrangement of his theme, and sometimes it is fitting too. For instance, in the case of statues or paintings we see a variety of costume, expression, pose. When the body is bolt upright it has but little charm. Suppose it confronts us full-face, with arms dropped to the sides and feet joined together: why, the work will be rigid—wooden—from top to toe. It is just the turning and the varied rhythm, so to speak, which give individual action true to life. That is why hands are shaped in such diverse ways and faces take on a thousand expressions. Some works show the runner's attitude and impetuous advance, others are seated or lean on a support. Here, again, are undraped figures, there draped; elsewhere partly draped, partly undraped forms. For sheer twist and complexity could anything equal Myron's famous Quoit-thrower? Yet if a critic were to condemn the work as not upright enough to suit his taste, would he not miss the whole point of the masterpiece? The very novelty and difficulty that offend him constitute its chief claim to our admiration."¹

¹ I have here given a very free translation of the Latin. In this passage Quintilian is evidently arguing against some conservative school of art critics who maintain the conservative standards of conventional beauty (the "idealists"), as opposed to those who favour the more forcible rendering of individual life (the realists) in upholding the "twist and complexity" of movement and life in the Discobolus of Myron against what we have called the static symmetry of earlier statues. The opposition of the two terms *quid deceat* and *quid expediat* I have rendered as conveying the contrast between *form* and *meaning*, as in a passage dealing with the art of Polycleitus I maintained (see *The Argive Heræum*, vol. i, p. pp. 173-6) that the same author's use of the term *decor* meant "formal beauty." I have thus also translated *flexus ille et, ut sic dixerim, motus dat actum quendam et factum* with "it is just the turning and the varied rhythm, so to speak, which give individual action true to life." The following is the Latin text:

"Equidem id maxime 'praecipiam ac repetens iterumque iterumque monebo': res duas in omni actu spectet orator, quid deceat, quid expediat. expedit autem saepe mutare ex illo constituto traditoque ordine aliqua, et interim decet, ut in statuâ atque picturis videmus variari habitus, vultus, status; nam recti quidem corporis vel minima gratia est. nempe enim adversa sit facies et demissa bracchia et iuncti

The final step was made in the history of Greek sculpture in what is called the Period of Transition, from about the end of the sixth century B.C. to the middle of the fifth century B.C. But in the interesting and attractive works of that period—as is the case in all similar periods of transition in the arts of other countries and periods—we still notice, to however slight a degree, the obtrusion of the ‘manipulation of tools, suggesting mechanical work, in the rendering of these organic forms, in composition and modelling, and, in so far, counteracting the full illusion of life, which is only obtained when the mechanical work of the artist is entirely removed from the observation of the spectator, who is then absorbed in the full and engrossing illusion of life which the work evokes in him.

I may here anticipate and point out a supremely important principle of artistic criticism, namely, that the obtrusion of the technique in the making of *any work of art*, details of construction and manipulation (whether in sculpture or in painting, in literary art or in music), be it by the want of skill of the artist or by the facility and exuberance of technical skill in redundant virtuosity, always results in the destruction or weakening of the illusion which the work of art primarily aimed at producing. In such sculptors as Pythagoras of Rhegion, Myron, Alcamenes and others, these last traces of archaism were overcome, until in Pheidias and his contemporaries and successors the full and adequate presentation of the

pedes et a summis ad ima rigens opus. flexus ille et, ut sic dixerim, motus dat actum quendam et factum: ideo nec ad unum modum formatae manus et in vultu mille species; cursum habent quaedam et impetum, sed aut alia vel incumbent, nuda haec, illa velata sunt, quaedam mixta ex utroque. quid tam distortum et elaboratum quam est ille discobolos Myronis? si quis tamen ut parum rectum improbet opus, nonne ab intellectu artis afuerit, in qua vel praecipue laudabilis est ipsa illa novitas ac difficultas? —*Inst. Or.* 2. 13. 8–10.

human figure, in what is technically called "naturalism," was attained.

But there remains the other element in this complete and organic harmony which marks the perfect work of art—namely, the choice of the suitable subject in life which essentially and fully harmonises with the material. We have already noted or suggested that this harmony cannot be attained unless those aspects of life are chosen for presentation by the supreme artistic tact and imagination of the artist, which harmonise with the essential and ever-present qualities and attributes of the sculptor's material or, at least, do not obtrusively contradict these ever manifest attributes. With whatever degree of technical skill a sculptor may put into his material the convincing form of fleeting and momentary movement or event, the spectator, consciously or subconsciously, will feel and resent the contradiction between the subject conveyed and the mode of expression. The essentially momentary motion, especially when it is not typical, but individual and even accidental, in man or animal, fixed in a weighty and lasting material, which specifically and inevitably suggests heavy and durable qualities, must strike the spectator with the "contradiction in terms," the inadequacy or absurdity of the idea suggested or at least the absence of full harmony in the organic unity of the work presented.

It was thus the supreme genius of the ancient Greek artists, notably of Pheidias, to have selected those forms of life most completely in harmony with the material of their art. I have elsewhere¹ endeavoured to show how in the broader aspects this was achieved, in that Pheidias and the other great sculptors of ancient Greece established in art what I called the Type and the Ideal of nature and life. The Type

¹ *Essays on the Art of Pheidias*, Essay II.

refers more especially to the physical, the Ideal more to the spiritual attributes. Both Type and Ideal are the generalised forms of the individual physical and spiritual manifestations (they by distant analogy correspond to "the laws of nature" of the physical world). The individual connotes the finite, changing and fleeting, whereas the general implies that which is lasting. Thus in establishing the type in the physical appearance and life of man, including the generalised varieties, activities and incidents of such life, the artist chooses that which is most lasting—which is monumental in character, worthy of being expressed in the weightiest language of his art and in a form, moreover, more lasting than bronze (*aere perennius*). The Greek artist found fashioned for his hand the religious and heroic world of his mythology, which had early established in his mind and in that of the whole people, intelligible to all, the more spiritual manifestations of human character and life and of the social and moral world. The great gods Zeus, Hera, Apollo, Athene, Ares, Demeter, etc.; the numerous heroes, Hercules, Theseus, Prometheus, etc., their qualities, lives and fates, raised from fleeting individuality into the heroic sphere of living generalisation, furnished the imagination with visual types of an ideal world. Religious and secular literature¹ was the common and familiar vehicle for giving to these more abstract ideas a physical, if not a tangible, reality in the consciousness of the Greek people. It was thus that Pheidias, above all, could present and fix through the eyes of the spectator these ideals of spiritual types in the qualities of man and of human life.

¹ In the sacred writings of the East, and more especially in those of the Hebraistic and Christian world throughout the Middle Ages and modern times, similar types were furnished to the artist, intelligible to the people, though not in that directly naturalistic form.

It was owing to these conditions (and this point is to be especially noted) that in the monumental quality of his sculpture he could display the complete harmony between the form and material of his art. Among the numerous great sculptors of succeeding generations we may add that the work of Michelangelo and, in some of his statues, Rodin, attained to this largeness of monumental character.

In singling out these great masters in the art of sculpture, and in thus recognising the essential qualities of their works, as illustrating the highest achievement of that art, embodying the essential principles of harmony which underlie it, we must guard against the danger of dogmatic narrowness in limiting our approval and admiration by such absolute standards and thus ignoring further developments in sculpture which do not directly and fully correspond to the standards of greatness set by a Pheidias and a Michelangelo. We must thus not forget or ignore that, in the evolution of life in the various periods of civilisation, the variety and complexity of that life itself, as well as the standards of æsthetic perception and appreciation, created as a whole in the human mind through the advance of painting, poetry, music and kindred arts, as finally the advance in the technique in the treatment of the older, and the introduction of newer materials and tools in sculpture and in the sister arts—that all these conditions created in their combined influence newer and more diverse forms of æsthetic appreciation, as well as the need for the satisfaction of these in each single art.

Thus, in spite of what has been said above regarding the essential harmony of sculpture directed by the weighty and monumental character of its materials, which leads to the selection of the larger, broader and more lasting aspects of life and character, and to the avoidance of momentary, light, or frivolous

subjects, the growing feeling and appreciation for movement, developed in the æsthetic mind through the confluence of so many artistic influences, led the artists of subsequent periods to a far wider and higher skill in the presentation of movement in sculpture. We may note this development in a whole line of sculptors in ancient Greece, as well as in more modern art, when the sculptor has possessed the supreme artistic tact to choose the most generalised sculpturesque form to express various movements, to fix the fleeting moment through the very soul of the whole movement into its most significant instant, by the harmonious fusion of all parts of the moving body to express the one central idea of activity and life. In Italian art¹ perhaps the highest point in this one central achievement was reached by Giovanni da Bologna, whose figures and groups impress complex activity and movement by most varied, and still harmonious, lines and composition, of what might be called *crossed* rhythms ; while Rodin and his followers have successfully struggled with the difficult task of seizing the complex and individualised movements and moods in the pose and modelling of the human figure expressive of such vitality and movement.

Needless to add that in the small statuettes, which, because of their size and their more fleeting qualities, do not imperatively suggest the monumental and lasting, such greater diversity and liberty in the choice of subjects have always been admissible. The same applies to the wonderful, fantastic and naturalistic works in bronze and in ivory of Chinese and Japanese sculpture, with its harmonious and decora-

¹ Of course, I cannot, and need not, dwell here on the numerous Italian and French sculptors, the great Tuscan sculptors preceding Giovanni da Bologna, with their singular national and religious charm, nor the French sculptors of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, with their distinctive national grace and their courageous vitality.

tive sinuosity of lines and modelling, and its naturalistic variety of characterisation of actual life down to the grotesque.

The same applies in the growth of the appreciation and the need of texture in modelling. In Greek art the development on this side was already furnished, as regards the great temple statues, by the combination of gold and ivory with the addition of profuse coloured enamelling and, subsequently, by polychrome sculpture in marble.¹ No doubt, both before and after the Pheidias period the development of the art of painting in its various forms increased the appreciation and the need of varieties of texture in the eyes of the Greek people, as, in the later development of painting in modern times down to our own days, such a growing need for the satisfaction of an increased sense of texture, light and shade, and colour, reacted upon the art and technique of the sculptor, producing ultimately some of the innovations in the use of material and in modelling of a Rodin and his modern followers.

The sculptor thus has presented to him a much wider sphere as regards the choice of subjects and the variety of life and movement beyond the central and supreme expression of his art in monumental sculpture. But even at far earlier dates the possibility of a wider sphere of expression was furnished and copiously used by the sculptors of every age. This occurred especially in relief sculpture, as well as in pedimental sculpture, both of which forms are not pure sculpture in the strictest sense of that term, as they are modified by their fusion with, and subordination to, architectural and decorative art. The supreme harmony of composition which the pure sculptor in the round must concentrate upon is, in "architectural" sculpture,

¹ *Essays on the Art of Pheidias*, Essay VIII, "The Athene, Parthenos, and Gold and Ivory Statues," p. 269 seq.

widened out to a new form of harmony, in which composition, craft and technique must include the harmony inherent in the building as a whole, the function of each part, and the nature of the object decorated. Of themselves these needs urge him on to larger subjects and compositions, including more complicated scenes and movements. Even the pedimental groups, which consist of single figures in the round, subject to the inner harmony of form suggested by each figure in itself, still form parts of an organic whole, a larger composition. As they are seen by the spectator standing at some distance from the building, they really appear in the nature of high relief. Now, both high relief and low relief, in some respects, stand halfway between sculpture and painting, or present the fusion of the two arts ; and sculpture is thus modified by the laws governing pictorial composition, as well as by some of the laws governing the technique of drawing and even of painting. The result is that sculpture may here borrow from the graphic and pictorial arts some of the subjects conveying far greater complexity of life, incidents, and movement.

What we learn from the consideration of all these essential features in the art of sculpture is : that the full achievement of this art depends upon the complete harmony between the subject-matter and the artistic expression of material in which it is conveyed. But we also learn that both the spiritual harmony of meaning and the artistic technique of expression are modified and developed by the application of the fundamental principle of the evolution of that special form of changing life, as well as by the historical evolution of each period and country. There is thus added to the intrinsic æsthetic interest and quality in this art (as in every art) another delicate and varied source of artistic appreciativeness to be found in the

historical character of each language, period, nationality, locality and school, and this historical character finds its expression in the evolution of man's life by means of that art. The art of the East and its various periods and schools, as well as that of ancient Greece and Rome, has this additional æsthetic attractiveness and charm added to the specific quality of their respective types of sculpture. The Gothic sculpture of the successive periods in the Middle Ages, among which the thirteenth century stands out markedly, conveys a distinctive quality and charm inseparable from the intrinsic value of the sculpture itself. This is also true of the art of Italy and the subtle grace and spirituality in early Tuscan sculpture and its later achievements, even down to the exaggerated, and at times grotesque, movement of the Barocco period, which also produced the supremely excellent portraits by Bernini. The same applies to that rich and full plastic expression in the great art of France, from its primitive sculptures through the Renaissance to the delicate and powerful expression of each characteristic age from Louis XIV onwards to the present day. Yet each period must adequately and sincerely live up to the highest standards of taste which express their full spirit, and thus, as conscious human exponents in their special language and craft, the artists must contribute their normal share to the spiritual evolution of man.

(b) PAINTING

The graphic Arts of Meaning are of course closely related in origin and in development in time and space with the graphic arts of "ornamentation" as regards form and the art of "writing," from the rudest signs and picture-writing through hieroglyphics to the pictorial records of historical facts. The earliest

symmetrical incisions or scratchings of symmetrical lines and shapes, produced directly to satisfy the harmoniotropic instinct and the feeling for form, would naturally lead, when the need and desire for unspoken but graphic communication and fixing of meanings arose, to such graphic representations to convey the images of things. When the reproduction of colour was added to that of line the ornamentative function received a new and wider variation. On the other hand, the presentation of definite objects grew in accuracy. This same ornamentative impulse was confirmed and developed *pari passu* with the development of skill and variety in the production of objects of use, buildings, and implements of peace and war, which themselves called for ornamentation. This again led to the development of decorative graphic art on the walls of caves and more advanced dwellings, as well as in utensils. Especially when ceramic art in its various materials was developed, the decoration of this group of objects finally led, through innumerable stages, to highest form of vase-painting. But though we can thus trace the origin of such graphic art pictorially free in itself from its earliest technical beginnings to the higher and more complex achievements, it is questionable whether in itself it can be considered amongst the earliest manifestations of artistic creativeness. For, *a priori*, as well as empirically in the evidence of existing remains of antiquity, the fashioning of works to convey the meaning of actual things in purely graphic art presupposes a power of symbolising and abstracting in the human senses which would not mark the earliest evolution of these senses, their passive and active functioning, and the power of stimulating them by abstractions or symbols of reality. For the essential characteristic of graphic art is that it transfers depth and volume to a flat surface. Now, the realisation of depth and

volume—though the duality of our visual organ of sight may apply the stereoscopic principle—is primarily ascertained through touch and not through vision. Thus the coroplastic craft and art which leads children to make mud-pies is the earlier form of image-making ; and earliest prehistoric excavations, as well as the works of savages, will always show some form of rude figures in the round. Though modern children are born with pencils in their hand, if they were allowed to live within reach of any fictile substances, or to make for themselves the rudest form of doll, they would make such attempts at creative imagery before they would “ draw ” their typical house and man.

Thus, on the one hand, the graphic and pictorial “ Arts of Meaning,” which lead to the picture in the full sense of that term, were subservient to the art of ornamentation as their technique grew out of these, as well as to the picture-writing symbolism which belongs to the domain of writing and of language-communication. To understand fully and accurately the essential principles of this Art of Meaning, even in its earliest origin and development, we must realise clearly its own highest and complete form, namely, the *picture* as a work of art, corresponding to the statue which represents the full expression of the plastic arts. The picture is thus not in the *decorative and narrative forms*, which are subservient to a different essential principle and aim at absorbing the chief attention of the spectator. He has before him a building or implement of use, or the quasi-linguistic communication of facts and thoughts, which are graphically ornamented and to which the pictorial work is subordinated. Not from drawings but from the picture must we discover the principles of pictorial art. The essence—the origin and aim—of the picture lies in the fact that the various meanings of things,

events, thoughts and feelings, which are to be conveyed on a flat surface by the technical means of graphic and pictorial art, are to be harmonised into an organic whole, so that all the attributes and parts of the work should be inter-related and fused into organic unity, and that the harmony of the parts and of the whole should convincingly convey the new harmony of meaning, strengthened, if not wholly produced, by this unity of spirit, by this harmony of form. In the simplest terms, we may realise this essential and distinctive nature of the picture in the fact that our pictures are surrounded by a "frame" or a "mount." The frame is a neutral border which separates from the surrounding objects, and it limits the space in which the pictorial artist creates his work. The eye of the spectator is, on the one hand, not to be distracted by any other subjects outside the frame or by the associations connected with them, and on the other it is to be concentrated upon the lines and forms and colours through which the artist presents objects related to one another in form and meaning and to the whole in a central unity of presentation—meaning, thought and feeling, again harmonised into one mood—all together evoking the corresponding harmony of emotion and mood in the spectator, stimulating through these his feelings and thoughts. The picture thus framed is not primarily ornamentative or decorative, not subordinated to the building, room, or article of furniture or use ; on the contrary, one might almost say that the place where it hangs merely exists as a receptacle for it and is either indifferent or subservient to it. Nor is the picture thus framed a part of a succession of objects depicted, the succession itself corresponding to the logical sequence of communications in sounds, symbols, or imagery to things in order to replace the narrative of language in recording a fact merely as a means

of such definite communication which has served its purpose and may be discarded entirely when the definite message has been given—the form of expression being in no way essential to the one immediate aim of recalling a definite fact to the apprehension of man and in no way to his emotional feelings or moods.

The gradual development and struggle of the painter's skill to achieve this final product of pictorial art through the ages is most varied and complicated. It can be traced in the history of the art of the East and West, of the North and South, wherever human beings have lived and developed a social organisation. We can here in no way attempt to give a résumé of this varied history throughout the ages; but the main facts of establishing and elucidating the development of the principles of pictorial art can best be gathered if we consider in its broad outlines the evolution of painting in Greece—especially in its relation to the whole organic body of Hellenic art and its subsequent direct influence upon the whole art of the Western world. For we have already insisted upon the fact that the Greeks were the first people to produce the *statue* and the *picture* as pure objects of the Art of Meaning, as in every department of the mind they developed culture, which means the functioning and exertion of the human mind with the direct aim of satisfying the spiritual needs corresponding to these functions and with no ulterior and secondary purpose of material advantage or use. They thus developed consciously and systematically art, science, ethics, politics and the Art of Living, as they were also the first people to develop athletic games.

Though it be admitted that the ancient Greeks thus established the essential principles of art for sculpture, it is maintained that they did not to the same degree achieve this with regard to pictorial art. Writers

and critics of note have fallen into this misconception concerning the ancient Greeks. There can be no doubt that, as in the case of music, pictorial art from the early Renaissance onward down to our own days did make comparatively greater and more far-reaching advances than is the case with sculpture or certain other forms of art. But there can be no doubt that the essential elements which go to the making of a picture, and a great picture, were already to be found in the works of the great painters of ancient Greece. It must, in the first instance, be remembered that the best tablet-pictures, upon which the fame of their greatest artists rested, from the nature of the materials used are no longer extant. We are thus limited, as regards our appreciation of their works, to their decorative art in vase-paintings and kindred forms, or to the mural paintings in the private *bourgeois* houses of a comparatively unimportant provincial town like Pompeii and a number of mural paintings and mosaics in Rome and elsewhere. Whoever has read with care the description and appreciation of the great works by the chief painters of ancient Hellas scattered throughout the writings of ancient authors, must realise that these were on the same level of excellence as the great works of sculpture. Nor can it be conceived that the standards of artistic appreciativeness of the Greek people and art critics, measured by their sculpture, could be essentially lower when applied to the sister art. Moreover, we are furnished, through numerous passages in the ancient authors, with a systematic account of the development of painting, achieved step by step, which convincingly shows how that art passed through all the phases of technical advance, as well as in the enlargement of subject-matter in painting, which gradually led to the highest pictorial achievement. It is a most striking and singular coincidence that the

history of this development of painting, as recounted in the ancient authors, corresponds in many instances exactly to the definite steps by which in Vasari the achievements of the various artists in the history of Italian painting rose to the highest perfection. Though modern graphic art in its various forms has made most striking advances in technique and in a variety of modes of pictorial expression, as well as in the enlargement of the scope of subjects in life and nature which it has added to its domain, the Greek artists did undoubtedly establish and form the leading principle of that art, as they did for the art of sculpture.

No doubt—herein following the natural progression of plastic and pictorial arts—the development of Greek painting in freedom of expressiveness belongs to a period far subsequent to that of sculpture. In fact, for a considerable period of its higher development the Greek painter is under the influence of the principles and ideals of the great sculptors of his own and preceding ages. To put it roughly, whereas the acme of Greek sculpture must be assigned to about the middle of the fifth century B.C., that of painting is to be found nearer the middle of the fourth century B.C.; while the great painters of the fifth century B.C., centring round Polygnotos, are still “sculpturesque” in the choice and treatment of subjects and even in the basic principles of their linear design. The great painters of the succeeding generations, such as Zeuxis, Parrhasios and Timanthes, established the full and specific principles in conception and execution by means of *chiaroscuro*, colour and its values, a new departure of pictorial art having been introduced by the innovations initiated by Apollodorus.

As we have already seen in dealing with the development of ornamentative or decorative art, as well as of sculpture, the complete introduction of the “picture”

itself, the tablet-picture, was facilitated, if not achieved, by its association with the other arts—building and implements of use, into which it was introduced as an “ornament.” This fact is most fully illustrated by the history of Greek vase-painting (especially to be noted later in the black-figured and the four red-figured vases) as well as in the decorations of buildings in “fresco” painting.

The decoration of vases in the several structural parts of the vase—neck, belly, foot, handles—especially in the square or oblong space on the body of the vase, or the circular medallion in the middle of the flat cup or *kylix*, furnished such a definite space, well defined and “framed off” within the vase, and within such a “framed” space was generally drawn or painted some mythical or epical scene, or scenes from athletic life, which space by itself led the painter to a definite form of *composition*, as it also led his constructive imagination to select definite scenes from life and to concentrate through all the means of craft his artistic skill in conveying the complete meaning and enforcing it by all the principles of harmony inherent in and essential to his particular art. Greek vase-painting in all its periods is a perfect mine for the study of development in pictorial design.

When further the task was imposed upon the painter to decorate, by means of his art, the large though thoroughly defined wall-spaces in great buildings, such as the *Stoa Poikile* at Athens, with living scenes containing many figures, it will be readily seen how the development of “composition” was advanced and how the need for representing a great variety of living figures inter-related by definite action urged him on to renewed efforts. The descriptions and appreciations of the works of Polygnotos, son of Aglaophon of Thasos, to be seen at Athens, along

with those of Nikon, Panænos, and Pauson, give evidence of elaborate and vivid scenes drawn in a masterly manner in the grand style, which may have recorded some of the qualities of great sculptors with the epic fullness of situation and character which inspired the artists in whose mind Homer lived with all the wealth of his broad characterisation and the intimate and vivid familiarity of poetic imagery, such as the Bible stories possess for the mass of the people in modern times, brought up from childhood in the knowledge of the Old and New Testaments. Yet the art of the Polygnotan painters in its variety of graphic presentation and characterisation was preceded by early struggles to enlarge the capacity for graphic presentation step by step from its crudest earliest beginnings onwards. Thus we learn that, only with Eumaros of Athens (little more than a generation before Polygnotos) was the painter able to distinguish in his drawings between men and women; while his pupil Kimon of Kleonæ, according to Ælian (*V.H.* viii. 8), "developed, as is said, painting which at that time was only in its first stages and was exercised without art or experience by his predecessors, was really in its teens, wherefore he also received greater pay than his predecessors." Pliny thus characterises his innovations (xxxv, 56): *Hic catagrapha invenit, hoc est obliquas imagines, et varie formare voltus, respicientes suspicientesve vel despicientes. articulis membra distinxit, venas protulit, præterque in vestibis rugas et sinus invenit*—"He invented *catagrapha*, that is profile views, and further varieties in the movement of the face, especially the eyes, showing the looking backwards, upwards, and downwards; he also distinguished details in the chief members of the body, indicated the veins, and introduced in dress the longitudinal and massed hollow folds."

It will be seen how this last passage corresponds to that ascribing similar advance in the rendering of the human figure to Pythagoras of Rhegion and Myron in sculpture. Even in the case of the great paintings of Polygnotos, which belong to the Pheidian Age, the technical achievements ascribed to him are still essentially more linear drawing, sculpturesque in character. They chiefly concern the modelling of the human figure, as well as 'drapery, as Pliny says (xxxv. 58): *Primus mulieres tralucida veste pinxit, capita earum mitris versicoloribus operuit plurimumque picturae primus contulit, siquidem instituit os adaperire, dentes ostendere, voltum ab antiquo rigore variare*—"He was the first to paint women with clinging [not 'transparent'] drapery, dressed their heads with caps of various colours, slightly parted the lips and showed the teeth—in short, he freed the face from its archaic hardness and severity."

As regards his use of colour, however, we still find him in the elementary stage. Quintilian (xii. 10) is astonished that his *simplex color* is still admired in later days. We in our days, who appreciate and admire the works of the "primitives," need not be astonished at this. Cicero (*Brut.* 18) ascribes four colours to him. Some of these colours are specified by Pliny, namely, ochre (*sil*), *tryginon*, black tartar. There must have been a greater variety when we hear that he painted female figures with caps of many colours. That these must have been correlated and shaded off is evident, when Lucian (*Imag.* 7) praises the "blush of the cheeks in the face of Cassandra." Still, the very nature of such praises proves that the colours were applied on a simpler scale without consideration of their values in relation to one another and of their relation together to the picture as a whole. They were used in their variety simply to indicate broad differences,

to strengthen the graphic presentation of general character and individualisation.

The real step to the fuller development of the specific quality of painting as such in the use of colour—the beginning of specific painting (not under the dominance of plastic art)—is marked by the achievements of the painter Apollodorus, whom Pliny calls an Athenian and who belongs to the succeeding generation.* For Pliny (xxxv. 61) tells us that “through the gates of art opened by Apollodorus, Zeuxis of Herakleia stepped in the fourth year of the 95th Olympiad.” But we learn that, immediately before Apollodorus, Agatharchos of Samos, who resided and worked at Athens, turned the painter’s art to a definite use, which no doubt had great influence in freeing it from its more archaic sculptur-esque trammels, and was most effective in leading Apollodorus and his successors to give greater technical as well as spiritual freedom to the whole art of painting. This innovation was Scene Painting. For we learn from Vitruvius (7 Pref. 10) that this artist painted a scene for a tragedy of Æschylus and wrote a commentary on it. Analogous to the influence of the athletic games on the development of Greek sculpture at a much earlier date, the influence of the drama on painting and its own scenic presentation has the greatest effect in impressing upon the eyes of the spectator in the theatre complex dramatic scenes and their “composition,” giving visible unity to action. But the introduction of the special art of scene-painting had the most far-reaching technical effect in that, perceived from a distance, scenery was bound to tax the ingenuity of the painter in producing illusion by means of bold drawing and, especially, colouring, and thus in giving freedom of technique and of introducing a fuller study and presentation of light and shade and of the values of colour. Apollo-

dorus thus became the first *skiagraphos*, which is closely related to the *schenographos*. Hesychius and Plutarch explain this step as "the blending and graduation of light and shade."¹

Innovations introduced by this artist and his followers were most important and marked a new era in the development of that art. By analogy we may recall the difference between the 'painting of our "primitives," in the exquisite coloured drawing and modelling of Dürer, Holbein, the Van Eycks, and their successors (a system of painting which is exemplified in the treatise of that art by the miniature painter of the Court of Elizabeth, Nicholas Hilliard, who advises the "avoidance of shadows"), contrasted with the introduction of strong differences of light and shade by Rembrandt and all his followers. At the same time, the scope of subjects from life and nature is infinitely widened as the impressions of vitality are intensified in the presentation of the scenes. Though hardly any works of Apollodorus are mentioned, we can realise how startling must have been his innovations when we consider his picture of Ajax struck by lightning, with the ships tossed against the rocks, the rushing sea, the burning ship, and the avenging figure of Poseidon; and we can then understand how the ancient critics, in spite of their admiration for the primitives, could say of him (Pliny, xxxv. 60) that he was the first truly to give the living illusion of things as they appear, and had brought glory to the painter's brush, while before his day pictures could not *hold* the eye of the spectator.'

¹ σκλασις, ἐπιφάνεια τοῦ χρώματος ἀντίμορφος σκιαγραφίαν τὴν σχηνογραφίαν οὕτω λέγουσι· ἐλέγετο δὲ τις καὶ Ἀπολλοδώρος ζωγράφος σκιαγράφος ἀντὶ τοῦ σχηνογράφου. Cf. also Plut *de Glor Athen.* 2: Ἀπολλοδώρος ὁ ζωγράφος ἀνθρώπων πρῶτος ἐξευρὼν φθορὰν καὶ ἀπόχρωσιν σκίας, κ τ.λ.

² "Hic primus species exprimere instituit primusque gloriam penicillo iure contulit—neque ante eum tabula ullius ostenditur quae teneat oculos."

Apollodorus thus truly "opened the door" to the great painters, great colourists, as well as draughtsmen, leading to the highest development of pictorial art in Greece under Zeuxis, Parrhasios, and Apelles.

The specific innovation of Apollodorus was evidently carried still further and confirmed by clear methodical treatment in Zeuxis. For we learn from Quintilian (xii. 10) that he is reported to have invented the fixed principles of light and shade (*luminum umbrarumque rationem invenisse traditus*). But it is not only on the technical side that Zeuxis marks such an advance in pictorial art; it is also in the greater variety of subjects, which moreover he produced by truly pictorial means, i.e. by rendering the situation with its surroundings, and not merely conveying the full meaning within the central subject itself. His subjects ranged from the world of gods—for instance, a great assembly of the gods, among them Eros crowned with roses, also a fettered Marsyas and Pan—to the heroic world and the great epic figures, Herakles, Alkmene, Helena, Menelaos, Penelope, etc.; to figures of daily life, such as an athlete, a boy with grapes, and even still-life, such as a bunch of grapes. His larger compositions, such as that of the famous Kentaur Family, described in detail by ancient authors, in some ways suggest to our mind the pictures of Rubens. His contemporary, Parrhasios, while also painting a variety of larger compositions from the heroic world, as well as a Personification of Demos, the People, and subjects of real life, seems to have turned back again to the more classical, highly finished drawing of which he must have been a perfect master. In his modelling of the body and his rendering of the expressions of the face he appears to have attained very high perfection.

With these great innovators pictorial art reaches its height in the fourth century B.C., and this great

age of painters continues down to the beginning of the third century. Three chief schools competed with each other in those days—the Sikyonian, the Attic, and the Ionic school. Of these three the Ionic seems to have been the most influential, and its most illustrious members were Euphranor, Apelles, and Protogenes ; though the great impulse in the forward direction is ascribed to the Sikyonian artist Eupompos. While this development is marked by a great increase in realism, the work of such an artist as Apelles points to the supreme mastery in the rendering of beauty, so that we can conceive, of his figure of Venus Anadyomene being similar in æsthetic effect to the great works of a Titian ; while the definite ideas which he embodies in the form of pictorial allegory convey the deepest physical experiences in life, as for instance in his remarkable picture of Calumny, the account of which inspired Botticelli in his attempt to represent deep allegorical meanings convincingly to the eye of the spectator.

With all this extension of the range of subject into every aspect of life, advanced by perfections in technique, pictorial art in ancient Greece cannot be said to have attained to the width, variety and adequacy of full æsthetic expression which it reached during later centuries in the development of European painting. Though, for instance, there is every reason to believe that the Greek painters introduced harmonious landscapes into their subject pictures, landscape painting as such is the achievement of subsequent ages and, in its highest development, of comparatively modern times. Man's attitude towards nature as an object of pure contemplation in the harmony of its form and its substance, irrespective of man, and as calling forth by means of artistic harmony the appeal to his appreciation and the satisfaction of his æsthetic moods, belongs to a later age.

Extensive and intensive contemplation of nature has led man in his attitude towards her to recognise the underlying laws or principles of harmonious existence and change which I have ventured to call the Phænoménology of Nature.¹ Moreover, the technical innovations and varieties of 'graphic presentation, accumulating through the ages, have furnished such a variety of means of expression that pictorial art can practically cover the whole extent of life and nature seen through, and rendered in, form and colour. Thus from the Byzantine, Romanesque and Gothic mosaics and paintings in stained glass, through the wealth of exquisite pictorial illustrations in illuminated manuscripts (both as regards colour and pure drawing), perhaps through the goldsmith's craft of incised design, the innumerable methods and combinations of engravings, from woodcuts into line-engraving, through etching, mezzotint, aquatint, *pari passu* with the advances in wall-painting, new fields are opened to pictorial art. Through the Flemish school of the Van Eycks, the vehicle for oil-colours and all its modifications, and, finally, with the addition of pastel and water-colour, the pictorial artist has at his command a variety of *media*, lending themselves to the expression of every form of life and nature and the various moods these may evoke in the heart and mind of man. The further developments in the technical rendering of *chiaroscuro*, in which the achievements of a Rembrandt stand out conspicuously, and the knowledge and command of the laws of perspective, still further lend accuracy to the presentation of life. Above all, in the realisation of the relationships between colours and the modification of their intrinsic *values* on account of those relationships, coupled with the indications of light and shade, the painter's craft is fused with a whole world of

¹ *The Work of John Ruskin*, p. 62 (New York, Harper & Bros.; London, Methuen; 1894).

modified colour and form as well as meaning, which endows his art with the greatest variety and vitality, urging him to adapt these to all shadings of thought, as well as of emotional moods, of the expression of individual character in man and in outer nature.

Broader subdivisions and categories have thus been more or less clearly established within this endless variety of pictorial conception and execution, besides the perfect pictorial rendering of 'harmonious figures and forms for the sake of their own beauty ; just as, in pure lyrical poetry, the beauty of rhythmical sounds in the quasi-musical sequence of words is the most prominent feature of that art. In spite of the reactionary revolt against what some artists of the modern school contemptuously call " prettiness " (unfairly begging the question by the connotation of frivolity in the search of man for pure formal beauty), this formal and lyrical motive will ever remain a central stimulation of endeavour for the pictorial artist. Venus and Apollo will always live, in spite of the fascinating and riotous vitality of the Mænad and the Faun. So too the rendering of every variety of outer appearance and visible character in man, as well as of objects in nature, will always find fertile field of activity in the portrait, single figure, as well as inanimate objects called " still-life." But beyond this there is a wide scope of work for the painter in religious art, which formed the centre of endeavour for the artists of the Middle Ages and reflected the leading moral currents of the life of those times. Then follow scenes and incidents from sacred and profane life in peace and war, subject-pictures of all kinds, " historical " scenes, battle-scenes, scenes reflecting important and typical events in social life, down to the *genre*-scene in the humbler aspects of life ; life out of doors, domestic life in interiors, and, finally, landscape in all its varieties,

including also the aspects of man's life in the country, in the street, and in work.

The essential quality which, in all these multiform attempts to render the fullness of life in a definite and circumscribed work of graphic art, constitutes a true work of art, is to be found (as it was found in sculpture) in the degree of perfection with which the harmony between the subject-matter and the specific means of expression, in every phase and in every aspect of the pictorial rendering, is impressed and gives to the work of the artist the spirit and soul of a new harmonious creation.

The artist must thus have chosen for presentation that subject and those attributes of it best suited to the vehicle or language in which he conveys his new meaning—whether it be in outline or shaded drawing in line, in engraving, in etching or in mezzotint, in water-colour or in pastel, or in all the varieties and methods of oil-painting, or even if he choose mosaic or stained glass. His artistic tact and well-attuned imagination must lead him to establish the perfect harmony between the subject-matter and the mode of expression. Each technique has its own essential quality of appealing to the senses and of evoking the corresponding impressions and moods. But the highest, fullest and most varied vehicle of graphic expression up to the present developed by the graphic artist is painting. Here colour, line and form are harmoniously blended for the rendering of every phase in the life of nature and man, as well as for every subtle gradation of emotions and moods. While all the other graphic arts can in their way render the fullness and variety of life, they are relatively limited when compared with the craft of the painter. These very limitations may accentuate certain graphic aspects which, in their concentration, may more readily respond to and evoke a definite and special

harmonious mood in the spectator. Not only, for instance, does an etching convey certain qualities in the outer forms and scenes which the true artist conveys in concentrated emphasis, but this form of monochrome presentation differs from those which, by their own peculiar qualities of treatment, line-engraving, mezzotint or aquatint can convincingly and harmoniously produce by their peculiar technique.

But the technique of the great painter affords him a much wider variety and fullness in the range of his expression. The perfect picture as a work of art, in the first instance, conveys or suggests the subject-matter and form by "outline composition" in the broadest and simplest aspects of its structure. I am far from meaning by this that conventional conception of "composition," based chiefly, if not solely, on *static symmetry* (in which every picture is to be reduced in its outline forms to the triangle or pyramid); but symmetry modified and fused with rhythm in producing the harmony of suggestive line and the central meaning of the subject composition as a whole—*organic symmetry*—which is as varied and expressive as is life itself. The outline composition, for instance, in a peaceful incident or scene is to be more reposefully continuous, more uniformly horizontal in its dominant lines than a violent and stormy scene or incident of battle and strife. The latter must impress, as it were, the keynote and tone of its intrinsic nature by restless and intersected lines, the quiet continuity of the horizontal being cut into by perpendiculars and diagonals which together forcibly and immediately, through the eye, convey the impression, followed by the mood, of restlessness and violence. The same applies to the gradation and inter-relation between foreground, middle distance and background, which on their part again tend to fix the eyes on the points of relatively greater

or lesser importance in the organic relationship of the scene or incident as a whole. Beyond this harmony in composition of form and relationship of lines, light and shade and all their gradations, harmonies and contrasts, and, above all, colour with its infinite varieties and relationships, must again be harmonised, so as to contribute to, and fully express, on their part, the organic harmony of the incident or scene which in form and colour, pictorially and convincingly, the artist desires to present and through which, by every visual means, he sets vibrating the chords of the senses until they evoke a harmonious image in the perception, in the understanding and in the emotions of the spectator.

Such *pictorial* harmony can be found in every truly great work of painting. The perfect, simple landscape or seascape, conveying a general impression of peace, quiet and repose, with its horizontal lines and clearly harmonised colours and tones, or the wild romantic scene in which a Ruysdael delighted (ruined castles in narrow wooded gorges, with rushing waterfalls, lowering clouds through which the light bursts in contrasts of light and shade), will convey by contrast such a variety of pictorial effect. As I have maintained, music is of all arts the one which most directly, if not exclusively, expresses pure harmony, and it is thus not a mere accident that painting borrows from music some of the terms to express pictorial harmony, such as the word *tone*. We can understand Whistler and sympathise with him when he gave to some of his pastels and water-colours the designation "Symphony, white and gold, etc."

These harmonies are but a few rudimentary elements in the technical treatment of the work of a truly great painter. There is an infinite variety of such harmonies in every phase and aspect of his work.

Even the most individual as well as the most complex meaning, and the associations and moods which they evoke, whether the subject be one from the life of nature or from the life of man and his history, can be expressed pictorially, and such definite and complex presentments are conveyed as fully in their individuality as would be their description in words : they are conveyed by strictly pictorial means, expressing that aspect which corresponds to and harmonises with the vehicle of line and colour and not of words.

To take one particular instance : the French heroine Joan of Arc and her attractive personality have formed the subject of endless records in history, in poetry, drama, sculpture and painting. Apart from the literary form of expression, she is most familiar in the presentation of sculpture, of which the graceful and yet strong equestrian statue by Frémiet, as also the smaller seated figure of the peasant girl, are widely known.

There are endless historical paintings illustrating scenes from her life. Few of these, however, will convey to us the soul of her personality, the central spiritual keynote in the exultation of the peasant girl which made her the saintly heroine of France. No doubt a full historical record entering into her inner and outer history, with the aid of psychological analysis, may approximately convey to us a full impression. So too with regard to poetry and the drama. But the paintings which forcibly record some of the great scenes of her military leadership and of her trial, while suggesting to us the deep significance of the historical figure she became, cannot by themselves adequately account for the exalted poetry of her inner life and development. But the picture by Bastien-Lepage has seized upon, and expresses fully, by purely *pictorial* means, the feelings, the complexity and subtlety of her inner history, and in a manner

so stirring and so fully harmonising with the poetic mood of that personality, that by no other means could the same exalted aim be achieved. In his picture we see the simple French country maiden in the garden of her home, standing among all the harmoniously toned greenery in solitary communion with her own visions. She stands entranced by what she sees ; and what she sees is the faintly drawn image floating in the air before her of her own self in armour, as subsequently she led the armies of France. No attempt at verbal paraphrase can approach in adequacy the impression which the picture produces. But the painter has done this, not from the sculpturesque point of view, by painting a figure in armour, with correctly rendered appurtenances of her warlike craft, and by giving dramatic expression to her face ; nor in a composition of many figures like the scene on a stage in which a dramatic incident of her life is exposed. He has conveyed his idea by the composition in outline, in the gradation of importance of the central figure and her surroundings, in the plain sober monotony of her humble country life, in the character of her poor peasant dress and the colour and tone of it, and, finally, in the exalted visionary expression of her countenance, with the shadowy indication of the vision floating before her—all harmonising into a peaceful and idyllic mood, big with the suggestion of the heroic struggle to which her loneliness led her. All these visual attributes of a most complicated psychical process combine to convey to the spectator of this picture one of the most striking heroic figures in the history of mankind.

I can recall visually a picture called *Jeanne d'Arc* in the Royal Academy Exhibition in London during the early eighties of the last century, though I cannot recall the name of the artist. The actual painting did not attain the excellence to be found in the work

of Bastien-Lepage. But it had, in common with that great picture, the quality of selecting truly pictorial means to express most individual and complex aspects of human character and situations of life. Outline and inner composition, tonality and values of colour, the character of the surrounding landscape or figures in their inter-relation and gradation as impressing the central idea—all these must be harmonised by the painter. The true painter sees everything which he approaches as an artist in its visual expression by means of form and colour, even the most abstract and subtle ideas, as the sculptor sees them in pure form, the musician in rhythm and melody, and as the poet's

brains beat into rhythm ; you tell
What we feel only ; you expressed
You hold things beautiful the best,
And place them 'in rhyme so, side by side.

The picture of Jeanne d'Arc which I thus recall consisted in the main of a landscape expressive of bleakness, loneliness and melancholy. A sterile hill-top, far from habitation or the sounds of life and companionship, with just enough stray 'pasture for the browsing sheep, and among them a comparatively small figure in the vastness of the picture of large dimensions. There kneels a solitary shepherd-girl gazing at the sky with head thrown back and arms outstretched, as through the mass of grey clouds a sunbeam bursts forth, sending its dazzling rays into her upgazing eyes. The surroundings of this desolate scene, in which a lonely child with ardent heart and glowing imagination is lifted up in mystical exaltation to see the vision of a divine mission which comes to her from above, within the meanness and misery of her sordid and hard life, pictorially tell the story, or at least stimulate the imagination of the spectator emotionally to experience what the definite name of

Jeanne d'Arc may have prepared his intelligence to apprehend concerning her from the historical facts recorded.

It is thus that the infinite variety of "meanings" receive their individual interpretation through the imaginative and emotional channels of each painter's rendering of pictorial harmony.

There is thus an additional æsthetic quality and source of pleasure to be derived from the apprehension of the distinctively individual interpretations of various artists and their modes of pictorial expression—their style. A Giotto and a Mantegna, a Titian and a Raphael, a Botticelli and a Leonardo da Vinci, a Van Eyck and a Rembrandt, a Velazquez and a Murillo, a David and an Ingres, a Courbet and a Manet, a Gainsborough, a Watts, and a Whistler—while all differ essentially in their initial conception of the same subject and in the pictorial method by which they convey it, the recognition of such individual style through our perceptive and æsthetic faculties is in itself a source of æsthetic pleasure. But we must always guard against confusing this definite pictorial quality in each work with the "biographical" interest which insidiously leads us to concoct a personal story round the life of the artist, blending this story of his own with the work itself as an added element of pictorial quality and interest, while it has nothing to do with the work of art before us—in fact, which in so far prejudices and weakens truly æsthetic observation and appreciation of the work as such. It is always the work of art itself and not the personality of the maker of it, or the methods and means by which he attains his effects, which produces the full æsthetic appreciation of art.

Further, there is a distinctly æsthetic quality and additional interest inherent in the common character and delicate differences within a particular

school of art. The Florentine and Venetian, the Umbrian, Milanese and Bolognese schools of Italian painting have their common qualities and their differences of relationships within themselves ; and the recognition of these individual styles, inherent in the actual quality of the work, is a legitimate source of æsthetic appreciativeness.

There further exists the æsthetic correlative of our "historic sense" and its appreciativeness, which convey to us the charm of the "primitive," even when it means the comparative imperfections of early peoples struggling to express a truly artistic emotion and thought. This again adds to the wealth of appreciative qualities which the great works of art convey to us. We must always maintain historic catholicity ; and, as the appreciation of the works manifesting the fullest technical freedom must not debar us from the appreciation of the earlier primitive or archaic stages with their peculiar charm, so, still less, must we allow ourselves to be misled into that self-satisfied and "precious" narrowness and exclusiveness which turns against and depreciates full technical freedom and perfection because it is able to appreciate the earlier forms and stages. Finally, another source of æsthetic appreciativeness lies in the recognition or suggestion of national or ethnological difference of character in the history of human artistic endeavour. We must be able fully to realise and to appreciate the spirit of the Near and Far East in Oriental Art, not only in the ancient art of Egypt and Syria, of China and Japan, but of such exquisite artistry as is, for instance, betrayed in Persian and in Indian miniature paintings, to see these qualities of national artistic expression as contrasted with the classical art of ancient Greece and Rome ; to enter into the spirit of the religious art in the Byzantine and Gothic periods, in the mosaics of Ravenna,

Palermo and Santa Maria Maggiore, as well as mediæval paintings and drawings ; to recognise the strong, yet delicate, characterisation of early German art, culminating in Cranach, Dürer and Holbein, and all the kindred, and still distinct, exquisite virility of the early Flemish and Northern French primitives, centring round the Van Eycks, Roger van der Weyden, Memling, van der Goes, and their French primitives cousins, Clouet and his school ; to feel the highly significant contrast of, let us say, the national art of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in France, the paintings of a Watteau, Boucher, Lancret, down to a Fragonard, compared with the Hispano-Mauresque vigour of Spanish painting from Velazquez and El Greco down to Goya ; until, through the exuberant technical mastery and stupendous pictorial expressiveness of a Rubens, refined into courtly grace by a Van Dyck, we cross the Channel to find the full expression of British social refinement in a Gainsborough, Reynolds, Romney, Hoppner and Raeburn ! Again, we may turn to the more recent development of landscape painting and note, with the precedent remarkable achievements of a Claude Lorrain and Hobbema, those of Gainsborough and Wilson, and the immortal Turner and Constable, and the contemporary and succeeding development of English water-colourists and landscape painters in oil ; and back again to France with the great representatives of the Barbizon school—the Corots and Daubignys, Rousseau, Diaz—until we come to the modern impressionists in France and England and in other countries, Renoir and Manet, Cézanne and Whistler, their contemporaries and followers. Surely the recognition of the purely pictorial expression of these national characteristic interpretations of nature and life is an additional source of æsthetic wealth !

The appreciative public can be trained, and can train itself, to this catholicity of artistic appreciation ; and the productive artist may find artistic stimulation and inspiration from his responsiveness to the works of the best in all periods, to the different schools, to the different nationalities, even of remote ethnological characteristic units, and may thus modify his own taste and the characteristic interpretation of things in nature and life. But, within all this catholicity—historical, geographical, ethnological, universal—which represents the wealth of our Western civilised, spiritual and intellectual life, the creative artist must ever remember that he must, above all, become a truthful, wholly sincere and adequate exponent of the leading taste of his own age and of the historical, social, moral and intellectual spirit of that age, whatever passing inspirations, fancies or fashions he may borrow from alien sources for the nonce. To be thus fully and adequately expressive of the taste of a definite period and social group or nationality, through the channels of his special art, will ever remain the chief function of the true artist and will thus lead eventually to the evolution of the highest standards of taste.

(c) THE LITERARY ARTS

We have seen in the chapter on Epistemology how the principle of all knowledge must *ultimately* be reduced to Harmonism. More directly this principle is active and effective in the discovery of truth and especially in the exposition of scientific truths. Even in works dealing with logic and abstract philosophy we have noted how the composition of such works manifests the principles of form as a dominant element in the exposition, so that in the construction of the whole work of any main argument, the sentences, paragraphs, chapters bear a distinct formal

relation to one another, and maintain a certain proportion in length and sequence which makes the work of such writers closely akin to that of an architect, a sculptor, or a painter, in presenting an organic and harmonious unity of composition. We can even note in the form and length of the paragraphs in a work of Herbert Spencer and their inter-relation to one another, how they are essentially of the same nature as the parts of some composition of literary or musical art, architecture, sculpture or painting.

Besides these, however, we have, even in writings which are primarily meant to satisfy the sense of truth, to convey accurate information, and not to produce æsthetic emotions through the eye or ear, passages which forcibly impress us with the formal adequacy, if not beauty, of what we call style, in which the diction itself, by its harmonious perfection, directly produces æsthetic satisfaction and pleasure. Such passages may even, in their limpid clearness or in their well-proportioned ornateness, evoke our admiration. When words are not written, but spoken, this form of exposition, ultimately meant to *convince*, does this greatly, if not wholly, by æsthetic means and through the channels of our æsthetic sense and emotions. It has then led to the art of *oratory*, and to the theory and practice of rhetoric, so highly developed throughout the ages in distinct and systematic theory and practice. Moreover, with almost every prose-writer in the domain of "science" aiming at the establishment and communication of laws of nature and thought, what must be called their individual "styles" are almost as clearly marked as the styles among painters and sculptors, to which we have referred, in the previous chapter. I have endeavoured elsewhere¹

¹ *The Balance of Emotion and Intellect*, l.c.

² *The Work of John Ruskin*, p. 8 seq., "Ruskin as a Writer and Prose Poet" (Harper & Bros., 1893).

to analyse the very marked and individual style, almost in its musical or lyrical quality, of Ruskin's prose. While there is thus a normal standard and type of impersonal ideal perfection in prose-writing in the epistemological sphere (what the ancient Greeks called *lexis* and rhetoric), and while we can thus discern the individual style of such writers—a clearly artistic characteristic of theirs—the form and diction of their “style” must adapt themselves to the nature of the definite subjects or thoughts which they are conveying and harmonise with the subject-matter. This latter achievement again depends especially and directly on æsthetic principles of harmonism.

But, in spite of this evidence of the infusion or intrusion of the æsthetic elements into scientific methods and exposition, the fact remains that language is used directly and ultimately to convey truth, meaning, and not form. Form is distinctly ancillary to the establishment of truth, and in its “exposition” it is not the essential element itself filling the consciousness of the reader or hearer. Now, we have already seen how in art, form—into whatever material it is put—is the essential element in the new creation. When thus language is used as the material means of embodying formal harmony, appealing to, and satisfying, the æsthetic instinct directly, as its essential aim, we are in the domain of Literary Art. Though the claims of language as a means of communicating impressions and thoughts have been greatly exaggerated (not only by philologists but by psychologists and philosophers), the fact remains that language is the chief vehicle for the direct expression of meaning and that meaning cannot be wholly dissociated from words. Tones (outside of words), colours, as well as lines, have no meaning in themselves. We have thus seen how in music, and in what we called Ornamentative Art, tones and

lines could produce by their harmonious distribution and composition what we call Pure Art. This may also be the case in the meaningless babbling or sing-song stringing together of words, in metre or rhythmical sequence, by children. An instance of this may be taken from that delightful writer Lewis Carroll—

'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe :
All mimsy were the borogroves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

But these words are meaningless and are treated as mere tones.

But among the "Arts of Meaning," the literary arts, with their unlimited extent and intent of conveying meanings, the arts of poetry and prose, have always been, and will always be, the central arts of meaning, encompassing the whole range of human experience of nature, life and thought.

LYRICAL POETRY

The literary arts approach nearest to the pure form of art in Lyrical Poetry. As the name indicates, it is nearest to music, closely allied to the song. But, while gaining in the definiteness with which it conveys meaning, it loses some of the more manifest qualities whereby music directly produces æsthetic emotions ; for, though it conveys time and measure through metre and rhythm and in some forms of assonance, alliteration, and rhyme, which approach melody in their effect, and though the rise and fall of the voice reciting them conveys variations of sound which approach melody, they are not melody in the full sense of that term. By analogy we may say that lyrical poetry more or less takes a similar position in the musical song to melody which black-and-white drawing or engraving holds to colour-painting. Metre,

rhythm, rhyme, alliteration, the sound-quality of words, their succession and inter-relation, all work together to produce harmony of sound which gives a distinctly artistic unity and life.

In its simplest form, the folk-song, the *chanson*, *lied* (perhaps originally coupled with music), the lines and verses follow a symmetrical principle in metre and rhythm which would naturally lead the human voice to recite them in complete symmetry. But, soon rhythmical varieties relieve it from the more mechanical constraint of pure symmetry and convert the *static* symmetry into *organic* or dynamic symmetry, giving to it greater freedom of life and variety of movement.¹ But the leading characteristic of lyrics which retain the simplicity of the people's song is chiefly to be found in the fact that their truly lyrical quality depends upon the succession of a group of words in a line, a strophe or a verse, in metrical subdivisions subordinated to one larger metrical unit as a whole. The simple folk-song is thus in later times adopted as, perhaps the purest lyrical form in poetry by even some of the greatest of poets. The classic examples of such simple songs are, for instance, to be found in some lyrics of Heine, Goethe, Burns, Blake, Byron and Wordsworth, as well as in Béranger, de Musset and Lamartine. But even from the earliest times this purely lyrical form is extended and diversified as the feeling for language itself develops and as civilisation and culture rise above the simpler conditions of pure folk-life. The metres and verses then become much more complicated and subtle, and advanced artistic appreciativeness produces more complex and developed æsthetic pleasures. Especially in the classical poets Pindar and Horace, in the choral odes of the Greek dramatists,

¹ We have noted a similar process in the advance from archaic to free sculpture.

in Victor Hugo, Gautier, Verlaine, and the modern French lyricists, such complexities and variations of metre and rhythm produce at once the strongest and the most delicate lyrical qualities. This extends also to the sound-quality of single words themselves, beyond the general metrical or rhythmical alliteration and rhymed harmonies of distinct groups of words taken together. This is so in the earlier poets whom we have just mentioned, but becomes especially noticeable in the works of modern lyricists, like Shelley, Keats and Swinburne. My meaning may be illustrated by quoting from memory what I once had the privilege of hearing Tennyson say in dwelling upon the intrinsic quality of single words. After enumerating a number of such "beautiful" words as "lullaby," he turned to the peculiar expressive quality of words not intrinsically melodious, and recited a line ending with the four monosyllables "and stamp him flat," giving a deep and abrupt ending to the last word as expressive of its significant sound. *Per contra*, we might single out the line from Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind"—

"Than thou, O uncontrollable! if even
I were as in my boyhood, and could be," etc.

In this the long-drawn word "uncontrollable," especially when the line was preceded by rapidly moving rhythm leading to this more reposeful climax, has the strongest lyrical effect.*

Now, these lyrical elements correspond to and convey various human emotions. As we noted in the development of music and the musical song, they are expressive of all the scale of human emotions, from joy to sadness, and of the typical experiences and events in human life. So there is a form of lyrical poetry which corresponds to the dance, as the elegy corresponds to the dirge, with all varieties and

shadings of emotional life between them ; until we come to definite leading ideas and deeper thoughts of life which inspire the poet and move him to embody them in a harmonious unit of form. Such, for instance, is the function of the sonnet, which might almost be classed in the group of " didactic " poetry, from the fact that it generally conveys, in purely artistic form, some wider, loftier, or deeper idea.

We must thus note that the lyrical form of poetry enters into every aspect of life and thought, as it also is fused with and forms a part of all the other subdivisions of poetry which are distinguished by more definite aims in the attitude of the poet facing the world of human experiences and feelings. Such broad subdivisions are, in the first place, the epical, narrative and descriptive poetry, in which, by means of harmonious composition of the work as a whole, as well as of all its parts one to another and to the whole, retaining throughout the dominance of pure form, events, experiences and descriptions of scenes are recorded. But even in these continuous narratives or descriptions we can again single out elements which in themselves are more purely lyrical. Thus in Homer and in Vergil passages can be selected which are superlatively lyrical within the general epical continuity. In Dante and in Milton this power of enforcing the presentation of great scenes, deep thoughts and vast emotions by the perfect harmony of sound in the words chosen and the rhythm which connects them together, marks one of the greatest achievements of literary art. So also in certain well-known passages in which the *onomatopæic* quality of words and a succession of a limited number of words reproduce or suggest definite sounds or movements in life and nature. In descriptive poetry the same lyrical means (recalling what we have before noted in painting with regard to the harmony in out-

line and internal composition, as well as in tone and relationship of colouring) are used to convey, by pure harmony of sound, the distinctive character and unity of scenery and mood, the leading features of the scenes described, and to weld them into vital unity and harmony of mood by means of the more emotional character of sound. Two contrasted instances will illustrate my meaning. I wish to place side by side for comparison the passage from the opening of Browning's "Flight of the Duchess," in which the rough gamekeeper describes the wild country of his Duke, and one verse from Wordsworth's "Ruth."¹

Ours is a great wild country :
 If you climb to our castle's top,
 I don't see where your eye can stop ;
 For when you've passed the corn-field country,
 Where vineyards leave off, flocks are packed,
 And sheep-range leads to cattle-tract,
 And cattle-tract to open-chase,
 And open-chase to the very base
 O' the mountain, where, at a funeral pace,
 Round about, solemn and slow,
 One by one, row after row,
 Up and up the pine-trees go,
 So, like black priests up, and so
 Down the other side again
 To another greater, wilder country,
 That's one vast red drear burnt-up plain,
 Branched through and through with many a vein
 Whence iron's dug, and copper's dealt ;
 Look right, look left, look straight before,—
 Beneath they mine, above they smelt,
 Copper-ore and iron-ore;
 And forge and furnace mould and melt,
 And so on, more and ever more,
 Till, at the last, for a bounding belt,
 Comes the salt sand hoar of the great sea-shore,
 —And the whole is our Duke's country !

BROWNING: *Flight of the Duchess*.

The youth of green savannas spake,
 And many an endless, endless lake,

¹ I must thank Mrs. Bury for suggesting Wordsworth's poem to me.

With all its fairy crowds
Of islands that together lie
As quietly as spots of sky
Among the evening clouds.

WORDSWORTH: *Ruth*.

Note the contrast in outline composition: the jagged and abruptly varied general effect of Browning's word-landscape and word-music and the even, rhythmical, and melodious flow of the verse from Wordsworth. When we look more closely in detail to the musical character in the description of the wild country of the Duke, note the broad, simple sweep of line, in measured emphasis, of the first six words, after which there is a pause, and we are then carried on in rapid sweep, growing more rapid and breathless in its variety and contrasts until we arrive at the very base of the great mountains. Here, again, breath is taken for a new vigorous ascent, at first "solemn and slow, one by one, etc.," conveying the regular ascending growth of the pine-trees—"up and up"—and then, at the top we pause with the words "and so," whence follows the rapid downward rush to a greater, wilder country, to a "vast red drear burnt-up" mining country, with its restless unceasing activity above and below the soil, in *staccato*, broken rhythm, hurrying until we reach the end of our rushing journey and face "the salt sand hoar of the great sea-shore," alliteration of the line and the additional rhyme of "hoar" and "shore" inducing a pause.

Contrast with this Wordsworth's verses with the simple and restfully harmonious flow of words and rhymes, the very quality of such a word as "savanna," the repetition of the word "endless" and its own specific quality, the alliteration in "islands" and "lie" in the fourth line, the dwelling rhythm in the beautiful word "quietly," and the perfect peaceful

harmony of the whole, lulling our hearing and our own mood into harmonious and melodious repose.¹

Even in didactic poetry, so called, we have already noted the function of the sonnet in conveying concentrated thought through channels of art. Shakespeare's dramas are not only interspersed with purely lyrical poems, but undoubtedly one of the most striking and lasting qualities of his work lies in the great truths which, in masterly form, he embodies in many passages which have furnished the world with a familiar body of great truths fused into the perfect

¹ Innumerable instances from the works of the great English poets could be given, as well as (besides the great Greek and Latin poets) in the literature of other European languages. I may single out a few which occur to me as being striking illustrations of the point before us. Read Victor Hugo's poem "Les Djinns," with its masterly rendering of awfully mysterious movement in shorter and longer verses, and contrast this with the exquisitely peaceful and melancholy rhythm of de Musset's lines, beginning "Mes chers amis, quand je mourrai," placed upon his tomb. Read the description of the Maelstrom in Schiller's "Der Taucher"—"Und es wallet und siedet und brauset und zischt," etc. (the English translation of Bulwer's—the first Lord Lytton—"And it bubbles and seethes and it hisses and roars," gives a most remarkable rendering of the whole poem), and contrast it with Goethe's simple lines, "Ueber allen Gipfeln ist Ruh," etc. Take any of the descriptions of the awful scenes in the "Inferno" of Dante and contrast them with Carducci's poem beginning "T'amo, o pio bove" (note the attribute *pio* in sound and meaning).

I cannot resist drawing attention to one of the finest lyrical poems of Longfellow, which I have never seen or heard as being singled out or commented upon, called "Snowflakes":

Out of the bosom of the Air,
 Out of the cloud-folds of her garments shaken,
 Over the woodlands brown and bare,
 Over the harvest-fields forsaken,
 Silent, and soft, and slow
 Descends the snow.

This is the poem of the air,
 Slowly in silent syllables recorded;
 This is the secret of despair,
 Long in its cloudy bosom hoarded,
 Now whispered and revealed
 To wood and field.

form of his harmonious diction.¹ So with Pope and with Wordsworth; while Matthew Arnold's "Self-dependence" and Tennyson's "In Memoriam," Browning's "Paracelsus" and "A Grammarian's Funeral," as well as Kipling's "If," in their distinctive and characteristic differences of form are eminent instances of such didactic poetry.

THE DRAMA

One of the greatest achievements of literary art is to be found in the creation of the drama. The drama is not merely to be read or heard, but is to be acted and directly apprehended as action. It is to be heard and seen. No doubt there are also written poems which are distinctly dramatic in character, such, for instance, as Browning's dramatic *Romances and Idylls* and *The Ring and the Book*, and, among contemporary works, the remarkable poems of Masfield. In these works definite action, in its setting and striking situations in life, is conveyed, not purely in epical description, but with dramatic methods, strengthened by the almost lyrical quality of the verse. But it must always be remembered that the drama itself is not to be read, but to be acted on a stage. The scenes are brought before the audience in their natural surroundings—scenery, costumes and all the appurtenances of the stage strengthen illusion. Now, in the earlier drama, these scenic appurtenances were frequently merely suggested rather than fully produced. Such more or less conventional and symbolic stimuli as suggestions through the eye to the imagination perform their function to a certain degree, and may even at times give freer play and more relief to the action and diction of the performers

¹ The same applies to Goethe's "Faust" and other poems, to Schiller's dramas and epic poems, to Racine, Corneille, Voltaire—in fact, to all great poets of the world.

themselves ; so that attempts have been made to produce the more archaic forms of stage production and to give an added flavour of historical character, if not remoteness, to actual modern stage performances. But the fact remains that the more adequate and truthful scenic surroundings are, the less do they assert themselves (unless they become the chief spectacular objects, of absorbing interest in themselves and thus wholly detract from the truly dramatic impression), and thus convey to the spectator the attitude of mind and the æsthetic satisfaction belonging essentially to the plastic and graphic arts. On the other hand, imperfect scenic surroundings, especially solecisms from the historical and social point of view (the wrong costumes, appurtenances, and scenery belonging to other ages, faulty topography or errors in the social and individual appearance of the actors and their social environment) painfully attract the attention, weaken illusion and fail to convey fully the action itself.

The higher form of the drama as an art adopts verse diction and calls in this central element of formal literary art to strengthen, through lyrical form, the exalted æsthetic mood in the audience. The subject-matter in these is generally of the heroic order ; and in its exalted spheres rises above the actual daily life of the spectator, the obtrusive interests of which it strives to dispel by raising him into the more harmonious spheres of art and evoking in him the æsthetic mood. The characters and events themselves and their atmosphere require such elevation of mood and receptivity on the part of the audience. The Greeks thus introduced the *cothurnus* into their tragic representations, which raised the dimensions of the actor's figure, and required corresponding modifications, through masks, etc., to produce the impressive effect of the personalities and

their surroundings. Verse, and especially blank verse, performs a similar function. We have already noted the lyrical quality in the Greek choruses, strengthened by expressive and harmonious movements in the dances, which directly impressed the general mood, character and deeper significance of the action as conveyed by the actors themselves. These choruses, as we have seen, are eminent specimens of lyric poetry; but also 'in many of the single speeches of heralds and messengers, as well as of the principal actors, the artistic quality of the verse gave elevation to the action as a whole. The same applies to many speeches and soliloquies of Shakespeare's characters, of distinct poetic and lyrical beauty in themselves. The French audience is thrilled by the *beaux vers* in the tragedies of Racine and Corneille, as is also the case with some of the verses by Richepin, Coppée and Maeterlinck. Even the melodious and impressive passages in Swinburne's dramas, though they are not seen on the stage, have this quality.

In Greek comedy the *cothurnus* is discarded, nor have we the same solemn and formal diction. But even in these the poetic and lyric element is often presented in speeches and passages of which the Parabasis in *The Birds* of Aristophanes is a notable instance. Lessing showed long ago how it was chiefly through the English novels of Richardson and his followers that the scope of the drama was widened out to embrace all aspects of life, as also, by discarding the more formal mode of artistic expression in verse, it gained in directness and intensity in presenting the reality of actual contemporary life. The drama thus aims at presenting the illusion of life in pure naturalism, which must, however, not be confounded (as we have seen above) with the reality of actual life, with the perception and apprehension of life as we

see it day by day, or in descriptions in newspaper reports. The facts and incidents of life must be composed and harmonised, so as to convey fully and convincingly the human character, acting and acted upon, its fate, as well as particular incidents conveying the social, political, and economic condition affecting fate, and, sometimes, thus forcibly introducing the leading incidents of the drama.

The famous—if, unfortunately, fragmentary—passage in Aristotle's *Poetics*, that "the drama is to produce *katharsis* (purification) through fear and pity" (whatever may be the exact meaning of these terms from the philological or critical point of view), helps us in its vaguer suggestiveness to grasp for ourselves the important distinctive feature of the drama. To follow the spirit of Aristotle's reasoning in its wider sphere, art and ethics differ from science in that they are not so much concerned with things *as they are*, or happen to present themselves to the apprehending mind, but with things *as they ought to be* in the most perfect harmonious relation to the apprehending mind of intelligent and moral beings. In dramatic art there is thus called into play the creative activity of man to "compose" the events of life in the harmonious inter-relation of the factors which produce events and decide the fate of those concerned. In such an artistic representation of life, therefore, we do not receive the direct "affects"—personal impressions, feelings, and passions—which are aroused when we are concerned in, or directly perceive in life, certain incidents affecting the fate of those concerned; we do not experience actual fear or the suffering of pity, but these emotions are "purified" by art. This purification (though we dare not consider this *only* interpretation of the words of Aristotle) concerns, in the first instance, the presentation of the events in which all that is accidental and irrelevant to the

true meaning and import of what is enacted is eliminated; the causes which produce the effects, the characters themselves, the surrounding conditions, and the incidents which follow are concentrated and harmonised to be fully expressive of the central ideas. But, in the second place, as regards the spectator or audience, they are thus not directly affected and suffering or *passionately* interested; their pity or compassion is turned to *sympathy*; because, in some degree of consciousness, the illusion takes the place of actuality and, in the degree in which it constrainingly interests us in the events and in the fate of the characters, do we feel the *sympathy* which produces the æsthetic pleasure. Thus, under the dominance of our more or less conscious realisation that what we see and feel is an illusion and not actuality, the emotions which at the time we feel, however strong they may be, have carried us for the nonce far from the actual interests and desires of our daily life into another sphere where, through sympathy, our leading hopes and aspirations of life are brought home to us and thus produce a moral elevation which purifies the heart and mind. Now, ~~this~~ dramatic illusion may, as a whole, lead to two final results corresponding to the two broad classifications of the drama: comedy and tragedy." The conception which led the dramatist to compose the incidents of life and character by their inner affinity to produce certain definite consequences, may confirm the ideal order of events in the direction of justice and charity. The effect upon the audience will therefore be a correspondingly cheerful and happy mood, leading even to laughter. This, in its broadest form, is the effect of comedy. On the other hand, the final and fatal result may, owing to the individuality of the character presented and the surrounding conditions and succession of events, clash with ultimate justice and

charity and then lead to disaster, evoking pity and sadness. This is the result of tragedy. But not only is this sadness deprived of its sting of acuteness through the consciousness of "illusion," but the tragic individual miscarriage of justice and charity confirms all the more in the consciousness of the spectator the supreme power of the rightness of ideal standards of social justice and order and the longing for the realisation of these.¹

In many of the great tragedies this ultimate leading idea or ideal is actually conveyed in the drama itself, and in some instances forms the climax to the whole dramatic sequence. This is notably the case in the Æschylean trilogy of the *Oresteia*, where the tragic results of the *Agamemnon* and *Cæphori* culminate in the conversion into benevolent *Eumenides* of the furious spirits of revenge hunting down the unfortunate victim of inherited crime, and these converted Furies ultimately live under, and bow down to, the establishment of justice in the Court of the Areopagus at Athens, founded by Athene, the Goddess of Pure Wisdom and Justice, who yields to the charitable pleading of Apollo.

THE PROSE DRAMA

In the prose drama we approach nearer to actual life and all its varieties, with more detail drawing and individualisation of characters in their inter-relation to, and interaction with, the surrounding society. But we must never forget that in the great verse-dramas the forcible presentation of character in its relation to, and conflict with, society was already presented in classic types. Hamlet, Othello, Macbeth, Lear, stand out as monumental types of clearly individualised characters, acting upon, and struggling

¹ See Part I, p. 81.

with, the social conditions that surround them. Even on a broader plane of collective human activity in history, we see the individual characters in the life of nations, the world in which the events take place, and the changes in the social and political world which through their own individuality and position in life they directly affect. Such is the case in the succession of Shakespeare's king-dramas. A remarkable instance of historical drama, in which both the central character and his historical surroundings are effectively presented in the action on the stage, is Schiller's *Wallenstein's Lager und Wallenstein's Tod*. There are others in many of the great classical French dramatists. On the side of comedy the immortal Molière—perhaps the greatest literary genius of France—has given the world the most strongly marked plastic types of human character and human frailties within the setting of the social environment of his day. The same applies to the works of the eighteenth century dramatists of England, among which Sheridan's *School for Scandal* stands out as a most perfect instance.

More and more in modern contemporary drama are the characters themselves individualised in variety and delicate shadings ; while the social groupings are also differentiated in more individual and distinct gradations. Within each national group the distinctively national and local element is forcibly conveyed, until the audience also has presented to it, not only by means of dialect, but by all the distinctive characteristics of provincial traditions and social customs, with convincing local surroundings and costumes, dramas such as the Belgian, Sicilian, Irish, Lancashire dramatists and actors have produced, so that the provincial differentia stand out prominently as the central characteristic of the performance as a whole. Within each nation and each

provincial centre, again, there have been long since established, as important dramatic factors, class distinctions with their marked differences in appearances, manners, language, tastes, and customs of living and acting. Out of the clash and conflict of such social class difference grows again the distant action of the drama, leading either to tragic or to comic results. The modern French and English drama, as well as that of every other country, abounds in typical dramatic instances of this kind. From the great dramatic writers of the last generation, among whom Dumas the younger ranks foremost, the French as well as the English stage abounds in instances. In this sequence the most refined and subtle differences in characterisation are furnished by one of the last of the series, Pailleron's *Le Monde où l'on s'ennuie*.

The most characteristic development of this process of dramatic and social differentiation is produced by the introduction of the problem-play, in which the social questions of our day form the centre of interest and of dramatic composition. Within these problems that of sex is most prominent. Ibsen may here be considered as the leader, followed by a large number of eminent dramatic writers in France, England, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Spain. The definite problems of modern political, and even economic, life have established themselves and are coming forward with greater prominence. An earlier attempt of this kind was the *Die Weber* of Hauptmann, in which the conflict between the employer and the employed, leading to a strike, forms the centre of dramatic interest, and is powerfully presented on the stage; while both in France and in England the same subject has been skilfully dealt with by Bataille and Galsworthy. Still more defined and diversified problems of modern life are chosen and presented, notably by such French dramatists as Bernstein,

Bataille, and most professedly by Brieux, and in England by Granville Barker and Galsworthy.

Naturally the form of the drama, its means of scenic presentation, as well as the methods of acting, have been essentially modified by these modern developments of, and approximations to, actual life. On the other hand, the material form of presentation may, and does, react upon the character of composition, as well as in exposition and even in the choice of subjects for composition. This process is most clearly demonstrated by the development of modern cinematograph performances. Whether this form of dramatic presentation is good or bad, leads to the extension or degeneration of dramatic art or not; whether it is destructive of taste and leads to the atrophy of thought, of higher reasoning and of deeper feeling; or whether it quickens intelligence and perception, developing visual faculty, and thus, by mere suggestion stimulating the reasoning powers to supplement the full presentation of the actions presented only in their visual aspect; whether, finally, this visual means of bringing home to the widest public the most varied historical events and movements and incidents of life, which would never have been presented to them through any other vehicle, thus acts as a powerful educational influence; or whether, by the introduction of sensational and even coarse and immoral incidents favoured by the limited visual scenic presentation, it is debasing—all these are questions which do not concern us here and which I need not endeavour to answer. The fact remains that it is an interesting aspect of modern dramatic presentation; though after all it is not so new, because, depending upon a one-sided and imperfect form of presentation without the spoken word (except in the short written prologue to each scene), it has already existed. It really corre-

sponds to the pantomime and ballet of old. It is not inconceivable that, in the future, by some ingenious invention, the moving pictures may, by most accurate mechanical synchronism, be combined with the gramophone, so that the acting figures presented to the eye would at the same time pronounce the actual words which in the real scene they would utter. It may be said that this, though a very complicated mechanical invention, would be but a clumsy makeshift for the actual modern drama. But the answer to this would be that the cinematograph "play" can visibly produce all the striking scenes and surroundings in actual nature and life, while the drama, limited to stage and its mechanism, cannot do this.

PROSE LITERATURE

We have just seen how in the drama the characters and their fates, the central figures and their environment, are rendered in concentrated action limited in time to one scenic performance, the antecedent and succeeding events being implied or suggested in the characters themselves and the effect of the environment upon them. In prose literature—roughly speaking, fiction—this power of literary presentation of life is developed still further, in definiteness, as well as in variety and complexity. The means of presentation are thus not limited in time and place to one specialised sequence of events as representative of the wholeness of life; but, both in regard to characters and their development, and also to the surroundings and the incidents modifying them in their sequence and changes—in all these the work of fiction is not tied down by the limitations of time and space imposed upon the drama. We can follow the development of the characters and their social surroundings, from their origin (even their ancestry),

through their growth to decay, within all the stages of the physical and social environment in which they grow up or have been evolved, through all the changes in the physical and social conditions in which human beings were born, lived and acted. Moreover, the impressions, emotions and thoughts produced are not so concentrated and instantaneous, depending upon one performance ; but the reader can ponder and reflect on each part of the presentation, refer back to earlier passages and consider their bearing upon the later ones, and thus gain a fuller apprehension and a more exact and complete understanding of every part, as well as the whole, of the complex artistic unit which the author wishes to convey with vivid fullness.

We have seen how even social problems can be vitalised into convincing illustration in the dramatic action of a play ; but to a still higher and more extended degree can this be dealt with in the work of the writer of fiction. So varied and clear is the " meaning " in these works of art that the " form " seems lost in it, both as regards the work of the author and the effect upon the reader, and it may thus approach, and even be identified with, writing and exposition in the sphere of epistemology and science. Still, the " form " remains the essential element in the work of fiction to which the meanings are subordinated as elementary parts, welded together by its own spirit and harmonious unity into a new creation, both in the mind of the author as well as of his readers. As we have insistently noted before in other departments of art, life is not presented " photographically," the scenes and events are not produced autographically, in a detailed report in which the completeness and exact sequence of details and incidents is the one object aimed at, a counterfeit presentment of the actual facts of life ; but all the elements, seen and

unseen, momentary, precedent and subsequent, are harmonised into an organic unity, into a complete picture or presentation, or illustration of larger or deeper ideas.

We thus have before us that important department of literary art, growing in importance if not actually predominant in modern times, which has produced the novel or romance, including the short story.¹ We can trace its origin far back into the centuries, but it still remains, in its complete development, a product of modern times. From the story of adventure it soon develops into the story of a whole life, the life of the hero, to the romance or novel; the presentation of a whole life into which, by the artistic skill of the author, the reader is forced into sympathy or at least sympathetic understanding; and through all the growth and vicissitudes, successes and failures, the interested and fascinated reader passes, experiencing æsthetically through his receptive soul all those elements of purified sympathy which we have noted is the effect produced by a dramatic art. Yet all is not concentrated into one vivid experience during a single performance; but, passing through the duration of extensive reading into all the detailed experiences and the fate of the characters presented, it approaches nearer to actual life.

Among the great works of the past standing out as a supreme type of fullness in the presentation of the character in its relation to the social surroundings of his age, stands the creation of the great knight of La Mancha, *Don Quixote*. With powerful strokes of the pen the author enables us to follow this noble-hearted *gentleman* through all the incidents of his life, carried onwards and upwards by the spirit of chivalry of which, in spite of comedy and humour, he is the last tragic figure. He battles with the social conditions

¹ Cf. *Art in the Nineteenth Century*, chap. iii, "Literary Arts."

surrounding him, as he marks the last stages in the struggle of that age of chivalry, succumbing in the great social struggle of bloody conflict, until it meets with its death in the dissolvent and annihilating virus of ridicule. In less heroic and romantic form among the many classics of the eighteenth century, we follow lives and characters struggling with the spirit of the age in *Tom Jones*, in *The Vicar of Wakefield*, in Goethe's *Werther*, until more and more, in the finer drawing of details, as well as in the character of the hero and all the nicer shadings of his social environment, we pass into the nineteenth century, when the genius of Balzac fascinates us into sympathy with the life and development and fate of his vivid personalities and the delicate shadings of the social surroundings, powerful and strong in their standards and dominance—if not tyranny. More and more the complete and vivid presentation of the character itself, even its psychology, becomes the definite aim, together with the collective psychology of society, through Dickens and Thackeray, culminating in the production of such a classic type as Becky Sharp. The "psychological" novel is still further developed by George Eliot and her followers, and the immediate effect of the surroundings in producing and modifying the character is vividly displayed in the sequence of incident and story. It can be shown how the central unit, the central idea, in most of her stories lies in the process by which the social surroundings and the experiences and their effects upon the central figure modify the character and produce either a tragic or conciliatory final development. As illustrating this contrasted result we need but live through the lives of Maggie Tulliver and Gwendoline Harless in *The Mill on the Floss* and in *Daniel Deronda*. One of the most striking instances illustrating the development of a soul through the experiences forced upon it by its

environment and the incidents of life is Mr. Conrad's *Lord Jim*. I may also single out a remarkable presentation of the life of a girl within strongly marked religious surroundings by Mr. Hugh Walpole in *The Captives*.

Besides the portrayal of social environments in classes, the differences and conflicts among them and their relation to the central character, many works may also be classified as regards the portrayal of national and provincial characteristics in which the collective and distinctive national character forms one of the chief, if not the chief, idea toward which, and into which, all the details of the life described tend and in which they are harmonised.

Thus in the Russian novel from Gogol to Turgénief, Tolstoy, Dostoievsky, Gorky, and Tchekov, the distinctly Russian characteristics in single figures and in the social life provide a centre of artistic unity. The same applies to such German writers of fiction as Fritz Reuter for the North, Anzengraber for the South, as well as in the powerful fiction of Fransen in such novels as *Yoern Uhl* and *Hilligenlei*; while Gotfried Keller carries us to Switzerland, Jokai to Hungary, and Emil Franzos to the tragic homes of the Jews in the south-east of Europe. The numberless French novels showing these characteristics are best typified by Balzac's distinctive delineation of Parisian and provincial life and, in the masterly series of more recent French life, in Anatole France's stories grouping round the central figure of M. Bergeret. The English-speaking nations are equally rich in novels of this character. We need but single out Sir James Barrie's Scottish stories, supplemented by so many other distinctive writers of the North, Mr. Arnold Bennett's searching and intimate portrayal of the life in the Midland pottery districts, the characteristic Irish humorous and pathetic tales of Martin

Ross and Miss Somerville and George A. Birmingham, until we are carried to the confines of the British Empire in Mr. Kipling's vivid descriptions of British life in India. In America, New England life, made familiar to our fathers by the genius of Hawthorne, has since been presented to us through the pen of W. D. Howells and Miss Wilkins; while the life of the South is brought near to us in Mr. Cable's Southern and Creole stories and the writings of Joel Chandler Harris; and the middle and far West through the humour of Mark Twain and Bret Harte and, with added social problems, by Mr. Norris's vigorous writings and that remarkable story *Main Street* by Mr. Sinclair Lewis. Scandinavia, in spite of a general similarity of character, has brought home to us the distinctiveness of Danish life in such a novel as *Niels Liene*, by Jacobsen, as Sweden in the powerful story of *Goesta Berling*, by Selma Lagerloef, and Norway in that strong novel embodying the economic problems—*The Great Hunger*, by Johan Böjer.

Not only is national character thus reflected in the literature of fiction, but as a purely modern product in the evolution of intimate social as well as commercial and political relations, the inter-relation, uniting as well as conflicting, of several nationalities is itself made one of the central points of artistic interest in the masterly novels of Henry James and Mrs. Wharton, as well as in some of the works of M. Paul Bourget. The incidents in such novels, directing and modifying the life described, and the fate of the characters arise out of the complex personal and social characters of the actors in such international dramas which are to be harmoniously reconciled in life or which clash into irreconcilable antagonism. Physical conditions, especially the influence of climate in affecting national and individual life and character, have formed the groundwork of many remarkable

works. This is especially manifest in their influence upon the morals, manners and traditions of those bred in temperate and western civilized countries who come under the spell of tropical life. The transition from temperate to tropical life is furnished by Mr. N. Douglas, *South Wind*, placed in some such island as Capri, while such masterpieces as Mr. Woolff's *A Village in the Jungle*, Mr. Conrad's numerous stories of remote regions, those of Sir Hugh Clifford, some of O. Henry's, and finally more recent works by Mr. Somerset Maugham, strikingly illustrate this characteristic modern development of fiction.

Finally, we come to the problem story and the "Novel with a Purpose," in which the central or leading idea of the artistic composition as a whole is a social problem which the story sets itself to solve or to elucidate. The so-called "Novel with a Purpose," the "essay-story," has met with much platitudinous generalisation and superficial criticism. There is no doubt that, when such general ideas are pedantically obtruded in doctrinaire instances, they counteract the artistic illusion of life which fiction must produce. But it is hardly an over-generalisation to say that every great novel is in some sense a novel with a purpose, or, rather, that it contains some leading idea, at once effective in producing the story in the mind of the author as it also impresses upon the readers a harmonising unity of idea within the parts of the work as a whole. Still, some writers have more clearly and definitely emphasised a general idea or purpose from the beginning to the end of their books. Thus no doubt many, if not most, of Dickens's stories were written with a definite social or moral purpose and centre round the abuse of some institution or custom which he desires to rectify. So, too, Zola definitely manifests and embodies such social ideas or purposes in some of his serial stories, when he wished to convey

the gradual physical and moral degeneration of the life of the Second Empire ; while single stories deal with definite aspects and problems. Matilda Serao in *Il Paese di Cuccagna* purposes, by means of the actual life and living interest among the people acting in the story, to illustrate the evils of the public lottery system in Neapolitan life. In *L'Assommoir* Zola has deliberately aimed at bringing home to the reader the effect of drink upon the community, and does this vividly in leading the reader to follow in sympathy the lives of the individuals in a family. He has even, in that shorter masterpiece *Au Bonheur des Dames*, taken as his subject the economical evolution of the modern " Department Store " in its conflict with, and final victory over, the small special shop. He thus brings home to the reader a most specific movement in modern economic and industrial evolution by his constraining power of forcing the reader into sympathy with the living impersonations of these two conflicting economic elements. The country shop-girl who goes to Paris to live with her uncle, a small umbrella-maker, upon entering Paris in the morning stands enraptured before the bewildering show-windows of one of the great department stores at the early hour when the shutters are being removed. Her uncle's trade is being ruined and he himself reduced to indigence, by the competition of this great store, whose manager is thus his impersonal, his unseen and relentless, enemy. The conflict between the two economic and domestic camps thus rages on without pity. The human and dramatic interest of the story carries the girl into the camp of the enemy ; she enters the service of the great store, and falls in love with its manager. The idea is made living, made life, and the arguments are transfused with life and with the heart-blood of living beings. Now, whether the problem itself be solved or not,

whether economic arguments obtrude or not, from the point of view of political economy and purely scientific exposition, the central idea has led the novelist to write a great story, and the idea, moreover, has been converted into a harmonious emotional and æsthetic whole which thus forcibly moves the reader into the æsthetic emotions and moods—which is the function of a work of art. I cannot refrain from dwelling in this connection upon a Spanish story by Blasco Ibañez which I have recently read in the French translation called *A l'ombre de la Cathédrale*. The story is centralised round the great contemporary problem of the struggle between labour and capital, inequalities of opportunities and privileges. With supreme artistic instinct the author has chosen the most typical and expressive contrasts in this dualism and conflict presented by actual life in this civilised world of ours. The centre of action and the central citadel on the side of existing privilege is placed by him in Toledo and, moreover, in the great cathedral of that most picturesque and representative city of bygone ages in European history. The cathedral itself and the whole human personnel of the cathedral stand for the old order of things and the firmly established privileges of a class. Among the menial attendants of the cathedral, living in poverty in one of the cloisters, there grows up a boy who, through his talents and his studies in the seminary, is marked out for a prominent position in the hieratic world. He is endowed from the outset with remarkable intellectual powers and with a passionate imagination and tender heart, courageous and still loving and charitable. Just before entering the priesthood he is carried away in enthusiasm into the camp of the Carlist revolution, the conflict between the old orthodox privileged world and the liberal movement of emancipation and democracy. He leads

with his comrades the life of a revolutionary, essentially tending towards anarchism in its practices. Through personal conversation with revolutionaries and through his reading, after the failure of the Carlist revolution, he breaks loose from his orthodox faith and traditions and becomes a convinced socialist, though never a violent anarchist. His ideal is to be the pacific social reformer ; but he is carried on by the violent current, identified with definite outrages, thrown into prison, escapes, and wanders through the world as a hunted enemy of orderly society ; until in absolute misery, in the last stages of phthisis, he is presented to the reader returning to his native cloisters to find a refuge with his brother, a menial attendant in the cathedral, carrying on the hereditary work of that old cathedral family. The brother receives him affectionately and devotedly nurses him in the vain hope of restoring him to life, which is manifestly approaching its end. But the peaceful end is not to come, the fire of conviction burns in him, and by gradual steps, in spite of his essentially peaceful intentions, he creates a revolt among a group of these poverty-stricken, miserable, menial attendants of the cathedral, and ends his life in a sordid conflict, killed by his own associates. The literary artist could not have embodied in more typical illustrations of life the great conflict of economic interest, and, moreover, these typical instances are drawn with such literary power and so strongly appeal to the imagination of the reader that they stand out in their living truth and constrainingly bring home the tragedy of this great conflict. The author does not venture to give any direct means of solution, of conciliation, or of ultimate peace in this struggle, but the problem has inspired him with a truly great story, a work of art.

The " problem " is thus an essential, if not the

essential, point of artistic unity and forms a legitimate centre for such an artistic organism. It does in a way deal with the elucidation of a great problem in actual life, just as this same subject is usually taken up by writers on economics, politics, sociology and ethics, in the department of science. The difference in method between such a work of art and works of science lies in the fact that the artist directly stimulates the imagination, and through the imagination the emotions, to realise the generalised problems of modern life. Æsthetically, through the imagination and the emotions, thought is stimulated. The economist or social student who writes a book, a treatise, or an essay on such problems aims at dispelling from the reader's mind all imagination and emotion ; but step by step, by enumeration of facts and data, by sober observation of these facts and the processes of reasoning and pure intelligence, he leads up to more general truths ; until at last he produces his final conviction—which we have seen is also an emotion resting on harmonistic principles. But the process in the case of the literary artist or writer of fiction is the very reverse, from that of the economic and social student, the man of science. Still, the " problem " remains as a legitimate and important element in the provinces of this department of literary art. Thus the essay-story, whether transmitted in imaginary human life by means of letters or opinions, or of conversation¹—the conversation-story—is a legitimate form of literary art.

THE SHORT STORY

Individualised instances illustrative of situations and problems of life in a concentrated form have led

¹ See Preface to my Conversation Story, *The Rudeness of the Honble. Mr. Leatherhead*, and others published in *The Surface of Things*, as well as in *What may we Read*.

to the development of the short story in modern literature, which emphasises and conveys those individual shadings of modern social life. The short story is thus a very distinctive modern development and is (owing perhaps greatly to the adventitious influence of the pressure of time and its economy in our modern life) likely to be developed still further in its leading characteristics. No doubt Balzac in France, as in Germany, Tschoke and subsequent writers, have already produced "short stories." In its present form it may have been inaugurated by Bret Harte, and has been carried further in the perfection of its characteristic technical means and form in varying spheres of life by Guy de Maupassant, Henry James, Mrs. Wharton, Mr. Rudyard Kipling, and, finally, by O. Henry. As its name indicates, it differs from the novel in being much shorter; but this shortness is based upon, and justified by, the concentration upon one definite situation which itself suggests some leading idea. The versatility, almost universality, of these typical human incidents, characteristics of life in all its aspects, to be found in the work of O. Henry, makes us regret that the outer and mechanical conditions of his work as a journalist, writing in ephemeral publications and under similar hasty conditions of production, should have made his work so unequal. I venture to surmise that if he could have brought himself to give more sustained thought and continuous technical finish to his work, its quality would have led him through the portals of classic fiction. It may be hoped that a thoroughly judicious selection, or anthology, of his best work may be issued to minimise this fault of hasty production.

No doubt new forms may be evolved. In a form somewhat approaching the lyrical—the *vers libres*—short, disjointed and suggestive sketches in strong drawing, the varied life of a community in the Spoon

River Anthology, Mr. Edgar Lee Masters introduces a distinctly new form of fiction, the total result of which is perhaps the presentation of a completely harmonised work of art.

(d) MUSIC (AS AN ART OF MEANING)

We have already seen how music and ornamentative art are the purest arts as compared with the "Arts of Meaning." Music thus stands out as one of the central arts—positively, because the vehicle for æsthetic expression is directly concerned only with the harmony of sound, and because its purpose is satisfaction of the æsthetic feelings; and negatively, because the tones which it uses have no "meaning," are not associated with any other form of expression, do not appeal to other human faculties and interests.

With the development of man as an intelligent human being, however, the tendency more and more asserts itself to define and individualise impressions and to establish various mental associations. We have thus seen that, at an early period, differentiations are introduced by means of the character of the emotions through which musical expressions are evoked; and that, beyond sad and joyful music, the various shadings of emotion evoke definite harmonies of tone and are associated with them. We further saw that by associations with occupations and various conditions of life music was called in; different and clearly defined classes of music were evolved, as, for instance, dance music, dirges, religious music, martial music, etc. Finally, when associated with lyrical forms of combinations of words in the song and in all similar developments of such fusion of language and music, even with the addition of dramatic action, mere associations were converted into highly differentiated forms of music, were multiplied and developed

in each, not only through vaguer associations, but by specific definition; and that meanings were conveyed emotionally through æsthetic moods. But it must always be remembered that it is primarily and predominantly through these æsthetic emotions, and not through suggestions of definite meanings, that these further musical differentiations act. Still, the central domain of music as a *Pure Art* will always be instrumental music, in which man has invented and uses instruments of his own fashioning, in order that they should produce tones in different qualities, the composition and harmony of which produce a work of musical art. More even than the human voice (which is directly connected with, and subordinated to, the enunciation of language), and the emission of ordinary unmusical sounds for definite purposes and uses of daily life, as well for the interested reflex expression of actual emotions, the notes of instruments convey in the fullest and purest form the *tones* out of which 'musical harmony is composed. At first these instruments are used as solo-instruments, such as the pipe, the flute, reed instruments and various forms of string instruments, until the metal or "brass" instruments in their varied forms are added, the drum having from the first been the most rudimentary instrument to express rhythmical measures of sound. But with the development of polyphonous music the tones issuing from more than one instrument, corresponding to the development of the part-song, are harmonised into a higher and more complex musical form—until, finally, the various instruments, each containing its peculiar quality of sound, are concerted into a greater and more varied harmony, leading at last to the most highly developed forms of orchestral music and "orchestration." It is in comparatively modern times that this development of man's artistic efforts

has reached a point of great height and artistic perfection. With centuries of noted composers, especially in Italy, in France and even in England, this highest form of orchestral music (including the organ) attained the most rapid development in three generations of composers succeeding one another down to the present day, namely, in Bach, Beethoven and Brahms, until in our own days most important varieties and further developments have followed, and may promise to lead to still further achievements in the artistic expressiveness of that master art.

Inventions and physical conditions under which the music itself is performed have had, and have, their influence in producing modifications and developments in instrumental music. This is notably the case in wind instruments and instruments producing definite, more individualised, total effect of orchestration. A new impulse has been given to expression by the line of development passing through Berlioz to Wagner, to Strauss and the leading composers of our day, in which, both in France and England, led by the older generation of masters, like Saint-Saëns, Debussy, César Franck, Ravel and others, as with Sir Edward Elgar, Sir Charles Stanford, Sir Hubert Parry, and the vigorous younger school of composers in England, there is a promise of great vitality and future development.

In other respects as well, by the invention and improvement of instruments, notably the pianoforte and its precursors of simpler form in past centuries, the expressive power in variety and quality of musical composition has been modified and increased—until the phonograph may have its definite influence, whether for good or for bad. The conditions of time and place for the performance have again tended to diversify and individualise the character of musical composition, as is eminently the case with

purely domestic music centring round the pianoforte and organ, for which, in its earlier forms, Bach produced works which were, however pure in their musical harmony of form, still essentially influenced by the character of that instrument ; until we come to the specifically expressive pianoforte composers such as Chopin and Schumann.

The domestic form of music leads us on to that distinct and prolific development of " chamber " music, and this is enlarged by being transferred to the concert room, to which has been added all the varieties of song or ballad expressive of the whole scale of lyrical emotions, which can be powerfully recalled to the audience by perfect musical art.

From the earliest times onwards religious music, originally entirely ancillary to religious rites and ceremonies, is developed in a great variety of forms, until at last we come to the oratorio, which, in the domain of music, is analogous to the development of the Passion or Mystery-Play of earlier centuries. To this must be added all forms of choral music. But in all these, as well as in the oratorio, the word has been introduced, though as an artistic expression the music still forms the predominant element.

We thus see how through these various modifications arising out of contingent influences, music, primarily a pure art of ornamentative character, tends by inner development and association to approach to the definiteness of the Arts of Meaning. Analogous to the development we recognised in the arts of sculpture and of painting, as well as in the literary arts, the step is made from Static Symmetry to Organic Symmetry, from the absolute harmony of form which lasts and does not suggest movement and life, to the rhythmical symmetry which suggests life and even the changes of human emotions and thoughts. This same process of development and differentiation is

to be noted in the two main elements of music, namely, symmetry in time as well as harmony in tones. The absolute regularity of time-beat, directly expressive of static symmetry, becomes too cramped and narrow for the expression of the varieties of life, emotions and thoughts ; and thus, as in sculpture " rhythm " had to be added to symmetry, so the absolute regularity of time-beat has to be modified to express the varied flow of life and feelings by means of deviations from that strict regularity, in syncopated and other more rhythmical forms of succession. I can recall a most noteworthy experience when, about forty-six years ago, I had the privilege of being present at a rehearsal in which Richter conducted the orchestra, Wagner himself standing beside him. At a specially difficult passage Wagner burst in and addressed the orchestra with the significant phrase : " Gentlemen, you must not play this according to beat (*takt*), but rhythmically, taking the passage as a whole " ; and, taking the baton, he illustrated the difference by at first beating according to actual time, so many beats to the bar in symmetrical regularity, and then, with wavy motions of the baton and with variety, if not irregularity, in the beat, he drew as it were in the air a graphic symbol and movement of the *motif* as a whole.

As regards melody and harmony, again, the same incursions into the static, more conventional, regularity can be noted, even to the point of introducing chords which in *themselves* are cacophonous, but which are at once resolved into a wider harmony. Thus, in melody as well as in harmony, a greater variety is introduced, all of which increases the power of music to express the movement and flow of life, of human emotions, and even to express moods and thoughts. The result is that modern orchestral music has led to the development of the Symphonic

Poem and to that whole varied form of musical composition under the name of Programme Music. Here, either by definite passages in poetry or prose, or by a single title suggesting a particular idea or incident (such as the various symphonic poems of Liszt, *Im Wald* by Raff, the "Ocean"-symphony by Rubinstein, and philosophic, if not cosmical, ideas centring round some of Strauss's symphonies), the mind of the audience is aided in fixing a definite sphere of emotion, incident, or thought, by means of, as it were, an outline argument to the composition, and thus tending to direct a musical mood into more definite channels, out of which mood the imagination may evoke more definite images. From Liszt onwards through the great Scandinavian musicians, beginning with Grieg, to those of Russia and Bohemia, besides the great Western nations, innumerable works of highest artistic excellence abound to illustrate this fertile development. They, together with Hungarian and even Negro national and racial characteristics of music, convey individual moods fully expressive of such national and racial individualities as we have already seen the literary arts were also enabled to produce.

Still, from the intrinsic nature of this pure and ornamentative art there are limits to the expression of definite meanings, because it is not, and cannot, be in itself a suitable vehicle for the conveyance of exact information. If it attempts to do this it must fail, and such failure disturbs the harmony essential to the production of a harmonious æsthetic mood. The composer who, as we are told, attempted to give a musical image of "Washington Crossing the Delaware," including even a reproduction of the sound of cracking ice, certainly must have failed singularly in evoking harmonious mood in his audience corresponding to the artistic properties of music.

When definiteness of meaning is imperatively demanded by the development of the composition as a whole, recourse must be had to the introduction of words. The classical illustration of such an important transitional step in musical composition (I believe first cited by Wagner) is the Ninth Symphony of Beethoven. In this wonderful musical composition the several distinct movements were constructed to lead up to a climax of exuberant and exalted joy. Music here seemed to fail to convey by itself the definite meaning which inspired Beethoven, and in the last movement he bursts out into the Hymn of Joy, adopting Schiller's poem to fix the culminating point in his lyrical meaning—the words conveying the definiteness of thought, while the music infinitely strengthens the corresponding emotions and mood and constrainingly carries the audience into the highest sphere of æsthetic realisation.

We have on several occasions referred to the Song or Ballad. In this lyrical work the musical and literary arts are, or ought to be, fused into one harmonious whole. But there can be no doubt that, in the song, music is predominant, if only for the simple physical reason that the melody is unmistakably expressed, while however perfect the diction and enunciation of the singers may be, full justice is not always done to the words. In fact, we can hardly believe that the poetic values of some of the most perfect lyrics of Shelley and Keats can be increased, if they are not actually diminished, by being set to music. Still, the harmonious fusion of poetry and music in songs has at the hands of the great masters, Schubert, Schumann and Brahms, as well as of many composers in all countries, produced works which respond to the highest standards of art. Besides giving specifically lyrical expression to all human emotions in every form, they can give, and have

given, lyrical forms to dramatic incidents (as in the "Erlkönig" by Schubert and by Loewe), and even convey complex thought and definite impressions of characteristic scenes and landscapes. As instances of this growing power of lyrical individualisation, I may single out a song by a young composer, Brückler, who died prematurely, rendering in most perfect musical form a poem by Hebbel called "Gebet"; while landscapes and the corresponding moods in highly individualised and beautiful character find their lyrical response in Strauss's "Morgen," in Schumann's "Sonntag am Rhein," and in Fauré's setting of a poem by Verlaine called "Clair de Lune." The first of these three songs marks a restraint and subordination, both in the melody as well as in the accompaniment, which bring out the poetic value and definiteness of meaning in the words. I shall (when we consider the melodrama) develop this point in suggesting a new form of lyrical presentation, ensuring still further the lyrical value of poetry when joined to music.

THE OPERA

The fusion of language and music, coupled with action manifest to the eye in the drama, underlies the development of the opera. In the early dramas lyrical parts were interspersed, as on the classical stage from the Dionysiac festival onwards, though the chorus, song and dance were essential parts of the performance. In its earlier phases the principle of the opera was essentially lyrical, so that the dramatic principles were to a considerable degree subordinated; and though in Mozart's Operas and in Beethoven's "Fidelio," as well as in a great many of the works of eminent pre-Wagnerian composers, the dramatic principle was recognised and impressed

—even including to some degree the introduction of definite *motifs*—especially in the exquisitely melodious Italian operas of the last century, the lyrical beauty of the arias, duets, trios, quartets, quintets and choruses, with the more subordinated accompaniment of the orchestra, became independent lyrical interludes, asserting themselves in their single qualities more or less irrespective of the dramatic flow and unity of the action. Distinct from these was the recitative, a form of quasi-lyrical chant, which conveyed the less lyrical portions of the action.

With Wagner a new era in the development of the opera is inaugurated. By his innovations he, in the first instance, no doubt expressed the current feeling of the common-sense critic among the people in pointing out the contradiction, if not absurdity, within the convention that people in the ordinary course of life should sing where they naturally speak, and that the exalted mood of purely formal and lyrical music should be wedded to the natural and sober course of cause and effect in human actions. He thus laid down the canons of the music-drama by, in the first place, harmonising, as far as possible, words and music, the music being the adequate emotional or lyrical expression or concomitant of the individualised meanings conveyed in words. This led to the establishment of his *Leit-motifs*. But he went much further in this individualisation in using, above all, the orchestra to strengthen and to complete the emotional content, as well as the environment and its interaction with the characters and incidents. One further important step beyond the mere music-drama lay in consciously and definitely calling in all the other arts—those of vision—to intensify and complete the full unity of dramatic representation. He called this *All-kunst* (a pan-artistic work). Finally, he rightly maintained that

the ideal composer of such music-dramas should, from the very outset, conceive his dramatic production as a whole, and that therefore he should be the writer of his own text or *libretto*—words and music flowing from the same inventive and emotional source.

Now, there can be no doubt that, as a pure musician, especially as a composer of orchestral music, he stands, and will ever stand, on a very high pinnacle in the history of music. There can also be no doubt that as a dramatic and lyric poet he also attained to a high rank. The *Meistersinger*, as a great historical comedy reflecting in perfect action as well as diction the complex characteristics in the life of mediæval Germany, and at the same time presenting the central idea of the struggle between the old and the new schools of poetry expressive of that age, is a masterpiece and one of the greatest literary and dramatic comedies ever written, placing Wagner in close proximity to Molière. So also some of the passages conveying the great central idea of the struggle between night and day, the world of overpowering feeling and conventionalised thought embodied in *Tristan and Isolde*, have qualities which remind us of the ancient Greek tragedies. Furthermore, his principle of completely harmonising 'the visual aspects of dramatic presentation with the action, in scenery, costume and grouping, is completely justified. Nothing can be more impressive than the simple device of the rolling clouds passing by in the *entr'acte* of *Parsifal* to suggest visually the powerful composition and orchestration of that transition between the two acts. But there are aspects and instances in his drama in which his actual work failed to realise his artistic principles and theories. The scene-painting and costuming, as well as grouping, are often quite inadequate to the suggestion of grace or

sublimity, which the dramatic situation and the music itself lead the audience to expect ; and they thus strike an inharmonious note. His taste, his sense of proportion, are frequently at fault. His doctrinaire (*Schopenhaueresque*) theories of philosophy, religion, sociology and ethics are inadequately expressed by his art or merely indicated by didactic phrases—such, for instance, as his theory of the all-powerful Will in the hero " who does not know fear " in *Siegfried*. The Christian ideas of purity and simplicity of mind, coupled with the doctrine of " Service " leading to Salvation, in *Parsifal*, impressed upon the audience by the mere phrase " the simple dolt " (*der reine Thor*), or the repetition of the word *dienen*, are artistic solecisms. As regards the latter work, moreover, " a simple dolt " can never become a hero by merely repeating the words " I do not know " (*ich weiss es nicht*).^{*} Perhaps in *Siegfried* the Nietzschean superman who " knows no fear " may approximate to the hero. Moreover, the same artistic weakness leads him into what the French call *des longueurs*, undramatic and unconvincing in their literary and even musical presentation, which interrupt the continuity of action or weaken even the lyrical and emotional impressiveness. They simply become tedious. His taste did not always tell him when to stop.

Nevertheless, in most of his operas and especially in his " romantic operas " he manifests the supreme artistic taste and tact of a great musical genius and thinker which have led him to establish a central principle which must ever guide the music-drama. It will be noted that, with the exception of *Rienzi*, practically all his operas are romantic, mystic, or lyrical in subject and in elaboration. This applies notably to his *Lohengrin* and his *Tristan*, which are lyrical and romantically mystical, both in subject

and in treatment ; as the subject of the *Meistersinger* and *Tannhäuser* is centrally lyrical, namely, the contest of the lyrical poets forming the centre of action, the former with the romantic background of mediæval Nürenberg, the latter with the mystical atmosphere of Christian folklore ; while the *Flying Dutchman* and the *Nibelungen Ring* are the lyrical renderings of Northern and mediæval mysticism and mythology ; until, finally, we come to Christian mysticism in *Parsifal*. All these, by the subject-matter, as well as the actual scenery in which the drama is set, are removed from the sober environment and criteria of daily life and are raised into a more mystical and emotional sphere, where the highest lyrical and musical form of expression harmonises with the atmosphere and mood of the drama and certainly is not in direct and absurd contradiction to the events enacted. We are not constantly jarred by our awakening to the fact that people do not sing instead of speaking.

Thus, unless the dramatic composer, in the subject which he elaborates by all the powerful means of his art, can raise the audience into that lyrical and romantic mood which justifies the introduction of music, the opera cannot be a perfect expression of art. Bygone ages, removed from this immediate association with our present life, and remoter localities with their own life distant and distinct from our own, convincingly and constrainingly presented so as to eliminate the sober and interested thought of our daily life, may thus supplement that lyrical requisite. So also the great and leading emotions of life, above all love, can in themselves supply that lyrical foundation upon which the imaginary illusion is evoked. Even the comparatively proximate period of the middle of the last century can thus be converted into a more romantic background for the action of the

exquisitely lyrical music-drama *La Vie de Bohème* by Puccini, because the purely lyrical love-story forms the centre of dramatic interest. But the limits to this form of art are soon reached whenever the actual story and the dramatic action itself force us into the mood of definite realistic apprehension of the actual life in which we are living.

THE MELODRAMA

There is one form of dramatic music in which music is combined with literary art in a somewhat subordinate and yet effective function, providing an æsthetic element to strengthen literary meaning and form, the harmonised whole being best termed Melodrama.

Music is associated with poetic diction or dramatic action, separately and by itself, to harmonise with the general tone and mood of the meanings, incidents and situations the ideas or feelings conveyed by the poem or drama—emotionally to prepare the audience to receive those meanings, to apprehend and to be moved by the scenic situation, incident and action, and thus to intensify poetic or dramatic presentation. Thus music, chiefly instrumental, but occasionally even vocal and choral, acts as an emotional foundation and accompaniment to definite expressions. Its introduction is now generally limited to touching scenes, especially in plays, and is thus associated with sentiment and even sentimentality, and in consequence may have fallen into disrepute. There can be no doubt, however, that its essential function, when artistically and judiciously applied, is æsthetically effective and eminently admissible, and that it has its historical foundation in the past from the Greek drama down to Wagner. It is also an essential part of the highly artistic production of the ballet, notably in the Russian ballet, and the higher forms of pantomime. Instead of the song, ballad, or *lied*, in

which words and music are actually merged into each other, there is a most effective and beautiful form of combination without actual fusion in the monotone recital of poems, with musical accompaniment, which the French assign to their *diseur* or *diseuse*: in which the poetic recitation is strengthened, heightened and beautified by the corresponding musical accompaniment. A remarkable and interesting form of such harmonious combination was recently presented by the composer (Mr. Armstrong Gibbs) of the music for the Cambridge performance of the Oresteian trilogy of Æschylus, in which, in some of the chœruses, the orchestra reproduced line by line and almost word for word harmonious musical expression of the rhythm and recited words.

There is thus a new sphere of fruitful artistic endeavour opened out to the poet and dramatist in co-operation with the musical composer, in that longer or shorter poems of high quality, lyrical or epic—or even didactic—can be rendered in perfect recitation with the thoroughly adequate and responsive accompaniment of a musical composition of the very highest quality. This principle may accordingly be carried still further into dramatic representations on the stage.

(D) BEAUTY IN NATURE

We have in the First Part of this book endeavoured to define the distinctive character of the æsthetic attitude of mind with regard to Nature and life. Though no doubt this quality of the mind can be cultivated and refined and is often a mark of higher mental disposition and education, nevertheless it is possessed by, and is active even among, the most uncultured and among those in whom the sense of beauty occupies but a small part of their attention and mental activity. A perfect spring or summer

day in the garden or woods and among the trees and flowers in bloom with the song of birds or murmuring of the brook, or the sight of a brilliant sunset, will rouse even the most insensible to some form of æsthetic admiration, even though they be not conscious of the æsthetic quality of their pleasure. How active this æsthetic habit of mind is even in the uncultured, we have already seen in the qualities which determine their choice in the objects of daily use and in the adjectives which they adopt to express every kind of approval or disapproval. As regards the contemplation of natural scenery, most people are guided by their individual predisposition and personal preferences, especially by their habitual home surroundings and the associations subconsciously there established. But often their æsthetic longings and preferences will be produced or strengthened by unfamiliarity and contrast, as the town-bred man or woman will delight in the relief from confinement, monotony of street scenes and their squalor, and rejoice in or long for the country and rural scenery.

All these subjective biases lead to a want of catholicity in the appreciation of natural scenery or the limited admiration of *striking* and strongly manifest effects and contrasts—to the *romantic* or manifestly picturesque. High or rugged mountains, rushing rivers and waterfalls (such as Ruysdael delighted in painting), strong contrasts of colour, light and shade, act on even the duller senses and imagination; while more placid and mild scenery, with toned harmonies instead of contrasts, are often overlooked, or do not stimulate the blunted senses and feelings into æsthetic emotion and admiration. Apart from local associations, habitual or more momentary, it requires some refinement and æsthetic training to discover the intense beauty in gently rolling or even flat country, with the change in light and atmospheric

effects, or a simple turn in the road, with fields on either side and meadows full of wild flowers, or a bank or hedge with its world of delicate forms in colour or in silhouette against a blue or darkening sky. Still, all is there for the eye, the mind and the heart that can discover the rich treasure of beauty revealing itself in Nature. We can all become non-painting landscape painters for the nonce, and thus make life the richer and our souls the nobler.

(E) THE ART OF LIVING

Before we leave the subject of selective and creative art, which together constitute the whole sphere of æsthetics, there is one wider sphere of æsthetic activity to which attention must be drawn, though the activities concerned do not deal with the selection or fashioning of definite material objects which are meant to respond to the satisfaction of the æsthetic instinct. The material dealt with is in fact the Wholeness of Life itself, acted upon directly from the æsthetic point of view. These facts are, no doubt, also related to Pragmatics and Ethics, where they may have to be reconsidered.

We are concerned in fact with the "Art of Living." Living itself, physical, human and social, is not considered from its scientific or intelligible aspect, or from that of use, or of rightness and goodness, but from that of harmony or beauty. As we have found that sense-perceptions as well as convictions lead us back ultimately to the principle of harmonism, so we shall find that utility rests upon the same principles, and that goodness and virtue, as the ancient Greeks long ago maintained, are essentially allied to beauty. But as to the Art of Living in civilised social communities, the response of life to our sense of harmony and beauty fills to a considerable degree our consciousness and stimulates our efforts. In

plain words, our attitude towards our fellow-men, singly and collectively, is not guided and affected by the interest as to what material advantage we can receive from them, or they from us ; nor by the feeling of our respective duties to one another ; but rather by the motive of responding to the social satisfaction and pleasure, the amenities of our social relationships, and the consequent perfect social organisation, its rules, customs, traditions and tastes, which produce or lead to harmonious relation between people, securing peace and more than peace, social gratification, elevation and refinement, to the community. In this sphere of intercourse among civilised beings all those manners and rules of conduct and deportment have grown which, above the mere necessity of preventing actual friction and contention or of facilitating interested business intercourse, tend to make human society in every way beautiful and refined. It might astonish even the most sober student of economics and ethics were he to consider how much of the actual efforts of human beings, from the most highly cultured to those least developed in thought and taste, is directed (sometimes misguided) into these channels of harmonious social inter-relations which constitute the Art of Living. In fact, if we were to concentrate our attention upon the social evolution of even our most material acts, we should find that they are at a very early stage raised out of the sphere of necessity into that of comparative luxury, where they become a matter, not of need or use, but of art. This, as we have already seen, is the case with regard to the fundamental necessity of housing, from the cave-dwellers onwards, leading up to the development of the art of architecture ; the same applies to the necessity of protecting the body against the inclemencies of the weather by means of clothing ; and also in the provision of sustenance

for the human body in the production and consumption of food. As with housing, so the rudimentary bear-skin leads through innumerable stages to the production of Paris and London fashions in dress and of the numberless details of wearing apparel, their texture and ornamentation, which make up modern costume. The same applies to food, from the uncooked raw meat or berries of the savage to the refinements of modern gastronomy. Though we may all agree that gluttony and all forms of intemperance in food and drink are among the lowest of physical vices and weaknesses, and that even 'when the refinements of culinary art fill the consciousness and the activity of any individual out of proportion to the wholeness of the aims and objects of life they become revolting, still, the fact remains, that the refinements and arts in the preparation of food, the way in which it is eaten, the manner in which it is served, and the degree in which it is subordinated to higher social and spiritual converse in the *convivium*,¹ the dinner, are an achievement of higher life and civilisation. The *mot* of the artistic French *chef*, who summarised his criticism of his master, in spite of all his kindness and considerateness to him, by the phrase, accompanied by a shrug of the shoulders, "Mais Monsieur mange, Monsieur ne dîne pas" (My master eats, he does not dine), illustrates an advance in civilised refinement.

If this is so even with regard to the purely physical necessities of life, it is still more so in social intercourse, where it ultimately leads to what we call good manners, created for social amenity, and to those varied forms of entertainment which constitute the body of our

¹ It is remarkable, as Cicero pointed out, that the Latin word for a dinner was *convivium* (feast), which places the accent on the social intercourse, and is higher than the Greek term *symposium*, which lays the accent on the mere physical act of drinking together.

social existence beyond our direct work and duties and secure for us the proper regard and consideration of our fellow-men and to ourselves the confirmation of self-esteem and self-respect. The important fact remains that this art¹ applies to every class in all civilised communities, however much their actual standards may differ among each other. They all are more or less consciously and directly subject to a certain rule of social conduct which constitutes the Art of Living and absorbs a considerable part of their active energies and endeavours, and this Art of Living is distinctly and wholly a matter of æsthetics.¹ Not only in his relation to his fellow-men (and here I am again anticipating what, from another point of view, is a part of Ethics), but in his conscious relation to himself is this Art of Living of supreme importance. Beginning again with the purely physical aspect, man is urged on to consider his own physical health, the perfect functioning of his several organs and their complete inter-relations to one another, and he then does this not merely by, as it were, reflex action to avoid a definite pain or discomfort, but in order to make of himself, on the physical side, a perfect human being, in perfect harmony with man as a work of art. Cleanliness and all care of the human body belong to these, and all the rules of good manners and deportment in the care of them. Rising beyond this simplest physical phase, he must make of himself an attractive human being, physically, mentally, morally, and socially. This aim and desire are not only the outcome of the natural sexual instinct, to attract others in this sphere of human relationship ; but also, if not chiefly, from the purely social point of view, to cultivate and to realise in himself all those forms of personal attractiveness and charm, without vanity, which appeal to his fellow-beings on the purely

¹ *Aristodemocracy*, pp. 24-277 ; also *Eugenics, Civics, and Ethics*.

æsthetic side ; again, physically mentally and morally. This applies to all social intercourse of daily life, but especially to those aspects of it in which the harmony of such intercourse is the æsthetic object and end, as is the case in every work of art : in play, in athletic games, as well as in lighter and more graceful amusements, according to age and circumstances ; in the good manners which constitute the art of attractive intercourse, as well as in the mental and intellectual refinements producing tact, the art of conversation and all the other arts of life. By all the contributory means of education and self-improvement man thus tends to make of himself on the æsthetic side a perfect being. Taste and tact, as well as considerateness and grace, are the æsthetic concomitants of the Art of Living.

CONCLUSION

To summarise the foregoing consideration of the principles of æsthetics in their bearing upon the main thesis of this book, we must fully realise that, among all the activities of the human intelligence, art is the most direct and complete function and expression of the harmoniotropic and aristotropic properties of the mind. Though we have seen in the chapter on Epistemology, and though we shall see in the succeeding chapters on Pragmatics, Ethics, Politics, and Religion, that, ultimately, all these activities are founded upon these essential principles and functions of the mind, the mental activities to which they lead man are not to the same degree *directly* produced by the satisfaction of the æsthetic instincts and aims, as is the case in art.

To apply the principles of conscious evolution to art, the æsthetic attitude of mind, taste, each age and nationality must aim at expressing fully and adequately its own highest national mental-

ity and culture in the æsthetic sphere, and not borrow its art or be affected in its taste by the art and taste of foreign and exotic modes or standards. No doubt one aspect of culture and high civilisation consists in the inclusion of the historic sense and intellectual altruism which produce appreciation of the life and thought of bygone ages as well as of the national life and spirit of alien peoples. But though the æsthetic horizon may be greatly widened, diversified and enriched, and may lead to appreciation and production of various styles and classes of artistic works not indigenous to the national spirit of a people, they must always envisage these consciously as not directly the expression of their own taste. It is also true that it may be one of the characteristics of an age to find expression of its own mentality and culture in works of bygone ages and foreign origin, and may thus directly embody their peculiar qualities in its own works, while modifying them in the spirit of its own national and historical character. Thus the age of Louis XV in France was inspired by the Far East in producing the *Chinoiserie* of its peculiar French style, which responded to something in its own artificial culture manifesting similar tendencies; but this orientalised element was essentially modified and subordinated to its own French character. In any case the aim of all sincere art must always be to express itself directly, fully and honestly as the true inspiration of its own mentality.

But here again we discover a tendency on the part of artists and critics to conceive of such an evolutionary progression of art *fatalistically*, i.e. as if every wave of taste and of art-work of any temporary and ephemeral school or set of artists, at times quite unrepresentative of the true spirit of their age or nation, was, merely because it exists and is productive, thereby justified as a legitimate or perfect expression

of the age : that *what is*, is by that mere fact, *justified*. To be really representative of the age, art must not be the expression of any or every manifestation of the national life at any period or in any aspect or movement of the age ; but must be representative of the **BEST** in each age, the highest expression of its culture. The actual time in which we now live, the years immediately succeeding the Great War, manifest, like other similar periods in history, on the negative side the disruption of the established standards which preceded the catastrophic crisis which led to the struggle itself. Most of us foresaw that the first phenomena to result from the war would be that our moral, social and economical if not our intellectual traditions would be uprooted, and that the dregs and dissolvent social elements would be forced to the surface ; the feelings, laws and duties as regards the value of human life itself, of the family ties and social traditions, of economic laws, of manners, conventions and institutions would lose their constraining power and validity, and the activity and energy of the younger people, filled with vitality and the passion for new life and things, would be essentially negative and revolutionary.

Though the expression of such a spirit in the domain of art, chiefly directed against the established standards of taste and of artistic methods, does thus in truth express this negative result of our post-war period, it cannot be considered a positive expression of the best that is in us, even as we are affected by the great upheaval of war. There is in us, and will undoubtedly come to the surface, a more positive expression of our national and historical genius, the best in our own civilisation corresponding to the lasting character of our national life, upon which the war and its tragic teaching will have acted as the great Liberator and Purifier (Katharsis).

CHAPTER III

PRAGMATICS¹

AMONG the more practical activities of the human mind which deal with the production of ideal states with the "ought to be" (*oīa eīvai dei*), in contradistinction to the theoretical activities of science, which deals with things as they are and aims at the complete knowledge of these things as they are, following upon æsthetics and art, we come to Pragmatics, which is concerned with what we call the "useful." This department forms a transition from æsthetics to ethics. Now, the relations of pragmatics to æsthetics on the one side, and to ethics on the other, present, from the very outset, a problem which has led to considerable discussion among the exponents of these departments and philosophers in general. Just as there exists a considerable school of those who uphold utilitarian ethics, as well as utilitarian politics and perhaps even utilitarian religion; so there are those who seek for the principle of beauty and art in the useful, from which they consider the æsthetic manifestations to have been derived. We have already touched upon this question in connection with the earliest forms of selective, as well as of creative, art, more especially in relation to architecture; and we have there maintained that the connotation of "utility" and the "useful" does not lead us down to a primary principle, but to one which requires further analysis into its elementary component

¹ The word is here used in its older significance, and in no relation to the special meaning assigned to it in modern systems of philosophy known as "Pragmatism."

parts. The creative energy, which leads to use and utility, may *possibly* produce a thing of beauty ; but the creative impulse which leads to such activity does not aim at producing harmony of form in itself and for itself. But it may be held that in such pragmatic activity the object created does manifest harmony between the purpose for which the object is created and the means of realising this purpose in the thing produced ; also that the creator of the " pragmatic " or useful work is moved by the instinct or conscious desire to harmonise means to ends. In both these cases it would then primarily and ultimately be the harmoniotropic instinct and desire which underlies his activity, as it is also his aristotropic instinct and aim to choose the best, and not the inferior or second best.

As we have already maintained, use, moreover, is purely individual, if not momentary, and varies constantly with the variations in the individual, as well as with those in his environment. It is therefore of such infinite variety that it cannot produce a general mental or material principle which is lasting and can act either in theory or in practice as a guide or norm to the human mind. In actual life it simply means that " we must take things as they come and make the best of them, fitting means to ends." It can never produce beauty by itself, nor truth nor goodness, nor lead to the better life individually or collectively. In so far as, in its elementary form, it might be defined as corresponding to the " line of least resistance " or to the economy of force and movement—to the straightest line—it is in itself based upon the principle of mathematical regularity and symmetry, which we have seen is a primary expression of the harmonistic principle. However you extend and intensify its meaning, deep down, wide afield, and upwards in height, you cannot raise it into a general principle and a guide to full

understanding or perfect conduct. You may generalise it infinitely, raise it out of its literal and direct meaning to the highest degree, and say that the most useful is ultimately the most moral, the most beautiful and conducive to the well-being of a community or of all humanity, that it finally leads to the divine harmony of the world—the term will not bear such a strain of meaning. In the “ought to be” of life you can never determine the end by the means, as little as you can define the attractiveness or moral value of the place you wish to reach simply by the facilities of transportation to it, unless there is no difference between heaven and hell, however well paved the road to either. Sophistry does not lead to truth. Opportunism does not make the statesman, facility and rapidity of production do not make the artist.

However fallacious most reasoning which contrasts theory and practice with regard to things of the mind may be, the natural instinct which has led people to oppose to one another the attitudes and activities which deal, on the one hand, with use and, on the other, with truth, beauty, goodness and sanctity, and which has maintained that you cannot both serve God and Mammon, is sound.

Though we were to admit utility as the immediate and ultimate aim, we must then satisfy ourselves whether in fitting means to ends the true relationship exists between them, and this implies that knowledge concerning both, and that skill in manipulating and adapting our knowledge of both these elements to one another, which truth and science give, upon which our activity ultimately depends. We must further satisfy ourselves that such activity is not revolting to our taste, to the sense of the beauty of life and the art of living; that it is not morally bad and degrading to the human heart and mind; and

that it is not degrading to the community and society at large ; and, finally, that it is not in flagrant contradiction to our ideal conception of the perfect life and the perfect spirit which leads us in imagination and aspiration beyond our actual life. It will then be found that, as a principle of life and mind, it leads us nowhere, or only round and round in the *proximate* circle of things nearest to our immediate reach. So far as it is a primary principle, it is itself, as we have seen, based upon harmonistic principles, as, in order to recognise the desirability of its own processes, it is again based upon the aristotropic imagination, which leads to the choice of the best ends and the best means. It is therefore only a secondary principle subordinated to the moral, intellectual, and æsthetic principle, and to the ultimate ideals thence derived.

CHAPTER IV

ETHICS¹

ETHICS is, like æsthetics, a department of knowledge which is concerned with "things as they ought to be" and not merely "as they are." It is practical and not theoretical; though, on the basis of the real, it aims at approaching the ideal and of converting man and human society as they are into what they ought to be. It must therefore always be eminently practicable, however thorough our methods of investigation may be in studying the data upon which our generalisations rest and the higher standards which we wish to establish. It is essentially based upon actual life, and is thus not merely imaginative, as æsthetics essentially is, nor yet purely contemplative and emotional in dwelling upon the supernatural ideal world as religion must needs be. Ethics deals with those principles of human nature and conduct which produce the most perfect man and lead him to act in conformity with the perfect life, individual and collective. It thus predemands the idea of the perfect human being and his full development in a society harmonising with such perfection; the development of all man's faculties and their relation to his being as a whole; and in its turn producing the

¹ Many, if not most, of the considerations on Ethics here given have already been published by me in other works in the following publications: *Aristodemocracy*, pt. ii, ch. i-v; pt. iii and pt. iv; app. vi ("The Æsthetic Element in the Education of the Individual and of the Nation," reprinted from an address delivered to the Parents' National Education Union in 1910 in *The Parents' Review*, 1910); *Eugenics, Civics, and Ethics*; *Truth*; and other writings.

perfect collective association in the social community or State. Its spirit and method are thus eminently harmoniotropic and aristotropic.

We shall see, when we come to study Politics, that there are some philosophers who find the primary basis for ethics in politics. They consider that the perfect human being must be defined upon the basis of the individual's relation to the collective body called the State, whereas we hold that the true conception of the State must be based upon the clear understanding of the perfect individual man, as well as his relation to his fellow-men and their various associations in wider collective bodies. Man undoubtedly is a *ζῶον πολιτικόν*, a social animal; but his social and political relations do not cover the whole of his existence—they are but a part of the mental unity of relationship of this highly organic being. It is putting the cart before the horse to derive the definition of man's total need and destiny from the State, which is one outcome and consequence of his life and being.

The same applies to the position of ethics, to metaphysics, and religion. All human activity and knowledge and all departments of systematised knowledge may be ultimately expressed in metaphysical terms and in religious terms; and our ultimate conceptions within each department may be based upon, and modified by, our metaphysical or religious principles and ideals. This applies to all mental and spiritual activities, to art, to pragmatics, to politics, as well as to science. But it does not help us in the theory and methodical elaboration of any one of these departments of knowledge to intrude the metaphysical or religious attitude of mind and methods of thought. They can lead to no satisfactory scientific results nor to the attainment of truth. This is especially the case with regard to

ethics, which is concerned with the actual conduct of life and must be based upon the sober and unbiased recognition of this life in order to establish rules of conduct to guide us in the varying complexity of our daily existence, and which demands the most unprejudiced, sober and dispassionate apprehension of the ever-changing conditions of life.

Religion,¹ on the other hand, as we shall see, is essentially connected with that higher emotional condition which contemplates infinity, the ideals of the universe and of supernatural life. The attitude of mind which favours religious contemplation and exaltation is not favourable to the clear apprehension of daily conduct and of the practical principles which ought to regulate our standards.

On the other hand, ethics is closely analogous to æsthetics in the immediateness in which they are both based upon the harmonistic and aristotropic principle and its realisation in life; and the Greeks were thus led by a correct instinct when they insisted upon the intimate congenital relationship to be found in the æsthetic element inherent in our conception of the Good, and in the relation between the Good and the Beautiful; so that they fused the two words into one as *καλοκάγαθία*. The *καλοκάγαθός* was the perfect man in whom (most significantly for the "Harmonist") the superlative form is *ὅτι κάλλιστον* while the superlative of *ἀγαθός* becomes *τὸ ἄριστον*—the Best. This corresponds to the natural and logical step from the harmoniotropic to the aristotropic which we have already recognised. The ethical ideal rests on the harmony of man's nature as a perfect organism—intellectual, moral, political, and æsthetic. It is the first as well as the supreme task of ethics to define and clearly to establish the standard of the perfect man towards

¹ *Aristodemocracy*, pt. iii, ch. i, p. 201 seq.

which we must strive, and by which we ourselves and our actions are judged. Man's being as a whole and every one of his actions are moral in the degree in which he approximates to the ideal totality of his actions and of each separate activity. Our conscious comparison of particular actions with the ideal type towards which this ought to tend constitutes what we call Conscience, by means of which we test ourselves and our actions. The full harmony and conformity between our actions and our conscience constitute the rightness of our actions, as discord constitutes wrongness. Out of the understanding of this perfect relationship man has defined his Duties. Here again we must realise that such harmony and symmetry are not *static*, because they are concerned, not with unchanging correlated elements or with general and abstract physical and mathematical principles, but with life—moreover, mental and spiritual as well as organic life. Ethics is thus eminently practical, and is concerned with the actual life of each individual, including his innumerable relationships to other human beings and the world about him. With these, which are not static, but moving, and are subject to change and development, the symmetry becomes *organic*, and the standards as regards the perfect man and his actions are subject to evolution. This evolution, however, is not *fatalistic* in character, beyond the reach of intelligence and imagination, but is directly subject to the conscious aims conceived by man to realise harmony within and without. It is not purely casual, but teleological. The movement is not directed by unknown forces, but by an onward and upward course in the direction of the end and aim of the most perfect human being acting rightly and within a society which facilitates and promotes the existence of such beings and favours their free activity conducive to such ultimate harmony. With

the variations of life and its moral movements in the direction of progress, man's conception of ethical harmony varies in the course of time and in the recognisable periods within human history.

In the earliest periods of civilised communities the general laws of conduct have thus been established by lawgivers in codes of moral duties.¹ Besides the great teachers of the East and of Greece, the two figures which stand out most prominently, especially in the establishment and development of Western European morals, are Moses and Christ.² The Ten Commandments mark a great epoch in the moral evolution of man and of civilisation in general, and have to a most remarkable degree maintained their fundamental validity down to our own days. There can be no doubt that they are supplemented and advanced by the teachings of Christ, notably in the Sermon on the Mount,³ and in many other ethical dicta. But in the various schools of philosophy, from ancient Greece and Rome onwards, through the Middle Ages, down to modern times, the best intellects and thinkers of noble character have exerted themselves to define the essential nature of morality, to establish ethical standards, and to lay down codes of moral conduct. Man's relation to himself, to the world about him, to his fellow-men and to God, his duties and his conception of the ideal world, have been studied and have led to a clear apprehension of those relationships to guide his conduct on every side in accordance with ethical laws.

¹ I do not propose to enter here into, or to dwell upon, the distinction between law and morality. Law is but one aspect of the purely practical development of the machinery arising out of ethical needs. However much in legal practice and in the conduct of civics it may be necessary to distinguish between law and morality, this distinction does not enter into the domain of the problems we are here considering.

² See *Aristodemocracy*, pt. iii, ch. ii, p. 208 seq.; ch. iii, p. 224 seq.

In spite of the lasting and constraining validity of many of the ethical principles which have thus been established in the past, it cannot be denied that, with the evolutionary change in the process of human history, some of these old principles no longer apply to the more complex conditions of life ; while the growth and complexity of social and moral relationships non-existent before, demand corresponding enlargement and change in standards of morality. Moreover, the recognition of the fact that many ethical tenets are not absolute, but relative, and that what was moral or immoral in one age or one locality and for human beings living under various conditions is not so for a subsequent age and locality under different conditions, has either led the ethical student and his followers to complete scepticism and the negation of the validity of moral tenets or to a rigid dogmatism which, whether it be accepted by human intelligence or not, cannot cover the multiform needs of growing social life. What, therefore, is needed, above all—and in no time more than the present—is the codification of the actual laws of ethical conduct, fully developed in each period, and comprising inherent potential advancement, all leading to progressive life in the future and progressive standards of morals. As I have already expressed it elsewhere,¹ I may be allowed to repeat it here :

“ What modern man and modern society require above all things is a clear and distinct codification of the moral consciousness of civilised man, not merely in a theoretical disquisition in vague and general terms, which evade immediate application to the more complex or subtle needs of our daily life ; but one which, arising out of the clear and unbiased study

¹ *Aristodemocracy*, pt. iii, ch. i, pp. 200 seqq.

of the actual problems of life, is fitted to meet every definite difficulty, and to direct all moral effort towards one great and universally accepted end. It is the absence of such an adequate ethical code, truly expressive of the best in us and accepted by all, and the means of bringing such a code to the knowledge of men, penetrating our educative system in its most elementary form as it applies even to the youngest children and is, continuously impressed upon all people in every age of their life—it is the absence of such an effective system of moral education which lies at the root of all that is bad and irrational, not only in individual life but in national life, and that has made this great war—at once barbarous, pedantically cruel, and unspeakably stupid—possible in modern times.

“The reason why such an adequate expression of moral consciousness has not existed among us, in spite of the eminently practical and urgent need, is that the constitution and teaching of ethics have been relegated to the sphere of theoretical study of principles, historical or speculative, and have not directly been concerned with establishing a practical guide to conduct. No real attempt has been made to draw up a code of ethics to meet the actual problems of daily life. Or, when thus considered in its immediate and practical bearings, this task has been relegated to the churches and the priests.

“It cannot be too emphatically stated that, though never divorced from each other, religion and ethics envisage quite different spheres, and that when in their practice and activity they are indiscriminately mixed up with one another, this fusion does not tend to the good of either. The confusion of the primary attitude of mind which they imply and the definite spheres of activity which they are meant to control results in the lowering or weakening of the spirit and the practice of each. Ethics alone can never replace religion. Religion alone, when wholly dominating the heart and mind of man, cannot prepare him to solve the problems of ethics with a clear

and unbiased mind, intent upon the weighing of evidence and the searching inquiry into the practical needs of society and of individual life. The at once delicate and exalted moods of religious feeling and of religious thought—not to mention the complex and remote dogmas of each religion—are, to say the least, not favourable to the sober, dispassionate, and searching analysis of motives, of actions, and their results in the daily life of man, or the relations between communities and States.¹ Moreover, this strictly logical, unemotional, and sober analysis, and its prospective application to the regulation of material prosperity as well as spiritual health, is of itself destructive of the very essence of that emotional exaltation and that touch of mysticism which forms an essential element of the religious mood. Its intrusion into the domain of pure religion is of itself lowering to such exaltation and destructive of its most delicate and, at the same time, most powerful spiritual force.

“Furthermore, it has undeniably been an element in all religions of the past that they should be strongly conservative, and, at all events, fervently reverential towards the past teachings of their founders and

¹ An almost caricatured illustration of the inadequacy of sectarian morality is furnished by the sermons of several German divines of high repute, representing the Lutheran Church, preached since the above was written, and which I here quote from the *Spectator* of January 26, 1916. They were translated by the Rev. W. Burgess. They remind us forcibly of the standards of morality based upon the Christian religion as adopted by the Inquisition. There is hardly a single religious sect—perhaps with the exception of the Society of Friends—which in its past history does not supply some grotesquely immoral results of religious fervour.

Pastor Froebel, preaching in the well-known Lutheran Church at Leipzig, spoke of German guns as beating down the children of Satan and of German submarines as “instruments to execute the divine vengeance.” The mission of the submarines, he explained, was to drown thousands of the non-elect.

Professor Reinhold Suberg, in a sermon preached in the cathedral at Berlin, said that Germans, in killing their enemies, burning their houses, and invading their territories, performed a “work of charity.” Divine love was everywhere in the world, but men had to suffer for their salvation. Germany “loved other nations,” and when she punished them it was for their good.

Pastor Fritz Philippi, preaching in Berlin, said that as God allowed His Son to be crucified that the scheme of redemption might be accomplished, so Germany was destined to “crucify humanity” in

tenacious of this teaching converted into dogma in bygone ages. In so far they are not fully adapted to consider, with clear and unbiased receptiveness, the actual problems of the present, which are generally strongly contrasted to the life of the past; while much of this lucidity will be lost when an attempt is made to translate the complex life of to-day into the simpler conditions of the past. Moreover, in religion all is seen through a veil of antique mysticism. Nor, still less, can such a conservative attitude of mind be favourable to the essential spirit of change, to the adaptation to new conditions implied in the conscious evolution of man towards the higher conditions of a progressive society, and to the continuous flow implied in the very principle of life which, in the moral and practical spheres, are the organic element of a normal, rational, and healthy society. No doubt we may rightly hold that, from one point of view, religion enters into every aspect of man's existence, and that it may form the ultimate foundation of our whole moral and intellectual activity. But it does not and cannot deal directly with the practical world, and cannot intrude itself into our consciousness when we are bound to concentrate

order that salvation might be achieved. The human race could be saved in no other way. "It is really because we are pure that we have been chosen by the Almighty as His instruments to punish the envious, to chastise the wicked, and to slay with the sword the sinful nations. The divine mission of Germany, O brethren, is to crucify humanity. The duty of German soldiers, therefore, is to strike without mercy. They must kill, burn, and destroy, and any half-measures would be wicked. Let it then be a war without pity. The immoral and the friends and allies of Satan must be destroyed, as an evil plant is uprooted. Satan himself, who has come into the world in the form of a Great Power [England], must be crushed. . . . The kingdom of righteousness will be established on earth, and the German Empire, which will have created it, will remain its protector."

A nation dependent for its moral guidance upon Nietzsche on the one side and "pastors" on the other must drift into amorality.

It may be said that these are perversions of religious morality due to the moral obliquity of those professing such views. But the fact remains that, as in the Inquisition and other sectarian persecutions of the past, the crime is committed by official representatives of the Churches, invoking the very authority of their religious tenets. If even such trained leaders can so misinterpret the moral laws of their creeds, it does not speak well for the constraining, practical efficaciousness of such moral codes and the logical practical foundations on which they rest.

all our mental and even physical energies upon the consummation of some definite task in the ever-varying changes of our actual life. It is concerned with man's relation to his highest ultimate ideals, and is based upon his higher emotional, and not his practical and strictly logical, consciousness. It implies no adaptation to surrounding and varying conditions, no compromise within the struggle of contending claims. In his truly religious moods, in his communion with the supernatural, with his ultimate ideals, there is no room for compromise, practical opportunism, and the adaptation to the ever-changing conditions of actual life.

"Hence, the priest is not directly fitted to be the transmitter of this moral code of a healthy society in directing the young and in advising adults as a minister of a definite religious creed. His ethical teaching must always be directly subordinated to the dogmatic creed which he professes; and his habit of mind, as well as his conscious purpose, must in so far unfit him for the problem of establishing a living code of practical ethics and of impressing it clearly as a teacher upon young and old.

"Moreover, in the present conditions of the modern world, we are brought face to face with a definite fact which, perhaps more than anything else, has stood in the way of effective and normal advancement of moral teaching among us. For in every community we have not only one creed but a number of creeds; and, whatever their close relationship to one another may in many instances be as regards fundamental religious tenets, they differ in organisation and administration and in the personality of their ministrants to such a degree, that such difference not infrequently involves rivalry and antagonism. The most practical result in our national life is clearly brought before us in the promulgation of the various Education Acts, which in great part were merely concerned with the adjustment of the claims of the varied sects among us. They have thus led to the exclusion of direct religious teaching and the retention of mere Scripture reading as the only directly spiritual

and moral element in public instruction, or they have led, and may lead, to the division of spheres of activity of each one of these sects and their clerical representatives of differing forms of religious and moral instruction among separate groups of children. That the impression upon the youthful mind, in so glaring and manifest a form, of fundamental differences in religious and moral principles between them (perhaps suggesting and establishing false standards of social distinction as well), cannot be considered in itself a moral gain to the establishment of a healthy social instinct in the hearts of the individuals or the development of a healthy and harmonious national and social life for the community at large, can hardly be denied. At all events, such a state of affairs does not bring us nearer to the formulation of a common ethical code, expressive of the highest national life on the ethical side within each age, and the promise of a growing development for the future. Meanwhile, whatever may exist among us of ethical principles and moral practices to which we all subscribe, is eliminated from the activity of our educational institutions ; and the younger generation grows up without any instruction in common morality and without any clear knowledge of its definite principles.

“ On the other hand, I should not like it to be thought that I ignore, or am unmindful of, the good work which the priests of all denominations have done on the moral side of the past and are doing in the present. Whether priests of the Church of England or of the Church of Rome, or ministers of the numerous Christian sects, or rabbis, they have in great numbers devoted themselves to the betterment of their fellow-men; they have held aloft the torch of idealism, and many of them stand out as the noblest types of a life of self-abnegation devoted to progress towards a lofty ideal with complete self-effacement. The positive good which they have done and are doing is undeniable. The picture of an English village without its church, not only as a symbol of higher spiritual aspirations, but as an active means of providing for the dull and often purely material daily life of the

inhabitants a gleam of elevating life and beauty, must make him hesitate who ruthlessly would destroy it by missiles of cold thought, as those of German steel have actually destroyed the churches in Belgium and France, and shudder at the devastation he might cause. But the firm conviction that what he has to offer is not sheer and wanton destruction, but that the growth and spread of true morality will clear the way for a brighter, higher, and nobler life, ending in the expansion and advancement of pure and uncontaminated religion, removes all doubt and fear and strengthens our conviction in the rightness of the cause, for which we also are prepared to lay down our lives.

"We cannot admit that a morality, however adequate and high it may have been for the Jews living many centuries ago, can be adapted and fitted to the requirements of modern society without great confusion and loss in this process of adaptation. This is especially the case when, as a chief ground for its unqualified acceptance, religious dogma steps in and maintains that it is of direct divine origin. Even when thus accepted, and effective as a guide to conduct by many, many remain who do not honestly accept the evidence of this direct divine origin. The effect upon these latter is one of clear opposition to the binding power of such moral laws, and may end in an opposition to all moral laws.

¹ "We have seen—and, because of the vital importance to the main purpose of this book, I have repeated the statement more than once—the crying need for what I have called the codification of contemporary morals, or at least the clear and intelligible (intelligible even to the average man) expression of the moral consciousness of each age and each country. The great fault in this respect has hitherto been that the treatment of ethical subjects in the hands of the philosopher-specialist in ethics has almost exclusively been concerned with the discussion of the main or abstract principles and foundations of ethics, the mere prolegomena to ethical teaching which should

¹ *O.c.*, pp. 256 seq.

be of direct practical use as a guide to conduct. Such practical and efficient guidance to conduct and teaching of morality has generally been by means of ephemeral or casual moral injunction on the part of the priests of every denomination. It thus not only received a sectarian or dogmatic bias—often causing the whole moral structure to collapse when the foundations of belief in these dogmas were no longer valid—or, in any case, introducing the element of mysticism and the need for translation into the remote language of bygone ages, races, or conditions of life, and thus making more difficult the arduous task of applying clear principles of action to the complicated exigencies of actual and present life, on the clear understanding of which such principles ought to be based.

“ Furthermore, the cognisance which the State has hitherto taken of this paramount factor in the life of the people, and the direct action which the State has taken, have generally been confined to that aspect of ‘ Social Legislation ’ chiefly or exclusively concerned in counteracting extreme poverty and social inefficiency and the evil results arising out of these, again, chiefly from a purely economical point of view. The State has not directly considered the positive moral and social betterment of the conditions of life and living of the people themselves, nor directly aimed at the highest conceivable goal for social improvement.

“ The most crying need before us, therefore, is the clear recognition of such an expression of the moral consciousness of the age, and, without any interference with the established religious creeds and their practices as the expression of religious life, to provide for, first, such an expression of our moral requirements, and, secondly, for the effective dissemination of contemporary ethics throughout all layers of human society.

“ The action of the State in this respect must be directly educational, and this educational function must be concerned, first, with the young and their lives, and, secondly, with the adult population and its life.

“ However limited the time set aside in schools for the teaching of ethics may be, certain hours should

thus be devoted to the teaching of morals. The textbook of such elementary ethics should, above all, be clear and concise, and must contain those moral injunctions which would be universally accepted by all right-thinking people within the nation and admitted by every religious sect or creed. The teachers themselves should be provided with explanatory additions to the textbooks, containing or suggesting instances from actual life which should convincingly illustrate each moral injunction from the short textbook in the hands of the pupils. Of course, it will be left to the well-qualified teacher to increase and to enlarge upon such definite and illuminating examples. Even the question of moral casuistry—the conflict or clashing of the various duties—is to be definitely treated.”

The final determination of the problem of moral casuistry depends upon a purely harmonistic faculty, the sense of relative values, of proportion, of taste. For, as we hold that the validity of every fully established duty remains in itself, but that, when one or more duties clash, one must prevail over the others, the point of decisive importance then becomes the recognition of the duty of highest value, of preference, of aristotropic dominance. To speak the truth always remains a duty, as also to preserve the life and health of a fellow-being. When speaking the truth endangers the life or health of a human being it remains with the sense of proportion on the part of the actor to determine the relative value of these two duties. This is ultimately an appeal to the faculty corresponding to proportion, the aristotropic and harmonistic instinct. A further moral safeguard against wrongly contravening one duty because of the superior claims of another is furnished by the test that, when the special cause which justified such a contravention is removed, we are prepared to confess our infraction.¹

¹ Cf. *Aristodemocracy*, p. 258.

The classification of the various subdivisions of duties into such an ethical code for each period, in order to cover the whole sphere of moral actions and to concentrate inquiry and exposition with the hope of responding to every aspect of life, forcibly presents to us the following categories. It will be seen that in the order in which they are here given they follow the natural course of life from infancy upwards by those spheres which, at all events from physical proximity, first present themselves to the growing human being, though it may be held that logically the duty to self and the duty to God are the most proximate duties of man ; but it will be found that in actual life the realisation of such duties is the product of a more developed and later mental process. From the fourth subdivision onward it will be seen that the progression from the concrete to the abstract advances, and that, however great the value and importance of these later duties are in the progression of morals, their apprehension belongs to a later phase of mental development. We can thus distinguish seven subdivisions, each of which of course is not isolated, but interacts with all the others :

1. Duty to the family ;
2. Duty to the immediate community in which we live, and social duties ;
3. Duty to the State ;
4. Duty to humanity ;
5. Duty to self ;
6. Duty to things and actions as such ; and
7. Duty to God.

DUTY TO THE FAMILY

As the infant is born, grows up and is confined in its life for a considerable period within the family,

so from the earliest times onward the duties prescribed by the family relation have been duly recognised. It is my firm conviction that, whatever changes have taken place and will take place in the future in the evolution of human society and in the corporate institutions which it has evolved, the family will remain as an indestructible unit, owing to the essential nature of human beings, their very origin and their growth. The physical propinquity of the members of the family and the constancy and intimacy of their relations to one another in life develop, and of necessity demand, the intelligent and moral regulation of such continuous and intensive intercourse. These very conditions, moreover, from their constraining imminence and constant urgency, form the best training for the development of those social faculties of altruism, self-control and affection which no looser and less constraining corporate institutions of society can furnish. But there can be no doubt that in the evolution of man from the earliest stages upwards the whole of life, including family life and the relationships which follow these higher social developments, have multiplied as they have modified to a considerable degree the extent and the nature of these duties. Whereas, for instance, in the earliest stages of human existence there was an almost exclusive concentration upon the duties of the child to its parents, the higher developments have also established, and are likely to establish still more in the future, the duties of the parents to the children in every successive period of their ages. The whole ethical relation of the family and the individuals which compose it is a subject which requires careful and fuller investigation in a spirit, together with the application of methods, with which we shall deal in a later part of this chapter.

DUTY TO THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNITY IN WHICH WE
LIVE, AND SOCIAL DUTIES

Our duties do not end with the family. They proceed by natural stages from the narrower to the wider in a progression in which the wider implies and includes the narrower.¹

"Each narrower group of duties must fit in with and advance the wider sphere of duties. Fortunately, there is no inherent necessity why they need clash. For the best member of a family ought also naturally to be the best member of a wider society. On the other hand, owing to the limitations of human nature, the absorbing dominance of single passions and instincts, and the centripetal or selfish instinct which congests the sympathies, each narrower sphere of duties ought to be supplemented and rectified by the wider and higher ethical outlook towards which it ought harmoniously to tend. 'Charity begins at home,' but ought not 'to stay at home,' is eminently and deeply true. Moreover, it can be proved (and I am sure I shall be borne out by any experienced observer of life) that the narrower and more exclusive are our sympathies the less efficient are they even when applied to the narrower sphere." The absolute and moral egoist does not love even himself truly and wisely. And those members of a family in whom the family feeling is hypertrophied to an abnormal degree, so that it is blunted with regard to the wider life beyond and may even produce an antagonistic attitude towards it, are most likely to be, within this family group, intensely selfish, whenever there arises a clashing of interest and passions between themselves and other members of their family. To them applies what in an earlier portion of this book has been said concerning the Chauvinist.

"In the progression of duties from the narrower to the wider sphere we proceed from the family to

¹ *Aristodemocracy*, pp. 271-5, 278-83, 290-2; *Patriotism*, etc., ch. vi, p. 101 seq.

² See *The Jewish Question*, etc., p. 94.

the immediate community in which we live. I in no way wish here to maintain that the social classifications now attaching to birth, wealth, or occupation are to be fixed and stereotyped in class distinctions without any appeal to reason and justice, as little as I accept the extreme ideals of absolute socialism, which reduce all life and ambitions to the same level. But, considering our life as it actually is, we must begin our general social duties by performing those several functions which physically and tangibly lie before us according to the position in which we are placed, with a view to the material, moral, and social advancement of such a community. However remote the central occupations of our life may be from the life of the place in which we actually live, we must not, and we need not, ignore our immediate duties to the collective life of this group of people or this locality. In many cases, nay, in most cases, our life-work may be immediately concerned, or connected with, a certain locality. Whether as labourers, or as farmers, or as landlords ; whether as artisans, or as managers, or as proprietors of factories, or other industrial enterprises ; whether as merchants or as tradesmen, employers or employed, we thus have distinct and definite duties towards those with whom we are co-operating, and, outside the interests of the definite work in hand, we are directly concerned in the collective social life of the place where our work and our interests lie. But even if our home and residence fall within a district far removed from the actual centre of our life-work, even if this work is of so immaterial a character that it reaches beyond the locality and even the county, our immediate duty as members of such a community, to do our share in regulating the social life surrounding our home, always remains.

“ Nor is the social duty which we have here to contemplate merely concerned with our not transgressing the existing laws that emanate from what is called social legislation ; nor is it only concerned with the provision of all that goes to physical subsistence within the community, the fight with poverty, misery,

and want, or merely with the increase of physical comforts and amenities; but it is positively and directly concerned with the advancement and improvement of the social life as such, in so far as we come into contact with it. It even concerns our relation with every member of such a community in which we live.

“Hitherto the recognised social activity in what is called social reform, as affecting the individual, and still more as leading to State legislation, has been chiefly concerned either with the avoidance of physical misery, or with the removal of injustice, or with the increase of physical comfort. From these broad and more public points of view we rise to the consideration of the social relation of individuals among each other in all the complexities of private life, and intercourse not only in business or work, but also in the free and varied inter-relations of purely social existence. But beyond this there is a further task, when we regard human society as a whole. We must then recognise and establish in each successive generation the rules governing such intercourse. These are established by an attempt to adapt life to the existing and constraining conditions which we find about us, to make it run smoothly and harmoniously with the least friction so as to avoid conflicts and consequent misery. But, by calling in the help of Plato, such rule of social conduct may be raised to a higher level towards the perfection of social intercourse and of society as a whole. Not only physically, but spiritually as well, each successive generation must be led on to higher expressions of its true humanity, to the highest expression of individual man, and the highest corporate existence of society. Kant's *Categorical Imperative*, which enjoins upon us to act so that we should guard in everything we do the dignity of our neighbour as well as our own, will ever remain one of the most perfect epigrammatic summaries of the duties of man as a social being.

“As I have said before, most of us are not likely to murder or to steal; but we are all of us prone to murder the dignity and self-respect of our neighbour

to steal from him that claim to regard and to esteem which is his by right, both human and divine, or to wound his sensibility by our own acts of commission or omission. How often do we not sin from a want of delicate altruistic imagination? Without directly wishing to hurt or harm, we are led, in selfish pre-occupation and bluntness, to wound a man to the very core of his self-respect, or more frequently to disregard and ignore his harmless vanity.

"Beyond economical prosperity, even beyond charitable efforts to relieve want and misery, beyond fair dealing in business and in social intercourse, lies, for the true conception of an ideal society, the Art of Living itself, upon the refinement and constant realisation of which depend to a great extent the happiness of human beings and the advancement of human society. To make our homes habitations which should harmonise, and thus favour the free development of our social instincts, and to prepare each individual for such perfect intercourse with his fellow-men, and to educate and to encourage the individual thus to perfect and harmonise his life in order to increase happiness for himself and others, is the definite duty before us. The claims of such duty are as weighty and the need of dealing with them as urgent as are all the more manifest and serious duties of morality which have hitherto received the sanction of moral society and of its educators. That community and that nation is highest in which this Art of Living is most completely realised in the home itself and in the training of the individual. . . .

"The summary of the qualities which prepare men for 'the art of living,' that most important factor in the ideals of human society, is conveyed by the one term 'gentleman.' This term has been adopted by most European nations in its English form and is the modern successor of the mediæval knight or nobleman, of the Italian *cavaliere* of the Renaissance, the French *gentilhomme*, and the modern Austrian return to Mediævalism in the *kavalier*. To be a gentleman is an indispensable condition to the production of the superman.

"The ideal of the gentleman includes in its connotation, above all, that he should be 'a man of honour.'¹ Such a man is one who in all his actions strives to live up to his highest principles in spite of all the dictates of self-interest or convenience which may draw or lead him in another direction. He has embodied in his code, irrespective of utility or advantage, the highest principles of social ethics prevalent in his day. Honesty and absolute integrity in all his dealings, and truthfulness, whether it be in the material business of life or in the more delicate relations of social intercourse, are coupled with the generosity and the courage to uphold before the world and in himself those principles which wilfully ignore all expediency. The man of honour is he who can never act meanly, think meanly, or feel meanly. He never can be a moral coward any more than a physical one. He is the embodiment of virility and moral courage. He has developed in himself Plato's τὸ θυμοειδές, true courage, which dominates τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, the natural instincts and appetites, and enables him, if need be, to stand alone amidst the ruins of selfishness and iniquity, dominating the life about him :.

Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidum ferient ruinæ.

"But it is in this conception of honour that the need for summarising the highest ethical principles successively in each age, to the insistence upon which this whole book is meant to contribute, makes itself most clearly felt. For there can be no doubt that

¹ I have on a previous occasion (*Jewish Question*, 2nd ed., p. 324) attempted to define honour as follows: "Honour is practical conscience, conscience carried into action; and the man of honour is one in whom this practical conscience has become second nature, an ineradicable habit." But we must all realise how frequent are the changes in the denotation of this term 'honour.' Each period and every country has its peculiar conception of it, and one age may oppose or ridicule the conception held by another, as one country may deny the code of its neighbour. One country may consider it to be a stern dictate of the code of honour to fight a duel in satisfaction of wounded vanity; while another country may laugh it away. But what always remains, and will remain, is the connotation of honour—the practical conscience as affecting our common social life, so effective that we are prepared to give up our lives in order to follow its dictates."

in successive generations and under varying social conditions, as well as with the different occupations and professions of life, the principles and standards of honour have varied and must naturally vary. They establish the accepted code of honour for men and women living under these changing conditions, until they may become what, in a derogatory sense, is called a convention and what really means the crystallised and sometimes fossilised social experience of each age, community, or social group.

"Now, it is against such conventions and their effect on life that the revolutionary innovators or reformers in our own day above all make war. These, of whom Nietzsche is the clearest and most pronounced example, endeavour with a stroke of the pen to eradicate from human society the sturdy plant of a moral growth which has been evolved and strengthened for centuries, grafted upon and improved by the conditions of the progressive and refined life of civilised society. By one stroke of the pen, they wish to extirpate it from the moral consciousness of men, calling it a convention which blocks the way to the advent of their favourite superman. But because there is no doubt that the conception of honour thus varies with different social conditions, that it even changes in its character and nature with the different social gradations affected by the life occupation of groups within the wider communities, such change only proves the vitality and all-pervading penetrative effectiveness of such a conception of social ethics and the urgent need for the constant revision and renewed justification of its existence by the application of the highest reason, by the action of *Practical Idealism*.

"The more a later generation, looking back with the unprejudiced clearness of impartial apprehension, can realise the limitations and even distortions inherent in the conception of honour in previous ages which have become effete social conditions, the greater and more crying becomes the need to modify and to define a new conception of social ethics as embodied in the idea of honour in accordance with the best

that the succeeding age can think and realise. The ideals embodied in the *Principe* of Machiavelli, even in the *Cortegiano* of Castiglione, and to some extent in the *Letters of Lord Chesterfield to his Son*, can no longer be accepted by us. Many of these principles are directly repugnant to our moral sense; while many others have lost their significance to such a degree that the seriousness and emphasis with which they are upheld appear to us frivolous and inept, because of the complete change in the social constitution and the actual life of our own time and society. Still, many of the fundamental principles might remain, and might be incorporated into a modern code.

“If we thus consider the conception of honour from the historical point of view, we find that the highest honour in a definite society or State is established by the ruling class within that State. The keynote in a community with effective aristocratic classification from the ruling classes down to the serfs is struck by the ruling class. Not infrequently the members of such a class claim for themselves (and the claims may be admitted by the lower and humbler gradations of society) the monopoly in the possession of the attributes of honour.

“Wherever such fixed and stereotyped class distinctions exist, the lower and humbler classes may accept such exclusion from the claim of honour or, at all events, may themselves be lowered in their moral vitality in this respect and to that extent. To give but one broad instance, not so remote in time from ourselves: The extreme effectiveness as regards honour pertaining to the ruling class of the Samurai in Japan has depressed the moral standards for the commercial and other classes in that country, so that, in spite of the exceptional loftiness of moral standards among the Samurai, the commercial honesty and integrity and all those social qualities affected by the conception of honour have been lowered among the Japanese merchants and traders compared with those of China, although I understand that some improvement has recently been effected in this

respect. As the uncompromising and stereotyped class exclusiveness in Japan is making way for wider democratic freedom, the higher standards of the Samurai may become inadequate and lose their effectiveness; but, on the other hand, the ideas of commercial honour and other social and ethical forces will extend and rise as the need for such extension and elevation makes itself felt with the rise in social position of the formerly repressed classes. This process of national and social transformation is one of the greatest problems facing the people in Japan. The same phenomenon may be perceived in comparing the social conditions of the free Continental towns during the Middle Ages, which were not dependent upon, and were unaffected by, the conditions of life prevailing amongst the nobility in the country, and where, therefore, standards of honour pertaining to commerce, trades, and handicrafts were evolved, which could not be repressed to a secondary and in so far more degraded position by the comparative superiority of social conditions and of honour in the nobility.

"In the same way in our own days, the careful observer may note that in countries and communities where social consideration assigns a higher position to those occupations and conditions of life remote from commerce and trade, the social standing and the standards of social living, ultimately the conception of honour among merchants and tradesmen, are not as high as in those communities where commerce and trade are not thus placed on a lower level. It is equally undoubted that occupations in life, and their direct influence upon the mode of living, have established special standards of social morality in themselves.

"The conditions of direct barter, for instance, are lower than in commerce, because they leave such a wide margin to personal persuasiveness, and even deception, which cannot obtain in those larger commercial transactions where the object bought or sold cannot be seen or tested on the spot, and where, therefore, the appeal to, and the direct need of,

faith and trust in the truthful statement of vendor and purchaser are a necessary condition to all commercial transactions. The presentation of a small sample in the hand to represent a shipload of such goods presupposes veracity on the part of the vendor and of faith on the part of the purchaser. Higher principles and commercial integrity, commercial honour, may therefore be evolved in such wider commerce and may establish themselves among all those following such an occupation in life. I wish merely to suggest, and leave the reader to work it out for himself, how certain trades among us, from the very nature of the uncertainty inherent in the objects offered for sale, have proverbially produced standards of honour greatly differing from those prevalent in other commercial dealings. . . .

"The gentleman is thus, before all things, a man of honour. He possesses a highly developed and refined sense of truth, honesty, and justice, tempered by a strong impulse of generosity which goes with strength and is the essential element of chivalry. The consciousness of superior strength must display itself in its attitude towards weakness. This in no way establishes the rule of the weak; 'the ethics of slaves,' and the dominance of the inferior; for the true gentleman has ultimate ideals for society and humanity at large of a distinctly aristocratic character, that is, the predominance of what is best, and will fearlessly work towards the realisation of these ideals. He will assert his power to this end, though such an assertion in no way precludes his generosity towards the weak, whom he will thereby raise and not degrade to the slavery which blind and immoral power imposes to the ultimate undoing of its own strength and virtue. I repeat, the superman who is not a gentleman is inconceivable.

"The same sense of chivalry must show itself in the attitude of man towards woman. He will always remain conscious of the fact, and manifest this consciousness in his actions towards her, that he is physically the stronger and will not take advantage of her weakness. If he does not act thus, he will sin against

his sense not only of justice but of fairness and generosity. On the other hand, he will not insult and degrade woman by excluding her from moral responsibility and from the dictates of reason and pure justice and conceive her as an irresponsible being. All that has been said of honour and all social virtues applies to woman in a form suitable to her nature.

“ Beside and beyond being a man of honour and responding to the weightier duties of honesty, justice, and chivalry, the true gentleman will develop in himself what, from a mistaken view of the needs of social life, may be considered the lighter and less important duties. These are the social qualities upon which the free intercourse of human beings among each other as social beings depends ; and from this point of view—of social intercourse and the aggregate daily life of human society—they are most weighty. They are the essential elements in man's humanity, in the restricted acceptation of that term, which make him human and produce the humanities. The sins which most of us commit in our ordinary daily life chiefly fall under this category, and from this point of view they are most serious and become almost heinous. In fact, the sins against the humanities are as serious as the sins against humanity ; they demand no less energetic resistance because they are the sins nearly all of us are most likely to commit. To put it epigrammatically, if not with paradoxical exaggeration : for most of us it may be as great a sin to commit a rudeness, to show a want of consideration, to shirk answering a letter, to refrain from paying a call which might reassure other human beings of our regard, or avoid wounding them by ignoring them, as to refuse a contribution to a deserving charity or to visit the slums, where, it is more than likely, our presence is not required and may do no good. The gentleman manifests breeding, consideration, and tact ; his whole nature is harmoniously attuned to respond to all the calls from the human beings with whom he comes in contact, and to dispel all discords in the life which immediately touches his own. The meaning

of this humanity or humaneness has never been more perfectly expounded than in the passage of M. Bergson."¹

In dealing with the Art of Living in the previous chapter, I have dwelt upon all those amenities and refinements of life which, apparently only dealing with the surface of life, go deep down into the character, and even the morality, of the individual and the social foundations of every community as a whole. The duty of man to his fellow-beings in his purely social intercourse with them demands his compliance with all the standards of conduct summarised under the term—Good Manners, Considerateness and Tact—and includes the proper care and cultivation of even his physical habits, the cleanliness of his person and of his dress, and even the manifestation of his best taste in his dress and in general appearance. In highly civilised communities, in contradistinction to the cave-dwellers of prehistoric ages, it is not likely that man will be primarily concerned in fighting his fellow-men nor in taking the lives of their family, clan, or race, or in carrying off their property, including their wives. Thus these fundamental rules of life, which have long since been embodied in formalised "Law," do not apply to the lives of the vast majority of modern men and women. But the man of to-day is in danger of wounding or injuring his neighbour by selfish aggressiveness of conduct, or by inconsiderateness and disregard of the self-esteem or the dignity of his neighbour, or even of encroaching upon his neighbour's comfort and impairing the general easy flow of social intercourse, by

¹ Quoted from the *Moniteur de Puy-de-Dôme*, August 15, 1885, in *Henri Bergson: An Account of Life and Philosophy*, by Algot Rule and Nancy Margaret Paul, p. 10. See also the passages quoted from Cardinal Newman and Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson in *Aristodemocracy*, p. 292 seq.

rudeness or want of thoughtfulness. It is thus in these particulars, so often neglected, if not absolutely ignored by ethics, that a very important, in fact essential, province of the laws of conduct is to be found.

"The gentleman thus conceived is the highest social being. The practical necessity, and, certainly, the practical advantage, of clearly establishing this ideal and of forcing it into the consciousness of all members of a community as such an ideal, cannot be overestimated. For no moral education is effective unless a type of highest morality can be clearly brought to the consciousness of those who are to be affected. I may be allowed to recall my own youthful experiences and at the same time to record my debt of gratitude to those schoolmasters and schoolmistresses in America—not to mention the earliest home-teaching in that country—who constantly held up before the young people some such ideal of a gentleman, be it by positively stimulating ambition to live up to it by self-repression and by definite courageous assertion ; or, negatively, by conveying their condemnation of a mean or unworthy act by denying to the delinquent the right to consider himself a gentleman. The appeal is here chiefly made, not so much directly to stern morality and to the conscious weighing and balancing of moral injunctions, as to our æsthetic faculties, to our taste, from which admiration or disgust naturally emanate. And it is in this æsthetic form that moral teaching may perhaps be most effective ; not by an appeal to duty and theory, but by an appeal to taste. No moral discipline, moreover, has become thoroughly efficient until it has been absorbed into man's natural tastes and preferences ; as we may also say that no general social laws have become efficient until they have been transformed into admitted social traditions and customs, or even until they have become fashionable, and are classified in the prevailing vernacular as 'good or bad form.'

"All these particular and later ramifications of

our social duties, however, are summarised in, and naturally lead to, the establishment of wider social ideals, in which the intercourse between human beings, productive of material good, tends to the advance of all social groups towards such final ideals, and facilitates and accelerates the dominance of what is best.

"In this ascending scale we thus rise beyond the individual and the larger or smaller communities, as well as the social groupings and classes, to the State, and, finally, to humanity as a whole."¹

DUTIES TO THE STATE

We shall have to deal incidentally with duties of the individual to the State when dealing with Politics. These duties have been greatly modified in the course of the evolution of society and even in the more recent history of civilised communities and States. They must of necessity be diversified and modified with the changes of the political constitution of the State. In purely autocratic States, a personal and paternal government, practically the only duty of the citizen or subject was obedience. With the growth of liberty the moral responsibilities of the citizen have grown. In democratic States—with which we are here concerned—obedience, so far from being superseded as a civic virtue, is extended and intensified. The very fact that the laws are ultimately made by the citizens themselves makes them all the more morally binding upon those who live under them; while the duty of the citizen to contribute his share in the making and modification of laws under which he lives becomes paramount. It is thus one of his primary duties to vote, and to vote, directly or indirectly, in the direction which in every instance he considers to be most in the interests of the State and its citizens. But it is equally in-

¹ *Aristodemocracy*, pp. 311-12.

cumbent upon him to become thoroughly acquainted with the laws and constitution of his country and to fulfil every public political function which the constitution bestows upon him. Ignorance of the law is no plea to justify its transgression. On no account is the free citizen of a democratic country to regard the State as his antagonist or enemy whose injunctions he may oppose or circumvent. The taxes and dues which the State imposes are ultimately demanded and fixed by the voter himself, and he must realise that he is clearly dishonest when he robs the State.

If this applies to the internal national life of the State, it also extends to the relation between his own State and other States ; and it is here, while willingly, in fact passionately, following the dictates of patriotism, that he should also exert himself so to direct the foreign policy of his own country that the laws of justice and morality may prevail in such international dealings.

Above all, in the most generalised, as well as the most individual, aspects of man's relation to the State, every citizen must by his thought and action endeavour to advance his own State higher in the direction of civilisation, culture and morality.

DUTY TO HUMANITY

" Through our duty to the State we are necessarily made to face our duty to humanity at large. Nor will the fulfilment of our duties in the narrower spheres, which we have hitherto traversed and which have led us through the State to the infinitely wider regions of humanity, clash with these ultimate duties with which they can be, and must be, harmonised. The real difficulty in the activity of the State and in the relation of States to human society as a whole will always be to reconcile the due care and regard for the mass of the people who require protection and

support in the conflict of individualities of unequal strength, with the encouragement of the strong and higher individualities, through whom human society is actually advanced and humanity draws nearer to its ideals. It is the great problem of reconciling Socialism with Individualism. Such a reconciliation is often considered to be hopeless and is given up as such. But it is possible, nay, necessary; only the two principles apply to different layers of human society. The socialistic point of view, in which the individual is restrained in deference to the rights of existence of all, in which the stronger is checked in his dominating course in order to protect and support the weaker, is right, if we consider only the weaker members of human society; and it is right that our social legislation, the direct intervention of the State in the processes of human competition, should be in the socialistic spirit and should be wholly concerned with the poor and the weak. Old Age Pensions and National Insurance are clearly socialistic in character, and it is right that the State should thus fulfil one of its primary duties of supporting and protecting those who require such support and protection. It is equally right, and it will be realised still more in the future, that the State must protect itself and the community at large against the undue power which, owing to dominant economical conditions and the protection which the State affords, tends to accrue to individuals in such a form and to such a degree that it endangers the welfare of society and the security of the State itself—is, in fact, against ‘good policy.’ Congestion of capital into single hands to such a degree that the power it affords without responsibility or control, becomes a danger to society, must be checked by the constitutional means which the State has at its disposal. As I have previously said, I thus plead for socialism at the top and bottom; but for pure individualism in between. Excess of wealth and excess of poverty must be checked by collective legislation from a collective point of view; but when society is thus secure at its two extremes, where the prohibitory action of the State is called

in to produce such security, full freedom must be left to the individual to assert and to realise superior powers, through which effort the individual and society at large advance and are perfected. Within the two extremes of the human scale inequality is to be encouraged in order to give free scope to moral and intellectual forces. Until trade unions recognise this, their activity will be immoral and retrograde. Our motto must be : ' Liberty, fraternity, and inequality.' Democracy must never degenerate into ochlocracy. Every democracy must be aristocratic in tendency and aim ; for with equality of opportunity it must encourage the realisation of the best. Socrates, as recorded by Plato and by Xenophon, has put the point in the simplest and most convincing form by the parable of the flute-player who is good and useful, and the helmsman who is good and useful ; but we do not call in the helmsman to play the flute, and we do not entrust the ship to the flute-player.

" The claims of the poor and humble, for which Christ pleaded, can be reconciled with those of the superman. As in the moral consciousness of the individual charity and high ambition can and must go hand in hand, so in the State the care of the poor and feeble, their protection from the rapacious onslaught of the strong and grasping, all those acts of legislation and administration which not only recognise the lowly and the lowest, but ever tend to establish and maintain equality of rights, must, on the other hand, encourage the advance of strong and superior individuals and corporate bodies, and raise the standard of living and social efficiency. In so far the State will confirm and encourage inequality. All its functions will converge in "ultimately raising the ideals of humanity. Plato will then be reconciled with Christ."

THE DUTIES WHICH ARE NOT SOCIAL AND THE IMPERSONAL DUTIES

" In all our ethical considerations hitherto we have considered man, if not from the exclusively altruistic

point of view, at least from the social point of view. We have conceived man too exclusively as Aristotle's social animal (*ξῶον πολιτικόν*). If this were the only conception we form of man, our ethical system, human morality, would be imperfect, if not completely at fault, both from a practical as well as a theoretical point of view. As a matter of fact both our ethical systems and the ethical thought and the prevailing habit of mind among thinking and conscientious people are defective, because they conceive man exclusively, or at least too predominantly, merely as a social being, merely in his relation to human society and to his fellow-men. Our ethical thought thus suffers from 'Human Provincialism'—or perhaps more properly put, the 'Provincialism of Humanity.' Our philosophy is, in the first place, too social, and in the second place too psychological. To introduce man where he is not needed is false, as it blocks the way to the attainment of ultimate truth. If this be so, even from the highest philosophical point of view, it is also so in the ordinary course of daily life; for we do not, even in practice, follow the purely social and psychological conception of our duties. The labourer who works at a definite task does not think of man, or the relation of his work to man, while he is engaged upon it. Still less does the student of higher science allow the thought of man to intrude into his search for truth. Thus neither practically nor theoretically are we guided by this primary conception of man's social nature. In fact, one of the supreme and most arduous tasks of the scientific student and the philosopher is to discard the personal equation, all human bias, the various 'idols' (as Bacon called them) which distort and falsify truth and block the way to its secure establishment. What we really do in practical life and strive to do in the life of pure thought is, without considering human and social relationships and duties, to perform the action and to solve the task we are working at as perfectly as it can be performed, and, as men, to approach as nearly as we can to the perfect type of the man we ought to be. We do this more or less consciously, and we have

before our minds more or less clearly this pattern or ideal of our self to live up to. If this *is* so in our life we as live it, from an ethical point of view, there is no doubt also that it *ought to be so*.

"Our ethics would thus not be complete, unless we adjust this one-sided exaggeration of the social, as well as the psychological, bearings of the problem. Man must be considered in himself, in his relation to himself, and also to his ideal self ; also in his relation to the world of things, to his actions, functions, and duties in themselves, irrespective of their social bearing.

"Man must also be considered in his relationship to nature and to the world, irrespective of the definite relationship which these on their part may hold to man and to humanity—he must break through the crust or tear the veil, pass beyond the restrictive boundaries of 'Humanitarian Provincialism.' To put it into philosophical terms : his final outlook must not only be psychological, but must ultimately lead him to that intellectual eminence where he can become cosmological, metaphysical, and theological—the climax of his whole spiritual life being now, as it was in the past and as it will be in the future, his religious life. The psychologist may remind us that, after all, man can only think as man, neither as a stone nor a plant, nor as a being from Mars or any other planet, nor as a demigod. But surely, *as men*, we can and must conceive man not as a purely and exclusively social being—and we constantly have before us, without in any way appealing to our philosophical thought, man's relation to nature and to the universe and to infinity. Vast as this prospect may appear to us it will be found that it is applied in our ordinary daily life, not only by thinkers and leaders of men, but even by the humblest and most thoughtless among us.

"We have thus finally to consider : (1) our duty to our self ; (2) our duty in respect of things and acts ; (3) our duty to the world and to God.

"In the ethical aspect of this threefold relationship, we must be guided by Plato. In realising, both as

regards ourselves and the definite functions and activities of man, and finally as regards our conception of the universe and the ultimate infinite powers of all, the highest and the purest ideals which we can form of each, with which we thus establish a relationship, we may realise and emphasise our own imperfection and our remoteness from such ideals. But, all the same, such high mental activity on our part will not end in an idle and resultless play of the imagination and a dissipation of intellectual energy; but will be, and is, of the greatest practical value in the sober and unfailing guidance of human action towards the highest ethical goal.

DUTY TO OUR SELF

“ This duty to our Self, as we here conceive it, really means the supreme and constraining power which, through the exercise of the imagination, an ever-present image of an ideal self has over us. Such an active imagination and its power of enforcing itself even upon the most sluggish temperament and understanding is not limited to the most highly developed among us, but is the possession of practically all human beings. In its lowest and, perhaps, reprehensible form, it manifests itself in vanity; in the higher forms it leads to self-respect and practical idealism. It, of course, includes, and is to a great extent made up of, man's conception of himself as a social being. But it occupies the mind and stimulates and guides action, not because of any definite social relationship but because of the relationship which we hold to our self as a whole, to our own personality, as it manifests itself to us in all acts of self-consciousness. Our vanity, our self-respect, and our idealism are gratified in the degree in which we are successful or in which our individual achievement, or the wholeness of our personality, conforms to the model, or pattern, the ideal which we form of our self.

“ This even includes the essence of what we call conscience. For whether conscience originally springs from fear, or assumes a relation to beings outside and

beyond ourselves; its essence really is to be found in the dominance which our ever-present conception of a perfect self has over our faltering and imperfect self. The degree of the discomfort or pain which conscience may evoke in us is measured by the discrepancy between our actual self and the image of our perfect self. Far more than most people would admit, our imagination is ever effective in thus appealing to a quasi-dramatic instinct in us, in which we are acting our part, not so much in life's play of which 'all the world's a stage,' but in that smaller microcosmical world (infinitely great to us) circumscribed by our actual and better self, in which, under the promptership of imagination, the two selves are at once actors and audience. Far more than we would admit are we thus always acting a part, evoking alternate applause and reproof, and fashioning our course of action towards good or evil. And if this is actually the case, it is right that it should be so; and what may in one aspect feed our lowest vanity, in another produces our highest aspirations and leads us onward and upward to the noblest and best that is in man.

"It may even be held—and I for one do hold—that the purest and, perhaps, the noblest guide to conduct and to the rule of the highest morality is to be found in the establishment of such a relationship to our self in a direct and effective intensity of moral guidance. When our moral efforts—be it in the repression of the lower instincts and desires or in the exertion of all our energy and power towards work and deeds that are good—are wholly independent of a relationship to others, to their regard or approval, but are determined by our self-respect and self-realisation, they are more secure in producing truly moral results. They are then established by our well-trained habit or by our conscious determination to live up to the most perfect image we have of our self; and not only have we attained to a higher stage of ethical development than when our eyes are constantly turned to the social world about us, but also, as moral social beings, as members of society, we shall

be more perfect and more secure in our course of moral action. We shall thus strive to make both body and mind perfect in their form and in their function ; we shall endeavour to maintain that supreme harmony of being which the ancient philosophers held up as the goal of man's efforts. But more than this, we shall establish the greatest security for our every act, and under all the most fluid and varying conditions of environment, maintain the loftiness of our moral standards. This will not only guide us in choosing in life those occupations which are most likely to bring out the best that is in us, that which brings us nearest to the totality of our highest self, the ideal of our self ; not only will it urge us to do our best work and to struggle against fate and untoward circumstance in overcoming opposition within and without, but it will securely confirm those social qualities which we must develop in the interest of a harmonious society. The habits which we thus form, the self-control we thus impose upon ourselves, the amenities which we strive to cultivate to please our fellow-men and to improve social intercourse, will have their perennial origin, justification, and vitalisation within ourselves, and will not be affected by the uncertainty and mutability of fortuitous outer circumstances or depend upon confirmation from without. We shall be clean of body, clear of mind, and delicate of taste, not to please others or to win their approval, but because our own self would not be perfect without such effort and achievement. And we shall thus be furnished with an efficient guide, not only in the loftier and more spiritual spheres of our life and being, but even in the humblest and most commonplace and lowly actions of our varied existence. To cultivate our habits of bodily cleanliness ; to dress as appropriately and tastefully as we can in conformity with our position and activities ; to eat and drink, not only in moderation, but in a manner expressive of refinement and repressive of greed and animal voracity—to do all this, even if we were placed on a desert island, isolated from all social intercourse, simply because we wish to uphold in ourselves the best

standards of human civilisation and to make ourselves perfect human beings, marks the highest, as well as the most efficient, phase of ethical culture.

"I cannot refrain from pointing these truths by definite illustrations which in their very slightness will emphasise my meaning. I have been assured by a friend that, when he finds himself in a state of moral indisposition and depression, his cure is to retire from his companions, to work hard all day, and then in the evening to dress with the greatest care and punctiliousness, arrange his room as perfectly as possible with flowers bedecking the table, and after his evening meal to turn to beautiful books or beautiful thoughts. When, as a boy, he for the first time left his home, his wise mother begged him as a personal favour not to take even a hasty meal without washing ; and, if others did not do it for him, that he should lay his own cloth, be it only with a napkin, if he could not find a tablecloth. She rightly felt how important it was to guard, as a spontaneous and vital habit of mind, the higher forms of civilisation and refinement. On the other hand, I have heard of a case where a man, brought up and accustomed to civilised habits, was found in the backwoods of Canada, where he had lived as a lonely settler for some years without even washing the plates after meals because, as he put it, ' the food all came from the same place and went to the same place.'

"There is perhaps no phase of ethical teaching and discipline which requires more emphasis, development, and insistence than the group of duties which ignore the social and directly altruistic aspect, and deal with the duties to ourselves, making them ultimately, through conscious recognition, an efficient ethical habit. For it appears to me that our ethical vision has been distorted as regards true proportion, its correctness and soundness impaired by the exclusive, or at all events exaggerated, insistence upon its moral, social, and humanitarian province. It has justified the strongest strictures and condemnation of professed amorалists like Nietzsche, their opposition of the prevalent morality and the de-

generacy to which so-called altruism must lead. At the same time such one-sided theories of social altruism cannot tend to sane happiness: they can only maintain such a state of artificial euphoria by feverish and continuous activity, submerging all consciousness of self, in which we deceive or flatter ourselves into believing that we are doing good to others. And when we cease to act and stop to think, we are thrown into a maze of restless querying as regards our own relation to our fellow-men, which ends in depression or even in despair. We can only be saved by following Matthew Arnold's commandment to—

Resolve to be thyself, and know that he
Who finds himself loses his misery."

DUTY TO THINGS AND ACTS

"But we must at times go still farther in our efforts of self-detachment. Not only beyond the social aspect of our duties, but even beyond our own personalities, must we realise our definite duties to things and our relation to our own acts. In this form of supreme self-repression and self-detachment for the time being, we must forget ourselves either in pure contemplation or in definite activity and productiveness. Pure contemplation finds its highest expression in science and in art. It constitutes man's theoretic faculty. To realise this faculty in spiritual and in intellectual activity makes of thought and emotion an activity in itself, and has led mankind to its highest sphere of human achievement, namely, the development of sciences and arts. But we are chiefly concerned with action and achievement themselves as distinct from thought and pure emotion. Such action is likely to be the more sane, perfect, and effective the more vigorous and concentrated it is in its energy, the more our will commands and directs our energies, as well as our passion and physical strength, to do the thing before us, and to forget ourselves in the doing of it. 'Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might.'

" Now, as there is an ideal of a human being, the ideal or type for animal and organic beings, in fact for all forms in nature, so there is a type and ideal for each definite act—the perfect act. This is a necessary conclusion of the Platonic idea and of Aristotle's *ἐντελέχεια*. The degree in which, while acting, we approach this ideal perfection of the act itself determines our triumph or failure, our satisfaction or discontent. The dissatisfaction and depression which we feel when we are not successful, the divine discontent out of which all great effort and great achievements grow, produces in us a *conscience*, irrespective of our social instincts, irrespective even of our own personality, and is, perhaps, of all our moral impulses the highest as it is the most effective. Besides this ethical bearing, it has the most supreme practical bearing in life; for only through it does man do his best, individually and collectively. All improvements, inventions, and discoveries find their unassailable justification and effective origin in this principle of human activity.

" No doubt there are no new achievements, no discoveries or inventions, which from the mere fact of their novelty do not alter the existing state of things to which they are related, do not in their turn destroy what actually exists and affect adversely those who have depended upon the existing state of things. In so far as this is so they may produce pain and want and misery, and much may be urged against their claims from other points of view. But we must ever strive to produce new inventions and new improvements, not so much to increase the fortunes of the discoverers or promoters, not for the merchants, not even for the labouring populations, to whom the exceptional control of such improvements or facilities of production gives an advantage over others; but because perfected production of objects, man's increased control over chance, over nature, man's defiance of restricted time and space, are thereby advanced. It is therefore immoral artificially to impede or to retard improvements or to lower the quantity or quality of production. To

take a definite instance, which the individual artisan and the organised union of working-men should remember : The bricklayer's duty is to do his best work as a bricklayer, to lay as many bricks and to lay them as perfectly as possible in as short a time as possible : not so much to increase the wealth of his employer (though this too is his duty and his definite compact) or his own wealth ; but because of the ideal of bricklaying, which must be the ideal of his active existence. The supreme and final justification of his work is to be found in the work itself, irrespective even of human beings, of human society, of humanity.

" But I feel bound to qualify what I have considered from one aspect only, though in its absolute and unassailable truth, by not only admitting but by urging the facts that there are duties with which man individually and men collectively have to deal, though these in no way weaken the absoluteness of our ideals of impersonal work. We must also consider, recognise, and be guided in our action by the incidental and temporary suffering frequently following in the wake of discoveries and inventions. It will, therefore, devolve on society to alleviate and, if possible, to remove such incidental suffering brought upon a limited group of individuals for the benefit of society and absolutely justified by the impersonal improvement of human work and production. Social legislation will here have to step in and to supplement insurance against old age, against disease, and even unavoidable unemployment, by insurance against acute and temporary forms of unemployment and dislocations of labour caused by such improvements and inventions. Such social legislation and the relief given to the unavoidable suffering of groups of people will be exceptional ; but it is moral and practically justifiable, if not imperative, on the ground that the community at large, and even future generations, will benefit by the introduction of the improvements which necessarily cause temporary individual suffering. To give but one definite instance : The undoubted blessing which motor traffic has bestowed

upon mankind has necessarily brought suffering and misery to groups of people entirely dependent upon the superseded means of transport, while it has also caused discomfort to the mass of the population. It was but right that all efforts should have been made, on the one hand, to support the cabmen and others who live by horse traffic during the period when these new inventions forcibly deprived them of the very means of subsistence ; while, on the other hand, public effort ought at once to have been directed towards securing the lives of pedestrians threatened by the new invention and the danger to health and comfort caused by the production of dust on the roads.

" But these separate duties, called into being by the improvement of production and the expansion of human skill and activity, in no way diminish the absolute duty to further such improvement and to concentrate the energy which man should bring to the perfecting of his work as such. Our supreme duty to things and acts remains ; and we must act thus, not so much on grounds of human altruism, not as social beings in our direct relation to other beings and our intercourse with them ; but simply in our relation to the objects which we are to produce, to modify, or to effect, with a view to making our production as perfect as possible, even if we were the only human beings in the universe."

DUTY TO GOD

" The duty to things and actions necessarily and logically leads us to the further and final course to which, in the rising scale of ethical thought, they tend. In man's ethical progression through human functions as such, through the objects which man wishes to produce or to modify in nature, he is necessarily led to his ultimate duties towards the world as a whole, not only the world as his senses and perceptions cause him to realise it, *as it is*, with all the limitations which his senses and his powers impose upon him ; but the world as his best thought

and his imagination, guided by his highest reason, lead him to feel that *it ought to be*—his ideal world. This brings him to his duty towards his highest and most impersonal ideals of an ordered universe, a cosmos, and of unlimited powers beyond the limitations of his capacities—his duty to God. Ethics here naturally, logically, necessarily, lead to, and culminate in, religion.

“The supreme duty in this final phase of ethics, man’s religious duties, is truth to his religious ideals. It is here, more than in any other phase of his activities, that there can and ought to be no compromise. This is where he approaches the ideal world in all its purity, free from all limitations and modifications by the imperfections of things temporal and material, as well as his own erring senses and perceptive faculties. There are no practical or social relationships, no material ends to be considered, no material interests to be served or advantages gained. The only relationship is that between himself and his spiritual powers and the highest ideals which these enable him to formulate and feel. His duty, therefore, is to strive after his highest ideals of harmony, power, truth, justice, and charity. Nor does this function of the human mind and this craving of the human heart require exceptional intellectual power or training. On the contrary, the history of the human race has shown that at every phase of human existence, even the earliest and most rudimentary, in the very remote haze of prehistoric times, the presence of this religious instinct and man’s effort to satisfy it are manifested, even though it necessarily be in the crudest, the most unintelligent and even barbarous forms of what we call superstition and idolatry. .

“Man’s desire and every experience necessarily have a religious concomitant. At every moment of his conscious existence he is reminded of imperfection and limitation without, an incapacity within, himself. This very consciousness is the mainspring of all endeavour, of all will-power, of all the exertion of his physical or mental capacities. For each con-

scious experience, as well as each desire and effort, has, as a counterpart to its limitation, the more or less present or complete consciousness of its perfect fulfilment. Limitation in time and space implies infinity ; limitation in power implies omnipotence ; limitation in knowledge implies omniscience ; injustice, justice ; cruelty, charity. Even if the limitation or the incapacity is admitted, and even if the tutored mind ceases from dwelling upon it as it realises the impossibility clearly to grasp and to encompass the unlimited and relegates such fantastic cravings to the region of the absurd, through long and continuous rationalistic training and habit, this only confirms the correlative conception of infinite power. The consciousness that we cannot span the world, regulate the powers of nature according to our will, dominate the seasons, and check the course of the tides—not to mention the limitations of every individual and commonplace action of ours—implies our conception of such power and such complete achievement.

“ The higher our spiritual flight and the more highly trained we are through experience and through thought in the range of our imagination and our reason, the higher will be our ideals of the infinite and the omnipotent. The Greek philosopher Xenophanes said, many years ago, that if lions could draw, they would draw the most perfect lions as their god, and that the god of negroes would be flat-nosed and black. Thus necessarily individuals, the collective groups of men, and the different periods within man's history will all vary in their capacity to approach this conception of the highest ideals ; they will differ in their theology and in their religion.

“ But their supreme duty, from an ethical point of view, in their attitude towards religion, is truth. They must strive so to develop their religious nature that it responds to their highest moral and intellectual capacity. They must not accept any religious ideal that contradicts the rising scale of duties from the lower and narrower spheres upwards as we have enumerated them. All duties must harmonise and

culminate in the ultimate ideals which belong to the religious sphere. *Credo quia impossibile* must never mean *Credo quia absurdum*. Man commits a grave sin, perhaps the gravest of all, by lowering his religious ideals, by allowing himself, on whatever grounds of expediency and compromise, to vitiate the divine reason he possesses as the highest gift in human nature, and by admitting the irrational into his conception of the Divinity.

"By this I in no way mean to say that either ethics, science, or art can in any way replace religion : though in their highest ideal flights they closely approach to religion, and even merge into it. Of all human activities in science, pure mathematics, which deals with the highest immaterial relationships, comes nearest to the ideal sphere of theology, and indicates the direction for religious emotion to take ; and of all the arts, pure music (not programme music), unfettered by definite material objects and individual experiences in the outer world, also approaches most closely in its tendency to some realisation of cosmical and religious ideals. We can thus divine the depth of effort manifested in the philosophy of Pythagoras, who maintained that number was the essence of all things, and who suggested the music of the spheres. But these are only signposts on the high-road of thought, where science and art give lasting expression to the onward and upward course of human reason ; they cannot of themselves satisfy the religious instinct and the religious craving of man which draws him onwards to his highest ideals."

"If science and art cannot thus replace religion, ethics, which is directly and immediately practical, is equally unable to do so. In fact, ethics must culminate in religious ideals. Man's duty towards the perfection of his acts, to the universe at large, as we have endeavoured to indicate it above, logically leads us to, and in itself presupposes and predemands, some conception of a final, summary harmony to which all human activity tends. All our rational and moral activity demands the consciousness of a final end, not in chaos, but in cosmos ; not irrational,

but rational ; not evil, but good ; not towards the Evil One, but towards God. Without this infinite boundary to all our thought and action, desires and efforts, man's conscious world would not differ from a madhouse or a gamblers' den, or a vast haunt of vice and criminality. Without this upward idealistic impulse all conscious human activity would either sink downward to lower animal spheres or erratically whirl round and round in drunken mazes ; it would lose all guidance and ultimate direction, and be purely at the mercy of fickle chance or relentless passion and greed.

" But this upward idealistic impulse itself, as a lasting and denominating emotion, must be cultivated, just as, as we have seen before, ethics must become emotional and æsthetic to be practically effective. We have also seen that each ethical injunction need not be, and ought not to be, consciously present in the mind of him who is to act rightly ; for it would weaken, if not completely dissolve, our will-power and our active energy. It would ultimately lead to the dreamer or the pedant who dreams while he ought to be awake and who idly thinks while he ought to act. The step must be made from the intellectual to the emotional sphere ; the moral injunction ought to be made part of our emotional system through habituation ; it must become subconscious, almost instinctive, if not purely æsthetic—a matter of taste. Rational and efficient education must, from our earliest infancy, tend to convert this conscious morality into a subconscious and fundamental moral stage. We must not rest on our oars to think while we ought to be rowing, and risk being carried away by the unreasoning current of circumstances.

" Still there will be moments when we must thus rest on our oars, when we must set the house in which we live in order, when we must ponder over and test the broad principles upon which we act. We must then bring into harmony and proportion the ascending scale of duties, regulating the lower by the higher in due subordination and discarding the lower that will

not bear the final test of the higher, until we reach the crown of human existence in our religious ideals.

" But in all this idealistic ascent we must cultivate the passion for such upsoaring idealism, and it is in our final religious impulses that the emotional, nay, the mystical, element must itself be nurtured and cultivated. Without this crown of life, life will always be imperfect. The striving for the infinite, which cannot be apprehended and reduced to intellectual formulæ, must itself be strengthened and encouraged in the young and through every phase of our life onward to the grave. Let us see that these ideals are not opposed to our highest reason and truth as far as we have been able to cultivate these in ourselves. But whether our ultimate intellectual achievement and our grasp of truth be high or low, we cannot forgo the cultivation and strengthening of our religious emotions. Whoever believes in the dogmatic teaching of any of the innumerable sects and creeds that now exist, truthfully and with the depth of his conviction, let him cling to that creed and the usages, rites, and ceremonies of the church or chapel, synagogue, mosque, graves, or sacred shrines and haunts in which his religious emotions are fed and strengthened. But, if he does not truthfully believe in the creed and dogmas, he must not subscribe to them, or he will be committing the supreme sin against his best self, 'against the Holy Ghost.' But for those, however, whose religious ideals cannot be compassed or bettered by any dogmatic creed that is now established and recognised, let them not forgo the cultivation of their religious emotions, which, as both past experience and all active reasoning teach us, must be created and strengthened by emotional setting, by an atmosphere removed from the absorbing, interested activities of daily life.

" The question for these people is, where and how can religious emotion thus be encouraged and cultivated? It seems to me that there are two possible methods by which this crying demand can be responded to: either in the domestic sphere within the family, or within the churches themselves, amid

the religious associations of the past and the religious atmosphere which is essential to them.

“As regards the home and the family as the centre for religious worship, some indication of the direction which such a domestic and religious cult might take can be derived from Japanese ancestor-worship, which is so vital and so potent an element in the life of that people. As has been pointed out by Nobushige Hozumi,¹ Japanese ancestor-worship can coexist with any variety of religious beliefs, doctrines, and creeds. For us, it has in its turn become stereotyped in its formal ritual to such a degree that it could never be accepted in its actual form by those who brought unbiased criticism to bear upon its binding injunctions. But the essential fact in its ritual, that it establishes within each family and each household a sacred chamber or altar, of itself sanctified by piety and gratitude towards our ancestors, and thus effectively upholding the family spirit, the family honour, with common strivings towards higher moral and ideal ends; furthermore, that it becomes the natural focus for solemn gatherings and lends spiritual elevation by association and emotional stimulus to the silent prayer of the individual or the collective worship of the whole family—these elements make of it the fit local and physical setting for religious communion or for silent self-communion or prayer when the individual desires to establish his solemn relationship with his highest ideals.

“Beyond this domestic and family sphere, however, we possess in every country the churches and shrines associated with definite beliefs in the present and with continuous religious aspirations for centuries in the past. Not only these associations, but the æsthetic qualities in the architecture and decorative art within and without, possessed by so many, make them the most suitable places for man's spiritual devotion. If the guardians of these sacred buildings admit, as they must, that religious aspirations and desires are in themselves good; that it is better for those who differ from them in creed to have some

¹ *Ancestor-Worship and Japanese Law* (1913).

religion, and that they should cultivate their religious aspirations rather than that they should have no religion at all and drift through life without any such higher striving, they will surely lend a hand to support their brethren in their highest efforts, even if they differ from them in form and creed. Let us hope that all our churches and religious buildings will at certain definite times, when not required for the special worship to which they are dedicated, open their doors to those holding different views. These buildings ought in the future, even more than at present, to become the centres of purest art, graphic or musical. These fellow-strivers may then receive the inestimable benefit of some stimulation in their endeavours silently to commune with their highest ideals, to pray, to think, or to feel, and to cultivate their truly religious spiritual emotions."

CONCLUSION, ETHOGRAPHY

Now, we must bear clearly in mind that these subdivisions of ethical actions and the standards of conduct which they establish are not absolute, but relative. They change with the evolution of man, of his mind, and of his social and natural surroundings. New ones arise, unheard or unthought of before; old ones become obsolete; and many, if not most, change and must be modified in varying degrees. The ideas of honesty, of honour, of sex morality, etc., etc., are thus in constant flux. In law, in contradistinction to ethics, the chief function of the legislative body in all parliamentary and democratic States is thus to create new laws responding to the new life, to supersede old ones, or to modify them. But in ethics this has not been so, certainly not to anything approaching the same degree, nor has it been recognised in the systematic study of ethics that the chief aim is consciously to recognise this evolution and to convert fatalistic change into

designed progress. We still are limited and bound down to the older dogmas and conditions concerning life. The great task before us is to lay down adequate new laws of moral conduct. We must establish for our own period and for the immediate future such a code of standard morals and the ideal of the perfect man—the gentleman. But here again, above all, we must fix these in the clearest contemporary language. Even in this most effective vehicle for conveying meanings the task will always remain a supremely arduous one. We must not therefore translate our meaning into the language of other periods and schools of thought. In such a process much is lost or overlooked on the way, and the road itself is blocked by obscurity. Through Conscious Evolution, having clearly before us and above us the Best towards which we tend, we must harmonise, as far as in us lies, the Actual with the Best. This is the duty in every period for every corporate body united by language, manners, customs, traditions and ideals. Only thus is there any hope for the success of conscious evolution—for Progress.

Into all these several departments, thoroughly systematised, the study of ethics must enter in the spirit and with the methods of exact observational and even experimental science. We must no longer be satisfied with single deduction or misleading individual introspection from first principles, established in metaphysics or religion as dogmas, nor with merely psychological deductions from the human mind; but we must also consider the mind in its relation to its social surroundings and with a definite aim, the perfecting of the social body itself. The methods applied must be inductive, conscientiously observational and experimental. We must guard against turning these methods into pragmatistical channels and thereby diverting them from their purely scientific

course. We must not exclusively or predominantly consider the mere physical needs of life or the economical or political motives and ends which have their place in due proportion and in organic relationship to the whole of life. The established theories of physical evolution in genetics, as well as in political economy, as in the conception of the State in the science of Politics, are not sufficient by themselves correctly to guide us in the establishment of these standards,¹ and when thus regarded purely by themselves are fundamentally misleading.

As yet such a widely recognised development of ethical study does not exist, while most of the energies of the best thinkers who have devoted themselves to ethics are concerned with the discussion of the primary principles of æsthetics, if not in a purely metaphysical, at any rate in a predominantly psychological spirit. All the light which each department of human thought can throw upon these vital problems of human life must be appealed to and co-ordinated in its due place and proportion; but in our outlook upon these great problems we should aim at first establishing the actual standards of morality in exact and thoroughly verified detail, and thence to advance to the establishment of higher standards to give direction to the best life that is to be. Not genetics only, but eugenics in the best sense of the term; not economy, but the proper spending, as well as the production of wealth and our duties in adding to it; not politics and only those aspects of life which concern the growth of power and prosperity in the State, but the full and highest life of civilised society and the production of the most perfect human being.

Each of the several departments of duties which we have enumerated must thus be focussed from the

¹ Cf. *Eugenics, Civics, and Ethics*.

point of view of pure scientific inquiry. So strongly have I felt the need of such a new departure in scientific ethics that I have proposed¹ to substitute for the term Ethics the term Ethography to indicate this distinctive treatment of the subject.²

The chief work of the ethographer will thus be to inquire into the actual standards of the existing duties that can be recognised and grouped within our complex life and the different degrees of certainty or finality attached to each. A wide sphere of inquiry and discussion will thus be opened out to the special students, and if the best minds are concentrated upon such an effort the results will in the aggregate be of the highest. No doubt there will be much discussion and great differences of opinion. Nor can we in any science hope for absolute agreement, which, if it were readily obtainable, would almost make scientific inquiry superfluous. Not only concerning the establishment of each separate standard will there be considerable divergence of opinion, inviting full inquiry and leading to valuable results; but also in the relative value of what we have called the progression of duties in their relation to one another, there will be opened a much needed field of serious examination, ending in actual practical benefit to the course of social life as a whole and also to the individual. What has long since been called casuistics will be fully revived, only not with the hair-splitting methods and tricks of the schoolmen and their followers. It may even be found—and this will become a most fruitful source of ethical information—that not only various periods but various countries

¹ Cf. *Eugenics, Civics, and Ethics*.

² I have wavered in the choice of the terms Ethography and Ethology. The latter had in its favour, that *logia* of itself connotes thoroughness of ratiocinative process. But Ethography lays more stress upon sober classification of ethical standards in each period, and this is the point I desire especially to emphasise.

and even localities will differ among each other as regards their several standards. The result of such comparative study will be of great practical and far-reaching benefit to all concerned, but especially to the body of ethnography itself, and would lead inductively to ultimate principles of ethics commanding the widest validity in all individual cases. Such inquiries must decidedly not be limited to the most general aspects of ethics and conduct, but must adapt themselves to, respond to, and be the outcome of, the actual diversity, complexity and fullness of modern life. Thus, not only the general question of the relation between justice and charity must be considered, but the aspect and concrete manifestations of this relationship in private and in institutional life in modern communities. The whole subject of commercial morality, the standards prevailing in each of the trades and of individual trades among each other; hand-to-hand barter in a small way and great international commerce and finance on the largest scale; professional morality in all its several aspects; truthfulness, scientific truthfulness, social truthfulness, truthfulness to self; duties to the State, political morality of the citizen and of the governments, national and international patriotism and their relation to one another, etc., etc.—all these, and many more which need not here be enumerated in detail, will arise, be classified, and inquired into. In their consequent field of inquiry would enter the search for the etiology of such group-differences compared among themselves as they are, both with regard to their origin, comparative differences, and the causes in the evolution of the past which have produced them. Why, for instance, one age, one district, or one occupation or class takes a definite view differing from another; why one country and one people differs from the other—the mountaineers

from the dwellers in the plain, those brought up in different religious creeds and atmospheres (the Irish compared with the English as regards truthfulness) ; race-history of the Jews, Scottish religion, and the Church of England, etc.

A whole new sphere of scientific inquiry in most manifold and varied directions is opened out to us. But such observation, sifting, and weighing of facts are not enough. The whole sphere of *experimental* inquiry must be explored. Mute nature and matter and dumb animals require for experiment material treatment which produces results determined directly by our senses of sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste. But man has, after all, the gift of language. Experiment need therefore not be more subjective and inexact—on the contrary, it can conceivably be made still more exact. Experiment in the case of ethnography must be on the lines of statistics in which, however, numbers do not exclude qualitative difference in values of evidence, and must be weighed by more complex, but none the less careful, methods of investigation. To ascertain these collective standards inquiries must be sent out in a large number of instances, examined and tabulated. At a very early stage the comparative method must be introduced in weighing the quality of the different data. Thus (i) different occupations, professions and vocations must be consulted to elicit opinions and *definite* points on the problems proposed, and instances carefully chosen by the inquirer as regards their bearing on the fundamental ethical principles. The same procedure must be followed (ii) with different classes ; and (iii) with different districts ; and (iv) with different countries. Out of the differences which might thus be recognised much important light would be thrown on national and group psychology, as well as on the effective power of such differences in modifying ethical

character and activity. Out of still more comprehensive study of all these variants together we may finally hope for widely valid, if not absolute, principles of the general ethical standards in each age.

Having thus recognised and fixed the standards that are current for the period in which we live, the final task for the serious inquirer, the master of this subject, the ethnographer, is to establish the most necessary or desirable standards for his time and to reach up to the higher standards for the future, pointing out how the envioning conditions of life ought to be changed to attain such distant goals. But here again, not in vague and unjustified generalisation, but within definite aspects and rules of conduct. So, for instance, in our first subdivision, the modifications in the complexities and varied relationships of modern family life will have to be studied, and the duties of parents to children, as well as of children to parents and of married people to one another, will have to be considered—considered, moreover, in their relation to the self-development of each, to the wider duties they each may have to the State, to the community in which they live, and, finally, to the ideals of social life. The same can be said for every other definite department of life, in most of which at present innumerable and divergent opinions exist absolutely unco-ordinated, so that no general standard can be recognised for the age in which we live ; and in consequence, adults act uncontrolled by valid standards according to their leading instinct, or even the impulse of the moment. Children grow up either without any ethical teaching and convictions of their own, or with moral teaching from bygone ages which fails to apply to the actual conditions and needs of modern life. Surely the future must remedy this disease of to-day, perhaps the most maleficent virus poisoning the existence of modern man, individual,

national and international. I hold with solemnly conscientious conviction that the fundamental cause of all the misery culminating in the Great War (though in other spheres of human effort we have reached comparatively so great a height of civilisation and culture) is to be found in the absence of true morals, fully responsive to the best thoughts in us, as well as of a religion which holds before us the convincing ideals of an all-perfect supernatural world.

Meanwhile, having studied the conditions which have produced the "Laws of Evolution," the ethnographer must aim at guiding and modifying the conditions by conscious reason and effort, so that, adapting them to the needs of each age, they should lead towards the best type of man and the best life.

CHAPTER V

POLITICS

The best State is the one which produces the best and happiest citizens.

To defend the weak ; to restrain the strong ; to encourage the best.

A State possesses the best constitution in the degree in which, while safeguarding the equal rights of all its citizens, it prepares, ensures, facilitates and accelerates the Rule of the Best.

La plus parfaite société humaine est celle dans laquelle la qualité doit prévaloir en tout.

Liberté, Fraternité, Inégalité.

Liberty to establish just authority and right discipline.

IN dealing with Politics we must be ever conscious that we are not considering the subject from the point of view of Pure Science or Epistemology ; as a single department or " discipline " of the vast field of inquiry, our attitude is not purely theoretical, but practical. As in the case of Art, Pragmatics, and Ethics, we are not dealing only with " things as they are," but chiefly with " things as they ought to be." Moreover, we are here endeavouring to reduce the phenomena and the methods of each department with which we deal, down to what we have recognised as the fundamental principles of the mind, i.e. the harmoniotropic and aristotropic instincts. Therefore, however conscientious and sober we must strive to be in dealing with any facts and data on which we found our generalisations and conclusions, and however clear and thorough may be our confirmation of these facts and the origin of the data with which we deal, we are consciously and ultimately endeavouring to ascertain and to establish things of the mind and of life as they ought to be, the perfect conditions

in which the human mind and human conduct can regulate these phenomena of life in order to establish the Best. We are thus not merely, or even chiefly, concerned with ascertaining how the modern State grew up, how it became what it is ; how originally it was based upon the family and the family hearth ; the clan or tribe or race, the city, State, monarchy, etc., etc., until we reach the modern democratic State and Federation or confederation of States, all with their geographical, local boundaries, their unity or complexity of language, law and customs. Our inquiry does not end with the study of the complex political bodies of modern times and the clear recognition of their origin in the past nor with the establishment of " laws of political evolution," in which we may recognise the " survival of the fittest," so that every successive phase of the evolution might be considered *ipso facto* " to be the fittest," and that " what is " because it is, is therefore also " the ought to be." In one word, we do not hold that to account for the existence of a thing or a human institution is also to justify its existence. But we must recognise, above all, that we are, in matters which result from conscious action, in the sphere of " conscious evolution " and not of " fatalistic evolution." Recognising all these happenings and the laws which govern them, we must learn by them and bring before our imagination, directed by reason and guided by the harmoniotropic instinct, the best forms, which will provide the best surrounding conditions in the direction of reason and morality, so as to create the best State with the most perfect principles of government, and we are urged on to this supreme effort by the arístotropic instinct.

The State, as we have recognised before, consists of men who derive their right of physical and moral existence not from the State. As with some Greek

philosophers, such a theory led in Germany to the intellectual and moral justification of militarism and autocracy, to that form of politics and ethics which, under the term *Politismus*, made of the State the final religious, if not supernatural, principle for all human conduct. The history of the State is the history of the people who made it, its changes marking the development of the people. The modifications which it undergoes in the course of time are caused by the people who live the better lives ; and the changes in these lives reflect the development of the best men who live them. It is the largest corporate body of human beings as yet established, though not the ultimate body which we can, and ought to, conceive.

The Best State, therefore, is the one most favourable to the production of the best human beings, enabling them to live their best lives ; and as human beings advance and progress, so will the State advance. In so far, politics ultimately depend upon ethics.¹ The well-known saying that every nation has the government it deserves conveys a deep and fundamental truth. The problem still remains : What is the most perfect man, and what constitutes his best life ? Here we may find ourselves in a vicious circle, for, if the best man is measured simply by the standard of his fitness for the security and aggrandisement of the State to which he belongs, his efforts must be directed towards militarism, making a religion of *Politismus*, as the aim of the State as a unit must be its own growth in power ; establishing an over-State for all others, as in private life the superman is to dominate his fellow-beings. Ultimately, therefore, the problem of the Best State (Politics) rests upon our conception of the Best Man (Ethics). The ideal of man must precede the ideal of the State and of society. There exists no gigantic, monstrous, living

¹ See *Eugenics, Civics, and Ethics*.

and organic being for whom nations and individuals are but subsidiary functional organs and atoms, whose right of existence and whose object of existence is solely to contribute to the growth of the Monster. Such is distinctly not our conception of Ethics, of the nature of man and of human life.

If the Best State is thus the one which is most favourable to the production of the best men in order that they may live their best lives, it becomes this by the action of its Government, its Constitution ; for corporate bodies cannot exist under individual licence, but by general rules and laws regulating corporate existence.

The first definite object and task of Politics is to define the best form of government. It is not a mere platitude—especially in our own days—that those ought to govern who are best suited for the task.

Socrates,¹ in that forcible form of his homely illustration, has confirmed this fundamental principle with convincing directness :

“ And that he spoke the truth, he thus proved. For, he said, let us consider, if anyone not really a good flute-player should wish to be thought so, what must he do ? would he not imitate really good flute-players, in all the external equipments of their art ? . . . but never should attempt a public exhibition of skill, or straightway he would be detected to be a fit object of ridicule and not only to be a wretched flute-player but also a vain boaster. And yet, after his large expense, while he is not a whit benefited, and moreover has acquired an infamous notoriety, must he not live laboriously, uselessly, and ridiculously ?

“ And in the same way, if anyone, not being skilled in strategy or in pilotage, would wish to be thought so, let us consider what would be the natural result to him.

¹ Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, bk. i, ch. vii, 2-5 ; bk. iii, ch. iv, 12.

... For it is clear that an unskilful person, if he were appointed to steer a vessel or conduct an army, would both lead to destruction those whom least of all he wished and also would have to retreat in disgrace and evil plight.

"... But the greatest impostor he pronounced him to be who, really being worthless, deceived the State by representing that he was fully capable to guide the city."

"Do not, Nikomachides, despise these men skilled in household management; for the care of private property differs from that of public only in amount, while it has all else exactly similar: but what is most important, neither is managed without men, nor are private affairs managed by men of one nature and public affairs by those of another; for managers of public matters command men not differing in nature from those whom managers of private affairs command, and they who know how properly to manage them successfully conduct matters whether public or private; but those who know not how, commit errors in both."

Though all will admit this truism, history has amply proved that power once conferred upon an individual or a class has an inherent tendency to confirm itself in the associative regions or grooves where in time it has been established, and that thus, by heredity, by descent from the wielder of power, or by descent from association of class, it leads to the establishment of authority and privilege, fixed, not by the fitness to govern in those who may receive it, but by the accident of birth and descent. Power may thus run counter to the free development of individual life, and disfavour the production of the best man within the community, while it may fail to select for power the man most fitted to govern. In one word, liberty is oppressed by privilege. Practically, the changes, fluctuations and conflicts in the inner political history of communities in bygone ages are the record of the

conflict of these two forces, Liberty and Authority, Equality of Opportunity and Privilege. In modern times (though the constitutional history of England is itself a full and living illustration of this conflict, and the resulting adjustments) the eighteenth century, especially in France, has marked the essential change in political principles by inaugurating the full recognition of man's rights to liberty and the removal of that form of privilege resting purely on heredity.

The new democratic era is ushered in by the watch-word "Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité."

Now, it is round the ideas, the basal principles, implied by each of these three words, their fusion into one leading idea, and their just relation and balance to one another, that not only the political theories of modern times have differed from one another and struggled for conciliation, but that the social, moral, and economic, as well as the political, life of modern States are divided in their leading principles and even stand opposed to one another in conflict.

FRATERNITY

The third element in this epigrammatic trilogy, which summarises the leading principles of modern political life, Fraternity, cannot arouse difference of opinion or controversy. It connotes the fraternal relationship among all men, true humanity and humaneness, the spirit of charity, symbolised in the religious form for the whole world by Christ and admitted by all sane and moral men whether they profess any of the established religions or not. I cannot believe that even those who accept the most extreme and brutal conclusions drawn from Nietzsche's¹ theory of the Superman (based upon a misconception

¹ Cf. *Aristodemocracy*, pt. ii, ch. i, p. 168 seq.

of Darwin's theory of the "struggle for existence" and the "survival of the fittest") will repudiate this principle of human relationship. In spite of numerous passages in Nietzsche's own writings, which point to the presence in him of a truly charitable and loving disposition, there still can be no doubt that his consistent construction of the Superman, including the "blond beast," must lead to the denial of compassion and charity. It may perhaps be noted that in the political watchword Fraternity follows Liberty and Equality; and that this sequence by itself implies that fraternity will follow where there is liberty and equality, but cannot exist and flourish unless preceded by them. It is held that the spirit of fraternity can only enter into human society if in its political organisation it ensures full scope to the action of liberty and is based upon equality. This, in short, would be a fair statement of the fundamental outlines in the creed of those who are fully convinced of the essential nature of this union of these three elements as a guiding star to all political organisation and effort. While thus fully accepting the ideal of fraternity, we cannot accept the conception which extreme "libertarians" have of liberty, and still less do we admit the validity of equality as a leading principle or ultimate goal of all political activities.

LIBERTY

The objection which we before raised against the value of pragmatism as a principle in the regulation of human life and conduct applies in another form to the misconception of the idea of liberty. We saw that the pragmatic attitude of mind made an aim of the means and in so far failed to give proper direction to our efforts. It advanced and gave great facility to ways and means, but did not provide the further

and ultimate aims and goals. Liberty also means freedom of action and liberation from impediments and restraints to the natural functioning of the individual will.

“ But liberty is not licence. ‘ It removes obstacles to ensure freedom of natural growth ’ ; but this does not mean that such removal of obstacles is to promote the rule of ignorance, selfishness and lawlessness. Liberty is a method, but not an aim. It is, in fact, the only method through which civilised society can ultimately attain its higher aims. It ensures freedom of motion ; but this movement may tend forward or backward, upward or downward, or round and round in mad and senseless mazes. Movement must therefore lead to a definite and approved goal—which is the Best. The familiar antithesis between Liberty and Authority, between freedom of growth and stagnation—or, at best, oscillation—the one moving, the other fixed, is a false antithesis leading to the fatal fallacy of all political theory. There are other limitations to liberty besides authority, namely, true democracy, which means the liberty to choose your authority, which again implies a living and moving process ; this life and movement constitute the history of organised and civilised society, of wider political bodies, of nations and States. If the ‘ libertarian ’ thinks of history in terms of progress and sees in it a continuous removal of hindrances to free life, while the authoritarian emphasises the coercion throughout and believes that this changes its form rather than its essence, the aristodemocrat sees in the process of history the ‘ libertarian ’ struggle to remove ‘ authoritarian ’ hindrances to the realisation in each period of its ideals of the best life, communal and individual.

“ Thus liberty pushed to the extreme and by itself leads to lawlessness and anarchy, as authority leads to autocracy or the rule of the few. But democracy

¹ *Patriotism, National and International*, p. xv seq.

² See G. Lowes Dickinson, *The Choice before us*, p. 263. Many of these remarks are in criticism of the views expressed in that book.

fills the whole ground between them ; and true democracy is aristodemocracy, the liberty to choose the best authority—itself not fixed, but moving and progressing with life. A State possesses the best constitution in the degree in which, while safeguarding the equal rights of all its citizens, it prepares, ensures, facilitates and accelerates the Rule of the Best."

Liberty can thus not mean freedom to act badly, but freedom to act well—in the interests of the State and in the interests of the individuals composing it. As a matter of fact, all civilised states, even the most democratic, have hitherto recognised distinct limitations to liberty. Moreover, every act of legislation and the creation of new laws, in so far as they are binding upon all citizens, are "limitations of liberty." Children, the insane, criminals, have ever been deprived of suffrage, and, in some cases, of civic rights. The constitutional changes in the activity of the British Legislature are chiefly marked by the extension of the suffrage. One of the most noteworthy of these extensions of political liberty is the introduction of woman's suffrage. With the single exception of the constitution of the House of Lords, birth no longer constitutes a privilege, blocking the way to full political liberty. This anachronism is now likely to be removed ; but, if "*in a true democracy, freedom means the liberty to choose the best authority,*" and if those who are to be entrusted with the business of government are those most fitted to the task, it cannot act thus on the assumption of absolute equality among all citizens—excepting the oft-quoted principle of "equality before the law."

EQUALITY

We must examine more deeply and widely into the meaning of the term "equality" ; for upon its just

conception depends ultimately the whole theory of politics, as well as ethics, our collective social life and our individual life. It will be found that most of the great struggles, the internecine warfare within States and communities in the past, and especially in the pregnant period of the present, depend upon the just conception of this term in its relation to human life.

Equality taken by itself means stagnation. Like absolute symmetry it is static and not organic or progressive.

It would thus only apply to the inorganic world, in which there is no life. Life implies movement and change. The laws of this change in organic life are determined by what is known as The Survival of the Fittest. But in human life with conscious reasoning and moral purpose we rise from purely physical values to moral values. These moral values (which include physical values) in their comprehensive varieties are determined on a scale of preference by conscious human beings. We have already seen¹ how all conscious activity (not to say the subconscious and even unconscious) is determined by preference, the choice of the line of action which approaches nearest to the image of a most perfect consummation. It ultimately aims at the Best and passes through the various degrees in the scale from the Inferior to the Better. Equality is the negation of this progression in values as applied to every single conscious action and to the summary aim of all action. As an ideal it would reduce human life, individual and collective, to that of the unconscious animal whose energies are all spent in safeguarding physical subsistence; and its ideal of social life would point backwards to prehistoric man, whose needs were limited to subsistence in which all could share equally without any differentiation in

¹ See Epistemology.

effort, in achievement or in personal values. The same emphatically applies to the relative value of human beings in themselves taken as individual personalities, and of their several functions, actions and capacities corresponding to the complex needs of advanced social life. Bolshevism rests on the assumption of the equality of all values—or, rather, it assigns the higher value to what is manifestly and admittedly the lower in what it calls the proletariat, which body is to rule the State and human society, while it directly aims at the extirpation of what is called the *intelligentsia*. On the other hand, we equally admit that the unregulated rule of forces which, originally possessing a superior moral value, have, by physical or historical accident, subsequently established their rule in spite of their actual inferior moral values, loses its moral quality and justification, and as blind physical forces they must similarly be controlled and regulated. It is here that the social and moral principle of Fraternity asserts its admitted claim in directing and modifying the leading force of the aristotropic instinct, and the "aristocratic" rule in social and political life. Thus, from the moral as well as the physical point of view, inequality, the prevalence of the physically and morally superior and best, demands and confirms the general rule in social life of what is called Individualism in the direction of what is generally known as Socialism. The claims of Fraternity and justice, as well as the final well-being of the State as a whole, must limit the activities of Individualism leading to Inequality. For instance, in every civilised community the duty to provide for the mere physical subsistence of our fellow-men, who must not be allowed to starve, must be admitted. Beyond that, as is fully expressed by modern legislation regarding "old age pensions," the care of the genuinely unemployed, various forms of

insurance against disease, accidents, etc., testify to the recognition of such "fraternal" duties. Even beyond these the means of providing for all forms of education, which not only ensure a general minimum standard of intellectual and moral training to the civilised community as a whole, but furnish opportunities for that self-improvement which enables the individual to display superior capacities in the progressive scale of human personality and achievement—all these clearly prove the recognition of these "Socialistic" principles. On the other hand, the inherent, almost facile, tendency of wealth to increase by its very bulk and centripetal attraction may reach a point at which it confers such powers upon the individuals who possess it that the inordinate predominance of power in private hands has proved to be "against good policy," to the detriment of society, and must, in so far, be controlled and limited.¹

Within these two outside limits the recognition and encouragement of individual superiority in every aspect of life is to be facilitated by the action of the State. Our Code must in the future be: Socialism at the extreme top and at the bottom, and Individualism in between. One of the most important functions of the State in the future will be, to clear the way from impediments and obstructions of inadequate traditions, as well as evil devices and skilful evasions of existing laws, if not dishonesty and crime, to make room for all individual and collective activities which

¹ *Aristodemocracy*, etc., Appendix iv, "Transportation of Capital" (quoted from my *The Political Confessions of a Practical Idealist*, 1911). I have here endeavoured to show up the evils of modern "Promoting" and "Finance," and have urged that the State must take over the function of "Transportation of Capital." It is futile to maintain that enterprise would cease or be impeded by removing the stimulus of individual reward. It can, on the contrary, be shown how "Confidence and Credit" would be increased, and how the true Discoverer and Inventor would be helped and encouraged if responsible public bodies would take over the work of the Promoter and the modern forms of Intermediation between Capital and Work.

tend towards improvement and progress, and, while encouraging the individual to make good the superior powers within him, increase the wealth and well-being of the community as a whole. The evolution in modern times of the system of public means of transportation as regards communication by roads and posts will have to be extended in all directions. While this will ultimately apply to all forms of productiveness of things of physical and moral value, it will in the first instance concern, above all, what we must call the Transportation of Capital from the point of its accumulation to the numerous regions where it is most required, to ensure the proper working of the industrial machinery of every State. Such action is called for, not only because of the immediate economic advantage to commerce and industry, but because in modern times the occupation or profession of manipulating the capital of others has led to an inordinately facile concentration of wealth into single hands without due moral justification as regards individual effort ; not only because it also leads to the demoralisation of standards of work and payment as regards the whole community, but because such a function on the part of the State, which will increase confidence and credit in commercial transactions, can readily be used as a source of public revenue.¹ These limitations, so far from supplanting the principles of individualism and of progressiveness by those of communism and equality, will safeguard and strengthen the real exercise of individual differentiated capacities and will ensure the prevalence of physical and moral superiority in all economic, social, intellectual, as well as political, life.

The principle of equality cannot apply to the political functions of the Government, and the people who create or select it. In this most important

¹ *Aristodemocracy*, "Transportation of Capital."

sphere of civilised life it is, above all, necessary that those who govern and those who confer upon them the authority to govern should both act according to the principle of progressive differences of value and should be qualified thus to act. The principle of liberty upon which democracy is based thus necessarily implies the liberty effectively to choose the best form of government, and to elect those best qualified to act according to its laws. While thus evidently there must be a difference in the degree of fitness for the task of governing, there also exist different degrees of fitness for the function of selecting those who are to govern. The privilege of birth being discarded, the broadest qualification hitherto adopted has been that of wealth. From the most ancient times onwards, and since the French Revolution markedly in our own days of so-called commercialism, wealth has been fixed as a standard of qualification for voting ; but it has been recognised by the intellectual and moral consciousness of modern peoples that such a distinction is not justified. On the other hand, it must equally be admitted that mere quantity of votes, in which the lowest quality may predominate, in no way ensures the Rule of the Best ; that ochlocracy is no less intolerable than were autocracy and oligarchy.

The more this is understood the more will it have to be recognised that it will be one of the most important functions of the State (as in past ages the fount of all " honours " was the king or the over-lord) to fix the progressive values of services and thus to direct the actual life of the people in all spheres, economically, socially, intellectually, in culture and morality—all tending towards peace and progress. The State will manifest its activity in this direction by encouraging and advancing all organisations and institutions which are directly concerned in culture,

the education of the young as well as adult education, and all the higher forms of Art and Science, and all organised effort in the direction of morality and public welfare. But, further than this, the State must give public recognition to the best work, and the improvement in all spheres of life from that of the best bricklayer to that of the best statesman, man of science, artist or philanthropist.

It is on these grounds and in this direction that a truly equitable distinction can be established to confer differences of voting power within the democratic suffrage given to all free people. I have elsewhere¹ ventured to make positive suggestions for a scheme by which Democracy can be saved from Ochlocracy, the rule of free, but competent, people saved from the tyranny of the ignorant mass. Let it not be said that such a plan rests merely on ideal grounds, that it is Utopian, and is not realisable in actual life. It is eminently just and practical, and can be worked by simple and just means. I cannot do better than repeat the passage in which this scheme is given in outline :

¹ " Now, in our own day in the momentous introduction of Woman Suffrage, we are already warned that some equally irrational and unjust limitation of age beyond majority, or of residence or property, may be chosen. But there is some hope for those who think as I do, that the practical problem of introducing and defining the principles of suffrage for women may ultimately lead in practical politics to the establishment of rational and just principles of selection and limitation into the franchise of every democratic State as a whole, a hope which before this great historic event would never have been thought possible of realisation.

" The only just and rational principle of differentiation which will accord with the modern political and

¹ *Patriotism, etc.*, p. xx seq.

moral convictions of civilised peoples is education, or rather the manifest and directly active results of education. But we must at once make it clear that such education does not mean learning. For, apart from our *a priori* reasons on the effect of science and learning by themselves as a direct preparation for social and political activity, our recent experience in respect of the German nation and the political influence of its learned professors shows the futility of such training in ensuring political judgment and independence of action. Moreover, the results of stereotyped and fossilised learning and its tests, as applied to the active political life of the Chinese Empire, give the same warning in this direction.

"The education required, and the practical results to be obtained, must themselves be social and political. It is furthermore essential that the tests for the possession of such qualifications must be simple, practical, and democratic in spirit. The principle, not so much of limitation as of differentiation and selection determining the franchise, must be that already admitted in the practical discussion of various democratic legislatures, namely, of proportionate representation. Free citizens would not be deprived of the franchise excepting on principles already admitted in the exclusion of minors, lunatics, and criminals, in order to safeguard the community against the rule of crass ignorance and folly. Now, with the introduction of compulsory national elementary education into every civilised democracy, there could be no hardship or grievance or any reversal of the democratic principle if the simple tests of the 'leaving' examinations from the national schools were to be applied as a condition of the grant of the franchise. Crass illiteracy can hardly be upheld by anybody, nor can the illiterate who fails to make use of the opportunities offered to every citizen consider himself wronged if he is excluded from contributing to the legislation of his neighbours as well as of himself. He practically remains a minor, if not a mentally deficient or criminal. But such elementary education must emphatically include in its school curriculum

two subjects : so-called civics and modern 'ethics. In an elementary form every boy or girl in the country must be instructed in the essential outlines of the constitution of the country and the duty of the citizen, as they must also be instructed in the code of individual ethics regulating the moral life of a definite community in a definite period. Though this will in no way produce statesmen or saints and directly ensure political efficiency or moral uprightness, it will in the aggregate save the masses from the crass ignorance of politics prevailing at the present moment, as it will raise the standards of social morality throughout the nation.

"At the end of the course of school-teaching in these elementary schools there is to be a 'leaving' examination, where especial prominence is to be given to *elementary* civics and ethics. An ordinary pass in such elementary training will be a condition for the franchise imposed upon every citizen when he has attained his majority. There will be no repudiation of truly democratic principles if those who fail to pass such an examination should not be eligible to vote, any more than our present refusal to admit minors, lunatics, or the feeble-minded constitutes an undemocratic repudiation of true liberty.

"In England our age has not infrequently been called the 'Age of Examinations,' and the phrase 'the curse of examinations' has often been used with some justice by those who have the higher interests of true science and learning at heart, as well as the unfettered development of the individual mind and the encouragement of individuality and genius. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that, if examinations are an evil, they are to the same degree a necessary evil; and that the advantages derived from them far outweigh the disadvantages which they entail. They do universally and ultimately encourage the diffusion of accurate knowledge, and the raising of standards of mental training and efficiency, and, above all, they assert and realise the principle of justice as opposed to injustice and partiality. In the case of public and official work,

without them the doors would again be opened to ignorance and favouritism, however many brilliant exceptions the practice of previous days may have produced in the unfettered success of great individuals or of the favoured classes. Moreover, examinations can be improved in their true testing capacities as well as simplified and made thoroughly practical in their application to the educational life of the community.

“Corresponding to our advance from primary to secondary education, there would have to be introduced, together with the proper teaching in these subjects, higher ‘final’ examinations in *advanced* civics and ethics. The ignorance of even the most favoured classes, owing to their deficient education, of even the rudiments of the laws and practices in the ordinary working of the British Constitution, is, when tested, beyond all belief. Without considering the more complicated and theoretical aspects of our legislative and administrative life, it would be a revelation to the inquirer if he discovered how many people amongst the most highly educated classes are in no way conversant with the system of local government and national administration, nor with the relation between these two divisions of public life ; and how very few there are who could give a clear and accurate account of what some may vaguely apprehend. Even the purpose, nature, and distribution of local, national, and federal taxation, in which we are all definitely concerned through the strongest appeal to our own material interests, are understood but by a comparatively small number ; while there are still fewer who could give a clear account of such principles and practices. Surely something is radically wrong in the training of citizens in a democracy when such ignorance prevails ; and this is especially so when we realise that the country is ruled by the people themselves.

“It is therefore not only desirable, but urgently necessary, that the civic life of our great democracies should be supplemented by the preliminary training in the constitutional practice of the country, and that further encouragement be given to the acquisition

of thorough knowledge of the political theory and practice of every democracy. While increasing the fitness of the citizen properly to use his right of franchise, it would also prepare the intelligent voter himself to become an intelligent and efficient legislator and administrator.

"The recognition and encouragement of such increased political fitness should consist in the granting of an additional yote, over and above the elementary franchise open to every citizen; and this *democratic* privilege would be acquired by the passing of the secondary standard of education, especially in higher civics. Beyond a more thorough knowledge of the British Constitution, such civics might even include some familiarity with the important constitutions of other countries, as well as international relationships, interests, and ideals. Though questionable, it may be found desirable that the further educational progression (always including a corresponding advance in the study of civics) from the school to the university or technical high-schools, when realised in the final testing examination, might lead to the conferment of yet another additional vote.

"Besides thus confirming the principle of democratic justice in this progression in the franchise and contributing to the consequent efficiency of the government of the State, such practice would (as I hinted above) react upon the advance of national education, raise its standards, and increase its practical effectiveness for the whole people. For it would directly furnish a reward for all progress in intellectual, moral, and *political* education, and would certainly end in raising the economic and industrial efficiency as well as the social and political standards of the nation as a whole.¹

¹ While I have always been a most convinced opponent of German militarism, I have always realised that there was one redeeming result of this cursed and barbarous survival in modern life, besides the physical training which it confers upon the mass of the people who in Germany have but little opportunity for such development. This boon is the long-established *Einjährig freiwillige* examination, by the passing of which examination the conscript German can reduce his military service to one year. These examinations mark a high standard of proficiency. Though not wholly due to them, the spread of higher

“ Beyond these tests, conveying increased greater voting power upon the free citizens of a country, there will be other sources of such increase and advancement, namely, through the ‘ Honours ’ conferred by the State. Such Honours will no longer be hereditary, nor will they be bought with money. On the initiative of Lord Selborne I am gratified to see that, at the very moment that I am writing these lines, a definite and renewed attempt is being made in the House of Lords to check, and even to eradicate, such abuses in the conferring of Honours. The Honours here contemplated by us are to consist in the additional vote, or votes, conferred upon the citizen who has done good service to the State, or has attained distinction and eminence in whatever walk of life might conduce to the welfare and progress of society. Not only statesmen and public servants, soldiers and sailors, but philanthropists and men eminent in Science, Learning, and Art, as well as the leaders of Industry, Commerce, and Labour, are thus to be distinguished and rewarded ; and such rewards are to increase and be cumulative as each recipient advances in achievement, eminence, and continuous work in his useful career. There will thus be not only three-vote men, but even ten-vote men ; nay, there is no reason why, towards the end of a great career, there should not be a hundred- or even a thousand-vote man. This progression in public recognition and stimulation would be one of the most important duties of the State, and the distinctions conferred would be effectively admitted by the public with the unconditional moral approbation of every free citizen. While ensuring and accelerating the predominance of what is best in the body politic, this function of the State would be distinctly democratic ; for such Honours would not be hereditary and would be within the reach of every citizen. Moreover, they would directly react upon the education of the people and would constitute the most powerful incentive to the

education and consequent industrial and commercial efficiency of modern Germany is, to a great extent, due to this very effective stimulant to education among the people.

advancement of education among the entire population which the State can offer.

"From time to time new laws would be passed, modifying and increasing or diminishing these privileges ; political contests and parties would surge round this all-important and all-powerful function. Conservatives and Liberals would define their distinctiveness on the ground of the position they would take with regard to the questions and problems regulating this power. No doubt in the process of such activity abuses would creep in and fierce contests would arise. But, after all, this healthy struggle in political life would be concerned with the establishment and advancement of what is most important and what is essential to the political life of civilised society, namely, the establishment of the Rule of the Best.

"This is my answer to the question we put above : How can this Best be assured ? "

But the fact remains that the economical or material expression of the various social values has been expressed by one common denominator in life, i.e. money. The numerous evils and injustices to which money in itself has led in our commercial age are conspicuous. We may, for instance, say that most crimes in the world can ultimately be traced back to the influence of money, sex or drink. The power which the accumulation of money gives has produced a revolt in the minds of most right-thinking people and especially in the hearts of the poor, who are deprived of such power. The ability to counteract this great evil of modern life lies, in the first instance, in the hands of every community itself. For it should bestow its highest approval and distinction upon those who by their services and productivity exhibit the highest moral, intellectual and artistic qualities, and thereby directly raise the standard of public life, so that the people themselves do

not worship the golden calf. But the State can confirm and give publicity to such recognition and, by its own public approval, set a stamp on such merit by conferring public honours. In all times, for instance, valour in battle has been publicly recognised by the State. Such action on the part of the State is all the more necessary in the conditions of modern life. Formerly the smaller states made it possible to assert merit, publicly realised and recognised by all the inhabitants. The improved means of communication and publicity in the larger modern states and empires can thus be utilised, which makes the direct action of the State in this important aspect of public life all the more imperative. Thus to confer social distinction according to the higher spiritual and moral values, which are ultimately one of the moving interests and aims of communal life, would counteract the tyranny of money.

But recognising these evils and counteracting them as far as possible, we still have to answer the question, "What can be substituted for money as the economic common denominator of values?" If completely dispensed with, what takes its place? We cannot return to the rudimentary system of barter, nor has any reasonable or acceptable means of the material expression of values been as yet devised. Until this is done, we must still adhere to this form of economically determining moral values.

But the trend of the broadest modern political movements, which aim at counteracting the evils arising out of economic power, measured by the standard of wealth in money, consists in ultimately counteracting its power entirely as represented by capital and substituting for it what is called Labour. By a series of arguments tending to show that all wealth is derived from labour, and that labour is the ultimate common denominator of all values, the

manifest or insidious fallacies which are employed to justify pure Communism or Bolshevism have grouped round the false definition and misinterpretation of the term Labour. For there is an effective and prevalent tendency to restrict the definition of labour to *manual* labour, and at least to make our standard of valuation depend entirely upon the basis of the lowest forms of manual labour, as deserving of the rights, privileges and rewards that are bestowed upon all other forms of service. If the *quantitative* degree of human energy put into labour is to be the measure of the *quality* of production, of the value of the object, and also of the service and the share of reward justly to be bestowed upon it, all idea of perfectibility and progress and of the higher life of man is *ipso facto* denied. Let anyone who is moved by communistic ideals simply ask himself what would be the result upon human productivity, achievement and service in the world, what would be the standards of productivity and the standards of social life following upon the realisation of such ideals? If all forms of labour and creativeness are equivalent, though we cannot even realise such a state of things in the earliest half-animal conditions in the life of pre-historic man, what would be the result in our own days? Why should any object produced be better than another? Why should any object rise above the ordinary minimum use of material existence? Why should foodstuffs, clothing and housing be improved beyond contributing to the needed physical subsistence of human beings? Why should any of these necessary products of life be raised upwards into a sphere of what might be called luxury—in the preparation and serving of food, in the manufacture and shaping of clothing, in the quality of building and the form of its construction and decoration? Why, to make a bolder step into the

delicate and innumerable complexities of highly civilised life, should books be printed as beautifully as possible, and skilled craftsmen and artists devote any time to producing exquisite bindings? Why should men of science devote themselves to the highest and most abstract problems of nature, life and thought, which have no ostensible bearing upon the necessities of actual life? Why should artists produce works that thrill and elevate mankind throughout the ages? A local stonecutter can hew a monument in the public square of a town which will occupy the same place and be made of the same material as the work of a Pheidias, a Michelangelo, or a Rodin. Why should beautiful textiles in exquisite materials be produced in the most perfect form, designed and woven by the most skilled hands? We could fill a whole volume with such questions, illustrating in detail what would happen if by one act we could sweep away all the innumerable forms of productivity to which our higher civilisation has attained and reduce them to one useful adequate standardisation that would satisfy the immediate needs of all citizens who insist upon the fetish of equality. And we could do this without any exaggeration or unfairness in argument, by following up the Communist theory to its ultimate consequence, the fundamental principles upon which it constructs its theory of economy and of social life. But the answer may be given: Let the best and highest works be produced, the most sumptuous buildings be erected, the perfect work of art be created, and science pursue its highest ideals; but these products belong to the community as a whole, to the State, and ought not to be procurable by a minority of citizens who have the good fortune to belong to the "possessing" classes. Though we may at once admit that the truly greatest work of art and achievement of science really ought

to belong to the community and the world at large, and ought not to be the property of one privileged individual or group, can anyone maintain that in the process of development and selection of the greatest producer and his productions, such highest excellence can at once be defined and obtained? However true it may be that the poet is born and not made, he only becomes the great poet or artist, or genius in science, in the arduous process of life resulting in a progression from the humble and inferior to the great and superior. Can it be maintained that in the ascending scale of human life, individual and communal, it is not desirable to infuse the best quality, beauty and intrinsic value into every product of the mind and the hand, and that these qualities should not enter into the daily life of all the objects of use in the homes and surroundings of civilised beings? It is upon this mainspring of human activity and effort that all productiveness of man rests as he advances from the animal stage, through all phases of the past, to the highest civilisation and culture. What would our modern life be if quantity were to replace quality, and equality block the way to the development of superiority? One immediate result would be, as is demonstrated before our eyes in Russia at this moment, that all the great achievements of spiritual life, and even of economical life, would be disintegrated and gradually annihilated.

Leaving the consideration of man's productivity, the things he produces, and turning to the services themselves and the scale of valuation of these services, we must ask the first question from the point of view of economic productiveness: How are these varied commodities that make up the totality of modern life, in contradistinction to the lower phases of civilisation, to be produced, i.e. for whom are they to be produced, beyond those great public works

that ought to be the property of the community as a whole? For whom is the best manufacturer, craftsman and artisan to do his best work, if no best works are to exist, but only the standardised minimum for the citizens of absolutely equal value? From this point of view alone, purely objective as regards the desirable production of best goods, the increased purchasing power of individuals is of itself desirable.

We thus come to the root of the fallacy in the communistic conception of "Labour"; namely, equality in the value of services, and consequent equalisation in compensation, or wages. If the statue of Michelangelo is absolutely better than that of the comparatively unskilled stonecutter, then the services of the more highly skilled are more valuable than those of the inferior worker and in all justice deserve superior compensation. The superior worker must have higher remuneration; and this applies to every form of labour and of productivity. Equivalence of compensation is an absurd principle. Starting from the just establishment of a minimum wage in every employment, the superior producer does and ought to receive a surplus of wage or money above the purchasing power which enables him to subsist physically. The question then comes: What does he do with this surplus? He may use it at once in responding to his desires for immediate physical gratification—he may waste it; or he may put it by, exercising one of the greatest of human qualities, the power of prevision to ensure and control the uncertainties of the future, or even to benefit others besides his immediate self. He may practise the simple and homely quality, prized for so many ages by humanity, the quality of thrift. Thrift has been recognised from the moral as well as the economic standard as one of the most effective private as well as public virtues.

Out of this simple activity of the worker and producer there grows the accumulation of Capital, which means nothing more than the activity of pure labour passing through human character, directed by man's supreme and differentiated faculty of prevision and at the same time developing that power of moral self-control marking the first step in his ascent to altruism beyond the gratification of his momentary desires. Thus, arising out of the superior quality of his work, to which are added certain moral and distinctly social qualities of mind and character, there invariably arises the difference between the inferior and the superior, and this takes the economic form of the difference between the possessing individuals and classes and the non-possessing or, as they would call themselves, the dispossessed individuals and classes. When once this difference is distinctly established, it may lead, and has led in the past, and more so in our days, to the revolt of the poor against the rich, especially if those inherent vices of the human species, jealousy and envy, stimulate opposition and passion. Finally, it may lead to internecine war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

Now, it is of vital importance that the nature of this opposition and conflict should be thoroughly understood and reduced to its moral and political foundations, and that each of the two contestants should sympathetically enter into the mentality of the other, and both strive to understand what moral and intellectual justification (if such there be) may exist in the hearts and minds of their opponents. Above all, we must endeavour to grasp the mentality of the dispossessed or poor in their attitude towards their fortunate fellow-citizens blessed with possessions and wealth. But in simple fairness we must clear the ground of controversy from some of the arguments which may justly be directed against the

privileged classes with which we have already dealt above. We have agreed that there is no justification for political privileges based upon birth. We have also agreed that such preference should not be based upon wealth in itself. We have also seen that in the direct action of the State all means of education both for the young and for the adult ought to provide those opportunities of self-improvement which will qualify those not possessed of privileges of birth or wealth to be governors and in just proportion to have a share in selecting and directing the government. Accepting these fundamental limitations in the organisation of all democracies (which, however, we insist, must tend to become aristodemocracies), the advocate of the dispossessed and poor might fairly object on grounds of justice that there still exist undue privileges which indirectly and ultimately, if not directly and immediately, unfairly favour those born to riches and thus possessing wealth. It must be admitted that, from the point of view of highest justice in the infinite sphere, religion responds to man's cravings for the highest ideals of a perfect life¹; our sublunary life is full of injustices which our harmoniotropic and aristotropic principles must urge us to rectify, as far as possible. Those who are born crippled, diseased or socially unfit in body and mind, those who are born with ungainly or repulsive appearance and disposition, compared with those born sane in mind and body, possessed of predispositions, if not qualities, that win the affection and ultimately the respect of their fellow-men, have cause to impeach the rule of justice in the world. Human society must do all in its power to rectify this initial injustice by every physical and moral means within its reach. But whatever direct action the State may take in its organisation to improve the physical and

¹ See next chapter.

mental development of its citizens, however much the study of eugenics, based in its aims upon civics and ultimately upon ethics, may enable us to do in mitigation of these evils, however much they might even be able to direct the course of heredity towards a more equitable distribution of the greatest physical and moral values of this world for future generations, these efforts cannot, and need not, destroy the one most efficient factor, namely, the parental relation on which the existence of the child rests—the family. Develop the schools and public tuition, as well as all highest forms of intellectual and moral upraising in the perfect State, as much as you will, you cannot replace the immediate factor of the mother's love and the father's care, the affections of the children, and of all members of the family to one another, as the most direct and potent training, if only on the mental side of those habits of altruism and those impulses of devotion which make for the best character and conduct in all social and even political life. And these favourable conditions are not only dependent upon the inherent qualities of the individuals who compose the family and the directing function of parental care and affection, but also upon the physical surroundings of the home and its moral and intellectual atmosphere. It is here that that quality of altruistic self-control, which led the parent originally to practise thrift instead of being carried away by the impulse of momentary self-indulgence, laid the foundations for those physical and moral conditions which favour the development of the young as well as the adult members of the family to be privileged in the race of life. Whatever direct action Society and the State may take to replace these advantages for those not possessed of them, they need not, and ought not, in the interest of Society and of our highest ideals tending towards the Best,

to destroy the initial conditions which created them. There is therefore no political, social, or moral ground upon which inequality, tending towards the realisation of the Best, ought to be discarded or actively counteracted. Eugenics, civics and ethics, on the contrary, must favour such inequalities in so far as they tend towards progressivity, perfectibility and the Rule of the Best.

But even if our advocates of the poor and disowned were to admit this contention, limiting equality and favouring superior development, and were even to accept the primary and favouring conditions of difference in possessions and wealth among the citizens, they would oppose the extension of such a principle to the transmission of wealth by inheritance. There is no doubt that there is here a strong case on moral grounds, on the grounds of justice. "What moral grounds?" one of the disfavoured or dispossessed may exclaim, "can there be for one man to step into the world and, without any merit or even action on his part, to become possessed of those privileges which give to him such a disproportionate start in the race of life over his less favoured fellow-men? What has he done to earn it, and why should this course of injustice be continued through generations?" Whatever may have been said in the past, and may be said now, concerning the rich man, the camel and the eye of a needle, and the temptations and pitfalls which must lead the possessor of unearned wealth from degeneration to destruction, the fact remains, and need hardly be argued further, that inherited wealth within a cultured home and under the most favourable surroundings, lasting through life, does give an initial privilege and favourable start in the race of life over the poorer competitors, which only come to those who have benefited by these conditions.

Though we have seen that the most favourable development of the family as a unit is thoroughly commendable and that there is no moral ground on which it should be diminished or destroyed, the moral justification of inheritance from the point of view of the unmeritorious and inactive beneficiary cannot be maintained, whatever might in addition be urged on the ground of eugenics and aristodemocracy. But the problem presents itself in quite another light when approached from the point of view of the testator—the parent or parents who desire to secure, not so much privileges, but conditions favouring the perfectibility of their offspring and their lives as citizens, so as to enable them to advance the State and society and ascend towards the ideals of ethical, social and humanitarian perfection. As we were bound to admit that the first acts of altruism leading to thrift were justifiable from every point of view ; and as we were also obliged to allow that the family as a social unit was, and ought to be, accepted as an irreducible social unit which tends towards the extension and perpetuation of desirable qualities in individual character and life ; so we must also admit that those who wish to secure these benefits and extend them beyond the actual present into future generations, are effectually realising social, political and ethical principles which are highly commendable for the good of the community and of mankind. To ensure such continuity of progress the supreme exertion of self-control, self-repression and altruism is a highly virtuous and beneficial activity. This does not only concern the individual members of the family and their lives ; but even the more abstract conception of the solidarity of a family in family honour, family eminence and tradition, tending to carry on the torch of social qualities and virtues continuously through generations of men. But it

also concerns the physical concomitant of the family, which is the home. To make that home itself and the atmosphere which pervades it as perfect as possible as a centre of domestic and civic virtues, as the focus of a life of affection, beauty and refinement, and to ensure its continuance and improvement in the future, is one of the highest and most social as well as highly moral ambitions—provided always that in the attainment of eminence by the founder of a family and his successors, and by the acquisition of those physical means which found the home and endow it with those qualities of virtue and refinement, no unrighteous or unsocial means be applied.

Thus, eliminating all doubtful or reprehensible means of securing such continuity of noble effort and higher traditions in the family, it must be admitted that in every home, smaller and humbler in its nature or larger and more brilliant in its structure and environment, it is a commendable social virtue on the part of the parents, if, suppressing the call to immediate self-indulgence, they practise thrift and even self-denial in order to improve the education of the young and their preparation for life, and to improve the conditions of the home.

Surely it can but be commended if, from the unskilled labourer upwards to the possessor of a great fortune and great traditions, the father puts by a portion of his earnings to give greater comfort and security to his wife and family, even if he should no longer be there, and the leader of industry or the possessor of land with a beautiful homestead does not expend all his income in costly forms of personal amusement, but realises in every phase of his life his duty and affection to his family, in continuing and perpetuating these favourable conditions which in themselves produce efficiency and refinement; elevation of taste and the conduct which is guided

by it, to those who follow him. To plant trees, the full growth of which one cannot witness oneself, but which will give shade and spread beauty for the children who are growing up and for successive generations that may follow, is surely not evidence of a lower instinct, but of that higher altruistic activity of the best men, stimulated and directed by an imagination realising the Best and the perfect harmony of things. Surely it is good policy for the State to encourage such activity on the part of testators, whether the inheritors have on their side any claim to such beneficent action or not. It remains for the descendants of virtuous and noble parents in every class to avail themselves of, and to profit by, the benefit which may thus have been bestowed upon them, and to pass on the torch of human perfectibility and progress which has been placed in their hand. If they fail to do this and cultivate the seeds of degeneration until they dissolve all the virtue transmitted to them by their parents and forebears, they will, and ought to, sink down in the social scale of citizenship, and their fall ought to be the swifter and deeper because they have spurned and abused the blessings that were showered upon them. *Noblesse oblige* does not effectively apply to a class or a caste, but to individuals. The individual must confirm and justify the privileges he has received and contribute his share to continuous progress. •In so far the State and well-organised society cannot recognise class or the distinctions of class or of occupations. In a well-organised State every individual in his fashion and peculiar capacity contributes his share to the harmonious organisation and advance of the community as a whole.

Though in a perfectly organised society, those individuals possessing similar taste, manners and traditions, and modes of conduct and intercourse, will naturally and justly group themselves together, and

ought, in the interest of human progress, thus to coalesce according to their affinities, this process of natural and social selection must be based upon actual and not fictitious social qualities and relationships. Distinctions of class and occupation must not be stereotyped nor galvanised into sham vitality when the soul of corporateness has fled and its purpose vanished. Static symmetry cannot be forced upon the organic symmetry of life ; for life must be guided by the aristro-tropic impulse which constantly moves upwards towards the 'Best. In a society every member will have his distinct function arising out of the real aptitudes acquired by heredity and education, but as manifold and distinct as are the complex individualities in the infinitely diversified corporate life of modern civilised communities. All citizens (unless it be the aged, who have earned their right to repose, or those otherwise incapacitated) have their tasks and their work before them ; and it is as untrue as it is absurd to try to create a Labour Party and a labour class in which the claim to the effective direction of public life is measured by the degree in which work approaches manual labour, and, ultimately, even the unskilled section of manual labour. In a true democracy based upon true liberty the organisation of the State would never be put under the control of one class or one group of occupations, but under the best individuals belonging to each and every one of the " classes " and occupations. " Direct action," as it is now called, of one group of citizens, however numerous, is as unreasonable and as unfair, and as destructive of true liberty and progress, as was the rule of the most selfish oligarchy or autocracy. The vicious results of such a rule, were it ever to dominate a State, would only be surpassed when, should the future produce an effective confederation of all States, the same combination of separate interests, based

upon differences of occupation, should dominate such supernational councils and, through them, the civilised world.

INTERNATIONAL AND SUPERNATIONAL RELATIONS

We have hitherto been concerned with the inner organisation of the State in its relation to the citizens. But the same basic principles applying to these inner political relationships apply also to the relations among the several States to one another—the international relation of States. As a matter of fact the whole conception of the State as the unit of society is proving more and more to be insufficient, and one of the great problems of the future will be its gradual and normal modification and reformation. However justified and beneficent may be that sense of piety and respect for all that has gained a certain moral right from the fact that it has been evolved in the process of human history, and that it has lasted for a period which adds a certain venerable quality to its existence ; however much we must cherish and develop in us that historic and distinctly æsthetic sense of the beauty of the maturity and age of institutions—provided always that it does not obstinately and nefariously block the way to changes morally justified and urgently required by the progress of civilisation—it is one of the chief and cardinal duties of States and corporate bodies to modify and to reform their constitution in the light of their true and original aims and ultimate ideals. When in the direction of their activity they are far removed from the course which they were originally intended to take in order to fulfil their destinies and have thus lost their truly normal functions, and even run contrary to their primary purpose, their constitution must be revised, or

reformed. Or if their aims are no longer justified, they must be superseded by new corporate bodies pursuing new aims and ideals.¹ The conception of Nationality and the State, the outcome of numerous currents in the course of history, flowing from very different and even opposed channels, has become so complex that a thoughtful world, suffering from these serious inadequacies in the organisation of political and social life, is led to consider them with a view to reform. The modern State may thus be in immediate need of change through the peaceful channels of organic reform and not the violent upheavals which sweep away and destroy the good with the bad and the perfect with the imperfect. The fundamental element of so-called "race" (one of the least definite and scientifically grounded conceptions of modern ethnology and sociology, still less of practical politics), arising out of the family and the clan, cannot, from the point of view of truth and scientific evidence, be made the distinct and determining ground for nationality. The so-called racial distinctions within each State only work for evil when they are made a basis for division among its citizens, and their evil can only be aggravated and intensified when to race are added sectarian differences of religion, fused into one passionate whole. The same, to a considerable degree, applies to purely geographical differentiation, which has, moreover, as well as distinctions of race, resulted from the fortuitous conditions of succession and inheritance among monarchs and royal families. Let us hope that in the future there will be no further need of geographical distinctions on purely strategic and defensive grounds. In short, the origin and history of many States are based upon adventitious and unreasonable grounds which find no justification in the actual life and needs of some modern com-

¹ See *Patriotism*, chs. v and vi, p. 87 seq.

munities. However many moral and social justifications there be to consider the sentimental aspirations of large groups of men resting upon their regard, love and passion for their real or imaginary racial origin, and however supremely justified the claim of protection of racial minorities within each State may be, I consider it one of the greatest misfortunes of these portentous days¹ that the so-called principle of self-determination² should to so great a degree, if not exclusively, have been based upon these racial differences, and thus have encouraged and revived racial antagonisms throughout the whole world. This disquieting and disturbing problem of modern life, when added to the numerous other powerful movements in the direction of change and reform which the present age is calling for, in the accumulation of all the dark and threatening clouds massing together on the horizon of civilised humanity, bodes the possible outbreak of a storm which may devastate all the fertile fields of cultured life throughout the world, unless the power of truth and justice, directed by man's striving after the Best, can divert the forces which justly move towards change into the beneficent channels of reformation to the blessing of future generations.

The revision of our conception of the State and the enlargement of the virtue which responds to the love of country—patriotism—can best be effected by a change in the relation between the several civilised States themselves. The fundamental laws of ethics on which the mutual relations of the citizens to the States are based must be applied effectively to the relation between States.

We must recognise that the times are not yet ripe

¹ See Appendix I, also "Nationality and Hyphenism" in *The English-speaking Brotherhood and the League of Nations*.

² *Patriotism, etc.*

for the creation of one great Super-State, in which the several States are units, holding a similar relation to each other to that which the citizens hold to their own State. It may be even doubted whether such a colossal organisation, directing and legislating for innumerable States spread over the whole earth, and thus immediately governing groups of people living under totally different physical and ethnical conditions, may ever be possible or desirable. But that in their directly international relationships, determined by the principle of pure justice, an active confederation of Sovereign States, retaining their internal sovereignty, is not only within the range of possibility and desirability, but has become of direct and supreme necessity for the maintenance of civilised life, must be admitted by all right-thinking men. This consummation, prepared by the international history of modern times, has been brought home with the intense realisation of its urgency by the great catastrophe of the past war, and it must thus be realised that at least some organisation of all civilised States is absolutely necessary. The mere fact that the engines for the destruction in mass, not only of soldiers but of the civilian population as well, have reached such a stage of annihilating efficiency that all war must in the future spell internecine annihilation and the extinction of civilisation, makes such prevention imperative. Whatever may be the shortcomings in the actual scheme of the League of Nations as evolved at the Paris Conference, there can be no doubt that some such preventive organisation must be established in the near future.¹ The establishment of a supernational political body, ensuring international peace and confirming the solidarity of specific international relations, will then, in the progressive scale

¹ See Appendix I, *The English-speaking Brotherhood and the League of Nations*.

of collective social life and consequent duties, as in the corresponding duties of man's ethical and social life, in its turn produce in man the love and passion for international patriotism as a further development of national patriotism, without in any way weakening (but in fact strengthening and confirming) this political virtue.¹ It will in no way hamper the free development of individual life within the independent national units, any more than the enforcement of law and of political obligations are destructive of the liberty of individual citizens. But, as we have endeavoured to show that political equality before the law must be supplemented by the direct encouragement of perfectibility and progress among individual citizens, so the ensurance of international justice by a supernational body among civilised nations, and guaranteeing their equality before the law, will favour free development in progressive life within each State and raise the standards for each and all. As the internal politics of the individual State confirm and develop for each individual citizen the political duties which he owes to the State, so in international politics and by the direct influence of a Supernational Body, man in his moral life will be carried still further, still more directly and potently, towards the realisation of his duties to Humanity.

I must here express my conviction that the so-called League of Nations, in its present form—and also the great Peace Conference of Washington, important and highly commendable as some of its results may prove to be in the immediate future—cannot be *practically effective* in supplying this one supreme want of our age. To meet this need a different body and a different organisation are required. The two main demands which the world makes of such a body

¹ Cf. *Patriotism, National and International*, etc.; also Appendix I of this book.

are, first, that it should command the greatest confidence in its own impartiality which can reasonably and practically be expected, and second, that its decisions can and must be carried into effect. Neither of these conditions is fulfilled by the bodies which have until now been established.

The whole civilised world is far removed from placing anything approaching to implicit confidence in the decisions of the League of Nations as at present organised. To attain this end, in the first instance, negatively, all doubt and suspicion of the continuance of the traditions and practices of the old regime of secrecy, "manœuvring for position," etc., of the old diplomacy as practised by the interested Great or Lesser Powers acting in their own ¹ interest must be removed. Since 1898 I have ventured positively to construct the outlined organisation of such a body, which must take the form of a *Supernational Jury backed by a Supernational Police*. Such a jury must be composed of a fixed (though large) number of delegates from each constituent State, represented according to numbers of inhabitants, with a maximum and minimum number for the largest and smallest States, without any mandate beyond the solemn pledge to decide according to justice and reason, and not to act in the interests of their own State. A juridical tribunal or supreme court is neither practical nor at present practicable. For there exists no Code of International Law, with due sanction, for such judges to interpret. The history of the English Common Law ought to teach us that something of the nature of a jury naturally preceded the establishment of the Judiciary and the approach to the codification of fixed Laws. Out of the process and practice of a long series of decisions by such a Supernational Jury, whose decisions will be based on equity tem-

¹ See Appendix I.

pered by a compromise of common sense and common fairness, the International *Law* to be interpreted by the Judiciary may ultimately be evolved. The time is not ripe for an International Tribunal of Jurists.

But the decisions of such a Supernational Jury must be purely academic and ineffectual unless backed by power. It must have a Police Force. Such a Force, however, must not consist of separate quotas from each nation *supposed* to act in concert with each other—even against their own nationals ; but must be enlisted from all nationalities among those who naturally and by preference choose the profession of arms and form a new military body owing sole allegiance to the Supernational body. From purely economical and practical reasons it must now be admitted that some form of "pooling" for the establishment of international security and national independence is absolutely necessary.

We have thus seen that politics ought to be concerned with the production of the Best Government and the Best State, in order to develop the Best Citizens leading the Best Lives. These Best Citizens and their Best Life is the central organism holding its relation to the social environment as expressed in the political organism called "State," with its existing laws, customs and traditions. Through legislation this process of adaptation leads to the continuous improvement of the environment. Yet in this interrelation we have continuous action and reaction. More directly through education and through all public institutions under the control of the State, the citizens themselves are to be directly advanced and improved, and this moral and intellectual advancement can create new needs and new demands for change and progress in the physical environment

within each State, so that organism and environment are harmonious, the active power ensuring that the harmony is progressive in its nature, striving towards the Best with the ultimate aim of the most perfect State and the most perfect social life which each period can in its turn conceive, and all leading up to the final ideals of life, of mind and of the universe, manifesting themselves in the human mind through religion. But in this sphere of thought, as in ethics, pragmatics and æsthetics, as well as in philosophy and science, we must establish above all things a clear understanding of the highest political consciousness of our own age, as we must realise the principle of evolution which has led up to it ; while, at the same time, we must never forget that this evolution, dependent upon the design and reasonable activity of man, must in turn stimulate our aristocratic activities in holding before our imagination as a future goal the well-reasoned upward steps which bring us nearer to perfection. It must therefore always be through conscious, and not through fatalistic, evolution that progress in man's life and in the institutions which he creates is brought about.

CHAPTER VI

RELIGION

THE culmination, the coping-stone (*θρίγκος*), of this structure of human life and mind is to be found in Religion.

We have seen in the Second Chapter of the First Part of this book that in the Infinite (the infinitely small and the infinitely great) asymmetry is dissolved into symmetry. Thus in this scale of relativity the harmoniotropic and aristotropic principles and instincts must lead to the Perfect and the Best in Life and in living and spiritual beings. No doubt the saying of Xenophanes (that, if lions or negroes conceived of divinity, he would take the form of the most beautiful lion or a black and flat-nosed being) is true, but it is conceivable that the inhabitants on some other planet might rise much higher than terrestrial human beings in the conception of their All-Perfect and Best. Within this relativity, however, the principle of Harmony remains absolute, and within all this variety and change the aristotropic principle and force remain the same.

We have also seen in the chapter on Epistemology, that somewhere in our consciousness, varying in the degree of consciousness or subconsciousness, the perfect image of every act, thought, or feeling is in our mind whenever we act, think, or feel.

Now it is with the relation between this life, with all its imperfections and limitations, to the Ideal World and Life and Being that Religion is concerned ;

and we are religious in the degree in which ideals are real to us.

Evolution, which in its established or reasonable forms, was, until quite recently, supposed to be inimical to religion, necessarily leads to religion. It does this through the idea of progress, in contradistinction to lifeless stagnation or retrogression and decline, or by replacing the blind Survival of the Fittest, which throughout nature rests upon strife—strife, moreover, in which the physically or “accidentally” strongest must survive. This physically and accidentally strongest is not necessarily the best, and from some points of view may be the worst. In the movement of the world and of life, and especially in that aspect of these which is capable of being affected by the activity of man, the aristotropic element is ignored in the purely biological and observational conception of the Survival of the Fittest in nature. When, however, the aristotropic element is coupled with the conception of Harmonism and with the principle of Conscious Evolution which tends towards the best, as conceived by the human mind in every period of its own evolution,* we are led to strive for some ideal conception—again varying with the growth of each period—of the Best World, the Best Life, the Highest Justice and Happiness, Consummate Goodness and Beauty. This mental activity leads to religion.

The enemy and the opposite of the Best World, the Best Life, etc.—the worst world and the worst life, where injustice, hatred and strife rule—is the dissolving negative spirit, the spirit of hate. It is the Mephistopheles of Goethe. Therefore Plato, as a philosophical forerunner of Christ, is the apostle of love; both are the great teachers and founders of religion, even to those who may reject the dogmatic and historical foundations of the churches. Their

religion culminates in the conception of a rule of God and not of a Devil. It is the religion of love and not of hatred, of love between men and all the animate world, and even in the inanimate world, the love of Beauty and of Truth—of the ultimate Best, of ultimate Perfection, of ultimate Harmony.

The harmoniotropic and aristotropic principles and instincts of themselves lead us to hope and to strive for that complete harmony where the Best is attained and consummated. When we apply this to our conception of the universe and of human life as a whole our every single experience informs us that this cannot be attained in our actual life, though we approach nearest to it in the highest abstract science, as well as in the highest art, the worlds of pure theory and truth and pure imaginative creativeness and beauty; but we are equally assured that such perfect harmony and the realisation of the Best belongs to the Infinite, which cannot be fully conceived or realised in the human mind.

We have noted in the origin of sense-perception that symmetry is contrasted with asymmetry, and that our perception, as well as the subsequent mental stages of more advanced human reasoning, are based upon symmetry or regularity, and we have established the fact that in the subsequent development of man's mental powers the highest conceptions of Truth, of Beauty and of Goodness rest on the same principle. But, as we also noted above, we have seen at that early stage of our inquiry into the purely elementary phases of sense-perception that the asymmetrical forms which we contrasted with the symmetrical bodies become symmetrical when we leave the sphere of the Finite and of the limitations of the human senses and mental faculties and ascend towards the Infinite. By anticipation I then pointed to the deep significance of this fact when applied to the meta-

physical principles in the domain of Religion. In analysing the nature of an asymmetrical body we discovered that, by reducing it to the smallest compass or by increasing it to its highest power, its irregularity and asymmetry vanish and more and more approach to a regular or symmetrical body. In the degree in which it thus approached symmetrical harmony did it lose its asymmetry, its discordant characteristics. This undeniable fact is not merely of importance symbolically, as vaguely suggesting the true nature of the mind, but actually as containing the principle of all thought and existence. It is through this principle, as it governs the processes of thought and of human striving and ultimately of nature and the universe itself, that the mind rises from the simple sense-perception to the realisation of order and law, in contradistinction to accident, disaster and anarchy in nature, to Truth, Goodness and Beauty, to Justice and Charity, and to the ultimate dominance of these.

Leaving these elementary phases of sense-perception and advancing to the formation of concepts and to the whole process of ratiocination or reasoning, on which rests the conception of all truth, we have seen how from every association these rest upon that power of imagining with greater or less clearness in the Fully Conscious, or Subconscious, the perfect image or consummation of every truth we conceive, every form we appreciate as form or desire to reproduce, every act which stimulates our mind, or our will to satisfy our needs, our desires and our ideals. The stimulation to our activities, whether in thought or in action, is the attainment of this perfect realisation of our design or end presented by our imagination or by the direct activity of our emotions or moods ; and though the full realisation of this perfect image of consummation may never be attained, there always rests somewhere within the mind the primary convic-

tion that somewhere or sometime this full harmony between the real and the ideal can be attained. Even in the most impossible images or aims of an imagination running riot so as to desire by thought or act what our actual physical experience teaches us to be impossible in view of our finite capacities and the finite world about us, there is still implied the possibility that somewhere, in the infinite world beyond the physical limitation of our surroundings, or of human capacity, such desires and aims can be consummated. This would apply even to things much more "impossible" than "to put a girdle about the earth in forty minutes," or flying to Mars.

When thus our thoughts turn to life as a whole and to our world as a whole, we can conceive—and what is more, we can and do long for—a perfect life and a perfect world, in contradistinction to the imperfect life and world in which we actually exist. In this world of imagination the real and the ideal type are fused into harmony; causality and teleology, necessity and freedom, liberty and authority, striving and power, justice and charity are all harmonised, and hatred is dissolved in love.

Our senses and the experience dependent upon them cannot grasp this infinite consummation, nor even our intellectual functions which demand the conviction which rests upon proven truth. But our sane imagination, saturated with, and guided by, the harmonious process of reason, can soar upwards towards the Infinite and can fill our emotions and our highest moods with hope and with love for this supreme harmony and beauty. Yet in every phase of this flight towards our highest ideal we must be directed by the Harmony of Reason, of Goodness and of Beauty, and not be turned aside or backwards by discordant untruth to what is irrational and unharmonious.

Still, we must be aware of the fact that this high imagination and true "enthusiasm" are powers of the human mind, of the human soul or psyche, and that thus, however swift and lofty our metaphysical and religious flight, it is limited by the psychological conditions of the human mind. Though we find the harmonistic principle within nature and its laws, unaffected by the human mind, and far beyond this earth, guiding the infinite constellations of the universe, the principles which we thus recognise, the design and ideal which we project and long for, cannot transcend those of the human mind. It is thus that our imagination is driven to some conception of a spirit, analogous and in principle of the same nature as the human mind in its loftiest potentiality, though far beyond the mind of man in the sphere of infinity, which he cannot conceive. It is thus that man can only approach these spheres of harmony through his emotional moods, filled by his highest rational and æsthetic imagination and vitalised by the spirit of love. But here again it is the supreme duty of man, as a rational and moral being, to guard against those deviations or retrogressions in his upward flight into the backward or downward direction of the irrational or the lower stages of his mental and spiritual development in the past. Above all must he guard against that anthropomorphic tendency which imposes finite limitations upon the infinite conception of perfect ideal harmony by an anthropomorphic and superstitious conception of a Deity¹

¹ It is here that all men will differ in the degrees in which their conception of the Infinite Ideal and Ideal Life, the *Summum bonum*, the Divinity, takes a personal form. By its very nature infinity cannot be definitely conceived by the finite mind. On the other hand, our imagination and our emotional moods, rising on the lines of rational and æsthetic progression upwards, lead us in such a quasi-æsthetic emotional state to what Plato has called the *eros*, and even Spinoza has called the *amor dei*—into that state which the Greeks in the term

which marked the lower stages in the evolution of the human mind from its quasi-animal conditions upwards.

"enthusiasm" have literally called being "filled with God." In order that we should feel with real intensity this love and passion for the True, the Good and the Beautiful, there must inevitably, from the very conception of our nature, be something of the interposition of love towards some Being. Adhering to the supreme duty to truth in self-questioning and without any self-deception, I must confess that I have not attained that degree of *certainly and conviction* which enables me to formulate my conception of a personal divinity with anything approaching to clearness—a state of mind which also applies to the belief in personal immortality. I am thus unable intellectually to ascend beyond the emotional and æsthetic state, tending towards the infinite Best and in moments of rational and æsthetic exaltation to strive towards or hope for such an ultimate perfect Being, however much the power of analytical functions of the intellect may oppose themselves to the lowering conception of a Being analogous to man himself.

In the same sense, while realising all the cogent and forceful arguments against personal immortality after the human body and the organs of sentience and thought have been dissolved, and especially in consideration of the changes in personality when mental disease has ended in insanity, I still cannot conceive myself that the element of personality, the ego, of the mental and spiritual character of the individual, so potent in its unity in modifying its own life and in acting upon the outer world, is merely a congeries, a collocation, of physical organs and atoms, and that this unity has no ultimate existence as such. Here too, on the basis of physical and mental experiences and throughout life, my perfectly rationalistic emotional nature and imagination lead me to tend towards, and to hope for, some form of personal immortality, which, however, I dare not accurately define in anything approaching to physical terms. It is important and cogent to remember that the *μη ὄν*, non-existence, of things supremely and vitally extant in the lives of the individual from infancy upwards, has ever been one of the most difficult conceptions of the developing human mind, especially when applied to parents or children. It was no doubt owing to this difficulty of believing that those beings who in earliest childhood were the most real objects and sources of all experiences for the infant should no longer exist, that the primitive mind fashioned its animistic religious beliefs in the survival of the departed ancestors and in their presence or return in various forms of actual influence within their own natural surroundings.

The inner history of every religious sect in the past of humanity and the comparative study of sects, religious beliefs, and superstitions (though all of them manifest in their rites and ceremonies outer forms to stimulate the imagination and the emotions in their super-

It is thus that the different ages and races of men present an infinite variety in the degrees in which their imagination leads them in the religious flight of their harmoniotropic and aristotropic faculties and especially in their conception of God. We must again recall the saying of Xenophanes. Even in our own days, as people differ in their senses and their standards of dimension influenced by their habitual experiences, conceiving the moon as being of the size of a threepenny-bit, sixpence, a shilling, half-a-crown, crown, and even a bass drum, so they differ in their intellectual and moral capacities as these affect their imagination in conceiving the dimensions and the moral qualities of things without and within. Here too there are those who actually conceive the Divinity, in what they suppose to be the spiritual flights of their religious imaginations, by the standards of sixpence, a shilling, and other coins, while there are those who can place no marketable value upon their highest conceptions of things divine and of the divinity itself.

Thus the principle of conscious evolution, moved and directed by the harmoniotropic and aristotropic forces of the human mind, leads us ultimately towards the conception of an Ideal Life and an Ideal Universe.

natural flight towards the Infinite) illustrate this gradual advance from the lower to the higher. Many of the superstitions from undeveloped or barbarous ages survive in the ritual, and are even embodied as dogmas, in the creeds of far more advanced religions. To convert such lower survivals into the actual life of religious faith is a Sin against Truth, against the Holy Ghost—for in our highest beliefs there must not be any compromise.

CHAPTER VII

EDUCATIONAL EPILOGUE

HARMONIOUS proportion in the human faculties and their functioning in life ; perfect physical health and the co-ordination of the forces of the soul and body ; *mens sana in corpore sano*—these are, or ought to be, the main objectives of all education.

As in the perfect Greek athletic type all parts of the body, in due organic relationship and harmony to each other and to the whole, are combined into life, so in the soul of man should all faculties be harmonised. If the arms, legs, the chest, or other members are by themselves developed out of proportion to the whole, they—and through them the entire body—present an anomaly, a disfigurement, and may produce almost a cripple. Their functionings are accordingly disturbed and impaired.¹

On the same principle our soul's forces, our character, our intelligence, our mental, moral and social activities must be regulated into perfect harmony.² No one of them, nor its functioning, must be allowed

¹ I remember many years ago travelling on an ocean steamer with the then champion professional sculler, Hanlan. In conversation I asked him whether he had a "coach" or trainer. He informed me that he had none ; but "coached" himself and applied to his self-coaching the following simple and highly efficient principle : "I simply scull and scull," he said ; "but I pay sharp attention as to which part of my body tires *first*. If it be my back, my arms, my fore-arm, my legs, my calf, even my hands or my fingers, I know that I am using that part of my body too much, and I try to use it less—until at last the *whole* of my body is equally tired at the end."

² See *Balance of Emotion and Intellect*. London, 1878.

to atrophise, or hypertrophise. As regards even our inherited temperament, which underlies character, we must endeavour, in the education of the young and in the self-training of the adult, to counteract the undue predominance of the one tendency over the other in order to produce harmony between both. Thus excessively passionate, imaginative, over-affectionate and erotic tendencies are to be counteracted by sober intellectual training in exact methods of thought, concentration, and analysis; as over-intellectual, cold-blooded and unloving dispositions are to be encouraged and stimulated in demonstrative affection and in all that makes for synthesis and imagination.

In our actual life the same principle of Harmony is to be enforced in all its aspects. First in the subdivision of our Life of Work and our Life of Play. These two phases of our normal existence as moral and social beings must harmoniously blend in the beauty of their balanced proportion. The sense of Duty, the power of concentration on the work that is predestined within us in the natural aptitudes of our personality, and the place which, through our personality and our personal environment, as well as the definite demands which the harmoniously regulated conditions of the actual society in which we live impose upon us for the prosperity of the community—this sense of duty and this concentrated and efficient work must above all be encouraged and developed. So also our self-control, our repression of the constant obtrusion and all-powerful instinct of self-indulgence and all-pervading self-seeking, must negatively prepare the way for that moral and social altruism which must pervade our active and emotive energy and should be converted into charity, love and sympathy. But this must in no way lead us to a purely negative and repressive ideal, which disfavours

our natural and highly moral striving for "self-effectuation" and pleasure. - On the contrary, there exists in a perfect world a clear Duty to Pleasure. Asceticism is distinctly immoral—it presumes an envious and unloving demon instead of a benevolent and loving God.

We have seen (in Part I, p. 67) how the Life of Play is naturally subdivided into its physical and mental aspects, the one producing our athletic games and pastimes, the other Art and its enjoyment. Educationally the greatest mistake is made by parents and teachers when they assume that the instinct which makes for play and recreation is sufficiently strong in the nature of the young to "look after itself," if not to be repressed and kept in bounds. Ignoring or repressing a force which is elemental and an essential part of an organism which cannot and need not be atrophied, leads to its congestion; and as with natural and mechanical forces when compressed beyond a certain degree may produce spontaneous combustion destructive in its effect; whereas when directed into proper channels it may be turned to beneficent uses. So too the constant repression of the instinct for pleasure may lead to secret or violent outbursts harmful in themselves and degrading to character and life. On the contrary, parents and teachers must not ignore, but take an active part in, the amusements of the young and positively direct them into the channels which ennoble while refreshing, and contribute to physical and moral health and to the refinement of taste. But great care must be taken that such positive guidance be not of the magisterial order of the drill-sergeant, robbing the spirit of play of freedom and spontaneity, which are, as we have seen, essential to its very composition and life.

But our educational aim on the work side must also be to convert even our exacting and stern duties

into pleasures ; to evoke joy in our own work and in our charitable attitude towards mankind.

There can be no doubt that in the successful application of an educational method which succeeds in arousing the joy of learning, instruction becomes more effective. Children in whom interest in what they learn is aroused, so that what they are taught is received, not mechanically, without the stimulation of their emotive faculties (or, if moved, the emotion is one of displeasure and opposition), but in whom pleasure is aroused, or even enthusiasm for what they learn and understand fully, will undoubtedly learn more readily and more thoroughly, and retain what they have learnt, through the impression which has sunk into the depths of their emotional nature. Beyond this also it must be remembered by educationists that a further valuable asset has been bestowed upon the mental and moral nature of their pupils and upon the whole of their life in every age and every one of its aspects. For they may thus have received, and been enriched by, that great boon and source of moral wealth to be found in intellectual pleasure and recreation (in the literal meaning of that term) to which we have referred above in dealing with the play side of life. And this will be the more so the less the subjects in which interest and love have been aroused are immediately connected with the life-work and duties of those who have been intellectually enriched. I have for many years impressed upon our labouring population, as well as on young people of all classes, the importance of providing themselves with a "hobby," especially one of a higher intellectual and moral character which ennobles and elevates, besides affording recreation and amusement. I have held before them the picture of the aged, or those unable to work through ill-health, who have nothing to fall back on to keep

their mental health and interest alive, who ultimately become a burden to themselves and those about them, as contrasted with the peaceful and happy existence of the old man or woman who has a perennial source of interest in some intellectual or artistic pursuit, in the absorbing work of collecting or classifying any objects or facts, or even in the reading of novels.

Such methods of tuition have, especially of late years, been successfully applied by those who follow a definite system and theory of education, chiefly associated with the name of Dr. Montessori. The upholders of this theory rightly maintain that the aim is above all to be *educative* in the literal acceptance of that term, i.e. to lead *out* or to draw *out* the latent faculties in the child, and not indifferently to infuse the subject-matter to be taught, irrespective of the individual receptivity of the child, which latter method fails to teach or to stimulate, and may even produce opposition and disgust. There is no doubt a deep and practical truth in this main thesis, and we may at once admit that all ideal methods would be educative in this sense, and even that in all teaching, as far as this is possible, the individuality of the pupil is to be considered and the teaching modified accordingly. Above all, what we might call the emotional receptivity in the mentality of the learner is an "asset" of supreme value and can, or ought, never to be dispensed with. At the same time, however, I am convinced that this importance of "individuality" and "personality" is greatly exaggerated. Personality is not an ultimately static unit. On the contrary, it is, perhaps, the chief function of all education to develop it in the right way and towards higher normality or a generally admitted ideal. Individuality can be changed, and, at all events, developed; and the main direction in which it is thus to be developed is towards the normality and

harmony which we have advocated above. Otherwise the danger is always imminent of limiting our positive education to the "aptitudes," and even the preferences or "likings," which we happen to find in the pupil and, exaggerating those faculties and activities to the neglect of others which are essential to the normal human and social being, mentally and morally, by such neglect to produce what physically we have called a "cripple." Moreover, though I heartily agree with the need of producing *positively* what might be called the joy of learning and the spontaneity of action, free from all negative and distasteful injunctions and constraint, there can be no doubt that, far from asceticism or moral "Rigorism," the sense of duty, of self-control and even of self-restraint must be taught by injunction and by practice. Without fear of paradox, a theory of education might be upheld, and convincing arguments adduced in its support, which maintains that we ought to search for and to detect those wants and deficiencies in every child which run contrary to its natural "aptitudes and preferences," and which are required to produce normal intellectual and moral health to attain to a more perfect social being. The "aptitudes" will naturally, at least, assert themselves, and need not always be stimulated or overstimulated. An emotional imaginative and spasmodically active child, under the stress of momentary likings and enthusiasms, may have to be checked in this exuberance of its individuality and systematically and continuously trained in the direction of equable activity, concentration, and sober analytical study and self-control; as we have already seen the child manifesting the consequences of the converse temperament may have to be stimulated in the opposite direction. But even in definite studies and disciplines there can be no doubt that, if not the ideal teacher,

at all events one possessing sympathy and tact, might by means of well-adapted methods, succeed in awakening and cultivating faculties and interests which at the outset were lacking or dormant. Above all the children themselves, by what they say or do, are not always the best guides as to what may be their, at times latent, aptitudes and tastes. Their distaste or irresponsiveness to certain studies may be the outcome of pure accident. I can recall in my own childhood that my dislike for drawing was entirely due to the unsympathetic manner and the faulty methods of my instructor, which deprived me of early training in a subject for which I certainly had taste and aptitude; while in a later phase of my studies my love for the classical languages was repressed and my application in *work* checked because my sincerely interested questioning of my master concerning the deeper thought and meaning in a classical work was rudely rebuffed by the injunction: "You study *āv* with the optative!" For many years after, I looked upon all masters of Greek and Latin as barbarous pedants,* and refused to do more work than was absolutely necessary. No, the aim and ideal which the educator must hold before his eyes is above all, mentally as well as physically, to produce in the pupil—whatever his individuality and personal aptitudes—human normality. *Homo sum; humani nil a me alienum puto* must, from the educational point of view, be supplemented by the equally important truth: *Homo sum; intelligibilis et admirabilis nil a me alienum puto*. The true and noble injunction of the Roman comedian on the ethical and social side is supplemented by the ideal of human normality on the intellectual and æsthetic side.

However, in following out this fundamental principle and ideal of the education of man as a perfect being in himself, limitations are necessarily and

forcibly imposed when we take our 'stand on another point of view, namely, that of the nature and duration of human life and its activity, as well as the social aspect, in which the activity and productiveness of human effort is judged by its definite results, the end of each single effort. We are constantly limited because of the shortness of life and the pressing demands of time itself in relation to our own limited capacity in effort and work. So also the deed or the work to be achieved requires, not only complete concentration upon the definite task, but a continuous preparation within the particular direction of such definite achievement. These forceful limitations lead to what, in one word, we call specialisation, which in so far is opposed to universal normality of training as well as of effort. We have thus seen how the specialist in science and art, in craft, and in the definite practical activities in organised social and political life must not only be prepared by long and arduous training, but also how the special attitude and habit of mind which lead to the most successful achievements in his own department of work must predominate in his conscious and subconscious life, producing, as it were, a certain bias and leading him to regard all phenomena primarily from his special point of view. As the sculptor and the painter spontaneously and involuntarily view all phenomena in their sculptural or picturesque aspect, so the man of science and the man of affairs regard the world of things and events in their bearing upon their own special life-work, its principles and aims. The specialist becomes 'abnormal and pays tribute to the ideal object of his work as well as to the total harmony and progress of the social organism in which he is but a 'contributing unit. In so far as he is a pure specialist he sacrifices his normality, his mental work as a human individual, to the social good as well as

to the impersonal perfecting of the body of work to which he is but a single and ephemeral contributor.¹ This is the supreme sacrifice brought by the specialist to the Altar of Humanity. It has never been expressed more emphatically as applied to the poet than in the beautiful verses of Alfred de Musset in the "Nuit de Mai," where he boldly calls in the simile of the self-inflicted death of the pelican to nurture his starving young, beginning with the words,

Lorsque le pélican, lassé d'un long voyage,
Dans les brouillards du soir retourne à ses roseaux

Pour toute nourriture il apporte son cœur.

Fortunately we are not all, and need not be, specialists to the same degree. We are, or ought to be, normal human beings; and before the specialist became one, he must fully have developed his mental normality. Yet even from the point of view of purely objective specialisation, we are bound to realise that there are again limitations to the forces which make for it, imposed by the all-important fact that the human mind, even more than the human body, is an organism, and not a mechanism. We must recall what was said above about the athlete and his training. The pure mathematician, the craftsman, the financier, the artist and the man of action, however much in the specialisation of their training they may master all the principles and facts of their definite work and concentrate all their energies on the definite task before them, must maintain their mental health and sanity, and must draw upon the fullness of their life experience, of thought and imagination, in order to concentrate the organic unity of their emotive forces upon the one activity or act. One definite instance will best illustrate this point: the performing

¹ See my article on "Specialisation, a Morbid Tendency of our Age," in *Minerva*, a cosmopolitan monthly review, edited by the late Pericles Tzikos in Rome, which appeared only in a few numbers in 1879.

artist, interpreting the works of the great masters, especially the pianist, requires the most complete mechanical control over his fingers, so that, upon the keyboard of the instrument which emits fully and mechanically all the sounds and their combinations which make up the great musical composition, he may render or interpret the fullness of the work of art. To attain this complete mastery of his art he must devote many hours of the day to this perfecting of this one definite skill; repeat difficult passages again and again, so that, almost subconsciously, they correctly flow from his fingers into the instrument; and he must also specialise in the appreciation and mastery of the musical works which he is to interpret and the whole of music in the atmosphere of which most of his conscious mentality must dwell. But such concentration of effort will not of itself make a great artist—even the reproductive artist. A young lady, who had attained considerable skill and virtuosity in pianoforte playing, visited the great master of the day, Moscheles, in order to ask his advice, whether or not she was fitted to become a professional pianist of the first order. After, at his request, playing a sonata of Beethoven, which she had thoroughly studied, he—perhaps cruelly—played the same sonata to her. When he had finished she sat there crushed and depressed, and appealingly asked him: “How can I ever learn to play like that?” The veteran artist turned upon her with a look of sternness, blended with sympathy, and answered, “Read Shakespeare!” This meant that, even in this comparatively mechanical function of one definite and special art, requiring the greatest concentration and subordination of all life-work upon the technical requirement of expression, the real spirit and essence of successful performance depends upon the wholeness of the personality, its mental and moral character,

the *Ethos*; and that this mental character, to be effectively sane, must include the essentials of life and mind in due proportion and harmony. More than that, all these factors which mentally make up life must not have passed singly and for the nonce through the apprehending mind, but must have been assimilated emotionally into the whole mentality, so that they effectually direct the will by means of natural spontaneous preference—harmoniotropic and aristotropic. They must have become æsthetic in character—what in one word we simply call "Taste." But this does not only apply to artistic activity, to which the instances I have given above belong, but to every mental activity.

The grammarian, the pure mathematician and metaphysician who live in the rarefied atmosphere, almost the vacuum, of abstract thought, above the air in which and through which we breathe and live, and attempt to apply and to adjust their abstract generalisations to nature and to life, lose that sense of proportion and *judgment* which guides us in mastering the vital art of weighing evidence. Their activities belong to an unreal world in which the questions of actual life almost become "puzzles" to be solved and treated like an intellectual pastime, and they live in a world where there are no hearts that beat, passions that burn, material and daily needs and wants that insistently cry for satisfaction and appeasement, or no ordinary uses of life that call for adoption or fulfilment. They have lost the normality of mind, and its own want of proportion and harmony distorts in their vision the harmony of nature and life.

Now the sense which makes us receptive and responsive to proportion and harmony is, as we have seen, essentially æsthetic in character and becomes active in the mind through emotion and imagination; while the ultimate test for the due recognition of proportion

and harmony must rest with that faculty of taste, and, moreover, good taste, applied to all things material and spiritual.

We are now faced with the practical problem as to whether taste—good taste—can be taught? I maintain that it can. But let me at once add that our educational aim must never be to produce poets or artists who, like de Musset's poet, "give their heart" and sacrifice their mental normality. Still less should we aim at producing the so-called *æsthete* of the last generation, who, with precious assertion of his own æsthetic refinement, opposed a manly and moderate athleticism and looked down upon the practical activities and eminently necessary and useful functions of a healthy society. Nor even the grammarian and metaphysician to whom we have just referred. It was the fear of this emasculating influence of art upon the training of the Attic citizen and upon the vigorous political life of the community as a whole, that led Plato and Aristotle to underestimate the nature, as well as the value, of art in its position in the State. The sense of due proportion and of good taste, however fundamental and important they are in themselves, must before all be applied to the educational position of art and æsthetics in the wholeness of life and mind.

Naturally the most direct form in which this æsthetic faculty is to be developed is through the appreciation of the best works of art, plastic and graphic, as well as musical and literary. The young should be surrounded by such works of art as are admittedly the best, and the inferior, the obtrusively resplendent as well as the obtrusively mean, are to be discarded. This applies also to the form and substance of domestic surroundings, and to articles of daily use. The desirability of this course has been, and is, strongly felt by many in our own days. I have

for some years been connected with an organisation called the Art for Schools Association, the work of which, I fear, has lately been suspended. It aimed at placing within the reach of all schools specimens of the Fine Arts to be displayed in the class-rooms, and thus to be constantly brought to the notice of all the pupils. I must add that I think it most important to select such specimens from the art of the past as are recognised as masterpieces. I do not think it wise to include those forms of contemporary art which may merely respond to a fashion or casual movement and which have not yet attained their right of existence as being of enduring value by longer test in time, and may, in fact, be purely ephemeral, or representative of an inferior phase of the national mentality. The same, of course, *a fortiori* applies to the national taste as represented by collections in museums, as well as in municipal buildings and the decoration of public places. As regards the literary, musical and dramatic arts, the same careful selection ought to be made by parents and educators, as well as by public bodies and the State. The example of the older Germany stands out in this respect with marked pre-eminence. Not only the capitals and metropolitan centres but even smaller provincial towns excelled in this public activity of æsthetic education. I can recall from my student days at Heidelberg how the neighbouring town of Mannheim, which then had a population of less than 50,000 inhabitants, supported a Theatre and Opera in which nearly all the Shakespearian dramas, besides the best modern plays of all nations, the great classical and modern operas, the best chamber music as well as orchestral and symphony concerts, could be seen and heard at such low prices as to be within the reach of all classes. Excellent actors and musicians, rendering works not surpassed in selection and in execution by similar institutions

in much larger cities, were regularly provided. Theatres and orchestras were moreover subventioned by the municipality by a tax on bread ! Surely it lies within the means of practical politics to bring before the young of all classes the purest art, and to enable the adult population to become habitually acquainted with the best works, embodying the best taste.

In the selection of literature, in the school readers and in recitation, far more care ought to be taken that the pupils be made familiar with the best works in poetry and prose, and be warned or carefully guarded against the bad taste and vulgarity and even sensationalism of much that is popularly included in such readers or which they are led to recite with dramatic precocity.

It is here that, both positively and negatively, the seeds of good taste can be sown and assured in their growth by the individual teacher in the school and the parent at home. To how many of these do most of us not owe the awakening of our taste for good literature, as well as our love of science and art in all their forms ? I have been told by many men of eminence and achievement that they owed a great debt to their housemaster or tutor at school for having tactfully lent or pressed upon them the best books, as well as by occasional criticism pointed out to them the bad taste in works of an inferior order, and thereby helped to develop in them the higher culture and the enthusiasm for the noble things of the mind. Of course, here again, great care must be taken as regards the form which such presentation and stimulation takes, as well as in the apposite time and place suited to the capacities of the young. Without this even the greatest classics, obtruded upon an unprepared and irresponsive mind, may produce lasting indifference, if not opposition. Above all, harmonious proportion must here also be applied, and the stimulation of taste in these directions must not take the form of

opposition to manly athletic interests or serious mental discipline, in work and play.

In the same way, besides the interest in "Nature study," the youthful mind and heart can be awakened to responsiveness to beauties in nature.

I know of the case of a wonderfully wise mother of four boys who, while in no way neglecting or depreciating accurate mental training and emotional development of character in work and play, carefully impressed upon her children the beauties in life, in nature and in art in the best forms that she could bring before them, without in any way producing in them the self-consciousness and pedantry of those conscious of their own refinement and "precious" superiority. On one occasion, in the old days of travelling by coach in America, after ascending the heights of the Catskill Mountains, this mother stood with her four boys, all wrapped in silence at the marvellous scene from the mountain peak, with the valley of the Hudson, through which the silver thread of the river glided past between fertile fields and woods, the luminous rays of the sun gleaming through massed clouds, until the smallest boy, aged nine, passionately fond of games and sport, burst forth with childish rapture, exclaiming, "This is better than a whole winter of Italian opera!" He had in the previous winter been taken to hear his first opera, which to him had been one of the most thrilling experiences of his life, and with his passionate love of music, coupled with an exceptional memory, he had been trilling some of the airs ever since. It was thus that this sublime experience in the heart of nature stirred him to express his supreme delight by comparing it with what in the art of music had previously been his most thrilling experience.

Thus to cultivate taste in every direction need never emasculate the sterner sense of duty nor the manliness

of character ; but, while providing the intellect with a dominant moving power, it will also tend, when applied to the art of living, to the refinement of taste, to the cultivation of good manners, to considerateness and tact in dealing with others, which is one of the highest, if not the latest, achievement of civilised society.

We thus come to the Art of Living itself. The atmosphere of the home, the school, of all collective social groups in what is called "tone," is most effective in producing good taste. It is here that individual parents and teachers can make or mar taste which, as we have seen in the chapter on Ethics, is ultimately the deciding factor in all ethics, in the appreciation of the Good, and in determining the right values in the clash of duties in Moral Casuistry. The general atmosphere of the home and of the school must be that of good breeding, good manners and good taste, leading to considerateness, charity and tact. Coarseness, vulgarity, and meanness must be held up to reproof and contempt in their ugliness and repulsiveness, so that they spontaneously produce disapproval and disgust. This course is more directly and lastingly effective than reasoned argument and moral condemnation, which, though appealing to intellectual and moral understanding, do not ensure effective control and direction in action to the same degree.

By example and by well-timed injunction, blatant self-assertion or morbid self-effacement and shyness are to be stigmatised and repressed, and are to be replaced by perfect harmony and the grace of good and natural manners ; the young are to be led to avoid humour and pleasantry as well as seriousness or solemnity out of time or place, the tedious obtrusiveness of the frivolous jester or the pedantic prig ; and positively and spontaneously to evoke the spirit of beauty dominating individual and collective action in every home and social centre.

When, finally, we come to the higher specialised and scientific studies in universities and in after life, the results of our inquiries in the chapter on Epistemology have shown us that, beginning with our sense-perceptions, our powers of observation must be intensified in every direction and made accurate and refined, sensitive to those manifestations of objective harmony in the outer world and in the functioning of our sensory organs—both of which rest upon æsthetic properties.

We have seen too that the further mental processes, effected by our memory and associative faculties, which are also based upon the principle of harmony and æsthetic responsiveness, are dependent upon our imagination, and that the full realisation of Truth in *conviction* ultimately leads to an æsthetic emotion; until, finally, in the discovery of new truths by means of isolation of phenomena and concentration upon their relationships, our creative, imaginative and æsthetic faculties are of supreme and effective importance. Still more have we realised how in the exposition of Truth the æsthetic quality is so pronounced that it can hardly be distinguished from the activities of the poet and the artist.

If this be true, then it will be of undeniable importance that, however intense and thorough the concentration of the special student of science upon the exact and natural sciences may have to be, the successful pursuit of these studies themselves, as well as the mental health of the scientific specialist as a normal human being, will always make it necessary that in higher academic studies what are called the Humanities should hold an important position, not only in the preparatory training of the scientific specialist, but continuously, throughout the whole of his subsequent work and life.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

I

THE FUTURE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ¹

*A Lecture delivered to the Summer Meeting Students at Cambridge
on Wednesday, August 11, 1920.*

THE Chairman,² in his opening remarks, said Sir Charles had had the cause of the League of Nations at heart for a great many years—many more than the years in which it had been familiar to them. His lecture that afternoon would be of great interest and importance.

Before proceeding with his lecture, Sir Charles Walston said : “ I venture to point out to you a very striking coincidence. In the first week of August 1914, just six years ago, during a course of lectures on ‘ Art and Industry ’ which I had the honour to give to this same Summer Meeting, we stood before the greatest world crisis. I then adjured my audience to stand together and submerge all individual and party differences in defence of the country and our country’s honour. I maintained that we could not stand by and see France crushed. (Applause.) That was on the 2nd of August. To-day, after peace has been signed, we stand before another crisis—a great world crisis. The world is threatened with international as well as national anarchy. It is my firm conviction that if the League of Nations were fully and efficiently organised, with a practically efficient machinery for ensuring its just decisions, the danger to the world and its civilisation would be averted.”

What is the future of the League of Nations ? Sir Charles proceeded. As in the history of most human institutions, the future, with its prospective environment, depends to a considerable degree upon their past and present. We are

¹ Here reprinted from the shorthand report published by the *Cambridge Daily News*, with slight corrections.

² The Rev. R. St. John Parry, Vice-Master of Trinity College.

not to any great degree concerned here to-day with the past history of the League, on which aspect of the question there exists considerable literature. You will be able to inform yourself of this past history by referring to any of the established treatises or textbooks on international law, especially in those chapters which deal with the laws regulating war.

The plans for the prevention of war go far back in the literature of civilised peoples, some of them partaking of a purely imaginary character in some so-called Utopian reconstruction of human society ; others, more consistently philosophical and reasoned and even technically legal and political, form the groundwork for the modern development of International Law.

We are distinctly not concerned with this aspect of the question, nor even chiefly with an exposition of the actual present constitution of the Covenant in all its articles and details. To apprehend clearly and fully this latter aspect of the question, I can refer you especially to the numerous publications easily procurable at a low cost through the efforts of the League of Nations Union, under whose direct auspices I am addressing you to-day. I may single out among the most convenient and instructive publications of this kind the pamphlet by Sir Geoffrey Butler (*A Handbook to the League of Nations*) ; *The League of Nations*, by Sir Frederick Pollock ; *Lectures on the League of Nations*, by Dr. T. J. Lawrence ; *The League of Nations : A Practical Suggestion*, by General Smuts ; *The League of Nations*, by Prof. L. Oppenheim ; and an article on "The League of Nations and the Problem of Sovereignty," by Lord Robert Cecil.

Thus, with the past and the present we are not chiefly concerned, and I shall only refer to them in so far as they are essential to the understanding of the future and more or less help us in our somewhat bold, though, tentative, forecast. The actual and distinctive nature of the modern League of Nations differs essentially from the history of the more remote past of the League (roughly speaking, down to the second half of the last century), in that all schemes for the prevention of war were purely academic and philosophical—they were mere paper-schemes, and were not before the world as actual

political enactments on which the several nations had to come to a definite decision. They had not been raised from the sphere of thought to that of action. On the other hand, such definite attempts as that of the Vienna Congress and the Holy Alliance differed fundamentally from the present state of the question in that the direct aim of that alliance was concerned, negatively, in combating, not only all national revolution, but also the whole trend of the liberal movement within the several civilised States; and, positively, to uphold all that is summarised under the term Legitimacy. Its activity was not wholly and definitely international in purview and in interventive action, but penetrated into the internal national political life of the more liberal States. It is much more difficult for me to deal with the present constitution and the resultant activity of the League in the form which the Covenant has taken.

I should not forgive myself—nor would you—if, in anything I said, I should weaken or retard the realisation of the great central aim which supporters of the League of Nations have set themselves, and to play into the hands of the Reactionaries, Chauvinists, Junkers, and Militarists—who exist not only in Germany but among us as well, as also (let us hope in minorities) in other civilised nations—who consider, with the Bernhardis, that war is a “biological necessity,” and even that it ultimately tends towards the moral advancement of mankind. I should prefer—and I have acted accordingly for some time—to suppress, though never to abandon, my own firm convictions, if I thought that, by urging them in a wide and effective publicity, such would be the result. As I am honestly prepared to give all the small help that I am able to give to those who are following the same ultimate ends, for which I would willingly sacrifice my own life, so I would beg of you not to be misled by any criticism I may make with regard to the actual constitution and the present activities of the existing League, to glide into, or deliberately to adopt, an inimical attitude towards the Covenant. Nor would I have you believe that I am unmindful of the high-minded and intelligent work which all those have done who have been actively concerned in drafting the Covenant in Paris, and are now using their best efforts for its realisation amid momentous, gravely tragic, and

ominous complications of the world's affairs since the signing of the Armistice, and more especially at this most critical moment in the world's history. Honest and far-sighted statesmen, like Lord Grey of Fallodon, General Smuts, Mr. Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil, Lord Phillimore, and almost every one of our other statesmen, and (to mention but one of the great men in other countries) M. Léon Bourgeois, have done all in their power during the drafting of the Covenant to steer the gallant ship among all the rocks and snags of conflicting interests, national and personal convictions, to within reasonable hailing distance of the secure harbour of lasting peace and international co-operation; and in so far we all of us, and the whole world, must be grateful to them. I may add that the formulation of the idea of Mandatory Powers conferred on the League was a stroke of genius for which alone the originator (is it General Smuts?) has won lasting fame.

On the other hand, I should not be doing my duty to you, nor to my better self, nor possibly to the world at large, if, absolutely convinced as I am that, during this period since the drafting of its constitution and the actual establishment of the League as a working body, it has far from fulfilled the promise of the promoters and hopes of the public, I did not fearlessly point out where I think there are flagrant, yet remediable, faults in its constitution. More especially, at this present momentous crisis in the world's history, I am bound to supplement such negative criticism by pointing to what, in my own conviction, is a constructive means of remedying its defects, when there is a possibility—nay, a definite probability—that such remedial practical action could be taken in the immediate future to save the whole situation.

Now, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for me to give you in so short a time a full and adequate exposition of the constructive plan to which, perhaps with some foolhardiness, I attribute such far-reaching benefits to the great cause which we all have at heart. It is for this reason only that I feel bound to acquaint those who may have especial interest in the question with a fuller account of my own views, which it is but right that I should tell you were not formulated or published in one day, month, or year, but go back, as a matter of fact, many years before their first publication in 1899, and have

been repeated and modified ever since. They thus possess, not the fault, but the merit, of progressive modification in the various phases of their publication to the present day. Besides the public, but not printed, anticipation of this scheme in the early seventies of the last century, an outline sketch was published (after an address at the Imperial Institute in London in 1898) in my book on *The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace* in 1899. It was further embodied in my book *Artisodemocracy*, etc., written in the winter of 1914-15 and published in the spring of 1916. Further aspects of the vital question were referred to in my book *Patriotism : National and International*, 1917 ; while in the pamphlet *The Next War : Wilsonism and Anti-Wilsonism* (October 1918) it is more definitely formulated ; until, in the autumn of 1919, the first publication of 1899 (which has now been out of print for some time) is republished, as well as the pamphlet on *The Next War*, with some added new material, in *The English-speaking Brotherhood and the League of Nations*. Since then, last April, I have also published a more condensed article in the *Renaissance Politique* of Paris, to which the veteran M. Boutroux has added an introduction.

While the modern conception and the ensuing movement towards a League of Nations, as we have seen, differs essentially from the individual and more academic schemes to ensure the peace of the world in the past, as well as from the more distinctly political action of the Holy Alliance, it must be admitted that these previous efforts in general *did* contribute to the creation of a public consciousness and the public opinion of the civilised world, so that men were prepared for its realisation in the national life of civilised peoples. The actual schemes were thus not cast upon the world as doctrinaire paper-schemes of the moment, but had in the very heart of their vitality what is called " historical evolution," infusing actual life and durability into the organic soundness of constitutional sanctions which States and individuals give to their effective laws. Still more has this been the case in the more compressed and rapid evolution of the last fifty years preceding the actual drafting of the Covenant. Step by step, during this period the historian of the future will be able to trace the advance of the seed towards germination and

complete fructification in the final production of the Covenant to initiate this greatest definite act in history—namely, the concerted decision of civilised nations to substitute Justice and Law for the Ordeal of Battle. "

Now, in the evolution of that public consciousness, or public opinion, there were several environing, or accessory, factors which had favoured and accelerated its growth and consistency to such a degree that, without their confluence, there could not have been that great torrent of human conviction rushing onward and carrying all impediments before it to the goal of realisation. To enumerate but three (though there are many more): The growth of intercommunication between the several nations, civilised and even half-civilised, and its facility, directness, and universality—whatever dissociating forces of competition, jealousy, provincialism of heart and mind, differences of national temperament and habits of living, may have existed, exist, and will exist—brought even remote people of different race and nationality sufficiently into communion with one another that it at least strengthened and made more real the consciousness of people in all civilised countries of the intimate relationship, if not the identity, of human beings to one another. The consequence of this closer sympathy and the familiarity with the lives of other nations, was that but few sane and moral citizens in all the civilised States could contemplate, without protest and horror, the idea that they should in cold blood slay the fathers, husbands, and sons of the families whom they had hospitably received, whom they had known in their several countries, or with whom they were in some, more or less, direct communication in social or business life. I may here at once mention, by the way, to those who constantly and with arrogant readiness assert that man has always been in the past what he is in the present and that past history proves that the readiness to slay is inherent in man—to those who glibly and ignorantly affirm in their arguments on all questions of social and material life that something is "against nature"—that the cave-dweller in the early Stone Age certainly had no such feelings as regards his fellow-men living thousands of miles from his own home among the most different conditions of life. Even towards his immediate neighbour of another family, clan, or

tribe, he would have had no hesitation whatever nor any scruples in slaying him. Why, some of your grandfathers would not only have considered it the right but the supreme duty of the model man of honour, to retire to Chalk Farm in order to shoot, or be shot by, a man who had insulted them. Further, in the economic evolution of our times, it had been realised (though the constraining force of the economic factor in modern life had in this connection—as perhaps now in other national and social problems—been greatly exaggerated by some writers and thinkers) that the economic loss or destruction of one nation did not result in the gain of its enemy—in fact, that the economic organism of the world is so delicate, that every nation might be the loser by the destruction of any one, and that the Wars of Conquest, which formed the chief motive to many, if not most, wars of the past, were no longer possible. In the third place, the economic burden of armaments tended to become such as to be practically unbearable to each nation as they progressed, until finally they would lead to bankruptcy.

The direct influence of these kindred forces, filtering into the public and political consciousness, especially of all democratic peoples, led to definite action on the part of those in authority, of the several Governments and rulers, and more definitely took the form of the numerous treaties of arbitration between various States, especially between the United States and ourselves, in which notably President Taft was most successfully active; until finally we come to the Peace Conference at The Hague, the immediate precursor of our Covenant. I may at once say that, however useful and meritorious the establishment of that international body has been, it failed in its real effectiveness, to my mind, for two reasons: first, that it had no force to ensure the carrying into effect of its decisions; and, second, that it aimed at being a definite Legislative Body, which, I believe, was premature, as I also believe that, to a great degree, the same objections apply to the present Covenant.

Thus it cannot be said that the League of Nations has been sprung upon the world out of the air and on paper only as a Utopian League of Dreams (as it has been called by our confirmed enemies); but that it has all the essentials of natural,

historical, and moral evolution which it is (perhaps with some exaggeration) maintained is essential to the durable establishment of social and political institutions.

We now come to the final fructification of this long and continuous germination in the world's history, and to the greatest crisis which civilised man has ever faced, namely, after the entrance of the United States into the Great War to the advent of President Wilson on the scene in Paris and the constitution of the Covenant.

This was indeed a moment in history most pregnant with the destiny of future man, and I cannot believe that it is an exaggeration to say, that no one man was ever presented with an opportunity of effecting to a greater degree the welfare of nations and individuals in his own personality and by his own judgment than was President Wilson on the occasion of his first visit. The whole world and all Governments, including even our enemies, were prepared to receive favourably whatever he might suggest, and, if not blindly to accept his own decisions, at least to meet the expression of his own judgment in a spirit of *a priori* favourableness, which has hardly ever been vouchsafed to any leader or prophet leading a cause. This did not only apply to the anticipation of a spirit of wise fairness, which the whole world was led to expect from him, in the drafting of the Peace Treaty itself, and by this wisdom and fairness to overcome some of the most complicated and apparently hopeless problems inherent in any such Treaty; but also in the weight he would carry towards the realisation of a League of Nations. As regards the most critical and difficult problems of the Peace Treaty itself, there were many of us who realised (and all ought to have realised this) that the advent of the United States into the war was the most significant and hopeful contingency, not only for the promise of an early victory and cessation of the war itself, but because the more disinterested, if not completely neutral, position of the United States, with regard to the hereditary conflict of interests in the form of the lust of annexation and the guarding of the Balance of European Power, coupled with the wisdom, judgment, and tact of the authoritative and august mouthpiece of American public opinion, would tend to solve all the difficulties grouped round the general question of annexation.

tion, the reconstitution of dissolved empires, and, above all, the disposal of the colonies ceded by the Central Powers. We all feared during every stage of the progress of the war, especially before Russia had left the ranks of the Allies, that the conflicting interests of the Allied Powers and the grasping spirit of the traditional foreign policy of each one of them would produce endless difficulties in the final ratification of peace. The same evil traditions, fixed by centuries of organisation and methods in Foreign Offices and diplomacy, in the strength and fixity of their survival endangered the realisation of any League of Nations or Covenant.

It is not for me here—nor, I believe, for any living person of the present day—to anticipate the verdict of history with regard to the personality and activity of President Wilson in relation to the Paris Peace Conference. We must leave this to the judgment of future history. Perhaps the unqualified sweeping condemnation of his action, so widely expressed and accepted at the present moment, may, to a considerable degree, be reversed. But so much we may venture to say with the deepest regret, that, if wisdom and tact in the sympathetic projection into the mentality of other people and nations, and in foreseeing the results of his action even upon the people of the United States and its government and constitution, had been more dominant in every phase of his activity, the results might have been far different and far more favourable. To take but one flagrant contingency: If the President had associated with the personnel of his own commission, some of the outstanding figures of the other great party in his own country, and especially those clearly identified with the class of work before the Paris Conference, such as Mr. Taft and Mr. Root, the experience and the advice of such men might have been of inestimable advantage both in the deliberations and in the decisions of the Conference, and would have assured authoritative consideration for such decisions in the United States itself.

But the Peace Treaty has practically been concluded, and the League of Nations has been established. Yet, as was to be expected, the conditions of the Peace Treaty itself have presented the contracting parties, and the whole world, with

contentious points, which cannot, and could not, at once be successfully removed. The Covenant of the League of Nations has been drawn up and approved. Yet here also the justified hopes of the whole world have not been realised. So far from this being the case, a large number of those who, confidently hoped for its success have practically given up their hope, or have at least lost their enthusiastic assurance in its effectiveness; and though the cause is far from being lost, and the work of so many wise and high-minded men has, we must hope, not been in vain, the present position and influence of the League as constituted is far from being what it ought to be. The question, therefore, before us is, whether the present constitution of the League cannot be replaced by another, or at least, whether it cannot be modified in certain directions to restore the efficiency and prestige which it had at the outset all over the world, and to ensure its help during the present crisis and those that are coming, to put right the conditions of the civilised world which are completely awry. It is our duty, and would be an unpardonable sin of omission on our part if we did not do our best, to save the position, and even to strengthen the life and dominance of this greatest movement in the world's history.

In simple words, the world at large has lost faith as regards confidence in the assured impartiality and justice of the League as now constituted; while, on the other hand, it is rightly convinced that the League as such (in contradistinction to the Allied Council of Great Powers) is in no way in a position to enforce the carrying out of its decisions. The result is quite analogous to the attitude naturally taken up by the world with regard to the Hague Conference. The complicated constitution of the League—which gives sign of so much intense labour and the surrender in compromise of the convictions of its several promoters—gives clear evidence of the desire on the part of the framers to uphold the claims of the sovereignty and prescriptive and traditional rights of the several States, and the result is an imperfect compromise. Not only those opposed to the League, but the world at large, is therefore not convinced that the one object aimed at is the substitution of a New Order for the Old Order, especially with regard to the foreign policy of nations and the attainment of the one

immediate and ultimate aim—the ensurance of pure justice as a sovereign force to which all other sovereignty admittedly will, and in fact must, bow. It is this bugbear of national sovereignty which consciously or subconsciously has stood, and will stand, in the way of a clear formulation of any international or supernational body which can ensure peace in the world.

Let me at once say that the world is certainly not ripe for a Supernational State, for “the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World,” not even for a Supernational Legislature, and, I may add, not even for a Supernational Court (in the technical sense of that term), which administers justice on the basis of a fixed code of law to which all nations have given their sanction. But all nations and all their citizens will admit that they will bow to Justice so far as it is realisable in this imperfect world of ours. I may, by the way, also refer you, as regards that critical point concerning national sovereignty, to the short and able treatment of that question in the article of Lord Robert Cecil to which I have already referred, and perhaps also to my own treatment of the subject in my previous writings. I should merely like to add one word on this point: that national sovereignty never has been as absolute as its champions endeavour to make out, even in the past centuries of pure dynastic autocracy. Further, every international treaty, or convention among States, is a limitation of sovereignty. A short time ago the postage of local letters in several European countries was necessarily raised to very nearly the same height as letters to distant portions of the United States. While these autonomous governments were quite free reasonably to raise their rate of postage to meet financial exigencies within their own country, they felt powerless to apply this equitable rise in scale to the various countries within the Postal Union because of their convention with them. They rightly bowed, whatever the “law of necessity” might be, to the just obligations they had once incurred.

Now, the constitution of the United States is broad and simple in its meaning and phrasing, avoids all complicated details, and is published in a few pages of print. It determines the relationship between the fluid and growing number of

States within a great continent, their complicated inter-relation in life, commerce and politics among each other, and to the Federal Government as a whole. It has maintained its constraining moral power up to the present day, when about one hundred million people live in peace under its sway. It has been subjected to but eighteen amendments during nearly one hundred and fifty years, of which eleven were added within the first two years, and only two amendments were of what might be called essential importance.

When now we turn to the articles of the Covenant, the constitution of the Council and of the Assembly, and of their relations to one another; the fact that unanimity is required to make valid so many important decisions of the Council; the punctilious regard for traditional rights and interests, often in themselves in direct conflict to a broader international justice—all these elements counteract conviction and faith in the practical efficiency of such a Constitution. To a still greater degree, tending in this direction, is the fact that the Council itself and, to a lesser degree, the Assembly as well, are made up of the representatives (especially as regards the Council) of a limited number of the leading States, and, moreover, the representatives of the party in power in the democratic States, who thus, I need hardly say, do not always, or necessarily, represent the unanimous, or even predominant, opinion of the nation itself. With all these national representatives on this supreme national body, however, there is one grave fault, namely, that, from the nature and method of their appointment (and this is certainly the case with the Council) they are inherently representative of the national interests which they impersonate. They have, as it were, a mandate to represent such national interests as official representatives of the government of the day (however desirous they may be of upholding fairness in all their dealings and decisions), and are not distinctly, absolutely and solemnly appointed to administer supernatural justice and nothing else.

These are the elements in the constitution of the League itself, which weaken, if they do not destroy, the faith which the world at large desires to place in its absolute impartiality and justice. But when we come to the actual history during the international crises of the world since the League has

been constituted and prepared to take up its work, the immediate causes for the loss of faith in the League are numerous and patent. For manifest reasons, the powerless League could not be invoked to clear up on the lines of equity and justice the difficulties which beset the completion of the Peace Treaty and the many new difficulties which have since then arisen. Its powers of deliberation were still further compromised and weakened, if not totally ignored, as it was also not endowed with any physical power to enforce its decisions. All the problems of these later days were therefore determined by the Council of the Great Powers, with the loss of some of its chief representatives, until practically it has been in the hands of two great and patriotic men, representing two of the leading great nations of the world, each burdened with a world of commitments and just obligations to their own countries as well as to their Allies; but each of them honestly, strenuously, and with admirable devotion bent upon the preservation of the world's peace.

But, meanwhile, where has the League of Nations been, solemnly inaugurated with so much labour by the chief representatives of all the greater and smaller leading nations in the world? Is it to be wondered at that people have lost faith in the reality and effective power of the League? Finally, we come to the action of the United States in withdrawing its adhesion and support. I do not wish to judge, or to account for, the action of the United States Senate, or of other political bodies in that friendly country. But so much is clear, that they have taken exception chiefly to two of the articles (XVI and III with annex). Article XVI in certain eventualities committed all members of the League to intervention with their armed forces to uphold certain decisions of the League, which, they maintained, amounting to a declaration of war, is contrary to their constitution, by which war can only be declared after due Parliamentary deliberation and decision. Article III, with annex, placed this nation of about one hundred million people, in the very forefront of modern civilisation and power, in an inferiority as regards the number of its representatives, compared, let us say, to the British Empire, including its Dominions. I need not dwell upon the essential importance of what this secession from the

body of the League means. I consider it fatal; unless it were possible to meet the objections thus raised by the United States by a modification of the constitution of the League as it now stands. Only if such fairly modified Covenant were rejected, would it be wise and just to continue in our efforts towards peace without the co-operation of the United States.

Can such amendments be made, and, if so, what are they?

In proposing such a scheme, there is but one fear which would prevent my giving expression to it, that is the fear of the charge of grotesque presumptuousness. But when conviction is deep, honest, and not hasty, it would be wrong and cowardly to give way to such fear. I am confirmed in the rightness of my course by the fact that the proposal I have to make is not hasty, but has been matured during many years, and, above all, in that I have the benefit of all the wisdom and the work lavished by the framers of the Covenant upon the plan which they have laid before the world. I must ever remind myself, as I beg also to remind you, that it is always easier to find fault with the work of others and to suggest amendments than it is positively to initiate a new great and elaborate work of construction. From this *ex post facto* point of view may I therefore be allowed to suggest what might have been a more efficient course to pursue in the disentanglement of this immense and complex crisis in the world's history.

In the light of what has since happened, and is transpiring now, we are justified in maintaining that the ideal procedure on the part of the assembled Paris Peace Conference would have been to initiate and to carry through with all possible rapidity all the broad conditions of peace with regard to all the different points and corresponding articles, with the express proviso that all further questions or doubtful points were to be referred for final decision to the International Body which they were, by the emphatic consent of all the contracting parties, to call into existence, and which was clearly to furnish the highest conceivable effectiveness in deciding with pure fairness and justice each doubtful or contentious case. Thus one of the chief, if not the essential, decision of the whole Peace Treaty would have been the agreement to establish such an international, or rather supernational, body to

secure justice and to entrust it with this first and supreme Mandate.

Failing the creation and effective equipment of a Supernational Police Force under the direct control of this Supernational Body, the Allies would have bound themselves to retain in existence a quota of their complete military forces, as heretofore under the Commander-in-Chief, to be placed, in case of need, at the disposal of this Supernational Body to enforce its decisions—in the first place, above all, in carrying out the terms of the Treaty itself, subject to its decision in all questions that were left undecided, after hearing the arguments of both sides.

There would then follow the careful framing of the constitution of this Supernational Body on the broad lines previously agreed to. Now, this Supernational Body was distinctly not to be anything of the nature of a Supernational State, nor of a Supernational Legislative Body, though its decisions might, in the course of time, be incorporated into something approaching to the common law of England as it has been evolved through centuries of growth. It was not to be even a Supernational Court in the strict meaning of that term, namely, a body of technically qualified jurists to administer law, for the simple reason, among others, that no such law exists to which the sanction of all nations has been given. It would simply be a Supernational Jury; and in this, by analogy to the history of English common law, it would follow the same natural and rational process of evolution. Professor A. F. Pollard has strikingly exemplified this process in the history of English law in the establishment of the beginnings of the trial by jury in the time of Henry II.

“The analogy comes from the somewhat distant past when men were striving to find some alternative to private war as a means to settling claims to property, just as we are to-day seeking another means than war of settling international disputes. I refer to the social circumstances amid which Henry II succeeded to the throne. The civil war of Stephen's reign had produced as many claimants, on an average, to each estate, as there are now to Constantinople, to Fiume, or to Lemberg; and then, as now, the only arbitrament recognised by custom was the sword for gentlemen of honour or the ordeal for less military folk. The claimant

challenged the possessor to single combat, and the defendant had to fight or forfeit his title; he was never secure except in his preparedness for battle, and, to quote Bernhardt's statement of modern militarist doctrine, 'what was right was determined by the arbitrament of war.' How and in what order of procedure did Henry II deal with the problem? Amateur historians may reply that it was an easy matter for him because he had the machinery of a national State behind him. But in fact there was hardly a national government at all; there was no standing army at the Crown's disposal for the purpose, no police, no public opinion; and the combatants were as much addicted and inured to the arbitrament of the sword as nations are to-day. Henry II had fewer means of dealing with his problem than we have with ours, and hence the value of the precedent he set.

"He did not attempt to create a new constitution, but limited himself to practical matters of detail. He provided possessors of land with a new writ out of chancery, called the writ *de pace habenda*. This, without any inquiry into the merits of the case, placed at their disposal whatever resources the Crown might possess as a protector against a challenger; it simply prohibited aggression. By itself it was as inadequate a means of justice as our proposed moratorium, but its value lay in its natural consequences. There were claimants with a good title just as there were possessors with a bad; and they naturally came to Henry with the justice of their case. We can—descending to modern vernacular—imagine the gist of Henry's reply: 'Now you are beginning to talk; you abandon, do you, your argument of might and arbitrament of the sword, and are content to rely on the justice of your claim? In that case we will see what can be done for you.' And he provided a further method of procedure, this time for the claimant. It was to the effect that he might have a writ ordering the election of jurors, sworn to declare the facts as they knew them, and requiring both the parties to abide by their decision. Thus was substituted the test of evidence as to right for the proof of might in battle, and out of these writs there grew in time our system of trial by jury, the perpetual English example to the world of the triumph of argument over force."

Now, the functions of this Supernational Jury would, in the first instance, be strictly limited to the international questions which for the time being were entrusted to it for solution and would not extend its functions beyond this, excepting when, in the course of time, at the unqualified

request and invitation of all the contending parties, they were asked thus to extend their activity, the whole tendency perhaps leading ultimately, in the remote future, to an ideal Confederate Super-State—the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World.

This Supernational Jury would have but one immediate and ultimate duty and function : to decide, after due pleadings on the part of experts of both sides, in the spirit of impartiality with the aim of establishing pure justice. Though there would exist between them and our ordinary juries a strong analogy of power and function, the essential difference would be that they would not be chosen at haphazard from among all available citizens, who by antecedents, locality, business and profession in life, might, as is so often the case, be biased in their judgment, and, still more important, would be essentially unfitted to such delicate work of sifting evidence and of maintaining high ideals of abstract justice ; but they would be, as it were, expert representatives of honourableness, fairness, of clearness and loftiness of mind and life. They would be chosen in each country professedly from among those citizens whose manifest record was highest in these directions ; and would thus not be either professional jurists or statesmen, certainly not the manifest and professed guardians of national prosperity and interests—the actual members of any Government.

I confess that an initial difficulty exists in determining the national authority who in each State would appoint such representatives. But I may say that this problem is far from being insoluble, and that this power might in every country be vested in authorities which would at least free their appointees from the charge of being representative of one party or class interest. Above all, they would distinctly have no mandate to represent, and to contend for, the individual interests of their own country, as little as a judge would be expected to be guided by his own natural local interests and those of consanguinity. With the greatest possible solemnity they would upon appointment bind themselves to counteract all such elements of partiality and to give their decisions purely in the spirit of absolute justice.

This Supernational Jury would in numbers be a large

body, and I may add that the larger and more varied, the greater the security of impartiality and freedom from all dangers of collusion and intrigue. I need not dwell upon the preventive measures which might be taken by the body itself to repair any manifest infringement of these fundamental laws of conduct on the part of the members. They are readily devised.

The full members of the League would all be represented on this jury ; but, of course, the full membership would be a fluid body, as the process of conversion from Territories to States in the United States also provides for the increase of the constituent membership of that great federation.

As regards the numbers of representatives, these would be determined in the ratio of the number of inhabitants in each State (by the millions), but it would be fixed by a maximum and a minimum. The minimum would naturally be one representative ; the maximum would also be fixed so that no one State should have an undue preponderance. The apparent difficulties in fixing such a maximum are in no way insuperable, but I do not wish to take up time by entering into a lengthy discussion on this point. The same applies with regard to the full admission of such vast dominions and population as that, for instance, of China, with its 400 million inhabitants. At present there are 45 States already belonging to the League, and there are 25 other States asking for admission. It will readily be seen that this jury will represent a large body, but prospectively not larger than that of any of the Parliaments of modern States.

Now, though it would be foolish to assume that in this world of ours unfailing absolute justice can always be secured, I am ready to throw down the gauntlet to anybody who would maintain that he could devise or imagine a body less likely to be partial, and more likely to administer pure justice, than such a select body of men from every civilised State, chosen because of untarnished reputation and high standing and solemnly bound to administer justice—a body, moreover, each member of which has during the time of holding this high office relinquished, in so far, his own nationality.

Of course this purely judiciary function will necessarily be accompanied by certain administrative functions. But these

administrative functions would be limited to those immediately concerned with their international judiciary work, and would, in so far, be assigned to sub-committees, or to co-opted experts and assessors in these definite administrative tasks. This would, above all, apply to the administration of the International Police Force following upon the relative disarmament of all nations.

Apart from all moral and social considerations, the economic conditions of the world make the establishment of such a Supernational Police Force an absolute necessity in the future. The bankrupt nations of the civilised world will never be able to continue the pre-war traditions of national defensive armament; and the more uncertain and threatening conditions of international life become to all States in the immediate future, the less, under the economic conditions of the present, will it be possible to meet the growing enormous demands. There is no other alternative open to us from the pure business point of view, and we must follow the current of modern business in other spheres in devising this form of "pooling" in the interests of national self-preservation to all of us and of the peace of the world.

The Supernational Police Force would distinctly not be made up of quotas of national armies as such. If not impossible, it is still very unlikely that we shall always find that national armies will themselves fight in the interest of some remote State, and still more unwillingly would they fight their own nationals. Nor will this ever form a cohesive and efficient army, navy, and air force. But this Police Force would consist of those individuals from every nationality who, for the time being, after swearing fealty to the Supernational Body itself, would submerge their own nationality into that of the Supernational Body, and who—as many thousands in every nation can readily be found—by predisposition and by acquired tastes, had chosen the profession of arms. They will in this respect be analogous to the "mercenaries" of old, who for centuries formed the body of the armies waging European wars under various masters, with this one essential difference: that their loyalty to their "sovereign" will not be conditioned solely by their material pay, but will be powerfully effected by the moral prestige of the body whom they serve and the

ideal and supreme cause which they adopt for the good of the world.

Granted relative disarmament, I am assured by military experts that a concentrated and ever-ready compact army, navy, and air force—ready as is a modern fire brigade to hasten to the extinction of any conflagration within its reach—would victoriously sweep through any district of the world. Besides the central force at the immediate call of the Supernational Jury in its fixed habitation, there would be numerous and more remote local stations all connected by wireless telegraphy, so that rapid action could at once be taken to prevent any infraction of the peace against the decision of the Supernational Jury. In course of time, with the growth and strengthening of public opinion throughout the civilised world and with the realisation of the material power backing justice, infractions of international law leading to war will become less frequent and even inconceivable. Though passionate crime among individuals can only be punished after commission, such crime is caused by momentary passion; whereas the waging of national war, implying preparation and complicated mobilisation of forces, all of which require much time and deliberation, and in democracies pass through various deliberate phases, is distinctly preventable when individual crime is not.

There are only two infractions of national sovereignty which would be vested in the power of the Supernational Jury, which, however, are essential. The first is the securing of disarmament in every country and the power to check all attempts at clandestine preparation for war when this is notified by the recognised agents accredited to each State. The second is the control of its own publicity and the ensurance of truth with regard to international relations throughout the world. The Supernational Jury must have authority for the most effective distribution of its decisions and pronouncements among the population of every one of its members and even beyond its own body, as it must also have power to contradict and to rectify any untrue statement published in any country to the prejudice of international peace. If this latter power had existed before, by itself it might have prevented most wars of the immediate past, as it

would prevent misunderstandings and consequent animosities among the several civilised peoples at this very moment. For it is from such misunderstandings and misrepresentations, some apparently trivial in themselves, that the seeds of the gravest conflicts are sown throughout the world.

We are now at the cross roads on which civilisation progresses throughout the world, and which, when blocked or diverted, may lead to war and ruin. • Though in no way wishing to interfere with the internal political life of a great and free nation like the United States, may I be allowed to appeal to the American people, that in their hands again lies the decision of right and wrong, good and evil, prosperity and misery, for the whole world—as it did in the spring of 1917 and in the autumn of 1918. Will they remain outside of this League of Peace and turn their backs on their brethren and their blood-relations of the Old World, and say to themselves: “What matter is their life and prosperity to us?” With the new conditions which can thus be substituted and which meet all the objections on the grounds of which the United States Senate felt bound to step out of the Covenant (for they will never have to declare war at the command of any other Power, and their representation on the Supernational Jury will be justly adequate to their own greatness and importance) will not either, or both, parties who are out to elect the chief magistrate of their great democracy step forward and propose some positive revision of the Covenant which will ensure the firm constitution of such a Supernational Body and perpetuate peace to themselves and to the world at large? In the United States of John Hay, President Roosevelt, and President Taft, as well as of President Wilson, the League of Nations cannot be a Party Question.

II. RESPUBLICA LITTERATORUM¹

CHER MONSIEUR JOHANNET,

Dans la question pleine d'intérêt et d'importance que vous avez eu le mérite de poser avec des anticipations si suggestives, il me semble qu'il y a deux éléments essentiels qui excitent les différences, mais, espérons-le, qui confirment aussi les harmonies des manières de voir :

Et d'abord : parmi les peuples civilisés, est-ce qu'un accord plus que national—supra-national—entre les *litterati* est possible et désirable ? Ou, en d'autres termes, est-il possible de produire et d'intensifier un patriotisme international comme il existe déjà un patriotisme national ? Ou bien, est-ce que ce patriotisme international est une chimère, *un contre-sens*, parce que l'élément international agit d'une manière dissolvante quand il s'infiltré dans le sentiment du patriotisme ?

Si la réponse à cette question est affirmative, reste la deuxième : est-ce qu'une association, une coopération ou une organisation de l'intelligence—une *respublica litteratorum*—promet d'être vraiment effective dans la vie sociale et politique du monde, ou sera-t-elle purement idéale, sans vraie influence ; bref, complètement académique ?

I.—Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire—car vous les connaissez—que dans mes livres *Aristodemocracy*, dans *Patriotism, National and International*, dans *The English-speaking Brotherhood and the League of Nations*, la thèse principale repose sur cet internationalisme patriotique. Mais qu'on ne dise pas que nous sommes des internationalistes "*pacifistes*," Bolcheviks ou Marxistes, qui pendant cette guerre auraient refusé

¹ The following is a reply to an *Enquête* sent by M. René Johannet, for the literary magazine *Les Lettres*, to men of letters of various nationalities and shades of thought on a possible *Respublica Litteratorum*. It appeared in the April issue of that magazine, 1920.

de se battre pour leur patrie et la Cause idéale de l'Entente. *Notre internationalisme n'exclut pas le patriotisme national, au contraire, il se base sur lui et il le confirme.* Dans l'échelle des passions nobles qui remontent de l'égoïsme individuel, passant par la famille, notre commune, notre pays et notre nation, et reconnaissant tous les devoirs qui s'imposent de ces centres matériels et de sentiment, nous visons à l'unité spirituelle et sociale de l'humanité civilisée dont nous assurons la paix et le progrès. Nous devons toujours nous rappeler les derniers mots de *Miss Cavell* : *le patriotisme (national) ne suffit pas (Patriotism is not enough) !*

Le patriotisme international n'est pas seulement possible et désirable, mais qui plus est nécessaire pour la réalisation du patriotisme national, c'est la clef de voûte des sentiments patriotiques. Pour la littérature, il est bien vrai qu'un internationalisme nébuleux et sans caractère reste stérile. Il faut s'alimenter à la vie réelle—*in's volle Menschenleben*—à l'amour de la famille, du *home*, de la patrie. La forme aussi nous vient de notre langage, de notre milieu, des coutumes de notre pays. C'est par ce caractère national, distinctif, personnel que nous devenons universels. C'est ainsi que Homère, Dante, Shakespeare, Molière, se sont intéressés à l'humanité entière. C'est la forme qui, d'après Aristote, se marie avec la substance et crée l'œuvre d'art. Mais cette substance, c'est la vie entière et éternelle, la vie des idées, le Bon, le Vrai, la Beauté, la Justice ; elle appartient à tous les pays, à toutes les nations et elle unifie l'humanité. Sans ces idées universelles, pas de pensée, pas d'art, pas de littérature, et surtout, pas de justice ni de paix parmi les hommes. Ce sont les seules réalités durables.

II.—L'autre jour, un de vos hommes d'État les plus éminents, au cours d'une conversation, nous déclarait : " En somme, Messieurs, il n'y a que les philosophes qui comptent. C'est eux qui ont fait la révolution du XVIII^e siècle." Et il citait d'autres exemples frappants de l'histoire. J'osai lui répondre : " Monsieur, je prends note de cette remarque. Si, plus tard, dans un de vos discours, je vous surprends à dire : ' Tout cela, c'est de la théorie, ce sont de belles idées de penseurs qui ne connaissent pas la vie pratique, les complications de la politique réelle, la force maîtresse des faits matériels et

économiques, qui produisent par eux-mêmes les événements et les changements.—Vos idées, si vraies et si bonnes qu'elles soient, n'exercent aucune influence sur le cours de la vie,' je vous enverrai un billet contenant les paroles que vous venez de prononcer.—Eh bien ! ce grand homme avait raison. C'est l'idéologie qui est la force véritable. Non seulement indirectement, par toutes les avenues de l'éducation pédagogique et publique et par les vagues idées dominantes du *Zeitgeist*, mais directement par leur force intrinsèque. Les grands législateurs de l'humanité, Hammourabi, Moïse, Solon, Lycurgue, étaient des philosophes, des *Utterati* ; Alexandre Hamilton est l'auteur direct de la Constitution des États-Unis, et cette Constitution a toujours été, et est encore, la force la plus décisive de la politique intérieure ou extérieure de l'Amérique—qui même détermine la réalisation du Traité de Paix. Je suis las d'entendre perpétuellement la voix—écœurante, insultante, dédaigneuse des sceptiques et des cyniques, ou encore des "hommes pratiques," qui connaissent "la vie telle qu'elle est" ; de cette arrogance du pessimisme, qui sourit avec une tolérance bienveillante mais pleine de mépris devant les fougues de l'optimisme qui lutte avec une ardeur positive en faveur de l'amélioration des hommes, des sociétés et du monde ! Il y a dans cette attitude une arrogance de critique négative—peut-être inconsciente, mais enivrante—comparable à celle que les pères et les maîtres portent à leurs enfants, qui n'ont pas encore subi les désillusions de l'existence. Eh bien, non, nous ne sommes pas dépourvus de "sens commun" parce que nous regardons en face l'idéal et que nous voulons tendre à sa réalisation, même si ce n'est que par un petit pas. Qui leur dit que nous n'avons pas vécu et souffert comme eux ? Si nous insistons sur le *bon* qu'il y a dans la nature humaine, c'est justement pour y faire appel.

Nous connaissons bien aussi le *mal* et sa force, la force de l'égoïsme, de la stupidité, de la convoitise, de l'indolence et de la lâcheté qui dominent les actions et les pensées des individus et des masses. Mais nous voulons pour le moment l'ignorer, afin que la force positive puisse s'agiter et grandir par des élans positifs.

Nous avons en effet cette grande confiance, que les idées vraies et bonnes sont les seules forces qui persistent dans le

monde—qu'elles sont la force matérielle qui persiste et mène à la victoire finale, quels que soient les va-et-vients des batailles d'un jour et les défaites momentanées.

Eh bien ! les champions des Idées, c'est nous, les *litterati*, les intellectuels. Par *litterati*, je n'entends pas seulement les poètes, les romanciers, les écrivains de profession. Souvent ceux d'un même pays se haïssent ou se jalourent, tandis qu'il y a plus de parenté entre ceux de différentes nationalités, quand ils sont capables d'harmoniser leurs pensées et leurs aspirations, qu'entre ceux d'un même sang.

Ce n'est pas dans l'esprit du Docteur Pangloss ni de M. de la Palisse qu'il faut se rappeler la grande vérité : *L'Union fait la Force*.—Organisons-nous ! Nous n'aurons jamais besoin de Comités secrets. Nous n'aurons rien à cacher. Nous ne craignons jamais la publicité absolue—au contraire, elle nous est essentielle. Les Bolcheviks connaissent la force de l'union et aussi les internationalistes Marxistes. Ayons de l'Union, nous autres, *Chevaliers du Saint-Esprit* ! La différence entre nous et " l'organisation du Prolétariat," c'est que nous ne sommes pas une classe ; nous sommes tous des travailleurs ; mais le travail n'est pas seulement manuel et le but de notre action collective n'est pas la réalisation de nos intérêts de classe, la domination de notre caste—mais la domination des idées directrices de l'humanité : la Justice, la Vérité, la Bonté, et la Beauté !

Sous nos pas cadencés faisons sonner la terre.
Jetons nos gants de fer et donnons-nous la main,
C'est nous qui conduirons aux conquêtes du Père,
Les colonnes du genre humain !

Agréez, je vous prie, mes sentiments les plus distingués.

III¹

LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS¹ CONTRE L'ANARCHIE NATIONALE ET INTERNATIONALE

INTRODUCTION

ON est ravi lorsque, s'attendant de voir un auteur, on trouve un homme ! Qu'on me pardonne de rappeler ici cette pensée de Pascal, tant de fois citée. Je ne saurais mieux résumer l'impression que me laisse la lecture du présent article. Gradué de Cambridge, de Columbia (New-York), de Heidelberg, ancien professeur de Beaux-Arts, puis d'Archéologie à l'Université de Cambridge, ancien directeur de l'École américaine des études classiques à Athènes, auteur de nombreux ouvrages tant d'archéologie que de politique et de philosophie morale, parmi lesquels son *Aristodémocratie*, entre autres, a excité le plus vif intérêt, Sir Walston, d'origine autrichienne, sujet anglais né et élevé en Amérique, nourri de connaissances variées puisées dans de nombreux voyages, traite aujourd'hui des questions morales et politiques que soulève la guerre avec une compétence et une sagacité auxquelles, de toutes parts, les critiques rendent hommage.

Quoi de plus intéressant que de voir abordés par un homme si exceptionnellement préparé pour les étudier, les problèmes relatifs aux causes de la guerre, aux conditions d'une paix durable, à la notion de nationalité, à la nature de l'organisation internationale qu'il convient d'élaborer si l'on veut que cette constitution réponde effectivement à son objet. Dévoué à la cause de la paix, M. Walston n'est nullement un pacifiste. Ce fut, selon lui, l'honneur de l'humanité, lors de l'agression allemande, de préférer la liberté dans la lutte et le sacrifice à la paix dans la servitude. Le pacifisme, d'ailleurs, n'a-t-il

¹ The following article, with an Introduction by the late M. Émile Boutroux, appeared in the *Renaissance Politique* of Paris on April 24, 1920.

pas sa lourde responsabilité dans l'explosion de la guerre en 1914 ? " Hâtons-nous, écrivait le général von Bernhardt, d'écraser l'Angleterre et la France, tandis que ces nations sont énervées par le pacifisme ; tandis que nous-mêmes résistons encore à la contagion. "

M. Walston demande que, décidément, et radicalement, la notion de nationalité morale, fondée sur le libre consentement des populations, soit substituée à celle de nationalité ethnique, consistant dans la communauté de race, de langue, de religion, de coutumes. A ce principe, qui est le leur, les Français adhèrent naturellement. Ils n'omettent pas, d'ailleurs, le lien de ce principe avec celui que l'on appelle le principe ethnique et qui, en fait, n'est autre que celui des ressemblances, soit innées, soit acquises. L'idéal humain, c'est le maximum d'harmonie entre des nations présentant le maximum de variété.

Comment obtenir cette harmonie ? Reprenant l'idée de la plus pure démocratie, M. Walston conçoit un Conseil international dont les membres seraient chargés de représenter, non les idées ou les intérêts de tel ou tel groupe d'hommes, mais la seule justice, universelle et éternelle. Platon, je crois, eût applaudi à cette théorie de la représentation. En lisant l'exposé de M. Walston, on sent, avec une vivacité singulière, que l'on a affaire à un homme qui veut le bien, l'honnête, le solide, le vrai, l'humain par excellence et qui ignore toute considération égoïste et partielle.

A un tel Conseil, ajoute-t-il, il faut adjoindre une police internationale. Est-ce possible, hélas ! est-ce même concevable ? Mais ne doutons pas qu'une cour permanente de justice qui serait composée d'hommes justes et compétents et qui, peu à peu, créerait un code de justice internationale, n'acquît, par sa seule autorité morale, une influence réelle de plus en plus puissante.

Il est impossible de parler des rapports de la France et de l'Angleterre d'une manière plus touchante, plus sympathique, plus cordiale, que ne fait ici M. Walston. Que les nations française et anglaise l'écoutent et s'inspirent de son esprit ; et les nuages que la politique des politiciens risquerait d'amasser demeureront sans consistance, et se dissiperont aisément sous les rayons de l'amitié et de la confiance mutuelle

de l'élite intellectuelle et morale des deux pays. Puissent les nations subordonner, à la vie de l'âme, qui les unit, celle du corps, qui les divise !

ÉMILE BOUTROUX,
de l'Académie Française.

L'ANARCHIE NATIONALE

Le danger qui menace l'Europe—et même toute la civilisation occidentale—vient de l'anarchie nationale et de l'anarchie internationale.

L'évolution des "classes"—le développement du travail matériel et intellectuel, comme celui des forces économiques et morales, ont déterminé l'état de la société moderne et chacune de ces forces contribue au bien-être de l'ensemble des peuples, à la civilisation, à la culture, et au progrès. L'irrationalité, l'erreur fondamentale du bolchevisme (et du soi-disant parti du travail dans plusieurs pays) se trouve dans cette thèse : à savoir, que la *majorité* des travailleurs manuels (le soi-disant prolétariat) doit gouverner, sinon tyranniser, les nations et le monde entier.

Il est même douteux qu'il en soit ainsi et qu'une grande proportion de travailleurs manuels partagent cette prétention des extrémistes. Le processus évolutionnaire du bolchevisme est à l'inverse du processus de l'évolution naturelle et morale. Car on veut réduire l'évolution sociale accomplie dans le passé à l'état préhistorique—là la civilisation des troglodytes—ignorant ce que la qualité signifie dans le travail, combien l'intelligence humaine est importante—même essentielle—pour le perfectionnement du travail matériel et le progrès de la Société. De plus en plus les inventions (qui avec nous prennent la place des esclaves dans la démocratie péricléenne) remplacent l'effort manuel, le réduisent à un minimum, jusqu'à ce qu'il devienne une quantité négligeable. Avant tout il faut que les travailleurs reconnaissent et admettent que *skilled labour*, l'agilité même dans le travail le plus matériel, implique comme éléments différentiels l'intelligence et les valeurs morales et esthétiques. L'anarchie nationale est basée sur cette antithèse fausse, illusoire, et néfaste entre les valeurs matérielles et les valeurs intellectuelles, et entre les

groupes sociaux qui, à première vue, représentent l'un ou l'autre de ces éléments qui, loin d'être en antagonisme, se compénètrent organiquement dans la vie normale de la société civilisée.

A ces causes de l'anarchie nationale il faut en ajouter d'autres, que nous trouverons dans la seconde partie de notre sujet à la base de l'anarchie internationale, mais qui, par leur intrusion dans la vie nationale, augmentent toutes les complications et antagonismes néfastes qui mènent à l'anarchie. Ce sont les différences de races, de "nationalités" et de religions, qui, avec leurs intérêts, leurs ambitions et même leurs haines, perpétuent le trouble dans la vie nationale intérieure et dans les rapports internationaux.

La vie nationale—comprise dans le vrai sens du mot—déjà menacée par les inégalités matérielles, était, dans le passé, détournée de sa course normale par les luttes latentes ou violentes entre des majorités et des minorités de citoyens, déterminées comme telles par leurs différences de races, de "nationalités" et de religions. Enfin nous arrivons—quant aux causes de l'anarchie nationale—à l'opposition et à la lutte des États, des vraies nationalités. Et nous aboutissons ainsi à l'anarchie internationale—le vrai sujet de cet article—mais qui réagit si puissamment sur la vie intérieure des peuples—les deux domaines s'entre-pénétrant constamment et avec intensité.

L'ANARCHIE INTERNATIONALE

La guerre mondiale a sans doute eu pour cause fondamentale les intérêts matériels des différentes nations modernes. Cela a été démontré par les événements et par de nombreuses publications littéraires et économiques d'auteurs éminents. D'un côté—plus ou moins purement matériel—on doit admettre que le commerce, l'industrie, l'expansion et la domination des marchés du monde ont été un motif puissant dans cette lutte des peuples civilisés. D'un autre côté—plus ou moins idéal—la cause générale et fondamentale pour laquelle nos soldats donnaient leur vie était la lutte de la démocratie et de l'antimilitarisme contre l'autocratie et le militarisme. Entre ces deux pôles—et de plus la cause immédiate de la guerre localisée dans les Balkans—il y avait la défense et la

liberté des petites nationalités contre la tyrannie et l'impérialisme des grands Pouvoirs expansionnistes et agressifs. Comme nous allons le voir, cette cause, admirablement justifiée par le sentiment de justice et de charité, a agi—et se manifestera peut-être encore plus dans l'avenir—comme une lame à deux tranchants, en accentuant et en compliquant l'anarchie internationale.

Mais cette énumération des causes fondamentales de la guerre serait incomplète et fausse si nous en restions là. La vraie cause, immédiate et ultérieure, se trouve dans notre conception de la nationalité et dans le développement de l'État moderne basé sur cette conception. Cette conception avec tout ce qu'elle détermine : institutions, administration, mentalité, et activité politique des citoyens, a fatalement mené les Nations à la lutte et au désir de répandre leur pouvoir matériel et moral à l'infini. Elle a créé, comme la vertu sociale par excellence, ce patriotisme national qui produit et qui intensifie les passions de l'ambition, de l'orgueil, de la vanité personnelle ou corporative, de l'envie et de la haine. C'est cette passion—ce sentiment, si vous voulez—qui a été le ressort essentiel et directeur de la guerre ; c'est lui qui incite les masses à offrir leur vie en combattant l'ennemi. Le poème de Hoffmann von Fallersleben qui visait, en 1841, à l'unité d'une Allemagne divisée, au temps du poète, en une masse de petits États particularistes, d'un idéalisme et même d'un romantisme vague et innocent—s'était transformé, en 1914, en un chant de bataille, non seulement des pan-germanistes, mais du peuple entier : *le Deutschland ! Deutschland über Alles in der Welt*, la domination du monde de son commerce, et de ses richesses par l'Empire allemand. Mais ce phénomène n'était qu'une conséquence logique et fatale de la conception de la nationalité.

La conception moderne de la nationalité—conception non pas exactement fixée, mais contenant, au contraire, des complications d'idées et des contradictions inhérentes à ses diverses significations—date du début du XIX^e siècle quand, par Mazzini et les publicistes inspirés par le Congrès de Vienne, l'idée de la nationalité est devenue directrice dans la conception de l'État et des peuples. Ensuite, par la politique arrêtée de Cavour et de Bismarck, l'État nationaliste (Nazionalstat), la

"nationalité" a été basée sur l'idée de la race ethnologique. Même avant cette époque, l'idéal du pan-hellénisme et du pan-slavisme était né. Mais, inspiré par l'idéal de la "*Cité Antique*" avec implication du pan-latinisme sinon de pan-gallicisme, et par les historiens d'Angleterre, comme Freeman, le pan-anglosaxonisme germait dans la Grande-Bretagne, jusqu'à ce que, plus tard, le pan-slavisme et le pan-germanisme se soient matérialisés dans l'histoire moderne comme des idées des plus fécondes dans la vie nationale de ces peuples. Nous osons même suggérer que, dans l'avenir, il se développera des mouvements pan-américain et pan-européen aboutissant à un grand soulèvement pan-orientaliste.

C'est surtout à ces idées qu'il faut ramener les causes de l'anarchie internationale qui a produit la guerre et qui en produira d'autres dans l'avenir. Au fond, le germe de cette végétation destructive de la paix consiste dans l'identification de la nationalité et de la race. Cette erreur fondamentale a été combattue récemment par des écrivains éminents dans chaque nation et même par des ethnologistes sérieux. La littérature de ce sujet est devenue immense dans tous les pays.

Renan, avec son éloquence claire et altière, avait déjà démontré que "l'âme d'une Nation" n'est pas une question de race. Des écrivains français¹ ont aussi exposé l'absurdité de la division des nations par races. Proudhon en avait déjà anticipé les conséquences en montrant qu'il y aurait en France même douze "nationalités" ethnologiques; et, en 1916, M. Flach (pendant le troisième Congrès des nationalités à Lausanne) a réclamé la division de la France en nationalités régionales comprenant : les Bretons, les Corses, les Flamands, les Basques, les Provençaux, les Savoyards, etc.

C'est par cette fausse conception des nationalités que l'idée du patriotisme s'est pervertie. Le patriotisme est une des plus hautes vertus de l'espèce humaine. Il doit rester et il doit être nourri et développé dans tous les sens. Mais il faut insister sur ce fait important et essentiel qu'il doit être mis en harmonie avec les autres qualités et *vertus humaines*. J'ai tâché ailleurs de démontrer la *valeur progressive* de ces vertus

¹ Parmi les ouvrages nombreux sur ce sujet, je dois signaler le livre sérieux et remarquable de M. René Johannet publié en 1918.

sociales sur lesquelles sont fondés la civilisation et le progrès du genre humain. Le patriotisme occupé une des plus hautes marches sur l'échelle qui va de la base voracité animale à l'égoïsme de la bête humaine et monte, dans une ascension continue, à l'amour de la famille, au dévouement au village, à la ville, au département, et jusqu'à la passion dévouée au patriotisme national. Mais la cime de cette échelle, la clef de voûte de l'arc humanitaire, est le patriotisme international. Si tous ces degrés ne mènent pas vers ce but final, le résultat est le chaos dans l'ordre social, l'anarchie dans les sociétés civilisées, anarchie qui mène à la guerre de tous contre tous.

LA LIGUE DES NATIONS

La guerre est terminée et nous avons la paix. Mais, même dans cette paix, les forces destructives qui ont mené à la guerre survivent encore. La tradition de la politique internationale et surtout de la diplomatie de l'*ancien ordre* a survécu. On n'a pas encore reconnu, quant au but et aux méthodes mis en honneur par le Congrès, le nouvel ordre qui doit régner. Mais c'est surtout par la survivance de la conception de la nationalité ethnologique que les germes de désaccord et de guerre sont restés pour produire une végétation de mauvaises herbes qui étoufferont, dans leur croissance rapide, les fruits nourriciers et les fleurs qui embellissent la vie des sociétés civilisées.

Le principe de détermination par elles-mêmes des petites nationalités était urgent, et c'est avec justice qu'il a dirigé le Conseil des Alliés au Congrès de la paix. Mais, comme je l'ai déjà indiqué, il en pourrait résulter un grand danger pour la paix actuelle et dans l'avenir. Je ne peux que suggérer à mes lecteurs ce qu'il advient et doit advenir dans la constitution des États ethniques du pré-Orient, surtout dans les Balkans, en Russie, en Asie-Mineure où ces peuples, avec les antagonismes de races et de religions, sont effectivement voisins les uns des autres.

Et me tournant vers l'ouest lointain, j'ose indiquer ce qui résulterait quant à la nationalité des États-Unis, si le principe de détermination par soi-même des éléments de races ou d'*origines* nationales, combiné avec la diversité de

confessions religieuses, se manifestait dans la vie politique de cette nation. J'ose même affirmer que le plus grand danger actuel dans la vie politique de ce "melting-pot" national—qui existe essentiellement par l'attachement patriotique de tous les citoyens à l'unité basée sur la Constitution, les lois, la moralité, les coutumes, les idéals—se trouve dans les divisions et les heurts des éléments ethniques dont la nation est composée ! Même actuellement (comme peut-être dans la première année de la guerre), la question des votes déterminés par la race, les religions, et les origines des citoyens, a joué un rôle considérable. Si cela persiste et s'intensifie, la politique intérieure et surtout la politique extérieure de cette grande nation s'en ressentiront dans les conditions les plus néfastes pour l'Amérique et pour le monde entier.

Je tiens à affirmer sans réserve aucune que je reconnais pleinement le travail immense et superbe qui a été fait par ceux qui constituaient la Conférence de la Paix. L'Histoire saura leur rendre justice. Quelles que soient les conséquences de leur action dans tous les domaines, il en résulte au moins un fait de la plus haute valeur permanente : c'est que les idées dominatrices de l'ordre nouveau ont été formulées et poussées de la sphère nébuleuse et altière des théories dans la réalité de la vie politique internationale et dans la conscience des peuples.

La Conférence de la Paix a bien pressenti que le danger central qui menace la paix était l'anarchie internationale. On a donc reconnu que la Ligue des Nations est la clef de voûte de la paix.

En admettant en toute sincérité ce résultat grandiose, je n'hésite pas à déclarer que, dans la forme actuelle et dans l'organisation de cette Ligue des Nations, la survivance des traditions de l'ancien ordre a affaibli—sinon détruit—l'efficacité pratique de cette base du traité de paix entier. Mais même dans cette critique négative, j'admets que l'activité mandataire accordée à la Ligue est une idée de génie dont la portée est immense, non seulement pour le présent mais pour l'avenir du monde entier.

Ce qui est certain aujourd'hui, c'est que déjà la Ligue des Nations a perdu sa place dans la conscience des peuples et des classes et a subi l'opposition active d'un des membres les plus

importants parmi les Alliés, du Sénat des États-Unis. Je trouve partout, dans chaque classe du peuple, non seulement parmi ceux qui, par leur mentalité et par tradition, ont toujours été opposés à des idées pareilles, mais aussi parmi ceux qui ont été et qui sont convaincus et enthousiasmés pour la fondation d'une organisation internationale capable d'assurer la paix, des personnes qui ont perdu la foi dans l'efficacité réelle et pratique de la Ligue des Nations et qui en parlent avec un scepticisme dans lequel on aperçoit un élément de mépris bienveillant.

Après avoir osé faire cette critique négative, j'aurai même la témérité de publier, en esquisse, une proposition positive et constructive qui, nécessairement, doit se borner à une exposition des plus sommaires des points essentiels d'une Ligue de Nations ou, pour être plus exact, d'un accord international qui doit effectuer et sauvegarder la paix.

Mais, j'ose aussi affirmer que chacun de ces points pourrait être développé de manière à satisfaire les exigences de la vie internationale actuelle et à rendre leur réalisation pratique et efficace.

Dans tous les cas, le plan que je propose échappe à toutes les objections promulguées par le Sénat des États-Unis contre le traité entier, et la Ligue des Nations en particulier. Ces objections n'auraient jamais été faites contre une ligue telle que je la conçois, car les deux objections principales ne tiennent pas contre elle. L'une porte sur l'incursion dans la Souveraineté de l'État, dans le cas où la Ligue fait appel à un de ses membres pour déclarer la guerre et mobiliser son armée, contre une nation récalcitrante—ce qui est, non seulement une contravention à la Constitution des États-Unis, quant au droit de déclarer la guerre, mais aussi ce qui est peu réalisable quant au peuple entier qui constitue chaque armée nationale et dont on attendra l'obéissance à l'ordre, venu du dehors, de donner sa vie pour une cause qui ne concerne pas directement sa propre existence. L'autre objection concerne la représentation insuffisante des États-Unis, représentation qui n'est pas en rapport avec la grandeur et l'importance de cet État.

Mais, avant tout, il faut insister sur ce fait que tous les

critiques, les sceptiques, et même les ennemis directs de la Ligue des Nations telle qu'elle existe, sont d'accord sur un point : la nécessité immédiate et absolue de trouver un moyen quelconque pour éviter une guerre dans l'avenir. On n'a qu'à demander, non seulement aux gens cultivés, aux penseurs et aux philosophes, mais à " l'homme de la rue " complètement illettré, ce qu'il adviendrait au monde s'il survenait, dans l'avenir, une seconde guerre comme la dernière, avec tout le progrès dans les machines destructives de la vie humaine, que la science et l'expérience de cette guerre ont fourni ? De plus, est-il concevable que les nations européennes—qui, si elles ne sont pas en banqueroute économique actuelle, sont dans un état voisin de la banqueroute prochaine—puissent supporter les charges de nouvelles batailles ? Si, avant cette guerre, les différentes nations ont déjà gémi sous le poids insupportable des armements de défense nationale qui les menaient à la faillite, comment trouver à présent et dans l'avenir les moyens de préservation économique de nos peuples ? Avec le danger devant nos portes, et surtout devant celles de la France, le maintien et même l'extension de nos forces militaires ne peuvent que s'accroître.

Voilà un état de choses impossible. D'autre part, la tendance de notre économie et de nos industries modernes va directement et forcément dans le sens de la coopération. Il faut donc que nous trouvions un moyen de créer une force coopérative—trusts, *pool*, syndicats—surtout quant aux dépenses de la production pour faire face au danger commun qui menace toutes les nations et tous les peuples. Mais comment ? Le seul moyen est de transformer la Ligue des Nations en un corps complètement organisé qui puisse répondre de la protection indispensable à chaque pays. •

POUR UN JURY SUPRA-NATIONAL

Voici l'esquisse d'une telle organisation.¹ L'élément

¹ On me ferait tort si l'on croyait que le projet que je donne en ébauche superficielle est le résultat d'une pensée ou d'une imagination trop vive, née d'aujourd'hui ou d'hier. Je dois à moi-même d'informer mes lecteurs que ce projet a été conçu il y a plus de 45 ans ; que la première publication des principes essentiels a été faite en 1898 et que, depuis lors, elle a été répétée sous différentes formes, dans des publications pendant la guerre.

nécessaire, absolument essentiel, dans une organisation nationale qui réponde aux besoins que nous admettons, est que le Conseil ou la Cour ou le Jury International, soit muni d'une force militaire, d'une police qui exige la réalisation de ses décisions de justice internationale. Le second point essentiel est que cet accord international ne compromette nullement la souveraineté et l'indépendance intérieures des nations qui forment l'organisation internationale. Il faut rompre avec l'ordre ancien et reconnaître le nouvel ordre. Les traditions et les méthodes diplomatiques, avec la mentalité des diplomates et même des hommes d'État qui ont dirigé l'action internationale jusqu'ici, doivent faire place à une nouvelle conduite des affaires et des intérêts nationaux et internationaux qui ne visent que la justice et, par conséquent, la paix entre les Nations. Le Corps directeur ne doit nullement être constitué par les représentants des différentes nations munis de mandats pour garder les intérêts des différents Gouvernements ou des différentes Nations.

Les membres de ce Corps n'auront point de mandat national, ce ne sera pas un Conseil des Nations, pas même un Corps législatif international, *le Grand Parlement du Monde* ; mais tout simplement une Cour de justice, pas même une Cour de juristes avec des magistrats judiciaires, mais un grand Jury International qui accorde l'équité la plus parfaite dans ce monde imparfait, dans toutes ses délibérations. Il est probable qu'il sera nécessaire que ce grand nombre de représentants agissent sous la présidence d'un juge et d'un juriste de métier, maître de la procédure légale. Mais les membres de ce grand jury seront tout simplement des hommes éminents et du caractère le plus élevé, envoyés par chaque nation et dignes de sauvegarder la justice la plus pure. Ce sont les plaideurs des deux parties qui dans un litige peuvent ou doivent être des juristes de profession.

Le seul mandat de ces membres du Jury sera la justice. Après un serment des plus solennels, chacun devra se vouer, sa désignation faite, à la seule réalisation de la justice pure, sans partialité individuelle, locale et nationale, comme un juge dans chaque pays, et comme les membres du jury dans nos tribunaux prêtent serment de n'être dirigés que par la justice. La nature humaine a produit, dans l'administration de la

justice actuelle, des injustices et des infractions au devoir, exceptionnelles. Mais nous pouvons affirmer que ce ne sont là que des exceptions dans nos Cours de Justice, et que dans un Corps de centaines d'hommes d'intelligence et de moralité supérieures, il n'y aura que peu de cas de ces délits contre la justice et la vérité.

Ces représentants nationaux seront élus dans chaque nation en proportion du nombre d'habitants avec le minimum d'un représentant pour les petites nations.

Une des objections capitales du Sénat américain est déjà annulée par cette méthode, et la disproportion dans la représentation des grandes Puissances et des petites Nations qui cause et qui causera le mécontentement continu, sera effacée. Mais il faut insister avec la plus grande force sur ce point que les difficultés négatives du fonctionnement de cette organisation internationale seront toutes résolues et que son efficacité sera assurée par le fait essentiel que les représentants, dans leur caractère et leur activité officiels, n'appartiendront à aucune nationalité et ne seront effectivement que les serviteurs du Corps international dans sa solidarité.

De plus, il est essentiel à cette conception d'un Jury Supra-National, qu'il ne s'occupera que de questions, de problèmes et de litiges internationaux. Il ne s'introduira nullement dans les affaires nationales sauf dans le cas où les deux parties litigantes d'une Nation et la Nation elle-même invoqueront sa juridiction. Cependant, sur deux points exceptionnels son intervention dans la vie nationale est absolument nécessaire à la réussite de ses fonctions et à la réalisation de la justice : le premier est le contrôle des armements dans chaque Nation qui a accepté le principe du désarmement afin d'éviter, par tous les moyens effectifs, les armements et les mobilisations secrets. L'autre concerne la sauvegarde de la vérité, c'est-à-dire la rectification immédiate et complète du mensonge, de l'erreur, et de l'ignorance. Il faut donc fournir à ce Corps le pouvoir pratique et efficace de répandre dans tous les pays, et parmi toutes les populations, la négation ou la rectification de toute publication mensongère ou erronée en ce qui concerne les relations internationales ; et, de plus, il faut insister sur un système de publications complètes et étendues de tous les jugements et décrets de ce Jury Supra-National.

Hormis ces deux limitations, il ne sera permis nulle infraction à la souveraineté de chaque Nation. Il n'y aura qu'un souverain auquel tous les États devront se subordonner : la Justice.

Mais il faut bien se rappeler que cette limitation à la souveraineté existe actuellement et a toujours existé. La Cour Suprême des États-Unis est reconnue par la Constitution et par la tradition parlementaire comme le tribunal de dernière instance dans l'interprétation de la Constitution des droits et des devoirs de chacun des États de l'Union ; et, dans le passé, dans le Moyen-Age le plus autocrate, la souveraineté absolue a toujours été conçue en tant que limitée par " les Commandements de Dieu et les Lois de la Nature." L'interprétation des Commandements de Dieu avec ses dogmes est différente parmi les sectes religieuses ; mais toutes ces sectes reconnaîtront comme seule valable la justice qui vient de Dieu. " Les Lois de la Nature " (nous en sommes bien conscients) peuvent mener à la maxime historique de Bethmann Hollweg : " La nécessité ne connaît pas de loi." Mais l'humanité entière reconnaît dans la politique, comme dans la morale, que la justice doit être supérieure aux cruautés et aux injustices de la nature.

L'ARMÉE SUPRA-NATIONALE

Mais les discussions et les décisions de ce Jury Supra-National seront illusoires sans l'appui de la force dirigée par cette justice, comme dans notre vie nationale, la décision des tribunaux n'aurait pas de valeur si elle n'était appuyée par la force de la police.

Le point essentiel d'une Ligue des Nations effective c'est qu'elle associe avec elle une police internationale capable d'assurer la réalisation complète et immédiate de ses décisions.

Dans le sens négatif, cette police ne doit pas être une agglomération ou une fédération de différentes armées nationales. D'une part, la libre disposition d'un armement national par une autorité étrangère à la Nation est une infraction insupportable à la souveraineté des Nations.

Mais, de plus, il n'est pas concevable que les armées elles-mêmes et leurs soldats reprendront la guerre, et tout ce que cela signifie, pour une question qui ne concerne pas directe-

ment l'existence nationale. Il me paraît de plus invraisemblable et illusoire de compter sur une armée internationale composée de différents Corps d'armées et d'unités gardant leur solidarité nationale, mais incapables de s'amalgamer et de former une armée entière. Il est plus qu'improbable, par exemple, qu'une de ces unités puisse faire loyalement la guerre contre ses propres nationaux. Dans le sens positif un instrument militaire efficace de police internationale doit résulter d'une force militaire (navale et aérienne), composée de militaires de chaque Nation, militaires de profession et de choix. Il est beaucoup d'hommes qui, par tempérament et par goût, choisiront cette profession d'armes et qui dans leur ensemble composeront une armée perfectionnée au dernier point, qui se battront loyalement et avec fierté pour la plus grande cause dans la vie humaine : la Justice. Il faut se rappeler que les armées mercenaires du Moyen-Age et des temps modernes même contenaient de ces soldats de profession qui sacrifiaient leur vie pour des causes bien douteuses, comme pour des individus et des autocrates qui ne représentaient pas toujours les idéals de l'humanité.

Comme la justice internationale aura son *habitat*, son domicile actuel, il y sera nécessairement adjoint les camps nécessaires pour cette armée avec sa marine et son centre aéronautique—préféablement dans une île neutre. Mais il y aura aussi des succursales distribuées dans chaque partie du monde et reliées par la télégraphie sans fil, de sorte que, de ces centres de police, chaque infraction à l'autorité du jury sera réprimée sans délai. Comme les membres du jury Supra-National, et à plus forte raison, les soldats de cette armée policière feront abstraction de leur nationalité dans leur existence officielle et ne prêteront serment de loyauté qu'à ce Corps Supra-National.

LE DÉVOUEMENT DE L'ANGLETERRE

Une condition essentielle pour la réalisation d'une telle police effective est le désarmement relatif de toutes les armées nationales, qui devra être maintenu strictement par tous les moyens matériels. Je n'ai pas besoin de développer plus en détail l'organisation de ce Corps ni son efficacité, mais je voudrais, en passant, appuyer seulement sur un point : c'est

que la syndicalisation des armées qui assureront l'intégrité de chaque Nation et garderont la paix du monde, réduira à une quantité négligeable les sacrifices économiques pour la défense de chaque nation, et évitera la banqueroute économique qui nous menace et qui est, en fait, imminente.

Le problème le plus difficile est de résoudre toutes les difficultés presque insurmontables, au point de vue économique et moral, de la période intermédiaire entre notre temps actuel et le désarmement des Nations et l'organisation réelle d'un tel Corps international. Mais les peuples s'en tireront. Un fait important et indiscutable, c'est que jusqu'au moment où sera établie une telle force—qui est le seul moyen d'éviter la banqueroute économique et la dissolution sociale de la civilisation entière—chacun de nous, dans les circonstances actuelles, doit garder et même développer ses moyens de défense nationale. La France, quant à la terre, la Grande-Bretagne, quant à la mer, avec l'appui moral et matériel des États-Unis, de l'Italie et de tous nos Alliés, doivent être prêtes à résister à chaque agression de nos ennemis, soit qu'il s'agisse de la guerre ou des points essentiels du Traité de Paix.

Devant nous se présentent des problèmes presque insolubles au point de vue économique. Pour nous tous il est indiscutable que la France doit être assurée des moyens de relever sa vie économique. Elle le doit à elle-même, nous tous nous le lui devons. J'ai la conviction que tous les Alliés et que surtout la Grande-Bretagne y contribueront par des gestes de justice et de générosité, comme j'ai la conviction absolue que, avec ou sans conventions formelles, les peuples de la Grande-Bretagne et des États-Unis se mettront côte à côte avec la France pour réprimer toute agression du dehors.

Mais il y a aussi le problème moral. La haine est une force négative et bien douteuse pour mener à des actions raisonnables et à la justice. C'est par des forces positives morales que la justice se réalise et que les actions se concentrent pour atteindre ce but immédiat et final.

Notre entente doit être affermie de jour en jour par la concorde vraie, l'intimité et la connaissance mutuelle. Nous avons toujours autour de nous et même chez nous des gens qui ont intérêt à nous séparer, à répandre le mensonge, à insinuer des malentendus, à semer la discorde et à engendrer

la haine. Il n'y a qu'un moyen pour combattre ces forces ennemies : c'est de se connaître. Tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner : voilà une belle maxime que j'hésite presque à répéter. Mais bien se connaître, pouvoir pénétrer dans la vie des autres, cultiver l'imagination altruistique, de sorte que nous comprenions les qualités, les motifs avec la justification de chacun, ouvrir son cœur pour qu'on puisse s'estimer et même s'aimer : cela ne rend pas nécessaire le pardon, puisque cela permet de devancer chaque mécontentement, chaque indignation, chaque haine.

Mais pour que cela se réalise, il faut que nous développions dans notre vie commune les conditions qui mènent à cette vraie entente, à cette connaissance mutuelle, et surtout, il faut combattre en chacun de nous l'ignorance, l'erreur et le mensonge.

Le peuple français doit savoir que les habitants de la Grande-Bretagne surtout sont bien conscients des sacrifices qu'a faits la France dans cette guerre. Il est inutile de comparer et de peser les sacrifices que chacun de nous a consentis. Henri Heine a bien dit : " Qui peut peser les flammes ? " Mais nous admettons tous que la France est le protagoniste quant aux sacrifices de sang et de biens matériels dans cette guerre. Nous devons être prêts à reconnaître ce fait dans nos actions.

D'autre part, au cours de mon séjour depuis l'automne, dans différentes parties de la France et parmi les différentes classes de ses habitants, je me suis aperçu que le peuple entier n'était vraiment pas conscient de ce qu'a fait l'Angleterre, des sacrifices que nous avons acceptés et que nous acceptons encore, loin de la guerre, surtout dans notre vie économique. Pour donner comme exemples quelques faits simples, qui peuvent paraître même mesquins, je n'en veux citer que deux. Le peuple français tout entier ne sait pas jusqu'à quel point, pendant la guerre et actuellement, le peuple britannique de chaque classe s'est imposé loyalement des sacrifices, non seulement dans son confort, mais même dans le nécessaire. Je ne veux parler que des faits que je connais absolument.

Pendant la guerre, les vivres étaient restreints au minimum, même pour les gens les plus riches et surtout pour les gens qui autrefois vivaient dans l'opulence. Je peux témoigner avec

exactitude que, dans presque toutes les familles qui possédaient des maisons dans la ville et des châteaux dans la campagne, on ne mangeait de la viande que trois jours sur quinze, tandis qu'on en donnait davantage aux domestiques et aux ouvriers.

J'ose citer un fait personnel : dans l'hiver de 1917 ou 1918, je donnais des conférences à des aveugles et à des vieillards des deux sexes dans le plus pauvre district de l'est de Londres. La société qui m'avait invité m'offrit un thé après ma conférence. J'étais surpris et ravi de voir des sandwiches avec du rosbif en quantité telle que je ne m'étais jamais trouvé à pareille fête pendant la guerre. Je demandai aux hôtes comment ils avaient pu faire de pareils sacrifices pour me plaire et comment ils avaient pu se procurer une telle quantité de viande. Ils me répondirent qu'ils en avaient toujours autant et que la viande qu'ils achetaient actuellement était même meilleure qu'avant la guerre et presque aussi bonne que celle qu'on donnait aux soldats.

Mais, à l'ouest de Londres, où sont les maisons élégantes, non seulement la quantité était restreinte au minimum, mais on n'a jamais pu se procurer une bonne qualité de viande.

Il en était ainsi de tous les aliments. Est-ce que le peuple français sait qu'une grande partie de la population, surtout parmi les riches, n'a pu se procurer le charbon suffisant pour le chauffage et la cuisine ? Je connais bien des maisons, surtout de grandes maisons, où il était absolument impossible de vivre à cause du manque de chaleur. Beaucoup d'Anglais ont été obligés de se réfugier dans le Midi de la France.

Est-ce qu'on sait que la taxe sur tout revenu qui dépassait un minimum était et est encore d'un tiers pour les revenus modestes et arrive, avec la surtaxe, à la moitié pour les gros capitaux ? Il y a même des cas, exceptionnels, il est vrai, où la taxe *dépasse tout le revenu annuel*. De plus, il faut bien qu'on sache que ces taxes sont actuellement exigées et payées au Trésor National par tout le monde. Est-ce que le peuple français tout entier sait qu'une grande partie de nos vivres et de nos matières premières provient de l'Amérique ? Que la livre sterling qui, avant la guerre, valait presque 5 dollars, avait baissé récemment jusqu'à 3 dollars et demi environ ?

Si ces faits simples étaient connus par tous les Français, il n'y aurait nullement danger que notre entente cordiale se

refroidisse. Il est essentiel que la vérité soit connue et qu'elle se répande partout. Il faut instituer une organisation qui facilite et qui fortifie notre entente, qui la répande de tous côtés, même dans la jeunesse, jusqu'à ce qu'enfin la France et la Grande-Bretagne, avec le concours de toutes les Nations civilisées, aient constitué ce Corps Supra-National qui assurera définitivement la solidarité de chaque nation dans la paix du monde et jusqu'à ce que la justice siège sur le trône suprême couronnée par la charité.

IV

AMERICA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

THE world-crisis immediately before us is as ominous as the one we faced in 1914. The pregnant, and now classic phrase, "A war to end war" (was it first used by President Hadley of Yale?), must now be superseded by the watchword of our day, "A peace to end war." The Great War was determined, potentially from its beginning and actually in 1917, by the entrance of the United States into the conflict. Had the United States joined the Allies after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the world would have been spared the stupendous destruction of life, property and moral values during years of unprecedented suffering.

The battle-cry of the United States in 1917, "War to end war," in no way implied the principles or practice of what has since been technically and specifically called Pacifism, though the aim and end of sacrifice and struggle was Peace. For it was clearly realised by those who thus fought, that to refuse to fight was to provide the militaristic and autocratic enemy with the most effective arm against the unmilitaristic and democratic Allies. In the same spirit the watchword of the present, "Peace to end war," does not mean Pacifism. For it is clearly realised that premature and unguaranteed disarmament of all the peace-loving and highly civilised democratic nations would give all the more power to the ill-disposed or less-civilised nations who would continually, though secretly, prepare for war.

As in 1915 and in 1917, the great world-issue now depends upon the action of the United States. If the American people turn their backs upon their brethren and their blood-relations of the Old World and say to themselves: "What concern is their life and prosperity to us? What have we in common with their civilisation and their ideals?" the evils in store for

¹ Reprinted from the *Fortnightly Review*, March, 1921.

civilised mankind will perhaps even be greater than they were at any period during the war. The writer of that remarkable article in a recent number of the *Metropolitan Magazine* of New York (reproduced in the *London Times* of February 5) has fully realised the issues that lie before us. The world has to choose between two alternatives, and only two: Continued and intensive armament, or an effective League of Nations.

The first will mean for the United States, as well as for the British Empire, not only universal military service (preferably on the Swiss plan as advocated by President Roosevelt), but increase of naval armament with all the resultant complications and dangers outlined by the writer referred to above. Furthermore, it will mean the concentration of effort on the part of science to develop the means of mass-destruction, with the widest range in extension and the most concentrated power of intensity in killing and destroying—killing not merely combatants, but (by the precedent established during the last war) non-combatants as well. Even the dullest imagination does not require further stimulation to realise what this will mean. In addition to this, we know that nearly all civilised States are practically bankrupt, and, according to pre-war standards, are completely so. What will it be if billions have to be raised for the armaments which every nation, urged by self-preservation and alive to the call of national honour, will be bound to expend! The phrase of the diplomat of long ago, *On peut toujours trouver de l'argent pour faire la guerre*, has been proved to be eminently true.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Napoleon was urged on by his convictions and ideals to bring the world under the dominance of France, no doubt, as he thought, for the good of the world and the progress of civilisation, racially-national ideals took conscious shape in the minds of enthusiastic patriots in the form of Pan-Hellenism, Pan-Slavism, ending in the most nefarious and powerful formulation of Pan-Germanism. Racial and religious ideals were, and are, infiltrated more or less consciously and avowedly with material, industrial and commercial interests. There was a short period when Anglo-Saxonism formed the ideals of some. During the Spanish-American War I pointed out the dangers, both for the United States and for Great Britain

and for the relations between the two, of such a conception ; and, in replacing for the phrase Anglo-Saxon Alliance that of English-speaking Brotherhood, I insisted upon the fact that an understanding and friendship of all the English-speaking peoples would be practically the safest means of securing peace and co-operation between all the civilised nations of whatever race, religion and language. But " self-determination " has proved a two-edged sword. The rivalries and clashing of interests, acting on the soil so fertile in racial prejudice and animosities in the south-east of Europe among the reconstituted smaller nationalities, are, and will be, as they have ever been, sources of unrest and conflict. The Powers of Central Europe, lying exhausted and maimed in the sullen and intense resentment of the vanquished, will in the future be ready to use the conflicts of the opposed nationalities, as well as the complications and contentions between the greater and more remote Powers, to widen the circle of dissension and war. Nay, as is foreshadowed by the writer already quoted, and as I pointed out in 1918, the day may come when Pan-Europeanism will stand opposed and armed facing Pan-Americanism. It is more than merely conceivable that these two great continents representing civilisation may be brought into internecine conflict ; while the organised nations of Asia, acquiring the implements of modern destructive warfare, will step into the breach of the fortifications^o protecting Western life and ideals, and swarm over the cultivated fields fruitful of so much that supported the higher life of civilised man.

Quite recently, in a conversation on these wider ultimate aspects of international relationships, a man of great intellect, experience, and eminence in this country, an avowed opponent of anything in the form of a League of Nations, calmly enunciated his belief, with stupendous intellectual detachment, that our civilisation was doomed, and that, as had more than once happened in the world's history, it must go under, to be followed by a cataclysm into much lower strata of human life, until gradually, by long social evolution, the standards of civilisation might again be raised. My answer was, and is : " Are we, who are possessed not only of volition, but of intelligence, imagination and moral responsibilities, to sit still with

arm folded and to do nothing in face of such a danger? Is there not any alternative?"

Quite apart from all our sentiments and ideals, the practical and material facts before the world, immediate and in their ultimate bearings, force us soberly to consider the second alternative to such arming of one nation against the other—i.e. some efficient international, or rather supernational, organisation which will ensure peace. This now means that the League of Nations, the existing Covenant, be so modified as to leave no grounds for refusal on the part of the United States to co-operate in this great work. It means the modification or emendation in the constitution of the League of Nations to respond to the demands and needs of the civilised States in the present world-crisis.

In facing such a problem it is important to bear in mind one general truth in the management of public affairs and the organisations dealing with them: It is frequently found, in deliberative bodies and parties, that differences concerning an amendment to a substantive motion create stronger antagonisms than differences concerning the substantive motion itself. There is thus a danger that those who are sincerely and completely agreed on the absolute need for the establishment of a League of Nations, but differ on the inner organisation of such a League, may develop stronger and more effectively negative opposition among each other than the fundamental differences which exist between the pronounced supporters and the violent opponents of any international organisation of the kind. This contingency must be borne in mind and jealously guarded against. However strongly we may feel that the present Covenant must be modified and amended, we must always gratefully acknowledge the work that has actually been done and the momentous step forward that has been taken by the convinced and highly qualified initiators of this greatest movement of modern times.

The task before us all, and especially before the people of the United States, is to devise and to establish a supernational body which will meet with the essential demands of all the leading civilised States, to ensure complete co-operation. Three main requisites are to be met: Firstly, the modification of the Covenant so as to conform with the constitution, as

well as the established principles and traditions of national life, in the United States, as well as of other sovereign States ; secondly, to command the most complete confidence in the impartiality and the positive equity of the judgments of such a supernational body, as far as unerring equity is at all possible in this world of ours ; thirdly, to ensure the greatest possible efficiency in enforcing its decisions.

The Senate of the United States has taken exception chiefly to two articles of the Covenant, namely, Articles III (with annex) and XVI. Article III (with annex) placed this nation of about one hundred million people, in the very forefront of modern civilisation and power, in an inferiority as regards the number of its representatives, compared, let us say, to the British Empire, including its Dominions. Article XVI, in certain eventualities, committed all members of the League to intervention with their armed forces to uphold certain decisions of the League, which, the Senate maintained, amounting to a declaration of war, is contrary to their constitution, whereby war can only be declared after due parliamentary deliberation and decision.

Both these objections can be fully met by the emendations here proposed in the organisation of the existing Covenant ; while, at the same time, the two other requisites of confidence in the impartiality of the tribunal and effectiveness in carrying out its decisions will be met.

In lieu of the present constitution of the Covenant, with its Council and its Assembly and the complicated arrangement between these two bodies, upon which we need not enter here, there would be a supernational jury with a more equitable representation for all nations, and commanding to a higher degree faith in the impartiality and fairness of its judgment. In lieu of the appeal to the several member-States to make war on a recalcitrant nation or nations, by means of quotas of their own military forces, this supernational jury would be provided with a police of its own to enforce its decisions effectively.

The supernational jury would be composed of representatives from every nation within the League, in the ratio of its number of inhabitants counted by the millions. But there would be a minimum and maximum for such representation.

The minimum of one member would be assigned to even the smallest nation admitted to the League ; the maximum would be fixed by the least populous of the existing Great Powers—let us say France. Analogous to the relationship in the case of the Territories and States in the United States, it would have to be decided which States, and when those not yet recognised as fully developed in the political and social organisation of all Western nations, should be thus admitted to full membership. In any case, even the most populous of such States would never have anything approaching to preponderance of representation in the general body. Now, this supernational jury, following the historical precedent in the long and consistent evolution of English law, from its beginnings in the introduction of the trial by jury under Henry II, which gradually led to the organisation and activity of the Courts, would not be a legislative body, not even to the degree in which the recent Hague Conferences aimed at being. The world has had ample experience that no effective sanction could be given in the present condition of international development to such a legislative function. On the other hand, the enactments and decisions of a supernational jury would, in the course of time and of political and legal evolution, become the material for the acceptance and the codification of such binding laws. Nor would the supernational jury assume the character of a supernational court of judges to administer the law which in reality does not exist as law. It would simply be a tribunal of equity. The representatives of each nation would not necessarily be jurists at all, however much each of the litigants with their cases and pleadings would be in the hands of competent jurists, and however strictly the presiding official of the jury would maintain all the strict and perfect procedure of legal evidence with which he would have to be fully acquainted as a jurist. But these jurors would not be chosen at haphazard from among all citizens possessing in every variety of degree the intellectual and moral qualifications to judge with fairness ; but would have, as their chief and clearly manifest qualification, that intellectual superiority of mind and experience of life, as well as that record of uprightness and of honourableness of moral character, which would, as it were, make them the most

competent experts in administering equity. They would thus be chosen from within each nation among those citizens of eminence who, on the face of it, represent to the highest degree such intellectual and moral qualities. Above all, they would not be the immediate members of Governmental administration, essentially associated with furthering the separate interests of that nation or the party in power for the time being. In any case, when the representatives in a League of Nations each stand for the conflicting interests of their own State and country, the deliberations of the League would be analogous to those in the conflicting life of national party government. So far from ensuring stability and peace, they would produce constant change and strife, and would certainly not command the absolute faith in the equity of their deliberations, not only in the contestant parties, but among all neutral members of the League.

The jurors would therefore not be sent with any mandate to uphold the interests of their own State or country, but would, on the contrary, divest themselves of any approach to such aims and be biased in judgment as little as any judge is now supposed to be influenced by his local origin, residence, or his associations in locality and consanguinity. By the most solemn and impressive formality they would declare, upon accepting this high office, that they will in no way be biased by their national interests, but will only be guided by the one endeavour—to administer absolute justice. As men of the world they would even, in cases that might not be considered strictly *justiciable*, be the best conceivable authorities to decide, with wisdom and fairness, the most complicated cases in which no clear decision, wholly *justiciable*, can be expected. Both parties would adduce all abstract and concrete reasons in relation to their national life and prosperity in appealing to the wisdom and fairness of such a select body of men endowed with common sense, as well as intelligence, fairness and tact. These questions might arise in connection with immigration, regulation of finance, industry, commerce, etc.

At present there exists no definite body for the appointment of such representatives by each State. But I am convinced that a completely satisfactory method can be easily devised in each country. At all events, such a body would in this

imperfect world of ours, approach nearest to guaranteeing impartiality and would command more confidence than any other body which we can conceive.

One word about the police force. Following on relative disarmament, an international police force of the most effective order in respect of modern warfare (military, naval and aerial), consisting, not of quotas from separate nationalities, but of one complete force enlisted from those who naturally and by preference choose the profession of arms, would concentrate at the seat of the supernational tribunal, under its immediate sovereignty, administered by sub-committees and chosen officials. There would also be local centres in various parts of the world, brought into immediate touch with headquarters by means of wireless telegraphy, to act with promptness when any necessity of enforcing the decisions of the tribunal arose. From the economical point of view the cost of armament for each nation, following the modern industrial precedent of "pooling," would be reduced to a minimum.

With the sanction given by all sovereign States to this supernational body for the settlement of purely international affairs, there would be no incursion into the sovereignty of any state in its internal affairs, with two exceptions. First, that the people of every nation be informed of all decisions and pronouncements of the tribunal, and that errors and deliberate misstatements published in any State be effectively contradicted and, secondly, that the accredited agents of the tribunal in each State effectively guard against clandestine armament of such a State, so that immediate steps could be taken to suppress any prospective disturbance of the peace. These two conditions are essential to the practical working of such a scheme.

It will also be realised that in the distant future the invasion of civilised countries by vastly superior hordes of inferior nationalities would be efficiently counteracted. For the claims of such nationalities would be met with fairness, even in the most complicated cases, demanding the highest wisdom and equity. Initial grievances and suspicion would be removed from the outset, while the united forces of civilised nations would be concentrated in their moral adhesion to the decisions of a supernational body uniting them all. Meanwhile the adjustment of immediate problems by agreement

between a group of leading Powers, such as the understanding on naval armaments, advocated by the writer of the article in the *Metropolitan Magazine*, on the part of Great Britain, the United States and Japan, might pave the way to further and more thoroughly and universally organised understanding in an efficient League of Nations.

National Service with intensive armament or an effective League of Nations—there is no other alternative.

The real decision at this moment lies with the United States. The World-Hercules now stands blindfolded in his strength between Irene and Bellona. It rests with America to which of the two goddesses she will turn him for guidance.

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